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PRIVATE DIARY

OF

GENERAL SIR ROBERT WILSON, C.M.T.,

&c. &c. &c.

VOLUME II.

PRIVATE DIARY

OF

TRAVELS, PERSONAL SERVICES, AND PUBLIC EVENTS,

DURING MISSION AND EMPLOYMENT WITH THE EUROPEAN ARMIES IN THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1812, 1813, 1814.

FROM THE INVASION OF RUSSIA TO THE CAPTURE OF PARIS.

£8539

BY GEN$^{L.}$ SIR ROBERT WILSON, C.M.T.,

BARON OF THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE; G.C.ST.A. OF RUSSIA; K.C.ST.G. OF RUSSIA; G.C.R.E. OF PRUSSIA, ETC. ETC. ETC.

EDITED BY HIS NEPHEW AND SON-IN-LAW,

THE REV. HERBERT RANDOLPH, M.A.,

OF BALLIOL COLLEGE, OXFORD.

IN TWO VOLUMES.—VOL. II.

LONDON:

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CONTENTS OF VOL. II

	Page
Report I. to Lord Cathcart ..	2
Report II. to Lord Cathcart ..	3
Journal continued—Fragment	6
Retreat across the Elbe ..	*ib.*
The Russians under Fire ..	7
A neglected Wound	8
Curious Letter of Regnier ..	9
Report to Lord Cathcart ..	10
Journal resumed	12
Doubtful position of Austria	14
Flag of Truce	15
Demands of the Allies	16
Important position maintained	17
Narrow escapes	18
Imperial recognition of Services	19
Under heavy Fire	20
Count Osterman wounded ..	21
Action at Reichenbach	22
Görlitz evacuated	23
Memorandum of the Battle of Bautzen	23—32
Prospects of Peace	32
Imperial recognition of Services	33
A gratifying Tribute	34
Affectionate greetings	35
Labour ill applied	36
Domestic arrangements	37
Necessity for an Armistice ..	38
A Political Courtship	39
Armistice concluded	40
Pacific dispositions	41
Lord Cathcart's Illusions ..	42
Real state of the case	43
Position of Prussia	44
Prospects of Russia	45
Russia's true Interest	46
Best Policy for England ..	47
Martial capabilities of Russians	48
Petty Jealousy	49
A short-sighted Policy	50
Berlin—Restricted Society ..	51
Cheerless Journey to Stettin ..	52
Damm—Colberg	53
Reconnaissance in Rough Weather	54
Visit of the Duke of Wurtemberg	55
Illness of the Duke	56
An unwilling Prince-Bishop ..	57
Generosity under disappointment	58
Warsaw — Political Conversazione	59
Countess Potoski—Costly Necklace	60
Dissensions of Russian Chiefs ..	61
Interview with the King of Prussia	62
Great Influence of France ..	63
Reichenbach—Gloomy Weather	64
Rousseau's opinion of the English	65
Berlin—Pleasing Réunion ..	66
Early reminiscence	67
Strehlen—Perilous Journey ..	68
Buonaparte on the Spanish Defeat	69
A brilliant Assembly	70
A Neptunian Court	71
Attractions of Landeck	72
Madame Orsinew, the Poisoner	73
Stewart's opinion of Bernadotte	74

	Page
General anticipation of War ..	75
Isolated feelings of Austria ..	76
Second visit to 'Arcadia' ..	77
The Armistice prolonged ..	78
Impotence of the Prussian Monarch	79
Austria's Declaration of War ..	80
Character of Czartorysky ..	81
The Duke of Cumberland's arrival	82
Josephstadt—Konigingratz ..	83
Grand Review near Prague ..	84
Conversation with Radetsky ..	85
Question of Command	86
Buonaparte's anticipations ..	87
Visit to the Grand-Duchess Catherine	88
Rough March to Marienberg ..	89
Action before Dresden	90
Gallant Attack on a Redoubt	91
The Redoubt captured	92
Retreating into the Lion's Jaws	93
Intrepidity of the Austrians ..	94
A Narrow Escape	95
Strehlen needlessly abandoned	96
Moreau severely wounded ..	97
Retreat determined on	98
Miseries and Losses en route ..	99
A difficult Defile	100
The Prussian Column in Danger	101
Brilliant Affair at Kraupen ..	102
Another Repulse to the Enemy	103
Stewart wounded	104
Humanity ill-requited	105
Recovery of the Prussian Artillery	106
Causes of Kleist's Misadventure	107
Reported Victory of Blucher ..	108
Degradation of Vandamme ..	109
The Duke of Cumberland's Affability	110
Buonaparte at Bautzen	111
Extent of the Allied Losses ..	112
Proposed Check to Buonaparte	113
Favourable State of the Troops	114
General desire for Peace ..	115
Perfidy of Murat	116
Unexpected recognition of Services	117
Death of Moreau	118
Character of Lord Aberdeen ..	119
A Scene of Devastation	120
Quarters in an Episcopal Palace	121
Experiments with Hand-grenades	122
Influence of Public Writers ..	123
Surprise by the Enemy	124
Exaggerated Reports of Successes	125
Reconnaissance by Schwarzenberg	126
Schwarzenberg's Military Character	127
Buonaparte's Notions of Peace	128
Movements and Reports	129
Anecdotes of Buonaparte ..	130
Repulse of the Enemy	131
Retreat of the Enemy	132
Prospects of the Allies	133
French Vestiges at Peterswaldo	134
Plans and Prospects	135
Successes at Freyburg and Dantzic	136
Estimated Allied Losses ..	137
Relative Power of the Armies	138
The Elbe passed by Buonaparte	139
A Reconciliation accomplished	140
Russian Coronation Fête ..	141
Order of the Red Eagle	142
Russian Banquet to the English	144
Metternich and the "Suppressio Veri"	145
Honesty the best Policy ..	146
Well-earned Decorations ..	147
Important Diplomatic News ..	148
Buonaparte's amicable Proposals	149
Necessity for effecting Peace ..	150
The Enemy's Dispositions ..	151
Beningsen's Opinion of Affairs	152
Alexander's Reply to Napoleon	153
Flattering Imperial Testimonial	154
Needless Hazard of the Russians	155
Napoleon, Talleyrand, and Berthier	156

	Page
Accession of Bavaria	157
Treaty of Russia, Austria, and Prussia	158
A Herald in strange Plight ..	159
Situation of the Crown Prince	160
Resentment of the Crown Prince	161
Favourable Position of the Enemy	162
Difficulties of the Allies ..	163
Buonaparte and Ney	164
Pillaging by the Cossacks ..	165
Memorandum of the Battle of Leipsic	165—170
Letter to Lord Cathcart	170
Protocol to Lord Aberdeen ..	171
Detail of the Battle of Leipsic	174
The Enemy in Retreat	176
An honourable Reception ..	177
Buonaparte's Military Reputation	178
Policy of accepting Buonaparte's Terms	179
Alexander's amende honorable	180
Allied Losses at Leipsic ..	181
Diplomatic Jockeying	182
Misrepresentations and Misadventures	183
Necessity for united Action ..	184
True Position of the Belligerents	185
Ill-organization of the Swedes	186
Encomiums of the Emperor Francis	187
A Critical Epoch	188
Concentration is real Force ..	189
Vicissitudes must be allowed for	190
Sufferings from Pillage	191
Movements and Counter-movements	192
Increasing necessity for Peace	193
Austria and the Saxon Contingent	194
Sir R. Wilson's confidential Position	195
Proposed Exchange of Prisoners	196
Schwarzenberg's Difficulties ..	197
Position of Austria	198
Buonaparte's Prospects	199
Visit to the Duke of Gotha ..	200
Letter from Lord Castlereagh	201
Disadvantageous diplomatic Change	202
Anecdotes of the Crown Prince	203
Character of the Duke of Gotha	204
Loss through a careless Servant	205
Buonaparte's Leipsic bulletins	206
Proposed Negotiations for Peace	207
Action of General Wrede ..	208
Curious intercepted Papers ..	209
The Theresan Collar	210
Napoleon favoured by Fortune	211
Buonaparte and Prince Sulkowsky	212
Buonaparte's Speech to the Poles	213
The Prince-Marshal's "Name-Day"	214
Injury done by the Cossacks ..	215
Conversation with Metternich	216
Reception of the Emperor Francis	217
Discontent in France	218
Meeting with Lord Burghersh	219
A gratifying Retrospect	220
Derogatory Treatment	221
A characteristic Farewell ..	222
Letters of Lord Aberdeen	223, 224
Proposed basis of Peace	225
Elastic power of France	226
Opinions on Sir R. Wilson's removal	227
Sentiments of the Emperor Alexander	228
A Prussian "mauvais sujet" ..	229
Tardiness of the British Government	230
Metternich's "Jour de nom"	231
Sir R. Wilson's Toast	232
Conversation with Count Nesselrode	233
Prospect of the Italian Mission	234
Napoleon's Reply to the Proposals	235
Scope of Buonaparte's Reply ..	236
Cathcart reduced to a nonentity	237

	Page
Return of Aberdeen to England	238
Quarrel of the Turks and Russians	239
Sir R. Wilson's Letter to his Brother	240
Sir R. Wilson's Prognostications	241
Proposed Mission to Switzerland	242
Increasing strength of Buonaparte	243
Compliment from the Russian Emperor	244
The Moscow Medal	245
John Bull honest but not wise	246
Lord Lansdowne on Public Life	247
Memoranda of the Autumn Campaign of 1813	247—261
Scheme of a Swiss Campaign	262
Wellington and the Theresan Order	263
Civilians with Military "Orders"	264
Basis of Peace accepted	265
Swiss Campaign deferred	266
Question of the Italian Mission	267
Elevation of Cathcart and Stewart	268
Sir R. Wilson's difficult Position	269
Carlsruhe—Freyburg	270
Proposal to cross the Rhine	271
Swiss Accession—Murat's Proposition	272
Potency of Money	273
Movements in Switzerland	274
Threatened Rupture with Sweden	275
Murat's perfidy towards Buonaparte	276
Basle—a Perilous Passage	277
Siege of Huningen imminent	278
Notification of Mission to Italy	279
Siege of Huningen—Wrede's inefficiency	280
Condition of France	281
Private Letter from Sir R. Wilson	282
Bombardment of Huningen	283
Freyburg—Soirée at Stadion's	284
Decadent Fortunes of the Allies	285
Accession of Political Difficulties	286
An Imperial Dinner-party	287
Taking leave of the Russian Emperor	288
Letter from the Russian Emperor	289
Unbought Testimonies	290
Last visit at Stadion's	291
Letter from Schwarzenberg	292
In the Trenches before Basle	293
Altkirch—condition of Alsace	294
Letter from Prince Metternich	295
Vicenza—an Alpine journey	296
Cordial reception by Bellegarde	297
Inclemency of the Season	298
Prevalence of Sickness	299
The Opera—the "Rotunda"	300
Character of Marshal Bellegarde	301
Inactivity of the Allies	302
Padua—Enemy on the alert	303
Anticipations and Prophecies	304
Retreat of the Enemy	305
Impending Downfall of Murat	306
Military Movements in Italy	307
A suppressed 'Moniteur'	308
Villa Franca—Valeggio	309
Letter from Sir J. Graham	310
Valeggio—running the gauntlet	311
Batch of unfavourable News	312
Victory of Brienne	313
Schwarzenberg's opinion of Affairs	314
Antipathy of the Italians	315
The Allies on the Defensive	316
Consequences of Murat's Defection	317
An Amazon Duchess	318
Communications ignored by Castlereagh	319
Resolution to dethrone Buonaparte	320
Battalion of S. Julien	321
Rural devastation — Austrian Forces	322
French Forces in Italy	323
Wilson's Determination to resign	324

	Page
Prospect of the Capture of Paris	325
The Invasion of France	326
The French Bulletins	327
French Operations in Italy ..	328
Bad news from France	329
Nugent's Venture and Defeat..	330
Nugent's account of his Defeat	331
Inclemency of the Weather ..	332
Verona—Untoward Accident ..	333
Count Bergen's Budget	334
Buonaparte's notions of Peace..	335
Situation of Schwarzenberg and Blucher	336
Disorganized state of the Allies	337
Humility of Beauharnois' ..	338
Threatened War with Turkey..	339
Murat and Wilson	340
Timidity of Murat	341
Proposed Alliance with Murat	342
Interview with Murat	343
Murat at the Opera	344
Murat as Host	345
Entry of the Pope at Bologna	346
Murat's Ultimatum..	347
Ratification unjustly delayed ..	348
Uncourteous note of Bentinck	349
Procès Verbal of Murat	350
Padua—Meeting with Bellegarde	351
News of the Capture of Paris ..	352
Excitement at the French News	353
Proposed Surrender of Italy ..	354
Abdication of Buonaparte ..	355
Prospects of France..	356
Buonaparte's benefits to Italy	357
Soirée with Beauharnois.. ..	358
Fall of Genoa	359
Condition of Italy	360
Dinner with Prince Eugène ..	361
Italian sympathy with Napoleon	362
Compensations in Buonaparte's rule	363
Desire for Independence	364
Milan—Government Establishments	365
Evils of the Pope's Restoration	366
The Lions of Milan..	367
Prospects of Italy	368
Buonaparte sent to Elba.. ..	369
Question of Italian Independence	370
Depression of the Italians ..	371
Murat a Constitutional Sovereign	372
Napoleon at Elba	373
Imperial state at Elba	374
Genoa "La Superba"	375
Fortifications of Genoa	376
Question of the Surrender of Paris	377
Cause of the Norwegians ..	378
Inspection of Alessandria ..	379
Castlereagh and the Italian Deputation	380
Tendency to Buonapartist reaction	382
Monza—the Iron Crown ..	383
Public Establishments at Monza	384
Works of Art	385
Camolli's bust of Napoleon ..	386
Turin — interview with the King	387
Meeting with Count Bubna ..	388
The Conditions of Peace ..	389
Milan — Discontent of the Italians..	390
Sir Humphry and Lady Davy	391
Como—Lake Maggiore	392
Geneva—Absurd Regulations	393
Basle—Huningen—Strasburg	394
Antipathy engendered by the Austrians	395
Gracious Reception by Alexander	396
Alexander's Opinions of the English..	397
Popularity of Buonaparte ..	398
Paris—Hall of Deputies ..	399
The Museums — Malmaison— St. Denis	400
Vincennes—Social Restraint ..	401
Unpopularity of the French Marshals	402

APPENDIX.

LETTERS, &c.

		Page
1.—	The Duke of Gloucester to Sir Robert Wilson	405
2.—		408
3.—	Sir Robert Wilson to the Duke of Gloucester	413
4.—	The Duke of Gloucester to Sir Robert Wilson	417
5.—		419
6.—	Robert Liston, Esq., to Sir Robert Wilson	422
7.—		424
8.—	The Duke of Oldenburg to Sir Robert Wilson	425
9.—	Count Metternich to Sir Robert Wilson	427
10.—	Prince Czartoryski to Sir Robert Wilson	428
11.—	Sir Robert Wilson to Lord Aberdeen	430
12.—		434
	Fragment	436
13.—	Sir Robert Wilson to Lord Aberdeen	437
14.—		439
15.—		442
16.—		445
17.—		446
18.—		447
19.—		449
20.—		451
21.—		453
22.—		456
23.—		458
24.—	Captain Charles to Sir Robert Wilson	462
25.—	Sir Robert Wilson to Lord Aberdeen	463
26.—		465
27.—		468
28.—		470
29.—		472
30.—		474
31.—		476
32.—		477
33.—		479
34.—		482
35.—		485
36.—		486
37.—	Lord Aberdeen to Sir Robert Wilson	487
38.—	Sir Robert Wilson to Lord Castlereagh	*ib.*

ERRATA.—VOL. II.

Page	*Line*	*For*	*Read*
13	4, &c.	Stuart	Stewart, *passim.*
40	32, &c.	Katsbach	Katzbach, *passim.*
52 Heading and	8, &c.	Damin	Damm, *passim.*
159	9	Queensbury	Queensberry.
174	16	Holyhaum	Holzhausen.
—	—	Zukelbaum	Zuckelhausen.
239	21	Ports	Posts.
409.	20	I plan	Plan I.

ADDITIONAL ERRATA

FOR

SIR R. WILSON'S DIARY, VOL. II.

Page	*Line*	*For*	*Read*
21	11	à la blanche	à l'arme blanche.
146	3 & 20,	Ramus	Kraus.
213	13	la commandement ..	le commandement.
229	19	néfiant	méfiant.

PRIVATE DIARY

OF

GENERAL SIR ROBERT WILSON,

C.M.T., &c. &c. &c.

DURING HIS MISSIONS AND EMPLOYMENT IN 1812, 1813, 1814,

IN

TURKEY, RUSSIA, GERMANY, AND ITALY.

Report I.—Sir Robert Wilson to Lord Viscount Cathcart.

Camp in front of Wilsdruf,
8 o'clock, P.M., May 7th, 1813.

My Lord,

I have the honour to acquaint you that the enemy this day attacked General Milaradowitch's advanced posts, and obliged his corps to retire fully upon the position in front of Wilsdruf, by menacing to turn the general's right flank; but fortunately he did not press much in front, or there would have been loss in the passage of the very long and difficult defile.

The prisoners say it is Marshal Beauharnois' corps and that there are other troops moving on the right and left flanks.

From the columns which I saw, and the bivouac fires of this night, I conceive that there cannot be less than thirty thousand men between Nossen and our position.

General Milaradowitch may be able to keep his position on the ground beyond Wilsdruf to-morrow; but I expect the enemy to make a serious attack unless he

wishes to induce our continuation on this side of the Elbe, while others of his corps are manœuvring on the right flank, &c. &c. &c.

The heavy rains have rendered the ground to the right and left of the high-road almost impracticable.

Neustadt, Dresden, } May 8th, 1813.

This morning at four o'clock the order was received for the retreat of General Milaradowitch's corps across the Elbe. The enemy, who had in the night debouched through the long defile in front of Wilsdruf, followed the rear-guard, but the passage was effected without the loss of a single carriage or a man of the corps. The town bridge and the bridge on the left of the town were burnt, and the bridge on the right of the town cut away and brought over to the right bank before the enemy could bring down any force. When the advanced parties appeared the Russian cannon played upon them, and there has been at intervals a partial tiraillade from both sides of the river. The cavalry which had been stationed at Freyburg had, on the night of the 7th, been attacked by a Bavarian corps which now occupies the villages on the right hand.

It is probable that the enemy did not press on the previous day in the hope of this corps being unable to force the Freyburg route and act on the left flank and rear of General Milaradowitch's corps.

The King of Prussia was on the bridge almost at the moment of its being burnt.

To the last instant the inhabitants of Dresden showed the most friendly disposition, and very many

felt great distress at the prospect of being again under the French yoke.

The importance of cultivating this good-will must be generally admitted, and I trust that such commissariat arrangements will be made in any future movements as will remove every pretext for disorders which still exist.

I should think that the enemy will endeavour to pass the Elbe without awaiting the necessity of our retreat from other movements; and I should imagine, from the number of troops thrown upon his right, that he will attempt the passage in that direction.

(Signed) R. W.

May 8th.

This morning at daybreak the enemy fired grape upon the sentinels who were on the bridge to observe the ruined arch, and wounded one man; but in every other quarter all is quiet. The French gun was placed on the wall near the theatres.

It is reported that the enemy's pontoons are at Pilnitz.

I send your Lordship a king's messenger, whom I found in great distress at the moment of the town's evacuation from the want of aid for his removal.

R. W.

REPORT II.—SIR ROBERT WILSON TO LORD VISCOUNT CATHCART.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to acquaint you that about 4 P.M. the Russian guns were ordered to withdraw from the

unequal combat which they had so heroically sustained, and the troops were directed to desist from action, as further efforts to prevent the passage with General Milaradowitch's means were deemed an useless expenditure of brave men.

General Milaradowitch, conceiving that he had orders to withdraw on the Torgau route in case of being forced upon his right, directed the immediate evacuation of the New Town and the concentration of his troops at Reichenbach.

This order was executed to the retreat of the last guards, when, having taken the route to Radeberg that I might see Count Wittgenstein, I had the good fortune to meet General Diebitch, who was advancing with a grenadier's division to sustain General Milaradowitch: hearing my account, he sent off officers, who by great expedition reached the town in time to prevent the last guards being removed, and to bring back General S. Priest, who with his force had marched two wersts.

Count Wittgenstein himself subsequently came to the Neustadt and proceeded to reconnoitre the ground where the enemy had lodged themselves near Mugeln. Here His Excellency directed the posts to be maintained until this morning, which order was complied with, and the retreat on the Bischoffswerda road effected without any loss or inconvenience from the enemy, who had, however, been all night working at a battery to command the road.

The enemy entered the Neustadt from the city of Dresden in small punts early in the morning.

The loss of the enemy in the action of the day before must have been severe, as the tirailleurs

were much exposed. The Russian loss could not be less than six hundred men, and many horse-artillery officers and men were among the number.

I am sorry to be obliged to observe to your Lordship that the Russian force is daily rapidly diminishing. The battalions are too weak for duty, and they waste without extraordinary casualties. The whole effective strength of the Russian army now under the command of Count Wittgenstein, exclusive of General Barclay's corps and five thousand convalescents which Prince Wolkonsky assures me joined yesterday, does not amount to thirty-six thousand men, all descriptions of force included.

The general spirit is, I am also very much grieved to note, unfavourable to those exertions and sacrifices which the exigency of the time requires.

The Emperor's attention cannot be too early or too strongly turned to the subject.

Men will always be influenced by the tone of their chiefs, and retreats are in their own nature calculated to produce disorder and insubordination.

I presume that your Lordship has seen General Regnier's letter to the Governor of Torgau, which commences with a falsehood that would almost dishonour a 'Moniteur.'

I have the honour to be,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

(Signed) ROBERT WILSON.

Yesterday the enemy certainly marched the greatest part of his Dresden forces on the Meissen route, and I was positively assured that a corps was passing at Wit-

tenberg, and Marshal Ney's corps at Muhlberg. He cannot, I think, for forty-eight hours pass on the Bautzen road with any force to harass the rear-guard.

May 10th, 1813, Bischoffswerda.

[FRAGMENT.]

At four o'clock we received an order to retire from Wilsdruf and pass the Elbe. The execution of this service was very creditable to the Russians, but much otherwise to the enemy. The commander must have very little confidence in his troops, or he would certainly not have been so cautious at the last moment. His previous forbearance was to be accounted for by the hope of the Bavarian corps getting in our rear.

The temporary bridges were burnt and removed without difficulty; but the principal bridge of the town, which Davoust had destroyed, and which had been repaired by a wooden arch, did not consume so rapidly as could be wished.

Fortunately the horses were stopped and the traces cut at the foot of the bridge.

I was desiring the sentry at the furthest ridge of the broken arch not to fire when the French entered, and several of their dragoons galloped forward into the great *place* opposite the palace and sent their balls at our heads. I was determined on revenge for such an unhandsome proceeding, and soon had it; for I mounted a 12-pounder on a ruined bastion of the New Town, and, having a skilful artillery-officer, the first shot fell among a mass of persons riding in confiding

complacency along the water-side; and the second and third with shells fell into the midst of a body of cavalry, who flew in all directions.

* * *
* * *

[Advised * * * * and] that the whole should be brought away dead or alive that we might be sure there was not one left to effect his purposed mischief.

This counsel was adopted too late: the men were strongly lodged, and every moment covering cannon were brought up. It was a terrible fire of artillery. It did not seem that an insect could live in the concave; and yet the Russian artillery remained immoveable, abiding the pelting of the iron shower without relaxing a moment from their efforts and duties. I carried up the battery of Colonel Maliar and placed it, where it pained me to do so, but

* * * * *
* * * * *

* * from my report has recommended both officers for the order of St. George, and they will honour the badge.

I refer to my military reports for the further operations. I was very angry at the order for retreat before night, as I thought it discreditable and unnecessary, and am glad to have assisted in counteracting it.

The appointment of Wittgenstein, who is a younger officer, occasions great jealousy, and the whole army, from this and other causes, is disorganizing. It is a pity: Wittgenstein is a valuable executive officer, and perhaps the best. Russia has no chief. Unfortunately in Russia there is great selfishness in men engaged in the

public service; and the defects of government institutions are sensibly felt to the prejudice of the public interests—by this cause the motives of action are contracted not expanded, individualised not nationalised.

I have suggested in the proper quarter what ought to be done to secure the restoration of a necessary spirit of perseverance in this struggle.

Last night was a very uneasy one: there were sharp cannonades occasionally, but the enemy made no attack. They had in the morning prepared to put ladders for workmen into the broken arch, but I planted a gun, which by the first discharge with grape made all the survivors ascend with expedition.

This morning we mounted at daybreak, and being wearied to a degree which I scarcely ever experienced before, and suffering some pain from a blow which a piece of bursting shell gave me on my shin bone at the close of the battle of Lutzen, I determined to come on here after I was certain that the army could not advance against General Milaradowitch to harass him this day. Tomorrow he comes here, and I wish to receive him. My leg has been dressed. From neglect and great exercise it has suppurated a little, but like my ankle it will proceed, while I am at work, on its cure. I did not mention the accident before, as I was afraid of giving uneasiness, and I really attached no importance to the laceration which it occasioned. Now I can note it, because there is self-evident proof from the elapsed time that there is no serious injury. It was just as I was leading the Prussian and Russian battalions to resist the French attack that I was hit.

It was a momentary severe sensation; but this passed, leaving only an aching pain that continued. On first looking at the leg, there appeared a swelling, and the flesh was cut. If I could have laid still a week I should have been well without any inconvenience: now it will take me a fortnight, and a little more punishment from inflammation; but vinegar and water will soon conquer its anger.

On my coming here I was shown a curious letter from General Regnier to General Thielmann, Governor of Torgau. Regnier states that Buonaparte had entered Dresden; that the fire on the bridge had been extinguished, and that the French troops occupied the New Town; that the King of Prussia had fled with 36,000 men, but whether to Berlin or Silesia was not known. He then tells the General that it would be more convenient for the French to pass by Torgau than by Wittenberg or Muhlburg; that the King of Saxony can have the part of Silesia which divides the Duchy from Saxony; and that General Thielmann's conduct is greatly injurious to the King's interests. Thielmann answers that he is only a soldier and does not know what are the engagements which his master has lately entered into *with the Emperor of Austria;* but that he is resolved to obey his orders and let no troops pass through his fortress; that he does not know the route which the King had taken, and which General Regnier wished to know; and that he communicates his letter, which is very injurious and sarcastic, to the Emperor, adding that the Allies may count upon Torgau as a point d'appui for their operations. The army marches to-morrow to Bautzen. There are many offensive projects in agitation, but I

fear we have not the means to fight and cut down the difficulties of our position.

We may reduce the enemy by active operations with our cavalry, but we must evade with the main force desperate extremities until we are very much reinforced. It is of importance to show to Europe that the Allies have the power and the will to continue the war. This mode of proceeding will, I think, eventually engage Austria, and if there be but wisdom enough to make terms with the Poles, Buonaparte's power in Germany will not endure; but this policy requires many sacrifices which Russia, I fear, will not make with a good grace, although she may lose that which would preserve the rest.

The King of Prussia is much to be pitied. He is really a stout fellow, which is a rude but expressive compliment; and his troops fought with a courage which redeems all their ancient character, and engages the deepest interest for their success.

SIR ROBERT WILSON TO LORD VISCOUNT CATHCART.

MY LORD, 14th May, Bautzen...

I have the honour to inform you that the enemy on the 12th advanced from Weissenkirsch and engaged the rear-guard of General Milaradowitch. The enemy's columns, in their advance to Bischoffswerda, were frequently much exposed to the Prussian artillery, and suffered considerably; but the enemy ultimately occupied Bischoffswerda (which had been fired at this side of the town by some shells) and the wood which

continues for about two wersts on the road to Bautzen. The French Marshal Macdonald commanded. He had a considerable artillery with him, and his infantry showed very good countenance; but he kept his cavalry quite retired.

On the preceding day the enemy advanced to Moritzberg in great force and obliged the Prussian corps of General Kleist to retire on Königsbruck, which the enemy afterwards occupied. The Prussian loss was very trifling, not exceeding a hundred and thirty men and two officers.

The advance-guard of General Milaradowitch has been relieved by the corps under the command of the Prince of Wurtemberg, which is a very useful arrangement.

Captain ———, who was taken at Dantzic as a spy, is arrived here. This officer assures me that at Dantzic there was a garrison of thirty-five thousand men when he first entered the place, but the mortality has been great.

I write this intelligence more particularly to your Lordship, as your Lordship mentioned at Kalish that my original estimate of the Dantzic garrison at thirty thousand men was considered as much overrated.

14*th*.—This day the enemy made no movement; but two hundred prisoners, chiefly recruits of three or four months' service, were sent in by the Cossacks, who had taken them in patrole in the neighbourhood of Königsbruck.

15*th*.—This morning the enemy advanced, and General Milaradowitch's rear-guard retired behind the Spree; but his cavalry took several opportunities of charging detached columns in the open ground, and

with success. The enemy made some dispositions to force the Spree, but, seeing the ground about Bautzen strongly occupied, they retired to the heights about a cannon-shot distant.

16*th*.—The enemy now remained quiet in front, but an intelligent prisoner has reported that Buonaparte is in the camp on the height opposite this town with his guards, Marshal Marmont's corps, and the whole of Marshal Beauharnois' corps. He adds that Buonaparte intended to have attacked this morning, but his cavalry was not up.

It is not probable that the enemy, if he dislodges the advance-guard from Bautzen, which he can do without great difficulty, would make a front attack on the position of the Allied Army; but it appears to me, after a repeated examination of the intervening ground, that he would find favourable lodgments for his infantry in progress to the entrenchments.

I have the honour to be

Your Lordship's most obedient, &c. &c.

ROBERT WILSON.

May 14th, Bautzen.

ON the 12th the enemy attacked Milaradowitch at Weissenkirsch. They showed great intrepidity, and advanced against grape fire very frequently: but latterly they were driven from the open ground, and obliged to gain the woods on their right, where they manœuvred so successfully as to dislodge the Russians from the position which covered Bischoffswerda, and obliged them finally to evacuate the town. There

was also a subsequent very severe contest to gain the wood in front of Bautzen, in which the enemy succeeded by a superior fire of artillery.

During this affair Stuart joined us in the field. When it was terminated I went into Bautzen to nurse my leg, and lodged with Stuart in the bishop's palace.

The 13th was quiet. The army had on the 12th moved into the celebrated position of Hochkirch, and the Emperor was lodged in the same house in which Daun slept after his victory, and which still retains shot-hole memoranda of the action. This day the enemy have made no movement, but two hundred prisoners, taken by the Cossacks on the Königsbruck road, were sent in. They were Bavarians, Spaniards, Croats, and Tyrolese of Macdonald's corps—mostly soldiers of three and four months. The Emperor sent his surgeon to dress my leg; but Count Wittgenstein's surgeon has regularly attended, and if I had been an obedient patient, inflammation and suppuration would have ceased. But the exercise I take only protracts cure and gives me pain; it causes no danger: I suffer the evil therefore to obtain the good, and shall not regret the inconveniences I endure to maintain my post.

15*th*.—This morning the enemy advanced, and General Milaradowitch fell back behind Bautzen, keeping the town and his advance behind the Spree River. The enemy lost a good many men in their progress by several successful cavalry charges, but still they gain ground and do not appear intimidated.

The French force is now posted within cannon-shot of the Spree; but their strength is not known: and

indeed, nothing is known of the movements of the enemy, except that a large column is advancing from Camenz, as I think, to Hoyerswerda, to turn our right; while the corps now opposite to us will march through the mountains on our left, as Daun did when he turned Frederick the Great.

Either movement will oblige us to quit the position of Hochkirch, and if Austria does not join immediately, the sooner we pass the Oder, in my opinion, the better.

Count Stadion has arrived at head-quarters, but I do not think, from what I hear and observe, that Austria is about to declare war on the part of the allies, although she is desirous of doing them service.

The Swedes seem to have totally withdrawn from co-operation, and Denmark has been playing the game that I surmised her to be meditating when I first mentioned her propositions.

By Stuart's society I have been made *au fait* of all that has been going on at home; and I do not know that I ever passed a more agreeable couple of days.

I have just received intelligence that a Russian officer is going to England. Not five minutes is allowed me to write. I therefore abruptly send what is ready, but not all, for I have various letters which I wished to forward, but I am doubtful of the mode of conveyance.

May 20, Graditz.

On the 18th the enemy made a show of movement which disturbed us early, but they returned to their position without action. In the evening I rode to see Sir C. Stuart at this place, but he had gone to Gorlitz. I however remained in his quarters, and he returned

in the night. Yesterday Barclay de Tolly, Yorck, and Kleist, with a force of about thirty thousand men moved to Königswerda and attacked Lauriston with success; but the enemy, having information of his design, detached from Ney's corps a force which fell upon Yorck and resisted his progress with a loss of two thousand men.

Hearing the cannonade, Sir Charles Stuart and I rode out to Bautzen with Mr. Verner, who had just come from England on his way to Vienna; but the enemy in front of Bautzen only made a feint to disturb our attention and prevent any reinforcement being sent to Yorck, &c.

In the morning a flag of truce had been sent by the enemy to propose the passage of Caulaincourt to the Emperor; and at night there was a second flag on the same subject. The answer was that all propositions must be sent through Austria in writing, or made to Austria direct, as she was the mediatrix of the allies.

General Milaradowitch, at Bautzen, told me that he had received the Emperor's commands to put in writing the services which I and my staff had rendered at the passage of the Elbe, and in the affairs of the rear-guard.

This communication gave me pleasure on account of others more than on my own. I am not ungrateful for intended royal favours; but I have more satisfaction in the consciousness than in the recompence of utility.

Last night I read Stadion's note. It will, I think, excite much displeasure in England, as she wishes, contrary in my opinion to her interests, to make a conjoint peace.

The answer of the allies is extravagant, but they are perhaps right to make huge demands in the first instance; I suspect, however, that in doing so they are favouring the protracting policy of Austria, who actually by Stadion dictated the pretensions. He was I know present when the answer was being penned.

Provided that Buonaparte permits continental traffic with England, the continent, that is the people, will quietly submit to his rule and not care about our private interests. The policy of England is always charged with self-love, and though our loans and gifts prove the contrary in the contracted sense of that term, we continue to displease by the mode of eking out our liberality; and the person whom we choose to represent our interests in the great crisis has invariably injured them by his manner of conducting the negotiations. This is no prejudiced opinion, but a positive fact broadly asserted everywhere by the *friends* and foes of our connection.

May 23rd, Gorlitz.

The last preceding three days have been replete with great incidents. I had scarcely finished my diary, and sent off some letters by Mr. Broughton, when a heavy cannonade on the right mounted Sir Charles, James, and myself. We rode forward and found that Barclay was vigorously attacked on the right, and that the action was commencing near Bautzen. When we arrived there, which we did, as the French would say, "*ventre à terre*," we found the left of our line in a warm fire, and that the enemy was passing the Spree on the right of Bautzen to take

the town in reverse, and act in the rear of Milaradowitch.

A battery on the hill, which ought to have covered the ground below, on which was a Russian battalion, was withdrawing from the enemy's fire upon it, and the battalion was also retiring.

In a few moments the enemy appeared on this side the river, and drove back rapidly all the tirailleurs, &c., who opposed. Not an instant was to be lost. The point was the key of the position of the advanced-guard, and the most prejudicial results must have been the consequence of its premature occupation.

Sir Charles agreed with my opinion. I brought back the guns and the retiring battalion. We then advanced at the head, caps in hand, and accompanied with loud cheers. The enemy fell back, but again we were obliged to retire by fresh succours sustaining the fugitives. Again and again we rallied and charged; and finding about forty Prussian lancers we dashed in among the enemy's infantry, while our own pressed forward to help our inferiority. The enemy threw their fire upon us before they gave way, and in flying singed us; but we were revenged. It was my lot to strike the arms out of three men's hands; one at the level, whom a Russian Yager instantly stabbed with the bayonet. A few were spared—a good many taken; and if we could have procured but one squadron, I would have engaged for at least five hundred prisoners. The importance of the success was not, however, to be measured by the numbers slain or taken. It was the preservation of the ground that was of chief moment; and that was saved until Kleist was enabled to reinforce the point with guns, infantry,

and cavalry: here he gloriously maintained himself for some hours against all the enemy's multiplied and powerful attempts to batter and storm him from the post.

It was hot work: little more than pistol-shot distance for near two hours; and considering that we were conspicuous *à cheval*, and in glittering kits, it is wonderful that no marksman fired with unerring aim; but this is another proof that "Every bullet has its billet."

The rest of the day I was here, there, and everywhere; but as this is more a personal than a general diary—for I have made a separate memorandum of the military occurrences—I must note two occasions of some interest. The first was that when in the evening I was on the battery of the conical hill at the right of our position—which the enemy took the next day—we were collected en masse as spectators, and the enemy, seeing the group, directed the fire of a battery against the height: every shot struck, and many persons were killed and wounded around the Sovereigns. As they were retiring I remained to look at the enemy's motions after such a fire, and three Prussian officers were seated in the battery: a ball came and struck the earth under my horse's girth, and passed thus completely under him. The animal I thought would have shaken to pieces with terror. The Prussian officers came to me and said, "Je vous felicite sur un tel coup de bonheur!" and in verity it was one. Colonel Campbell had his horse killed in the next battery by a cannon ball on the neck.

Second.—In the evening, when the French were endeavouring to force the mountains, the Emperor sent me to desire Milaradowitch to sustain himself

until the arrival of the guards and grenadiers who were ordered to repel the attack which, if successful, would have carried our main position. The troops were informed of the Emperor's wish, and in a short time I had the satisfaction of saying to the Emperor, that, with the use of his name, the enemy had been repulsed and driven down the mountain. He took me by the hand, grasped it in the most affectionate manner, and said the kindest and most gracious things, assuring me of his eternal friendship, although attempts had been made to estrange it. I knew by the hints he gave that it was not a *foreign* foe that had endeavoured to poison his mind. At night, I was told afterwards, notwithstanding all his anxieties and business for the morrow he descanted largely before many persons on the good service I had rendered, the exertions he had seen me make, and those which he knew I had made on every occasion without concern for my own person, but only for his interests.

The next morning at day-dawn we were again in the field; and Sir C. Stuart and myself keeping company we rode to see everything, and I was the bearer of many important communications from various points, particularly from Barclay in his extremity. This message first made the chiefs think of the question—whether they would retire or endeavour to retrieve the fortunes of the day? The Emperor seemed to wish for an offensive movement; but I could not help suggesting the question, whether, if successful, the recovered point could be maintained, or others equally important might not be lost by the removal of the troops? I had seen the enemy's superior force acting against us, and their redundant

force in movement to our line of communication. I thought it better to save the brave remains of an army than lose all, and with all our honour.

While this matter was under discussion, Blucher sent word that he was overpowered, and had ordered a retreat. There was then no option; but it was necessary to prevent confusion and preserve order. I begged of the Emperor to reinforce Kleist in the first instance, who still—but scarcely—held the post in the rear of our right, which commanded our line of retreat. The Emperor ordered me to march with the grenadier division, and lead them to the ground. I obeyed the order; but as soon as we began to descend the line, the enemy from the ground left by Blucher opened upon us at least eighty pieces of cannon, which played upon us for a mile and a half. *C'était un feu d'enfer;* but firmness was necessary: a bad example would have ruined our affairs.

When we had got to that distance, another order came for the grenadiers to take the road of Reichenbach by Hochkirch, and for Blucher's retiring force to sustain Kleist, which was done. Having escaped this pounding I went to Kleist who had occupied an old battery in front of Wurschen, and there I remained until all the troops had passed. It is surprising that the enemy did not attempt to molest the march, but they were satisfied with cheers of victory and a furious discharge of artillery. This was not permitted to pass altogether with impunity, for we opened a heavy fire, particularly from one battery of forty guns, and checked their cannon for half an hour. We did not lose a single gun or tumbril. Above six hundred pieces and eighteen hundred ammunition-waggons,

exclusive of regimental ammunition-waggons, were thus withdrawn in presence of the enemy. Is not this a strong proof of the respect which our conduct had imposed, and of Buonaparte's little confidence in his own people when employed in masses, except on ground much covered by wood where he can throw forward tirailleur swarms and support them by columns working their progress from point to point as in a game of chess? If he had advanced, he must have submitted the fortune of the day, thus partially his, *à la blanche*; and I am sure not one of the allies would have declined the challenge. The action lasted fourteen hours, during twelve of which we remained intact on our line. On the left we were completely successful throughout, and here the enemy suffered most considerable loss; but poor Osterman was shot through the neck, and the ball lodged in his back; yet this hero—for he really is one—kept his station for two hours, animating his men to efforts which obtained and preserved victory.

The scene with the Emperor, King, and Royal Family, was most truly affecting. Their gallant conduct, their firmness and self-possession, the dignity of their resignation, excited deep interest the impression of which can never be erased.

In the morning when I first saw Buonaparte, I prepared some guns for him; but the first law of nature operated too strongly upon him, and he was so skilful an artillerist as just to keep out of range both of shot and shell. He was, however, most distinctly visible to the naked eye.

When the sun set Sir Charles and I rode to Reichenbach, where we had a very poor lodging for the

night. The next morning Sir Charles went on to write his despatches, and I remained to make my Memorandum. I had just closed it when I heard a cannonade, and rode out to see the action, which was not yet begun in earnest, as the French infantry had not arrived. I was much pleased to see the good order of the troops forming the rear-guard. One would have supposed they were in review order, and had not yet entered upon the campaign instead of having fought in such a conflict within a few hours. The heights in front and in rear of Reichenbach afforded our position.

The object was to gain time, but of course not to maintain ourselves with ten thousand men against the whole French army. Buonaparte came in person with the troops, and directed the attack.

The cannonade was very heavy. After some time he threw some cavalry into the town, which were instantly charged and all put to the sword. The Russian infantry, however, fired and killed some of our own people in their eagerness to weaken the enemy. After an obstinate conflict, the enemy, by throwing troops on the different flanking heights, obliged us to leave the town, but the action did not diminish in violence.

Our guns, and particularly the Cossack artillery, kept up a heavy fire, and caused disorder in his columns.

As a coup de *Fou* rather than of a general, Buonaparte at last ordered his cavalry to charge round the hill on which our batteries on the left were placed. Eight hundred of the Imperial Guard, sustained by a regiment of lancers and about three thousand horse in reserve, made the desperate attempt.

Some Cossacks and hussars in advance fled before them; but a regiment of hussars charged down in flank, the others rallied, ran, bore on them, and in a few moments the enemy were rushing back with the loss of several hundred killed, wounded, and taken. Buonaparte then made another attempt of a different character, and with more success. He opened a battery of forty guns against our eight on the left, and in the same proportion against the others. This fire obliged us to fall back, and we occupied Reichenbach, but we had been detained till near night and could make no further progress. He had hoped to intercept Milaradowitch returning by Luckau on Reichenbach, to find his troops dispirited and in disorder, the train encumbered with fugitives, wounded, artillery, baggage, &c.; but in all this he failed, and did not find one single carriage of any description from the field of battle to his present ground. The next morning we leisurely returned but very slightly pressed. Yesterday we evacuated Gorlitz, and the enemy entered; but as he does not seem disposed to make any great efforts, I am come over to Count Wittgenstein, who has his quarters in the town, for the night.

I have done my duty to the Emperor and King in staying to the last, in encouraging by my language and example, and in aiding all in my power, but now I want myself two or three days' repose for several reasons.

MEMORANDUM OF THE BATTLE OF BAUTZEN, FOUGHT MAY 21ST, 1813.

On the 18th a courier had been intercepted, whose letters advised Marshal Macdonald of General Lauris-

ton's march to reinforce him with 9000 men from Luckau, in the position in front of Bautzen, where he had been kept in check several days.

General Barclay de Tolly, with the troops from Thorn, amounting in number to 13,000 men, having arrived the preceding day, was ordered to intercept this reinforcement; and as it was a service in which his left flank was exposed to Marshal Macdonald's corps, Generals Yorck and Kleist were ordered to support him.

The attack against General Lauriston, who was met at Königswalde, obtained a brilliant success with very trifling loss. Four generals, fifteen hundred prisoners, and six guns were the trophies of the enterprise, and many of the enemy were killed and many left wounded on the field.

The enemy, however, had obtained intelligence of the design of the Allies, and a detachment was made from Marshal Ney's corps on march to the Oder, which attacked General Yorck and occasioned him a severe loss (2000 men).

On the 20th the enemy, at about 10 in the morning, advanced from his position in front of Bautzen and attempted to force the Spree river.

General Milaradowitch, whose advanced guard was charged with the defence of Bautzen, had orders to evacuate the town and retire by his left into the intrenched position taken up by the Allies about three English miles in rear of Bautzen, in case of his being seriously attacked.

The enemy having opened a heavy artillery fire that flanked the troops posted on the Spree in the environs of Bautzen, and moved forward considerable

columns, General Milaradowitch, after some defence, ordered a retreat; but the enemy seeing this disposition, endeavoured to pass the Spree on the right of Bautzen, with the view of acting in the rear of General Milaradowitch's troops, and to possess themselves of a height whence they could sweep with their artillery very near to the main position.

For these purposes they threw their infantry across the Spree, but a Russian battalion and a few Prussian lancers—under cover of a battery brought up to the height which the enemy sought to gain by successive attacks—repulsed the troops which had passed, and maintained the ground until General Kleist could strongly occupy it.

The corps of General Yorck and General Barclay had not re-entered the position from their march against General Lauriston, when Count Wittgenstein heard of the enemy's first attempt to force the Spree. His Excellency therefore ordered Bautzen and the line of the river to be maintained, but the order did not anticipate the actual evacuation of Bautzen, and its recovery was not a practicable attempt by the advanced guard.

The enemy's principal efforts were at first directed against the height already noticed, which General Kleist maintained in the most gallant manner until near night when he was compelled to withdraw his batteries.

The enemy, towards the evening, had marched a strong force to gain the mountains on the left of the Allied position, through which Daun marched to the battle and victory of Hochkirch; but General Milaradowitch, who had withdrawn on that side from the

Spree, defeated all his efforts, which towards night had been very vigorous, whilst his detachments kept in check other columns which had attempted to pass between this ridge of mountains and Bohemia.

In the afternoon the enemy had also endeavoured to dislodge the Prussians from the right of their position by superior power of artillery, but they made no impression; and General Barclay, although attacked by General Lauriston on his retrograde march, regained his communication with General Yorck, who had entered the position early in the day.

During the night the Allied army retired from their advanced posts into their fortified position, except on the left where several batteries were pushed forward, protected by the infantry which occupied the woody mountains to a point on the ridge which projected into the low ground near the Spree. Some Cossack artillery also mounted the difficult crest of the ridge, and partizan corps were thrown across the mountains to watch the enemy, who had been moving on routes at the distance of from five to fifteen wersts beyond the mountains. The centre of the Allies was covered by a deep boggy rivulet, behind which field-works were constructed on favouring elevations, and in which a numerous artillery was established. The village of Burchwitz, on the right of the centre, was also entrenched, and the right of the position was appuied on the heights of Kreckwitz, behind which were three conical hills, and on these three batteries were placed. The left of the position was favourable to the enemy's force; the centre and right were strong, but the country beyond the right and in rear of its flank

was exactly of that *chicane* description which the enemy would desire as the best theatre for his troops. The extent of the position, from left to right, was about four English miles.

General Milaradowitch commanded the left. The troops which formerly composed Count Wittgenstein's army defended the centre. General Blucher was on the right, and behind him, in shelter and reserve, were the corps of Kleist and Yorck. General Barclay de Tolly was stationed at Malschwitz; but his corps must be considered rather as a corps of observation and manœuvre than one destined to assist in the defence of the position within its lines. The guards and grenadiers were in reserve behind the centre, and the cavalry of Russia was stationed also in the low ground between Kreckwitz and a ridge of high ground which may be considered as a fall of the mountain ridge, and which intersected the position from the left to the centre in a direction from Bautzen towards Hochkirch. This low ground, with partial exceptions, was favourable for cavalry, but the boggy rivulet contracted its operations beyond these limits, except along the high road, which passed under the command of heights where the enemy had posted numerous and heavy batteries.

The Allies had not under arms more than 45,000 infantry and 25,000 cavalry, including Cossacks. The enemy could not have had less in action and manœuvre against the positions than 130,000.

The battle began by an attack on General Barclay at near 5 o'clock in the morning. Soon afterwards the enemy's tirailleurs commenced in the mountains, and their batteries opened on that flank.

The efforts at both these points showed that the enemy seriously attempted to force them.

In front of Bautzen, Buonaparte was himself distinctly seen walking, during the greater part of the morning, to and fro on elevated ground while his columns took their station, and where, finally, about 4000 cavalry and 25,000 infantry, including his guards, were assembled.

The Emperor and King of Prussia were on a height close behind the centre of the position, but within cannon-shot which Buonaparte's post was not, whence they very early recognised their foe and the world's foe.

The firing had continued unremittingly and with great force in the mountains and in front of the ridge point, but, upon the whole, the Allies rather gained than lost ground, and, by a successful charge of cavalry, took one of the enemy's cannon. The corps of General Barclay, after an obstinate contest, was, however, obliged to recede, to abandon the villages of Malschwitz, of Klix, and Kaunewitz. About this time (2 o'clock), Buonaparte being desirous of engaging the attention of the Allied centre, and perhaps breaking in upon it, opened his heavy line of fire; but the Russian cannon in the batteries, aided by some flying artillery advantageously manœuvring in flank, soon drove his guns out of action. He then turned his column to the left, and resolved to force the right of the Russian centre at Kreckwitz, and endeavour to gain the rear of the right, which for a time was uncovered by the evacuation of Kaunewitz and the further retreat of General Barclay.

It had been the intention of General Barclay to

retire to the heights of Baruth, but the enemy had sufficient force to pass his right flank whilst he was engaged in action with a part, and occupy the heights before he could reach them. He therefore determined to throw himself upon the right of Wurschen, which had been the Imperial head-quarters previously to the battle, and here the enemy made formidable preparations to dislodge him.

At this critical moment the day was for a time re-established by the intrepid attack of a column of Prussian cavalry, about 4000 strong, supported by a combined movement of infantry, commanded by Generals Blucher, Kleist, and Yorck, and the village of Kaunewitz was recovered; but the enemy advancing with fresh troops and reinforced from his centre, again made a violent attack upon the village of Kaunewitz, and at the same time dispossessed General Blucher of the heights of Kreckwitz and the advanced conical hill. Generals Kleist and Yorck with difficulty maintained themselves, while General Barclay, who had reinforced them with eight squadrons of dragoons, two regiments of chasseurs, and a battery, now also required aid.

The loss of the heights of Kreckwitz and the conical hill afforded to the enemy the means of commanding all the low ground on the right and in the centre of the position, and the batteries from Kaunewitz played upon the road of Wurschen, which was the line of the Allies' communication with Reichenbach and Silesia.

There was no alternative but to recover these heights and the village by a general assault, supported by the guards and the grenadiers still in reserve; but, if recovered, it was still doubtful whether they could be

maintained against the enemy's increasing numbers, and the removal of the reserves to these points would have endangered the centre where the enemy still kept a considerable force.

If the attack did not succeed, disorder must have been the consequence of failure, and the enemy would have borne away the trophies of a decisive victory from troops who had yet only ceded, unbroken and undismayed, partial—though important—points to the enemy's overwhelming numbers.

On this interesting occasion it is impossible not to notice the Emperor's and the King's conduct. In the action of the preceding evening they had displayed great personal courage; perhaps they had been by far too much exposed, many persons having been killed and wounded around them; but here they showed a fortitude of mind, a calm power of deliberation, a self-possession and dignity in adverse fortune that commanded the respect and admiration of all who witnessed the scene.

After some consideration, a change of position was ordered. As the troops passed down from the centre, the enemy opened a tremendous fire of shot and shells from the heights of Kreckwitz and the village of Kaunewitz, but the columns of infantry and cavalry moved with ordinary pace, and every gun and every tumbril was withdrawn from the batteries.

Count Wittgenstein, to check the enemy's artillery, judiciously placed a battery of forty guns to prevent the advance of their cannon, while General Kleist took the position of Wurschen, and kept the enemy in check at Kaunewitz during the night.

General Milaradowitch, with the successful troops

of the left, withdrew from his post and the mountains, through Hochkirch by Lobau, and joined, the succeeding day, the Allied army at Reichenbach; thus baffling the hopes of the enemy to intercept his retreat, and contending, at Reichenbach, against Buonaparte in person with an order, courage, and success that must have proved to the enemy that he had obtained no other military advantage than the honour of the ground of battle.

The Allies, in the two days, must have lost near 20,000 men, but whatever might have been the Allied loss, that of the enemy could not be less, and according to all probable calculation, must have far exceeded it.

For very many reasons this battle ought never to have been fought; but it has proved the worth of the troops, and, although unsuccessful in its issue, has added a wreath of military glory to the renown of the Allies.

R. W.

May 25th, Göldberg.

This morning the Duke of Brunswick came at daybreak into Löwenburg, and as the enemy was quiet I determined to move on to Göldberg with him. We passed a line of artillery of fourteen wersts in length, and from Löwenburg to Göldberg—twenty-one wersts—there was an uninterrupted string of carriages; and not all in route and none of the rear-guard's guns, &c. Here I find the courier is not yet gone, and this enables me to send the packet which I have ready with one or two little packages.

The Emperor and the King are both here, and I expect to see them before they leave this for Jauer. There is no further Austrian news; but Buonaparte has expressed a second wish for negotiations and an armistice, which I think will be accepted if the proposition be again renewed through the Austrian minister at Dresden, and this is probable. My opinion, on the whole, is that negotiations will commence and a peace be made. The war evidently presses on Buonaparte. His army as well as his country is weary, so that although he wins battles he only augments the spirit of enmity in all directions.

I shall stay here to rejoin the rear-guard, which is now under the orders of Count Pahlen and not of Milaradowitch, the latter's frozen eye being so troublesome as to oblige some repose.

The enemy have quitted the Breslau road altogether, and only follow us with a few thousand men.

May 27, Jauer.

On the 26th I remained at Göldberg. This morning we heard the good news of Blucher's success, and in the course of the day of other agreeable military incidents which I have noted in my official report. The Prussian advantage is of great moral importance. The enemy, the people, the troops, Austria, and Europe, will all recognise it as of high interest at this moment, and especially so soon after the enemy's vaunt of a victory that ruined the Allies. England may believe we are a formidable Hydra; we may be hacked and reduced, but the vis vitæ is immortal against *the power of France.*

I rode in from Jauer this morning to suggest to

the Emperor the utility of looking at his troops who were in position between Göldberg and this town. He immediately seized the idea and mounted his horse. He was received with rapturous cheers, and every one present will witness that they were toned on the heart-strings. The Emperor spoke much to the officers and men; and on one occasion he said—which was very true—that he wished to attempt the recovery of the lost heights of Kreckwitz, but that he was overruled by the reasons I have stated in my Memorandum.*

When he came on the left of the first line of the Imperial guards and on the right of his cavalry of the guards, he turned to General Augerausky and said—"Now is the proper time for me to show my gratitude to Sir Robert Wilson for all the services he has rendered me. General, I request you to accept the order of St. George of the third class as a memorial of my esteem for your courage, zeal, talent, and fidelity to my service." Then turning to Sir Charles Stuart, while General Augerausky gave him the cross and ribbon, he added, "General, I give this to Sir Robert Wilson for a long series of distinguished services through the campaign—*through the war:*" (which last words were very emphatically expressed to Sir Charles, while with a gracious smile he made me understand the *full meaning* of the words). The Emperor continued some time to speak in the same strain, and then in the most gracious manner presented me with the cross, and affectionately grasped my hand in his: His Majesty almost during the whole previous time having his hand upon my shoulder, and only raising it to place it again with a motion of approbation. Sir

* See p. 30.

Charles behaved most generously and kindly on the occasion, saying all that could be said, and perhaps exaggerating my merits. The guards, &c., crowded round to salute me, and I received the additional compliment of an assurance that I wore a cross to which every man in the army would acknowledge my title. I do not mention my answer to the Emperor, &c. My expressions and my feelings must be imagined. It was not merely the Cross of St. George of the most distinguished class that could be given to one who did not command an army; it was not only the additional honour of having this cross presented by the Emperor himself, before his army in the field and in the immediate front of his guards; but the manner of the Emperor, the tone of voice, the look and the gesture, which animated me with pleasure and gratitude. It was a gratifying and proud moment, rendered more satisfactory by the further good-will which prevailed for my honour.

We returned home, and Sir Charles immediately wrote a despatch* to Lord Cathcart, with the intention of sending a copy of it to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, *lest the original might not reach him.*

This document, penned by a friendly hand, still is a true record of what passed; and as such it must convince His Majesty's Government that I have not deserved ill, although no statements may have been made of my having merited favour.

Perhaps if inquiry were deigned it would be found that while I was thought an agitator and an encroacher on authority,—while my acts were censured, my credit unsustained, and my power of doing

* See Appendix.

good restricted as much as possible—I was promoting the best interests of my country and maintaining its professional honour.

The best intentions may err in action; but the most impartial examination, the most rigid scrutiny, the most mature reflection on my whole conduct acquit me of any indiscretion under the circumstances in which I was placed, and secure to me the consciousness of having been a most disinterested, zealous, and useful public servant during the whole of my mission. I can charge myself with having done nothing wrong; and I have left nothing right undone that was within my intelligence and power.

May 29th, Schweidnitz.

After the Emperor returned to Jauer the enemy's cavalry advanced from Göldberg. Two squadrons of Cossacks and two of Melissino hussars, supported by four squadrons, charged twelve of the cuirassiers and Napoleon dragoons, overthrew them, and killed, wounded, and took at least three hundred. From that moment the enemy did not reappear. They reconnoitred to their loss, and found that the country between Göldberg and Schweidnitz presented a clear stage and no favour for their protection.

Yesterday I determined to ride with Stuart to Schweidnitz that I might pay my devoirs to the Emperor, write letters, and make other arrangements. Since my arrival I have been overwhelmed with affectionate greetings; but none pleased me more than that of my old Cossacks, who kissed the cross twenty times, and quite cried with joy.

Schweidnitz was once a strong fortress, memorable

for a very daring and successful surprise. The French have partly destroyed the works, but the Prussians are working to restore them. Why and wherefore I know not, as there are no guns to place on the fortifications and there cannot be time for the ramparts to be restored sufficiently for any defence.

If the work had begun six weeks earlier we might have derived some advantage from the position as a *place d'armes*, but now it appears to me to be labour ill applied, especially as the army is to fall back upon *Neisse* in case of the enemy's advance with his whole army. At Neisse we shall have a strong corps and the aid of all the Landwehr, &c., which is now assembling at Glatz; but beyond that we have no interest, unless Austria opens her frontier to receive us.

I dwell lightly on all these topics, however, as I have enlarged on them in my military reports and letters.

This morning I received letters from England. One long and very gracious one from the Duke of Gloucester, in which he notices Edward's attention and regular correspondence.

There were no letters from Edward or home, except one from Mrs. Carleton,* which enclosed an 'Examiner,' containing a defence of my charges against Buonaparte, and which I greatly admire for the acuteness, force, and good taste of the composition. All others who have read it speak of the paper in the same terms.

This day I met at dinner Count Hardenberg for the first time since I left him after the treaty of Tilsit. We had mutual pleasure in the interview, which brought to recollection interesting facts of past time.

* Lady Wilson's sister.

30*th*.—This morning I received a letter from Edward, dated the 3rd of May. It mentioned receipt of letters by Jemima from me to the date of my arrival at Dessau. I hope my subsequent correspondence has been more regularly received, as the interest is greatly increased.

There is in Edward's letter a recommendation of a Turnham-green town and country residence. To Turnham-green, Kew-green, &c., I particularly object. If my cottage is to be within the *sound* of Bow bells, I beg it may not be in *sight* of all the *ordinary* pedestrians.

I am of opinion that the principal residence so near the metropolis will not answer. The promenade *à pied et à voiture* will be very inconvenient. A rural nursery would have its advantages, or a country establishment,—but not a box within two miles of town and no town residence. I wish, however, a congress to be held, and a definitive arrangement made, so that the *family* may have a *home*. London must be chiefly *mine* for many reasons; but a London house must be very large to hold all the chicks and attendants comfortably. It would be best perhaps to keep the Montague-square house, and have a small house and garden on the Uxbridge line for an appendix; the chief furniture of which might be toys, *rods*, and washing-tubs.

It is very possible that I may soon "revisit the glimpses of the" English "moon," for I more and more believe in continental peace, which would probably terminate my appointment. I should certainly be kept on the staff, but an interval of repose would be allowed me, and I should like to find my mansion settled and not to be continuing my wanderings.

The Grand Duke has this morning paid me great honour; and, as a proof of his satisfaction at my being a Knight of St. George, he gave me one of his own bands to suspend the cross upon.

June 4*th*.—Since the dispatch of my last notes we have been in treaty for an armistice, and made frequent short suspensions of arms, which the enemy have converted to their own advantage, since they have occupied Leignitz, Neumark, and *Breslau*, which they offered in the first instance to leave in the hands of the allies. I believe if we do not immediately accept the armistice as now offered, we shall lose *Berlin* also; and then finally make a very disreputable arrangement, when we might by early decision have masked inferiority.

I think an armistice necessary, although the Russian army is much strengthened and greatly improved by Barclay's regulations, and notwithstanding that the king has augmented his army from twenty-one to near thirty thousand men, by throwing in some Landwehr and the blockading corps of Glogau; so that the Allies have a total force between Schweidnitz and the Oder of near eighty-five thousand men.

We cannot live where we are: our communication with the Vistula is almost in the power of the enemy, and perhaps, and probably, Polish insurgents will endeavour to close the only narrow route yet left us. I also believe the enemy to be in far greater force than ourselves.

The arrival of the Emperor Francis and Count Metternich at Jung Bunzlau in Bohemia prove that the Austrian Cabinet are very anxious to make some pacific arrangement. But I do not believe that

Austria will assume the previous character of a belligerent, which is necessary to extort from Buonaparte the cessions which are useful to her, not all those which are required by the Allies.

I have a notion, however, that Hymen is about to play a principal character in the last act. The King of Prussia has long been politically courting an Austrian arch-duchess, and the Grand Duchess Catherine would again put on the wedding garment if the interests of Russia required her to plight again her troth. I am sure she would not suffer one of the Corsican relatives to ascend her bed; but she would not think that an alliance through the wife would dishonour her.

I confess that I expect a family compact. Buonaparte, though in a better position than recently, has still many difficulties that are of a nature to make peace more desirable than war for the next two or three years. A thousand circumstances prove this feeling on his part; and in the late negotiation for an armistice he was most particularly anxious that the agreement should have for its title, "Armistice for the purpose of forming a general Congress to restore Peace."

Perhaps the state of France requires such an opiate.

The Cossacks *vont leur train*. Every day several hundred prisoners are brought into Schweidnitz; but the majority, I am sorry to say, are very fine men, and very many of them *resurrection men* from Moscow.

I have been passing my time between Schweidnitz the Emperor's head-quarters, and Stuart's, with whom indeed I am chiefly living; for the *food of the mind* rather than the body's entertainment, although he

banquets more sumptuously than any person in the army.

His appointment has been very agreeable to the Prussians. There is a great store of good sense, honourable feeling, and engaging candour in his character, which inspires respect and confidence. I do not know any man whose policy is more loyal, in the liberal sense of that term.

5th.—Yesterday being the King's birthday Lord Cathcart gave a commemorating dinner. The hall of festivity was a barn. Showers of rain prevented the *fête champêtre*, as was proposed, in the miller's garden. We mustered fourteen English, and all not assembled.

In the evening I returned here, and it was reported that the armistice would be terminated this morning. I do not believe it; but, if there should be renewal of operations, I trust we shall commence by an offensive movement upon Breslau, so as to clear the difficulties of the passage of the Oder and secure a very necessary *épaulement*. It is not out of the cards that we might do more, if we do not project too much, so as to divide and weaken our efforts; but unless Austria co-operates our successes must be temporary.

We have various speculations as to the effect of the late news on the British public. The friends of Government, particularly those who have lately left England, fear that a change will be the consequence. I waive all prognostics. Experience has taught me that John Bull is an incalculable gentleman.

June 5th, Plauendorf.

The armistice is concluded: the period, six weeks. The Katsbach river forms the line of demarcation;

but Breslau, and the posts now occupied by the enemy on this side the Katsbach, is neutral territory.

Hamburg and Lubeck are to remain with the power which shall be in possession on the 9th of June at midnight. The whole line of the Elbe and the Baltic is to be included in the armistice, and the enemy's fortresses are to be provisioned from five days to five days, I believe at the expense of the Allies. The terms are more favourable than I expected, and they prove the disposition of the enemy to make peace or be better prepared for war. The Emperor Francis is expected at Reichenbach, where the Imperial head-quarters will be established to-morrow. The next ten days will be interesting.

June 11th, Reichenbach.

"Now are our bruised arms hung up for monuments, and grim visaged War has smoothed his wrinkled front." Famine, however, still hovers around the field and endeavours to scare us from Silesia.

Since my last Memorandum no event of importance, or rather of notorious importance, has occurred. The mystics, which form the most interesting feature, escape the attention of the many. There are, however, most interesting mystics in progress, which I consider more and more pregnant with festivals of peace and marriage; and I expect no more in this year and in this part of Europe to hear a hostile artillery.

Nesselrode went to Vienna after the battle of Bautzen. He has returned from the Emperor, whom he left at Gitschin in Bohemia.

The British Ambassador still insists that Austria

only robes herself externally in the pacificator's pontificals; while she is locked in mail, and, resolute in action, strides to the field of battle with the guileful step of the "marche politique."

Bubna's first note on the 18th of May, the 'Moniteur' advertisement on the 24th, the Emperor of Austria's known *family* consideration, Metternich's character and avowed predilections, Austria's steady and palpably illustrated policy, the diminished chances of success by force, could not influence any variation in the British Ambassador's speculations: speculations which also confided in the enemy's total ignorance of what was passing in the Austrian cabinet, in the daughter's want of information, in Buonaparte's illusion and his ministers' enchantment by the superior genius of a power whose standard was at the same time planted in the camp of his adversary.

The rejection of the terms proposed by the Allies as the basis of the best mediation, which terms were represented by Lord Cathcart as the sanctioned and indeed dictated terms of Austria—and the proposition now made by Austria, of which Nesselrode was the avant courier the day before yesterday, that the Allies should join in Congress to settle the base of a general peace—can not shake the faith of the British Ambassador. He still sees the Austrian army with the *feldzeug*, or laurel-sprig in their caps (which is always worn by the Austrians when in war), descending from the Bohemian mountains, and forcing with their bayonets the boundaries of the French empire. So did he dream of battle on the very day on which the armistice was signed.

I shall now, however, leave the British Ambassador

to his dreams with more satisfaction, because I know his colleague, Stuart, is not asleep.

The case cleared of all fallacies is this:—Austria is resolved on the termination of the Continental war. She negotiates with France direct, using the power of her arms and her own display of force to obtain those terms from France which she thinks necessary for her own aggrandisement and the re-establishment of German tranquillity. Having secured these concessions, she will join in the views of France to form a rampart against Russia; and Buonaparte in some specious arrangement of Poland will find apologies to his *amour propre* for the other sacrifices which he will be required to make, and which he is prepared to make *ceteris paribus*.

Prussia and Russia must comply with the will of Austria and France. Resistance would be the destruction of the one, and bring ruin again deep into the empire of the other, especially with the temper of Sweden—probably lodge the white eagle on the shore of the Dnieper. Prussia has no money. Her treaty with us is not signed. Russia hesitates, and she must conjointly subscribe. Silesia will be a desert before six weeks are expired. Her fortresses are not in necessary order and state of siege. Glatz has a garrison of fifteen thousand men, but only forty thousand dollars in the military chest—all supplies are refused from Bohemia—ammunition, &c., is greatly needed. She has seen the inability of Russia to afford her protection; and bad commissariat arrangements have occasioned disorderly conduct that has greatly impaired the amity of the connexion. Is it possible that Prussia will refuse terms with France under the Aus-

trian auspices, which will secure for her restitution and independence, which will relieve her from the burdensome oppression of the war, and preserve the laurels which she will then have cheaply won? Will she not prefer also a political alliance with Austria —which family arrangements may render more close and more mutual—to Russian connexion, which will always render her a vassal in the van of a Russian hostile army against Austria, Germany, France and Denmark? Prussia has, in my opinion, no inducement to continue the war, Austria not being an allied belligerent, and no option against the will of Austria. Russia has saved her country: she has made an honourable experiment of her power and influence in Germany; she has afforded Prussia the means and the opportunity of retrieving her military reputation—of re-establishing herself in the estimation of Europe as a martial state. If Austria will not co-operate, but requires peace, what interest has Russia in the continuation of the war? She waged it to remove the yoke of France: she dashed that yoke to fragments, and that which was a badge of servitude forms now relics that record the greatest success that an invaded country ever obtained.

The freedom of her polity being thus won, and preserved by the proposed arrangements for peace, why should we expect, why hope to see her refuse a positive and assured good to engage in an unequal war which offers no advantage, but menaces numerous evils? 'If Germany will not fight for Germany, Russia has no business to maintain as principal the weight of a war for German interests. She has as yet signed no treaty that binds her to England's policy; and if

she, in the conditions of her peace, preserves the right of uncontrolled intercourse with England, an intercourse to be regulated only by her own system of interior polity and foreign connexion, England would act a very unfriendly and a very injudicious part in counselling against the adoption of any measures requisite for her own interest; measures which if postponed or refused might expose to hazard the advantages that are now attainable for Russia and Great Britain.

If Russia continues the war she must prepare to resist not only France, but probably Turkey, and certainly Sweden. After the desolation of so many of her provinces, after such a rapid demand on her population as has been made during the present war, and which she has met without feeling or showing a subdued courage, she must pause before she desperately commits herself to the further struggle.

It would be glorious to deliver all *conquered* Europe from the power of France, to accomplish what fortune pressed upon the *Marshal Prince Kutusow Smolensko* so often and so urgently; but if the topmost round of the ladder cannot be reached in a single enterprise, why should Russia hurl herself back, refusing the support of Hope who invites her to cling to her staff, and like a peevish child prefer lasting injury to temporary privation?

Russia may have some treaty with Spain, which will oblige her in honour to support the Spanish interests, but the settlement of that question must engage the attention of Austria, and has been probably one of the chief topics of discussion with France.

Russia, in my opinion, should make a disposition

with her army now here most suitable to the general interests, but she should form, as she is now doing, a large army of reserve on the Vistula, where, indeed, before the armistice expires she will have a hundred thousand men. She ought to have another body of forty thousand in Wolhynia, and at least thirty thousand in and about S. Petersburg.

What other strength she could bring forward she would, of course, advance towards the Niemen, according to the need and collateral considerations.

In this attitude she should go to Congress with a liberal spirit and a generous bearing that should lull the suspicions and enmities of the assembled states; but she should hold in memory in these as in previous arrangements, that however useful her exertions, sacrifices, and perseverance have been to Europe in the last contest, she does not enrol one sincere friend in the whole list of Europe's continental nations; and that her display of force, of resources, and of character, has given strength to the arguments of her enemies, and increased the fears of her neighbours, even of those now co-operating with her.

With such arrangements and conduct she may not acquire more support to extend her influence, but she will enfeeble coalitions against her interests, and impose a respect which will prevent attempts of encroachment upon her independence.

To gain the haven with her rich and productive spoil she must show defensive strength, but avoid all indications of ambitious adventure.

I do not investigate the causes which will induce France to subscribe to a particular continental peace; the closest *précis* would be too long for my neces-

sarily limited correspondence, and the operating springs upon French policy are perhaps better known in England than here.

With regard to England I hold to my former expressed opinion.

As we are not likely to have any person employed of sufficient talent to gain the ascendancy for England in the Congress, but as we should go there with much to give which all parties would be eager to acquire for their own advantage, I think we had better keep away and make our own arrangements independently and subsequently. The Continental Powers will obtain for their own sake the abolition of the Continental system which we should, if a party present, have to purchase with colonies and other sacrifices.

England has only to keep aloof, give latitude to her friends, and avoid exciting reproach or ill-humour by any invectives or vexatious interference with their arrangements. It is possible that a peace so framed may not be durable, but there will be much favourable intermediate time obtained; and the ambition of France, reduced by her impaired means, will now no longer embrace all Europe as the prize of her future contention.

The spirit of acquisition will rather be cherished, and grow with most energy in the cabinets of the bordering states. It appears from a report which General Thielmann, the late Governor of Torgau, has received, that, independently of the columns which passed through Wittenberg and Torgau, four columns before the 1st of June passed through Dresden.

The 1st composed of	.. ..	46,000
2nd „	.. ..	30,000
3rd „	.. ..	16,000
4th „	.. ..	8,000
		100,000

The Torgau column, the Wittenberg column, and the troops from the Lower Elbe bore down and united with the Dresden force before the battle of Bautzen.

The total which passed the Elbe previously to that battle is estimated by the Saxon reporters at a hundred and sixty thousand; the French say two hundred thousand.

Three days since, the Emperor reviewed or inspected four thousand two hundred new troops for the foot—guards and grenadiers, and twenty squadrons of cavalry. These infantry had since November last been marched as recruits from Yarisloff, &c., viâ S. Petersburg, where they were trained, and they themselves and their appointments appeared as if they had not moved further than from barracks to the parade during that time. The horses and men of the cavalry bore the same freshness of appearance. Man and beast certainly in Russia afford the most surprising material for powder service.

If English battalions had marched a tenth part of the way they would have been crippled for weeks and would scarcely have had a relic of their original equipments. Our horses would all have been foundered, and their backs too sore even for the carriage of the saddle.

The day before yesterday I dined with the Emperor in a family party; yesterday with the King at a great

dinner; and this day I dine with the Emperor, who gives a banquet. The Emperor the other day was gracious enough to present to me two crosses of the Junior or Soldiers' Class of S. George for my two dragoons, observing, when I thanked him, that he had "always pleasure in doing what was agreeable to me."

These attentions evidently mortify a certain person. His even more than female jealousy of the Emperor induced him to tell Stuart, the other day, that "he must not approach so near the Emperor." I could mention a thousand of the same ridiculous traits.

I did propose to go to Prague; but I fear Lord Cathcart will oppose that wish, although the military information I could obtain from the use of my eyes and the knowledge I have of Schwartzenberg and others, with the favour of the Emperor of Austria, would enable me to make a useful expedition. Great numbers of the Russian officers are already gone there and to Vienna.

I shall, however, persevere in the project.

I am sorry to be obliged to remark that the enemy, in withdrawing from Breslau, have left a good name here behind them. Everything was paid for in ready money. It indeed appears that Buonaparte has introduced a very strict discipline into his army, and, according to the report of the Russian officers, his camps are completely camps of instruction. The report of peace is prevalent in them, the wish universal and loudly expressed; and, aware of Austria's resolute interference to obtain it, the troops do not hesitate to applaud her reported menaces against the dissentient party.

In my political *raisonnement* I have only noted the views of cabinets; but I must, in justification of myself, in case of a result different from that which I anticipate, remark and record that the spirit of the Austrian nation, both high and low, is warlike. All accounts concur in stating that there is a belligerent majority whom nothing but vengeance will satisfy. This spirit may force the policy of Metternich to active hostility. War so brought on is not the effect of reason, but of passion, which admits of no calculation.

I have not either noticed the Danish or the Swedish question, as that story must be best known in England, and if properly investigated and handled may be a *decisive* illustration of our *able* policy. The guarantee of Norway to Sweden was the most short-sighted inconsiderate act that a British Government ever signed.

Let those who doubt look at the map, count the ports of Norway, and observe the latitude of the Norway coast. Let them recollect that it is now a *fettered* colony, which from Denmark's — from the mother country's—jealousy occasions us no harm, but provides us with several thousands of the most able mariners; let them anticipate a time when this tract is incorporated with Sweden, and encouraged to its greatest power of exertion and utility; when Sweden reverts to her natural policy, connects herself with France, and places the Norway coast at her command.

The answer will be that Norway cannot support the necessary increase of establishments for the maintenance of armaments.

I reply that pre-arrangements will provide the requisite granaries, &c., and that the poverty of the

land is no security for us when great measures against our interests are proposed by France and her then allies.

I remember, in my work on Russia, to have strongly alluded to this subject.

June 12th, 8 o'clock P. M.

Yesterday the King did not come, as was expected, to dine with the Emperor; he found himself unwell.

We want a 'Morning Post' to advertise all the grand fêtes. Cooks now are in more estimation than any other class. The diplomatic campaign is to me, however, more terrible than any other; gout, &c., awe me with a thousand alarms.

This day is Count Stadion's.

It is said that the French have occupied the Tyrol, and that the Bavarian fortresses are provisioning.

July 1st, Berlin.

The daily occurrences of a Berlin residence at this time cannot be very interesting to strangers. The Royal Family's hospitality and attention made our sojourn agreeable; but there is no other society.

Yesterday Stuart and I rode to Spandau. My military report contains my observations, except a private one which satisfies me that General Lestocq's original private communication was not unwarranted.

This day's despatches from head-quarters express increased hopes of Austria's co-operation. The intelligence enlivens the Berlin public, who, notwithstanding that their horizon looms with the enemy's lines, are impatient for war.

5*th*.—On the 2nd Prince Radziwil gave us a super-

fine specimen of French cookery. It was pronounced by judges to be unparalleled. It certainly had the merit of satisfying my appetite for two days.

After dinner we inspected the Berlin Landstürm. The cause was more agreeable than the effect to a soldier's eye; but, nevertheless, military progress had been made.

At midnight I entered my carriage, and found myself in solitude with a cheerless imagination. The pleasant society of Sir Charles, &c., was now a source of melancholy. Thus vagabondagers pay for their temporary pleasures. Pouring rain completed the discomfiture. Fortunately, I had exchanged *Queen Mab* for *Apollo* at Berlin, or I should have been drenched; but notwithstanding that *Apollo* rolled on elastic springs, with all the *légèreté* without the rudeness of *Queen Mab*, troublesome busy thoughts, and perhaps Radziwil's conjurer, banished sleep from my eyelids.

The next night I arrived at General Tauenzein's head-quarters, near Stettin, still cheerless, for I had not seen the sun the whole day. I had imagined a spiritless expedition altogether, but the intelligence that no armistice was in force at Stettin restored me to the *qui vive*.

At daybreak I mounted my horse, reached within six hundred yards of the body of the place, and saw enough to assure me that Stettin ought long since to have been taken by the bayonet, if powder failed for the siege.

On my return I read the correspondence between the Governor and General Tauenzein. I think it intemperate on both sides, and it is clear that General

Tauenzein wished to play the wolf against the lamb, as is memorably related in old Æsop.

I then passed the Oder and its branches; which, with their sinuosities, occupied me in a boat an hour and a half. On the other side a Colonel Roedler who had been aide-de-camp to Mack, was waiting to receive me, and I was shown by him the tête-du-pont at Damin, which remains still in the possession of the enemy, to the great reproach of the Allies. Indeed, there is so much military, political, and commercial importance attached to the re-occupation of Stettin and Damin that very few objects can be put in competition.

I was much pleased with the order, &c., which I observed in Colonel Roedler's command. The officer was in everything perceptible; but, although this man has been thirty-two years a soldier, esteemed by the most estimable, as his letters prove, and acknowledged to possess the most eminent military qualities, he has with great difficulty succeeded in obtaining the rank of Colonel.

From Damin I travelled all night, rain still pouring down, and arrived this morning at Colberg. Here I found the Commissary-general Trotter, an old Oporto acquaintance, but on the instant of departure for Stralsund and England. There being no accommodation in this sorry town so good as his quarters afforded, I took possession, and shared it with Captain ————,* of the 'Insolent' gun-brig. Comte d'Artois, the Duc d'Angoulême, &c., were my neighbours, and I soon passed to them. After dinner I again waited on them, and I believe that I have given them a just and sober view which will contribute to

* Name wanting.—ED.

their present satisfaction and future interests. As the Russian officer is not come to take charge of the stores of the three ships now riding in the roads, I wait to-morrow in hope of his arrival; but it is a melancholy place, and incessant rain renders the gloom heavier than ordinary in a season that *used to be* summer. The Prussian stores are all landed, and the proportion not yet sent away fills a large church here. Their quantity and quality astonish the Prussians, and gain the English many a gaze as forthcomers from a country where such articles are given to foreign soldiers, whose officers have not equal equipment.

6*th*.—This morning I mounted the Commandant's horse in a pouring rain, to reconnoitre the intrenched position and the fortifications of the town. As I wished to return by ten o'clock to breakfast with the French Princes, I went *ventre à terre*, and astonished man and beast, but I could not save myself from a wetting or secure a cut of the first round.

However, I found amiable hosts, who did not impatient themselves even at the weather, and that is an infallible sign of good temper in such a month of July. Last night the vessels in the road drove considerably. As they were laden on Russian account, I have directed them to proceed to Pillau. I do not enter into particulars, as they are all fully detailed in my military official correspondence, of which I send copies for security to England. They will be addressed, under my own name, to ————, who is to deliver these papers to Edward for his safe keeping.

To-morrow I leave this, after another breakfast with Count d'Artois and the Duc d'Angoulême, for

Dantzic, where I hope to pass two days with my most estimable friend the Duke of Wurtemberg. Heavy despatches for the head-quarters oblige me to conclude abruptly and leave a waste sheet, which not only grieves me for the sake of others but also for the scarcity of the article.

July 15th, Warsaw.

I quitted Colberg on the 7th of July, after breakfasting with the French Princes, whom I could not serve, but to whom I was anxious to pay every attention.

The weather instead of improving became more tempestuous, and on the day of my departure it blew so heavy a gale dead on shore that I feared for the safety of the transports.

The country from Colberg to Oliva, the head-quarters of the Duke of Wurtemberg, was *goose* domain, and very fully occupied by the family.

There was only one good town in the whole line, Coslin, where was a statue of Frederick Augustus, handsomely decorated. On the 9th I arrived at the Duke's head-quarters, with Colonel Willemineff sent to take the ammunition, whom I found a pleasant companion for the few miles he travelled with me.

I would not disturb the Duke's family so early, and therefore deposited myself under a balcony, where I slept four hours, lulled to repose by the falling water of nine fountains.

I was sorry to find afterwards that the Duke was very ill. Until he could see me I rode out to view the left of his posts. As I passed, some Frenchmen approached, and it was singular enough that the first

man was of the ci-devant regiment of Artois. I took that occasion to mention the neighbourhood of the Count himself, with other matters which I thought might tend to a good effect hereafter in the garrison.

The Duke having had a relapse and still being invisible, I dined next door with General Borasdin, where I met two French officers, both very well bred and well-informed men, one the aide-de-camp of Rapp. After dinner the Duke sent for me. On their mentioning my arrival he had fainted, but, recovering, insisted on my going to him. I was much shocked to see the great alteration in his countenance. I sat by his bed about an hour, and then, in obedience to the Doctor's commands, withdrew. The next day the Duke was not better. I passed the morning in visiting with General Borasdin all the corps, posts, &c., and was very much gratified with the arrangements. The camps were, indeed, more beautifully arranged than I ever saw, although I have seen many ornamented camps. Perhaps that architecture is better understood among the soldiery of barbarous than civilized nations: but it required instructed taste to obtain the perfection which existed here.

I went to dine with Admiral Greig, when I met Captain Adam of the 'Insolent,' a valuable acquisition to my acquaintance. I found that he still had the vases for Jemima on board, and proposed to keep them till he could safely land. Here I may justly apply the maxim "better late than never."

In the evening I returned and passed several hours with the Duke, who was better, and who assured me that my arrival had contributed to his recovery. This, without a vain compliment, might be his feeling,

since I had been enabled to give a new current to his thoughts.

The next day, as General Zastrow, the ci-devant Minister and now Governor-general of Prussia, came to see the Duke, who again so improved as to be able to sit up, I remained to dine with him, and passed some very agreeable hours, as no man is better informed.

In the evening I went to pay my respects to the Prince-Bishop of Hohenzöllern, a young man of remarkable story, and whose personal accomplishments, &c., increase the interest.

This Prince, then Count and nearly allied to the King, was about to be married to a young woman whom he approved—which was enough for his feelings—but whom all the world approved, which excited a more general sympathy. Before the marriage arrangements could be made the abbey at Oliva falls vacant. The ancient law requires that the eldest son of the Hohenzöllern family must be the bishop, or the mitre with a property which is very great, must be transferred to another family.

The Count did not hesitate to reject episcopal honours and episcopal advantages. Love in a cottage was all he coveted, if he was allowed to indulge his affections by divesting himself of his birthrights. The King, however, was inexorable: the Count was compelled to take the oaths of celibacy. Resistance would only have sacrificed the object of his regard without promoting his own happiness. Previously, however, to the fatal day he addressed her without whom he never expected to enjoy life, but from whom he was doomed to separate, not with such a request as mere

selfish men might make, but with a prayer that she would transfer herself to his brother, saying that he was the object next dearest to him, and that he was anxious for her to give him that affection which was forbidden to himself. Influenced by the generosity of the Count's conduct and actuated by love for him, she consented, and on the same day in the same hour in which he forswore marriage for himself, he, as Bishop, gave to his brother at his own altar of sacrifice, the hand which Nature seemed to have destined for his own; and since that hour there is nought in this world that can give him real joy but the thought of having diminished her grief by giving her a husband who, if she felt not for him the charm of first love, is nevertheless an object of her affection and regard.

The Count, some time afterwards made Prince, lives very much retired, and melancholy prevails in a countenance which would otherwise be extremely animated. All women pity him; all men esteem him. The King has secured the abbey, but he has lost the service of a man who would have been an ornament and a pillar of his state. He has overthrown a mind highly gifted, and which only required opportunity to apply its powers to eminent action.

In the evening I drank tea with some merchants who had lived in Dantzic several weeks since the blockade. There were one or two ladies, who assigned to me as their reason for withdrawing that they could not bring themselves to eat horseflesh, which the carnivorous townspeople are obliged to feed on and the garrison partially. The Hindoos would have a great advantage in a town so situated.

At night, after passing some hours with the Duke, whom I again left better, I proceeded on my course to Warsaw without any accident occurring which is worthy of note, unless I thought others would feel a sympathetic interest in my disgusts at the sight of the Jews. I was satisfied that it was only in twenty and thirty degrees of frost that I could enter their habitations and submit to their presence.

I arrived at Warsaw, where I found Beningsen, Novosiltzow, Lanskoi, Doctorow, and a number of my best friends. Next to the pleasure of a British welcome was the gratification of that which I met with here. There is not much society in the town, but I am free to the best, and last night was at a very animated political conversazione, where, of course, the ladies were the greatest orators, for I believe they take most interest in the fate of their country.

My hatred of Buonaparte and French connection, yet friendship for Poland; their struggle for independence, yet aid for the oppression of Spain, make a fine medley and afford much opportunity for self-contradiction if great precision of expression is not preserved, so as to keep the fine-drawn lines always distinct.

I have been amusing myself in the morning early by reading Beningsen's memoranda on the present war and a letter of his to Kutusow. They will make a noise in the world if ever published, but I have no doubt that, whenever he resigns his breath, a government seal will condemn all his papers to the bureaux of S. Petersburg, whence they will never come forth. I was happy to find that Beningsen perfectly agrees with my plan of campaign as proposed before the

battle of Bautzen, and with my present views; and until Austrian battalions are actually in line with the Allies he dreads the rupture of the armistice. To avoid the possibility of Buonaparte renewing hostilities instanstaneously on the ground of provisions being withheld from Modlin, he has represented to the Emperor that the provisions were contracted for, and that unless he gave them to the garrison Russia must pay for them.

17*th*.—Yesterday evening I went with Novosiltzow to see the *maison de campagne* of Count Alexander Potoski. I was transported to England in the grounds; and although the Anglo-mania prevailed in the comfortable arrangements of the house, I saw a Grecian interior and an intense decoration which almost defies all comparison. The place is called *Natolia*. The Countess, who is a woman of great talent and accomplishments, did the honours of the tea-table *à l'Anglaise*.

Pope has celebrated a diamond cross, of inestimable value, as having been worn by Belinda. Some Polish poet may describe similar enriching charms of the Countess Potoski; she wore a pearl necklace, with a *négligé* admirably sustained, which cost her lord ten thousand ducats, and for which at Paris she was offered by Buonaparte's jeweller sixteen thousand ducats: a sum not less than twelve thousand pounds British. I received them with a trembling hand, lest I might break the string or bruise them by a rude pressure, and I was quite happy to restore them again.

July 24, Reichenbach.

On the 21st, after passing several very agreeable days, and obtaining much information, I procured

passports; but not without the most positive pledges to return if the armistice was prolonged, and, if war broke out, to join Beningsen; provided that I could make the arrangement with Lord Cathcart.

I am sorry to find that civil war among the Russian chiefs is still probable. Barclay and Beningsen are contesting for command: Beningsen also wishes to have his army in a direct communication with the Vistula, so as to assure his retreat on Plock. Barclay desires to throw him up to the right of the Kalish route, and post him about *Lissa*, Winzingerode having marched to be under the orders of Bernadotte. These discords all tend *to peace*. They distract the Emperor, terrify the Allies, and destroy the confidence of the armies.

25*th*.—This morning one of the Duke's aides-de-camp arrived with information that General Rapp, on the 18th, had declared the armistice at an end, unless the provisions due were given and the order for the suspension of further issue until the arrangement of Lutzo's affair was cancelled. After six days he fired the six signal guns as he had predetermined, and closed all his posts, &c.

I was much alarmed lest this should assure the premature rupture of the armistice throughout; but I am told this day at the Emperor's, where I dined, that the definitive arrangements for the continuation of the armistice are made.

Lord Cathcart came to me this morning and requested me to visit all the outposts of the army, beginning my tour to-morrow. I saw that his object was to remove me from the Emperor; but as His Majesty asked me at dinner to accompany him on

Wednesday to the review of the cuirassier-squadrons, nine German miles distant, where the Grand Duke is, I shall not go till Thursday.

The Emperor was much pleased with the report which I was able to make of the state of the fortresses and troops: but I could not help again observing the total indifference of Count Stadion to all military intelligence; and this observation has been made at different times by many others. He actually thinks the sword a secondary, if not an unimportant consideration. If Austria were about to become a belligerent, could he regard the military powers of the Allies as a minor feature?

27*th*.—This day I had an interview with the King, who assured me that he had a hundred and eighty thousand regulars and Landwehrs under arms. I afterwards dined with him and met the Emperor; General Barclay de Tolly took me in his carriage, the King living three English miles off, and in that drive to and fro I received much interesting information. Barclay confirmed the King's statement, and assured me that he had in Silesia a hundred and eighteen thousand Russians, and seventy-five thousand Prussians; that his army was now put in good order, and that he had provided ten thousand waggons with two horses each for the transport of provisions.

He estimated the enemy's force at above four hundred thousand men, including a hundred and fifty thousand between Mayence and Wurzburg, and the garrisons on the Elbe. The troops which have been ordered to Spain have been countermanded.

He thought complete success certain if Austria

joined; but a good peace with her aid better than a precarious war without her.

From the King I went to Stadion's, with whom I was to have dined, and thus passed an hour. In the morning I had previously read the late correspondence between Metternich, the French, and the Allied plenipotentiaries. That correspondence convinces me more and more that Austria will not be a belligerent.

The late irritation of Buonaparte inspires hope in some that she will be brought to action by a misunderstanding, and the temper of the army and people encourages others to speculate on the Cabinet being compelled to adopt warlike measures. These, however, are vague speculations. The feeling of the Cabinet points to the only reasonable deduction.

The appointment of Fouchet to the government of Venice, and his passage through Austria, is a very suspicious incident in these times; and I could cite fifty others, which in the aggregate show that France still has great influence; but I refer these arguments, proofs, &c., to another opportunity, which I have in view.

In the evening Prince Paul of Wurtemberg made his appearance, having escaped from the tyranny of Buonaparte and his father; but the Austrians say that he is no very valuable addition to our society. He came in to us last night at Stadion's. Stadion paid him all royal honours, and kept us all standing an hour, that he might, by the display of so much ceremony, prevent his ever making a reappearance in that evening society. I suspect, however, that there is much obsequiousness to France in this reception.

To-morrow I go to the review, nine German miles

distant. Eighty-six squadrons of reserve cavalry are to manœuvre. From thence I proceed to my inspection of the advanced posts.

July 20th, Reichenbach.

The Emperor's departure, which occasioned the removal of Count Stadion and other diplomatic chiefs, produced a painful change in our society; and extreme bad weather has greatly increased our ennui.

I, who am certainly a creature of climate, yielded to the oppression of a sky holding suspended unusual proportions of moisture for some days. The "foul fiend" completely possessed me. Such was the load of the atmosphere, that no vivacity of spirit could contend against it; and if the sun this morning had not burst through the condensed darkness, Reichenbach might have been memorable for a "bowl, rope, and dagger" catastrophe. I am still so cold and cheerless that I could quarrel with any man who now presented himself in good humour.

It is fortunate for Brinken that he is gone to Vienna, and for Charles that he has started for England, out of reach of the effects of my present villanous disposition.

I did intend, as politics and war no longer engrossed my attention, or rather employed my time, to make various excursions, that I might see and describe the generally-praised beauties of Silesia; but where there is not a *beau ciel* I cannot be just to the earth, and my personal dissatisfaction would make me a prejudiced observer.

Nevertheless, in defiance of weather and my temper, I did yesterday evening go to a Moravian esta-

blishment, distant from hence about eight miles English. The extreme cleanliness of the apartments conciliated me a little; but Stuart and myself were not at our heart's ease until we had the opportunity of moralizing or philosophising in the churchyard of the institution, where we embraced in one view the termination of all the pleasures and pains, of all the hopes and disappointments of three generations.

22*nd*.—Rousseau did not appreciate ill the English military character when he described it by the remark, "Les Anglois se donnent avec gaieté à la fatigue et même à la mort, mais ils ne pouvent pas supporter l'ennui." To fly from the terrors of this most terrible ennui I have resolved to make a journey, which will night and day occupy my attention.

During the time that the armistice is still to continue, I propose to visit Berlin, Colberg, Dantzic, Bialystok, Warsaw, and Cracow. The objects of my inspection are various, but I hope that the results of my observation will promote the public utility. At all events I shall ascertain where and in what numbers and in what state the so-long-talked-of reserve forces are. They shall not fly from me as Wills-o'-the-wisp. I will grapple whatever substance they have.

We set off this day. I take Dawson with me, having no aides-de-camp of my own. I did propose the expedition to young Perceval, the eldest son of Lord Arden, a very fine young man; but he was fearful of the fatigue of the journey. He, however, requested me to introduce him to his first battle, and is so ardent to witness certainly the finest sight in the world, that he postpones his further travels, in the

hope that a battle may be fought, although appearances are unfavourable to his wishes.

Yesterday, while I was at dinner with Lord Cathcart, Mr. Gordon from Constantinople arrived. I am expecting him to come to breakfast and to bring my letters from that quarter.

July 28th, Berlin.

The Constantinople letters afforded me much satisfaction. The Capitan Pacha's expression of friendship is more than complimentary: I know it to be sincere.

Lord Cathcart made me dine with him again on the 23rd, and before my departure gave me carte blanche instructions for my movements, but I consider them as most peremptory on my zeal. "Do what you think right," is a mandate to do what is possible.

In the evening I set out with Sir Charles Stuart, Captain James, and Bidwell in Sir Charles's English coach. My britzka followed with servants. Dawson did not come with me: there were difficulties in the way of his departure which it was not prudent to force for either person's interest. The road, always bad, was rendered worse by heavy rains. On the whole, however, the journey was very agreeable.

In Berlin we found few persons of note. The Radziwil family, however, being here, Berlin is not a *triste séjour*. Last night we drank tea with the Prince and Princess Louise, and to-day we dine with them. Among the English here we met Messrs. Kinnaird, Hobhouse, Baillie, and Wyburn.

It is my intention to leave this city to-morrow evening: Stuart will remain several days longer.

Newspapers to the 21st have put me in possession of English story nearly down to the epoch that interested me most; but still I am anxious for intelligence from them to a later date on various accounts. My private letters only reach to the middle of May.

I omitted to mention that, before my departure from Reichenbach, I did not see the Emperor or King. The former had not returned, the latter was at Landeck; but I expect to hear from the former in my route on public matters, and from the latter on private business, which *an Eagle* will explain.

It is remarkable that the print over my bed's head this night (for this is the eighth night that I have undressed myself and gone to bed since September last) should be "The raising of Jairus's daughter." * The memory of a much-beloved father, and of my early life, made it a restless but a useful night. I think, upon the whole, if my father were living he would be satisfied.

July 29th, Reichenbach.

On the 27th I tackled my five horses to the *Apollo*, neck or nothing, and drove to Strehlen, five German miles. The King overtook me, but I kept up with him afterwards, although he had eight horses. The Emperor at Strehlen appeared by another route and found me on the box: this served for more than the minute's amusement, as I accused Lord Cathcart at the Grand Duke's table yesterday of this Anglomania, and stated that his non-appearance in the coachman's

* Engraved from a picture painted by Benjamin Wilson, Esq., Sir Robert's father, at the request of the governors of the hospital at Leeds his native place, and presented by him to the hospital, where it is still to be seen.—ED.

character was because I had disarmed him by reclaiming my whip. The truth is that Lord Cathcart also drives, but he has done so at an early hour. From Strehlen I went to Grotkau, where I found quarters prepared. The next morning we assembled at the Emperor's, in the house of the Grand Duke, and thence proceeded to the ground of review, where seventy-one squadrons of cavalry were drawn up and exercised. It was a fine sight. Five-sixths were cuirassiers. One regiment was armed with the enemy's spoil. After the review, which lasted several hours, we returned to dine with the Grand Duke. Not more than twenty persons were at table. The Emperor and King presided. After dinner I went per post to Strehlen, thence to Count Langeron's head-quarters at Heinensdorff, where I passed a very pleasant evening; and this morning I returned to Reichenbach, after an expedition of above a hundred English miles: rain pouring as usual.

From Strehlen I had on the preceding evening driven my own horses; and I thought that I performed wonders in saving my neck: but this day's journey was terrible. I am sure no member of the Whip Club would face the danger; but I arrived without any accident.

It was my intention to have gone in the afternoon to Count Wittgenstein, but a grand dinner given to-morrow by General Barclay prevents me.

Since my return I have read Metternich's note to Maret on the subject of the delay in sending a negotiator to Prague. It is very strong, and commences by declaring that Austria not only was induced to interfere as a mediator by a desire of peace,—"muée par

désir de la paix,"—but was determined by the necessity for putting an end to a state which was neither peace nor war, but worse than actual war.

The note, however, requires the commencement of negotiations by the arrival of some negotiator; and notwithstanding all that Stadion says, all that Colonel Latour assured me of yesterday at dinner, and all the hopes of the Allies, I feel confident that Buonaparte will yield enough before the 16th of August to induce Austria to declare for further delay.

I learnt yesterday that Buonaparte affects to consider the Spanish defeat as an event which he expected, with more or less military disadvantage. And certainly at Bautzen he did say to one of his generals, "If the English do not profit by their present opportunity and pass the Pyrenees, they will be as great *bêtes* as the Russians in the last campaign."

This speech was known, a few days after its utterance, throughout our army; nevertheless the capture of so many cannon, which is evidence of a complete discomfiture, causes a great sensation, which all his flippancy and declarations at Dresden about there not having been seventeen thousand French engaged, cannot lessen.

Brinken is come back from Vienna, where he was greatly fêted, and where he would wish to live for ever, if he could sell his estates in Livonia. Milaradowitch is also returned from Prague, where he seems to have left a great portion of his affections. The Russians think that they can attract the hearts of their neighbours, but they seem rather to lose their own.

It has been stated that the returning captive Greeks

inspired Alexander the Great with the desire of conquering and possessing Persia. It is not impossible that the present *visitation* of the northern hordes may induce a strong wish for settlement, and on a future day render the ambitious projects of some aspiring chief very palatable to the tribes of Asia.

No news from England since the 3rd. Great anxiety for further accounts and answers to Charles's despatches.

Aug. 8th.—On the 1st of August, Barclay gave a grand banquet. On the 2nd, Princes Czartorinsky, Radziwil, and myself were to have followed the Emperor to Landeck; but Prince Radziwil preceded us, and we remained until the 3rd, proposing to reach Landeck in time for the dinner of the King on that day; which was his birthday. Prince Czartorinsky was ill in the morning, and we did not arrive in time by several hours. We however went to the ball, where we paid our respects to the Sovereigns. I danced afterwards with the three young Princesses, with the Princess of Wurtemberg, and the Countess of Brandenburg, the King's illegitimate sister, a most accomplished and very handsome young woman, twenty years of age. The ball lasted until midnight. About a hundred ladies were present, and a hundred and fifty men, forming a very brilliant assembly. The architecture and decorations of the salle added greatly to the effect.

The next morning Czartorinsky, Radziwil, and myself went off to the bath. The Emperor and about twenty gentlemen and ladies were already chin-deep in water, and their nodding heads reminded me of the dancing angelic group who wanted the "*de quoi*" to

repose themselves. The spectators, however, in the upper gallery pierced with their eyes to the planks below, and could frame no incorporeal illusions.

Our arrival caused more than ordinary gaiety. After an hour's assembly in this Neptunian court the ladies retired to their barrack-room, and the gentlemen to another—where tubs full of hot water were ranged in rows—in which we removed our *court* dresses, and then renewed our toilettes.

Countess Golz, the wife of the minister, gave a breakfast in a shady bower, and the morning was passed in admiration of the Landeck establishments which are after the plan of Cheltenham, and of the surrounding country which is far more beautiful.

Not having an Udolpho pen I must leave each imagination to conceive mountains covered with thick pine-woods, slopes and valleys waving a golden harvest, and the rapid Neisse with various tributary streamlets pouring down abrupt rocks, or "kissing every sedge, and making sweet music with the enamelled stones."

The whole must be tossed together on the mind's entablature, with this impression: that it is possible to diminish, but not exaggerate, the charms of this locality.

We dined with Prince Biron, whose princess is a most amiable woman—in all but language, English. After dinner we went to the ball given by the Prince. The Emperor, the King, &c., were present. The dancing was in the same order as on the preceding evening.

The next morning at seven we reappeared at the bath. Platow was the sun of this day, but an April

sun which poured torrents on our heads without distinction of persons.

The Emperor afterwards challenged me to a combat, on the condition that I should not respect him more than I had done Czartorinsky, &c.; for every man's hand had become a scoop against me. I soon drove His Majesty from the field, which enabled me to say with truth, "Your enemies, sire, are more formidable when they throw water than when they throw fire against you."

After breakfast the Emperor and King left Landeck. *We* were prevailed on to remain another day, which we passed in reconnoitring the country, &c. The next morning we retired without bathing, which very much disappointed the *old* ladies at least.

On summing up the agrémens of Landeck we were of the unanimous opinion that it was a most delightful asylum from the solicitudes of the cabinet and the camp.

About a mile from Landeck we passed the residence of Princess Faustenburg; which, being English in the arrangement of the grounds, attracted us irresistibly, and we continued to walk through them for a considerable time notwithstanding heavy rain.

At Glatz we waited on the commandant, who conducted us to the citadel, where we viewed the fortifications, entrenched camp, &c. The citadel is formed out of a solid rock which rises loftily above the town and presents a noble feature of strength and majesty, in contrast with the surrounding scenery of milder character.

In one of the casemates we visited the celebrated

Madame Orsinew, who admits that she endeavoured to poison her servant twice that she might know the effect before she took a dose to terminate her grief for her husband's death.

She, however, was suspected, not only of poisoning him and her uncle, but various others; and one night she was suddenly arrested and taken to her husband's grave and there told that, if she did not confess, the body would be taken up and examined. She persevered in denial: the grave was opened, and in her presence, before her eyes, the winding-sheet was unclasped from the mouldering remains; and, although two years had elapsed since the decease, the surgeon believed that he perceived the proofs of poison in the bones.

Her own apparatus for death could not have presented to her so terrible a spectacle. But as the surgeon would not swear, and her servant did not die, she was condemned to perpetual imprisonment, and here she had been ten long years. She is yet only fifty years of age, and seems in perfect health.

I looked about to see if there was any score of years, months, weeks, days, hours, minutes—any note of weary time. I found only some books, and was told that she had composed a system of education.

This woman had once possessed fortune, and all the advantages that society, accomplishments, and a cultivated mind could bestow. What a dreadful change! Her countenance was masculine, but her manner was that of one who had learned to bow to misfortune, and who had known little indulgence in

the course of it. We endeavoured to prevail on the governor to allow her a little plot of ground for a garden, as she had implored permission to walk once again where her feet might press verdure; but I do not think we obtained our entreaty. Her criminality has been very great; but ten years is a very long period of correction.

From Glatz we returned here and passed the evening, as we generally do, at Count Stadion's.

During my absence three couriers had arrived, bringing letters to the 23rd of July, but not one for me.

I am now just returned from dining with the Emperor, where we talked over our Landeck exploits. A glance of royal favour fevered a certain atrabiliarian spirit again, but I allayed the rising gall, and by a *due exertion* made honey to flow from the lips that would have spit venom. The good consequences still continue, and in case of war, which I do not expect, I have a chance of action.

Last night I dreamt horrors—I note this powerful phantasmagoria of the brain as the impression has been more permanent than any I ever had before.

10*th*.—Yesterday evening General Stuart arrived. I was most happy to see him and to find that he had not been seduced by Bernadotte, whom he describes as a great *fanfaron* unworthy of trust, and one who desires general peace with France that he may renew the ancient relation with Sweden. Colonel Cooke, who had seen a great deal of him, tells me that he has said that "if anything happens to Buonaparte the French people would select him or Moreau as their chief." With this view he fears to make himself un-

popular by vigorous action against the French interests.

All is in motion around us, and war to almost all seems inevitable; but I cling to the expectation of peace, or a further extension of the armistice.

The consent of England to accept the mediation of Austria—if Spain, Portugal, and Sicily, and the transfer of Norway to Sweden be *sine quibus non* of the negotiation—gives Metternich further pretext to demand time: and I pay little attention to the denunciation of the armistice here after knowing that at Reichenbach the Sovereigns deliberated upon the question of renewing it at the very time that Austria and France had signed its prolongation.

Stuart tells me that Bernadotte—including the fifteen thousand men at Weimar, left to check the Danes—will have a hundred thousand men, of whom seventeen thousand are cavalry under his orders; but that his staff is very ill composed. He estimates the French force, after Bernadotte's information, at four hundred and forty thousand men.

Blucher is to be left here. The rest of the Prussians and the corps of Kleist are to assemble at Laun near Prague, which is to be head-quarters. The Emperor proposes to be at Prague on the 16th. But Count Stadion said last night very significantly, "He is not there yet."

Stuart proposes to Lord Cathcart that I shall be sent to the Austrian army, which is my wish, that there may be no more ground for jealousy. At the same time I am entitled to this field, which gives me a more conspicuous position: I have been kept long enough in the background.

11*th*.—Last night Lord Walpole arrived. He brought me a letter from Edward dated 13th July, and one from Charles of the same date.

All this day troops have been moving, and Count Wittgenstein's corps enters Bohemia at Trautenau. His head-quarters are to be on the 19th at Melnik. Still I believe that Buonaparte will accept the ultimatum which the Emperor wrote with his own hand, and which is a repetition of the six original articles.

There is not one person—Russian, Prussian, or English—who is not satisfied (Lord Cathcart only excepted) that Austria never seriously intended war; that her objects are at total variance with the views of the Allies. That she merely seeks to satisfy the hostile feeling of the nation and army; to obtain security, and not press the dynasty. That she is as much afraid of Russia as of France, and that she is by no means a believer in an easy victory; but circumstances within this fortnight have *entaméd* her further than she originally intended.

The Spanish victory increased her confidence, and Buonaparte's impracticable temper excited her resentment. Nevertheless I am still an infidel as to actual war. I am sure that it is the interest of Buonaparte to concede, *pro tempore*, and that by so doing he will be able to divide the Allies, who will quarrel about the arrangements of Poland.

If he suffers a shot to be fired he can no longer control the cabinets, and all his fortunes must rest upon his bayonets.

The arrival of Moreau at Berlin must still more dispose him to gain time and recover influence with his father-in-law. Moreau's arrival facilitates this

object as his views are hostile to the Emperor's daughter and to Austria's hereditary connection with France.

Moreau refuses to command foreigners. He will only fight in company with Frenchmen. It is feared that Bernadotte will be more slippery in consequence of Moreau's sentiments.

To-morrow is the important day of final decision. At all events I hope to reach Prague, for which place I start in the evening, and join the Emperor there.

I had promised Princess Lieven when at Berlin to pass by Nieborow and call on her mother-in-law, Princess Radziwil, as I could thus see the ground to be taken up by the army of reserve at Lowicz by taking that direction. I did not much regret my engagement, and still less did I do so when, for the second time, I entered Arcadia, to which I found that the Prince and Princess had gone after their dinner. I confirmed all my former opinions of the extraordinary charms and interest of this place. The Princess took me back to Nieborow, gave me tea and supper, which was my dinner also; and then, notwithstanding all friendly entreaties, I entered my calash again and braved desperate road, pitchy darkness and rain torrents. I never was more weary with any journey. I remembered that it was July, and I found the season of November. After three nights and three days I reached Reichenbach, to my great joy and my servant's; he fares but ill in my journeys, as I seldom take more than tea twice a day en route, and allow no time for kitchen operations.

I found here the original corps diplomatique with one or two exceptions. Lord Cathcart received me

au mieux, approved of all that I had done, and has been ever since very communicative and attentive. Yesterday I went to the Emperor, who was most gracious; but as he was about to review a regiment of guards I was obliged to attend, which annoyed me for two hours. I am sure I shall never be able to do the duty that will be expected of me when on a peace staff, for I hate the exercise of troops.

I found on my arrival here some friends of Lord H.* and his brother: Sir John Anderson, Sir John Chatterton, and Mr. Leslie. Although much tired I sat up very late to give them Vienna letters, as they purposed to go away in the morning.

The armistice I learn has been prolonged, but its prolongation has not been signed. Buonaparte very naturally wished to send more Commissioners to the fortresses: it was refused, for these Commissioners would have reported the infraction of the armistice in this respect. The consequence of the refusal has been a concentration of the enemy's forces, which I understand amount to four hundred thousand men exclusive of the Mentz army, which has returned to Spain in waggons.

Our Spanish news has greatly chagrined the enemy; but since that time Buonaparte has shown more inflexibility and humour in the negotiations. If he is sure of Austria, which I still think he is,—and more so, paradoxical as it may appear, since the battle of Vittoria,—he will perhaps prefer the renewal of hostilities with Russia should she refuse the peace offered by Austria. Prussia will probably, *as far as the monarch can control*, attach herself to Austrian policy;

* Hutchinson.

but the nation (with the exception of Silesia, where the warlike spirit has not been found high, nor the attachment great) is so exalted, and is in such organized *revolutionary* state from long preceding measures, that the voice of the monarch is not positive law. The King would have been dethroned if he had not declared against France; and if he withdraws from the war without very great advantages, it is more than probable that he will find unruly subjects. The Allied army, it is said, consists now of a hundred thousand Russians, and * . . . . . in Silesia, and of near a hundred thousand men, under the orders of Bernadotte. As yet I have not been able to check these returns so as to have obtained an accurate account of numbers, but I am sure one-fifth may be struck off from the present estimate as non-effective.

The interview at Reichenbach apparently conciliated all parties, but it is a hollow bond: and Lord Cathcart yesterday admitted to me that Bernadotte had proved himself an *élève* of the low school of the Revolution; that the Emperor knew him and was aware of all he had said against him, but found it necessary to use him and soothe him for a time. With these feelings, however, I am sure the Emperor would be eager to break the connexion, and in that respect would be glad of a pacific arrangement by the intervention of Austria, which would relieve him of his difficulties with Sweden and Denmark. I have said that the Prussian nation wishes for war: the Prussian army, however, is not so bellicose; and there is a great party in Russia, I hear from indisputable sources, which is also adverse to German struggles. Barclay, Bening-

* Blank in the MS.

sen, &c., among the chiefs, are certainly desirous of peace; they think their means inadequate for want of good organisation, and above all they dread the position of Silesia. Certainly the army here is committed to its own destinies. The communication with the Vistula cannot be maintained except through Galicia —a lost battle and we must be ruined.

At last I have met Prince Czartorinsky, and perhaps that meeting may have *very important influence on the fate of Poland.* This I may say, that he has approved of my *projet*; and before him all that was eminent and trustworthy in the Duchy. Prince Radziwil set off yesterday to sound others whose good will is necessary.

Aug. 15th, Landeck.

At length on the 12th we received advice that, Buonaparte having sent no answer, Austria had declared war against him. I refer to my private letters for all further particulars on that subject and my opinions on the present complexion of things.

I certainly did not expect that Buonaparte would have withheld amicable propositions so long, although I knew that at Erfürth he said to the Emperor of Russia, "When I negotiate myself I am always endeavouring to be the last person to show fear." He has probably miscalculated the character of another Emperor.

Events will prove how far he wished hostilities; but certainly Austria was most anxious to obtain peace, and the renewal of hostilities has been a surprise to all her allies.

If Buonaparte did not wish war, he has only to thank his own errors and impracticable temper.

Sir C. Stuart wished me to go with him to Landeck

where he had to exchange the ratifications of the treaty. We had so much to arrange at Reichenbach during the day that it was nine at night before we could leave it.

I went away with low spirits, for I had to separate from Czartorinsky, who, from the misfortunes of his country, has become quite melancholy, and who inspires these feelings in his friends from love of him as well as of his cause. He is certainly one of the most highly gifted of the human race, and the more I see of him the more I attach myself. He possesses a playfulness of temper in his moments of indulgence that is congenial to his natural character, and fits most aptly to his natural mildness of disposition.

Radziwil went to Berlin to remove his wife. He has also his amiable qualities in a high degree. Prince Paul of Wurtemberg having been refused service in the Russian army from a fear of offending his father, removed to Stargard with his wife who is a very pretty woman: I earnestly advised her to return to her children to protect them, and at Stuttgard watch over her husband's interests; but connubial prevailed over maternal love.

These are the only absentees from our society henceforth.

We arrived at Landeck on the 13th. The Emperor and King are both here, and at the ball in the evening received us all most kindly. Indeed the Emperor's good will and favour seem hourly to increase.

The Emperor danced until ten at night, when the company separated. Yesterday morning he went away to be at Prague on the 16th. The King remained, and remains until the 16th, when he joins the

Emperor. Yesterday the King invited Stuart, Colonel Cooke, and myself, to one of his family dinners, and we had a very agreeable entertainment. In the evening the royal family went to the assembly-room, and a small dance was made up. Stuart and I danced with the two elder Princesses, who have been my almost constant partners and who are truly most amiable girls. They will credit any Court at which they are destined to preside.

This morning I am going to Prague. Stuart remains the day here to finish his despatches. I would have cheerfully remained also, but I think it my duty to be present when the Emperor arrives.

We have just come out of the tub bathing-room—not the bath where the gentlemen and ladies hold their social meeting, into which I have not entered on this visit, but—where the tubs are ranged all in a row, and where so many Adams are floating. Stuart was much shocked at first, but he did as the Romans at Rome, and left his blushes for reflection.

Aug. 20th, Prague.

I quitted Landeck with Stuart on the 15th. The Duke of Cumberland had arrived the preceding evening. I presented my respects, as in duty bound, was coolly received, made my bow, and retired. Afterwards we met at his saloon, and I was obliged to surrender the Princess Charlotte to him as a partner, according to etiquette: she was the eldest and entitled to this honour. We spoke no further.

After a toil of two days and two nights over wretched roads, rendered worse by heavy rains, we reached Prague early in the morning. On our route we had

passed the fortress of Josephstadt with thirteen thousand men and five hundred pieces of cannon, and Konigingratz with three thousand men and two hundred and fifty cannon. The former place is one of the most formidable in Europe; the latter not so strong, but strong and in high order. Here I found Charles. I passed the day in reading my letters and looking about me. The busy note of preparation animated the scene, and everywhere vigour; with system, presented itself.

In the evening I went to young Prince Esterhazy's. The Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia, who had arrived during the day after breaking down three times, came in to visit the Princess of Tour and Taxis, and her daughter the Princess Esterhazy. After some time I withdrew, although the Emperor said, "Où allez vous? Ça a l'air comme si nous vous chassions."

The next morning, although I had but lain down two hours, I rose at three o'clock, A.M., went to Stuart, and we mounted in a little calash provided for us by Prince Esterhazy to go and see the review, distant, as we heard, forty-two wersts, but in fact fifty wersts. We found on the road relays of the Prince's own horses, and on reaching the ground I found to my great surprise sixty-nine battalions of Austrian infantry, of which seventeen were Hungarians and three of them grenadiers, and twelve regiments of cavalry. The total above sixty thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry, under the command of Prince Schwarzenberg.

Prince S. received me as an old acquaintance; and, as I could not find the horses provided by the

Emperor, he mounted us. Here I saw Prince Louis Lichtenstein, General Radetsky, General Chatelier, and various others of note, who all showed the most friendly attentions.

After some time the Emperors and the King came to the ground, when the whole army passed them.

It was a fine spectacle. Not quite so fine as the grand review in 1794 on the plains of Landrecy, but equally so as far as regards the Austrian portion. The infantry were active men in the best military order; the cavalry, both cuirassiers and hussars, superb—especially the hussars of Hesse-Homburg.

I thought the artillery not so good as heretofore; but perhaps the excellence of the Russian artillery has prejudiced me as well as General Moreau, who said the other day, "I have seen as fine infantry, but never as fine artillery, as the Russian."

The column did not clear until near five o'clock, P.M. The Sovereigns got into their carriages, and I undertook to conduct Stuart by a shorter route to the village where I supposed our stud to be after it left the field where we mounted. All happened as I had anticipated; and, although I had never passed through the country, except in a carriage ten years before, I succeeded as a guide, and found our calash. We arrived a full hour before the Emperor at the city of Prague. This town was very important for men who had gone a hundred wersts, and toiled many hours besides on horseback, without tasting a morsel of food since the foregoing day at dinner.

After a repast, I came to my quarters very tired, and with a cold which still distresses me.

I had been disappointed at not meeting Moreau on

that day; but I saw Jomini, who left the enemy five days since. He estimates the French force at five hundred thousand men, and calls Buonaparte "the ablest of men." I admire his sincerity, in his circumstances; but I cannot, from what I have seen, acquiesce in his opinion. He further told Stuart that the re-establishment of the French artillery was the most prodigious effort, accompanied by the most scientific distribution of the work, that had yet been made by France.

In the course of the morning, an incidental opinion gave me the confidence of General Radetsky, the Austrian Quartermaster-general. I had long wished to know this officer,—the auricular intimate of Metternich. I found him, as I anticipated, very able and intelligent.

General Radetsky told me that the Russian and French* advice for offensive operations had prevailed, contrary to his judgment. He felt assured that the enemy wished us to attack him immediately, and put the defiles behind us; whereas it was our intent to put *him* in that situation. The doubt he entertained of sufficient ability in the Chiefs to direct separate columns of attack, further induced him to prefer a system of defence combined with offensive operations on a smaller scale, to a general offensive movement which *might* win much, but *might* lose all. He feared the issue of the measures now proposed.

I perfectly agreed with him: for "if we forced Buonaparte to attack, we obliged him to do so under many disadvantages; and experience proved that, although he might gain the field of battle, he could not obtain

* It is presumed that *Moreau* is intended here.—Ed.

a decisive victory where eighty thousand Russians were present." And I said further,—that "if we waited until he commenced operations, we might be able to bear with all our means upon some weak but decisive point."

The question of command has been one which threatened and still threatens much mischief.

The Emperor of Russia earnestly wishes it, and I never saw a man more anxious than he was yesterday to obtain it; nor did I ever see disappointment more strongly expressed than when it was not offered to him. The Austrians wish to retain Schwarzenberg. If the Emperor does not get it, I, as well as others, much apprehend that his zeal will greatly diminish under the notion that success will be more precarious.

As a corps of the enemy, stated to be about forty thousand, had entered Bohemia by Friedland, this was certainly not the time to be selecting the commander; nor does the definitive nomination admit of delay.

The Austrian force in Bohemia may be estimated at a hundred and fifteen thousand men. Three divisions of Kleinau, at Brix, were absent yesterday, and three of light troops along the cordon. There are thirty thousand watching Bavaria, and nearly sixty thousand are in Italy. All the troops we saw yesterday were of the line—of course many recruits, but none of the Landwehr battalions. The Russians have about seventy-five thousand men in Bohemia, and the Prussians above thirty-five thousand.

General Radetsky thinks that Buonaparte can invade Bohemia with about two hundred thousand disposable men.

Buonaparte, when he proposed to surrender Illyria exclusive of Istria, and Poland for an indemnification of five hundred thousand souls to Saxony, and to raze the fortifications of Dantzic, said, "If these terms are not agreed to, peut-être le plus beau moment de ma vie est en reserve;" and certainly, if he can maintain present superiority of force and of position, he will have reason to consider all his other achievements as minor glory.

This morning I was presented to the Grand Duchesses of Weimar and of Oldenburg. Had I been of their own family my reception could not have been more gracious. Without, however, any feelings of acknowledgment for their good-will, I must, as an impartial person, note that these two princesses appear to me the most intelligent in Europe.

The Emperor was so busy that I could not be presented to him in form; but he desired that I would come to him at his head-quarters on the first opportunity, as an old acquaintance.

This day I have sent off my horses, and propose to join the Emperor of Russia to-morrow at Laun, on the road to Töplitz. I could not go before, as I have to settle all my accounts, &c., which appear so confused in England from loss of letters and inattention to the representations I have made as to the inadequacy of income, considering the rate of exchange and extraordinary expenses even of the most moderate establishment. It is too much to give private income to the public service, in addition to toil of mind and body.

Good news from Spain is circulating, and if verified must have a great influence here; for Soult demands

fifty thousand soldiers who have never been in the Peninsula.

This moment Prince Paul Esterhazy has been here to say that the Emperor regretted that, from a mistake, we did not dine with him yesterday; and that he waited for us. We are however innocent, as his invitation was positively not received by us.

Aug. 26th, Freyburg.

On the evening of the 21st I quitted Prague, though unwell with a most violent cold and highly-inflamed sore throat, which caused me the severest pain. It commenced as I was going to the review of the Austrian army on the 17th. On my return, I hoped it would pass with a night's rest; but, although the soreness of the throat has diminished, the cold to this hour has rather increased.

Before I quitted Prague, in a second visit which I paid to the Grand Duchess Catherine she asked my opinion of the projected movements. My answer was, "that it would be presumptuous in me to express disapproval of a plan projected and approved by so many abler persons; but that if such authority had not checked me, I should have done all in my power to prevent the intended movement. I thought we were putting almost impracticable defiles in our rear; opposing our right to a river lined with fortresses, of which the enemy could take advantage to strengthen his line of battle menace our communications, &c.; that we had not sufficient force to detach from the main army to operate on the Saal, enter Westphalia, &c., while we checked the passage of the Elbe army to its communication with the Rhine, which operation

could alone make our movement eligible; that, in case of retreat, we should not only find the greatest difficulty in returning through the defiles, but probably shatter our army very sensibly." We have passed the defiles: they are worse than I supposed them to be. We shall see whether my prognostics are in unison with a to-be-foreseen course of events, or the vain creations of a distempered brain.

On the 23rd I found the Emperor at Commotau. That night we marched through heavy rain and chaotic darkness, confusion, &c., to Marienberg. The Emperor's cook taking a wrong direction next day led us to Chemnitz instead of Sayda. When my guide found his mistake he fled back, but I remained, forming guard and garrison for the town, although the enemy was only three miles distant. At night the Swedish minister pursuing my steps joined his forces, and I had much pleasure in alarming him with tales of peril which might possibly exist, but which I did not believe to be probable. However, I did not myself think it prudent to brave them at three o'clock in the morning, so we marched again in pelting storm, and I joined General Kleinau at this place, where thirty-six thousand men whom I had not seen before are now defiling, although drenched to the bones; most of them without shoes, many without great coats, but still marching with animated step.

If such is the commencement of this march—if such is to be the weather, what will be its end? I shudder to think of it.

General Kleinau received me with the cordial welcome of a brother soldier, and put me *au fait* of all his orders, opinions, &c. I found him worthy of his

reputation, and am sure that he will always do his duty with energy. The general of his advanced guard, General Metsko, having already invited me to dine, I was obliged to decline General Kleinau's hospitality: but after dinner I went again to him and was presented to many of the generals, who all in virtue of my badge admitted me at once into the rights of an old friendship and of national connection.

August 30th, Töplitz.

I did not expect to be so soon again in Bohemia; but I have not erred in my calculation of events. We have made an experiment of the power of courage against the science of war. We have failed, and afforded a memorable lesson for the regret of the present age and a subject for tacticians in future ages to treat upon.

On the morning of the 27th I rode towards Dresden a little before daybreak. When within five English miles I heard a cannonade, and pushing on found the whole Allied army drawn up round Dresden, and partially attacking the advanced troops. After waiting some time on the left with the advanced guard of Kleinau, which had been marching all night, I rode to the centre where the Austrians were, thence to General Kleist, and afterwards to Count Wittgenstein on the extreme right and at the distance of five English miles from the extreme left.

A cannonade was maintained at all points, and some tirailleur firing extended along the line. The enemy during the whole of the morning kept up the heaviest fire and threw their shot wherever they could find an

object, but happily for myself not with a precision equal to their ardour.

Orders were given about two o'clock that the Allied batteries should commence their operations against the town at four o'clock; that an outwork of the enemy near the garden on the left of the centre of the town should be stormed, and the town assaulted from that point, if practicable.

It was an interesting interval.

Various opinions were entertained. The Emperor and General Moreau were against the assault. I thought success almost out of possibility, as the town was surrounded by a thick wall, many feeble parts strongly palisaded, and as we knew that above sixty thousand men were already in the place. I was glad, however, of the intention to take the redoubt outside the wall; perhaps from a spirit of revenge for some very malicious salutes.

About three o'clock I slipped from the Emperor's circle and went to Prince Maurice Lichtenstein's, who was to command the Austrians, and under whom Count Colloredo was to lead on to the assault.

About four o'clock the cannonade commenced against the enemy, and particularly the redoubt, with fury. In about a quarter of an hour some guns outside the redoubt, and between it and the town, were withdrawn. In another quarter of an hour the fire of the redoubt was much diminished. Count Colloredo perceiving the effect ordered his troops to advance. The distance was above an English mile over open ground. They moved forward; they increased their step; they pressed into a run, gave three cheers, and reached the ditch of the redoubt, which was

stockaded in the most formidable manner. While these brave men were endeavouring to tear down the palisades or climb over them to ascend the side of the redoubt,—eighteen feet high, smooth, and almost as hard as stone,—others drove the enemy by their musketry from the eight guns and out of the redoubt. At the instant of the huzza, Prince Lichtenstein and I could no longer restrain ourselves: we galloped down to the redoubt and animated the men to mount. Some by their bayonets had already loosened the cement in one or two places and reached the crest, but did not like to pass over the parapet, as the fire from the town wall, distant only fifty paces, was too heavy. I remembered what I owed to Austria, England, and myself. I dismounted, climbed over the palisades, with extreme difficulty reached the crest of the parapet, sprang on it, took off my cap and gave three cheers—Charles at my side—(who would not leave me, though I repeatedly ordered him not to follow me, as I thought it not necessary to expose him), and then leapt into the battery. My cheers had been answered by all around me of all ranks, and instantly hundreds mounted and manned the redoubt. This being accomplished, I descended. Count Colloredo came up to me, gave me his hand, said various handsome things, and so did all the other generals. It was a satisfactory moment. I then asked Prince Lichtenstein's permission to bring up some guns to batter the wall in breach, and force one of the doors of the town which opened immediately behind the redoubt.

Having got up the guns and placed them at the distance of sixty paces, we were in hopes of obtaining an entrance; but the enemy, through the loop-holes of

the walls, killed all the artillerymen of the first six guns. We brought up then another battery of twelve, and while this, under a murderous fire, was battering in breach, Prince Lichtenstein received advice that the enemy was making a sally upon our left with the view of taking us in rear. Stuart, who had come up to the redoubt almost at the time I did, and who as usual made every effort to aid and assist, with his adjutant Colonel Cooke, and Captain Dering who also shewed most conspicuous zeal and courage, now accompanied me and Prince Maurice Lichtenstein who galloped off to make dispositions for the retreat. After ordering forward some cavalry to support the infantry across the plain, we proceeded to another body of troops, and to our great surprise found their batteries and themselves facing our own position and receiving a heavy fire from the ground on which our army had been standing. Around us were at least thirty thousand men—some formed in squares, others in march to form—and a long column in movement. We rode up to the guns confused and amazed. It was then that I began to suspect our situation, and pressing up to Prince Lichtenstein, who at that moment had made the discovery, I said, "We are not right here." Prince Lichtenstein replied, "Follow me;" and I gave this answer to Stuart, who had just come up to me to express his surprise at our position; but he was not quite aware of its actual character. We darted along the column advancing from the town, occasionally calling to the soldiers on the way to clear to the right or left, many of whom were crouching from the shot which momentarily struck around and almost infallibly with effect, and then finding an opening turned to our

right, and happily rejoined our own, after having been in the midst of Buonaparte's guards for a quarter of an hour.

I can only attribute our non-discovery to the presence of the Austrian force which seemed to engage every man's attention, and to the darkness of the evening which obscured the colours of our uniforms.

As soon as we were clear I proposed to Prince Lichtenstein to go back with a body of cavalry and charge the enemy in rear. The Prince, however, was too anxious for the safety of his troops left at the redoubt to think of offensive operations; but I had the satisfaction of hearing General Moreau greatly approve of my idea, and lament that it had not been carried into execution. I verily believe that I could have thrown into flight with eight hundred horse the whole of the force which sallied, taken their guns, and perhaps Buonaparte, if present; for of course we should have made, with that object, at all the mounted officers.

The troops were withdrawn, and night closing in terminated the combat. The loss of the Austrians on this day may be calculated at four thousand. Of the troops which stormed and so long held the redoubt two thousand were killed or wounded, and many of them of the best regiments of chasseurs.

The intrepidity of the Austrians could not be excelled, nor the perfection of their dispositions; but they were required to do that which was physically impossible.

The next morning a little before day-light we marched again in heavy rain and fierce wind. The worst English December day was never more bleak

or soaking. The Emperor, soon after the firing commenced, desired me to go and see what Wittgenstein was doing, as the enemy seemed to be pressing most on that side. In going there, and while I was in front of the Prussians, a musket-ball struck my oil-skin cloak, which I had bought new at Freyburg weary of perpetual humidity and foreseeing the continuation of this year of "Pluviose." As the oil-skin was not lined, the ball tore the cloak greatly; the wind seized the rent, and as the tatters began to fly with a cracking noise my horse became almost mad. With one hand I attempted to tear the cloak off, and with the other to hold the raging animal. For five minutes I was in extreme danger of being dismounted, of having my bones broken, and being taken; but at last I succeeded in getting rid of my black streamers, and I pursued my course to Count Wittgenstein whom I found with only one division and two regiments of cavalry, pressed by a superior force. He requested more aid. As I went back by the Prussians I entreated Prince Frederick not to abandon the village of Strehlen—as he was ordered to do by General Kleist—since the occupation of that village by the enemy would render Count Wittgenstein's position extremely hazardous. I then rode and made my report to the Emperor, entreating him to direct that the Prussians should keep Strehlen. General Moreau approved, and orders were sent. Prince Schwarzenberg coming up I renewed the subject to him, and he requested me to go and order eight battalions to remain and defend Strehlen. On my arrival there I found the village already abandoned, except by one battalion, and that in retreat. By prayers as well as authority I pre-

vailed on the officers to remain half an hour and check the enemy already approaching. At the expiration of that time we received orders to retire, and I had the mortification of seeing all the troops withdrawn from a village which could have been kept by fifteen hundred men against ten thousand, and a village which was of great consequence to the general dispositions. I could only send notice to Count Wittgenstein of the Austrian intention. On my return to the Emperor and Prince Schwarzenberg they both expressed great regret at the evacuation, and Generals Kleist and Barclay with two divisions of grenadiers on the flank were ordered to retake it; but the enemy were too strongly posted before the arrangements could be made, and the attempt was abandoned. The conduct of the Prussians on this occasion greatly displeased me. Such skilful officers as they have are generally pedants, and the majority of their officers are good for nothing. The soldiers are willing, but rather brave raw clowns than soldiers.

The enemy showed a force of about a hundred thousand men; and, having the city to sustain their centre, threw with security their principal forces upon the flanks, while Vandamme with fifteen hundred men advanced from Pirna in view of our right, and against the corps of Count Osterman who was left to mask him and Königstein; but whenever the enemy attempted to beat back our artillery and dislodge us, he was driven, and all his efforts were vain to make the smallest impression.

Baffled in the flanks he thought we had weakened our centre, and about midday made a great effort with artillery; while great masses (probably of fresh

troops from the other side of the river) advanced under that protection; but, after half an hour's thunder, he was obliged to withdraw his guns.

A little after this, as the Emperor, General Moreau, Lord Cathcart, myself, and suite were passing on the right of the centre in the wake of a French battery which still played, a ball came and struck something about us. For a few seconds no effect was seen or heard, but then General Moreau cried "Oh!" and I perceived him, for I was next upon his left, struggling and endeavouring to dismount. I immediately said, "Sire, General Moreau is wounded." And almost at the instant I saw him throw himself from his horse, with one leg shattered and the inside of the left knee all mangled. His horse which had stood firm till the General fell, now staggered and threw himself down close to his master. The violent struggles of the horse alarmed General Moreau, who said, "Keep the horse down;" but the horse died before any one could get near him. Moreau then lifted himself up a little, looked at his legs, and said, "C'est passé avec moi! mon affaire est faite." The Emperor, on riding away, ordered him to be carried off the field. Some Cossacks lifted him on their pikes, and removed him to the nearest village. The operation of amputating both legs was performed by the Emperor's surgeon, Wiley. Moreau bore it as a soldier, and during the whole day kept a cheerful serenity that proved the possession of extraordinary powers of mind.

I never saw a more amiable man—more modest—more intelligent. It was my good fortune to be with him a good deal during the day, and to hear him express his opinion on various subjects in a manner that

convinced me that he was fully entitled to all his fame.

About half an hour before his melancholy accident he had seen me drenched to the bones, for I had not even a great coat after the loss of my oil-skin, and in the kindest manner he had given me a Spanish cigar which he told me he had brought from America, saying that he was happy to have preserved one for my use on that occasion. He had come from America by the Emperor's invitation, and in his first combat in presence of his rival he loses both his legs, and probably his life. I asked the Emperor about him yesterday. He told me that there was no certainty of his death, but less of his doing well. Thirty soldiers carry him: the roads are too bad for his transport by ordinary carriage.

Towards five o'clock Prince Schwarzenberg, &c., assembled to deliberate on what was to be done; and they resolved upon returning into Bohemia. The place of council was a field, round a wet wood fire; the canopy of state the blackest clouds of the heavens, which for thirteen hours rained their streams upon us. The Emperor and King, with the Crown Prince of Prussia, had chairs which they did not use, and their footstool was a board to keep them out of the mud, but which was not thought so good as the embers till the leather of their boots began to burn. I was present and heard all. The King of Prussia's observations were particularly just and apt. Few officers in Europe have juster notions. The Emperor of Russia with great reluctance consented to withdraw; but the fact was, that we should all have rotted before Dresden: it could never have been

taken with a garrison of above two hundred thousand men that Buonaparte could throw in or manœuvre with against us from Königstein and Torgau. What the sword and the ague did not kill, famine would shortly consume, as the line of communication was not practicable for the transport of provisions, &c., from Bohemia. The order given, execution was immediate. At about seven o'clock the chiefs quitted the field. The first part of the road to Dippoldiswalda I accompanied the Emperor through a sea of mud; the second, I rode with General Jomini; and the third, with Prince Schwarzenberg. Miserable as I was, replete and loaded with tons of water, I still thirsted for the cold but sober comfort of mathematical arguments from Jomini, and I refused the cuisine and quarters of Schwarzenberg to find my people and get a change of clothes.

I only remember once in my life to have made such a night's march, and that was in Flanders—a memorable night in the Flanders annals.

After a fruitless search for Charles, I pitched upon Stuart, who, like a friendly brother, a truly good Samaritan, gave me raiment, food, and lodging. I should have been comfortable if my cold had not been so excessive, but the nasal suffering kept me wretched all night.

The next morning word was brought me that I had lost my Turkish horse; and after having arrayed myself in comparatively dry clothing I had the misfortune to be thrown into a river by a cart, against the wheel of which my stirrup caught. The stirrup gave way as the horse plunged to extricate himself, and he and his rider were pitched from the road. The mud

in which I was obliged afterwards to walk was worse than the river; but I reached Altenburg, and from Altenburg came here to write. I must leave off, as the cannonade rapidly approaches. The army has been defiling through the most difficult roads, through the most desperate country, through the most impracticable woods that Europe presents. When the traveller hereafter passes through these mountains he will not believe that an army of two hundred thousand men, with all its train of equipages, &c., could have got through, especially when pursued by an enemy.

The cannonade on our right lasted till twelve o'clock last night. Buonaparte says, "Now or never!" but I think he will only maim not ruin us. If we reach the Eger without the loss of more than thirty thousand men since we marched from Laun on the Eger, we shall be fortunate; but I think our loss will amount to so much killed and wounded, sick included. It will, however, require three weeks' time to reorganize us, and time is of more value than men and guns.

It has been, on the whole, an ill-advised enterprise executed with great vigour: honourable to the troops, but I fear very beneficial to Buonaparte, who will acquire great consideration by our faults. He may strike a decisive blow against Bernadotte (if *Bernadotte is his enemy*, which the Grand Duke, with whom I dined yesterday, does not believe), or again attack Blucher, whose loss on the 21st Stuart tells me amounted to five thousand men, instead of two thousand as stated.

As far as I am personally concerned, the expedition has been favourable. I have been enabled to make

some very valuable friends, and to obtain the good opinion of the whole Austrian army.

If the enemy enters Bohemia we shall not fight, I believe, a decisive battle before we reach Prague, but there is a good entrenched camp on the Eger, where we shall make a partial stand.

August 30th, Töplitz.

I mounted my horse as the cannonade increased and approached. Outside the town I met the King very uneasy about the Prussian column, which, together with Barclay's and Wittgenstein's, had been obliged to leave the main road and take to the mountains; the enemy having moved from Königstein and strongly lodged themselves on the Töplitz road from Dresden. Osterman, who was now engaged, and who had been left to mask Königstein, had been himself intercepted and twice compelled to force his way with the bayonet.

The enemy now pressed Osterman, and, having occupied the village of Kraupen, menaced seizure of the embouchure of Eichswalde, at the distance of a werst, where it was supposed the Prussian corps, &c., would attempt to break out. Indeed the danger seemed imminent, for the whole army still remained fixed in the mountains, unable to move from the breaking down of carriages and other impediments. The distance from Kraupen to their embouchure was but five wersts, and, if that pass was gained, ruin was inevitable for above a hundred and fifty thousand men.

I rode forward to the scene of action and found Osterman with eight thousand men, mostly of the

guard, engaged with near forty thousand. His left was thrown into the mountains covered with thick wood; his centre was commanded, his left well protected by cavalry in open ground. The enemy made various heavy efforts to force the left, but were always repulsed. About midday two strong columns advanced from Kraupen, but the lancers and dragoons of the guard charged through garden-ground and ravines upon the right column, which threw down its arms and fled with the most rapid haste, but many hundred were killed and several hundred made prisoners. The other column retired with more order but not less speed.

It was soon after this that a shell burst and carried away the arm of Osterman, who still lives but in great danger. Never had the Emperor a braver or more zealous officer; never did any man deserve more gratitude than he for this day's conduct.

The Russian "eight thousand," notwithstanding a loss of *one-half*, for fourteen hours continued the action and finally remained masters of the field. The enemy could not gain an inch of ground, but as night closed in withdrew beyond reach of fire, with a loss of certainly not less than six thousand men.

Never was an action more gloriously fought by the Russians—never was success more important. The safety of the whole army was insured, and with it all the high interests with which it is charged. It is impossible to describe the general anxiety of this day; how troops were sent for in every direction, and how disappointment constantly accompanied the returning messenger. I myself rode no less than twenty-one wersts backwards and forwards in a gallop, bent on

fruitless search for infantry and twelve-pounders. At last, however, I did find two battalions and brought them up. It was not until six at night that the first division of infantry arrived, so great were the impediments; and certainly it will require two days more to clear the defiles of the baggage, &c., which still remains in them. To-morrow we shall have troops enough, but those survivors may think themselves happy who can boast that they fought on the 30th of August at Kraupen. The enemy may be reinforced and make another effort, but we have nothing to apprehend: indeed we ought rather to wish for the attempt.

I fear, however, that the loss of his guard, added to other griefs, will greatly exasperate the Emperor of Russia and weaken the conditions of co-operation. Indeed I have long seen, speaking in reference to that subject, more than I choose to note to others; and I *have heard more* than I choose to repeat.

This evening we have had a report from the rear-guard of the Austrians, and also from Wittgenstein. The former has repulsed the enemy advancing on the Dippodiswalda road with the loss of some cannon; the latter has made his passage good, but with the loss of all his own and the Prussian baggage. It is a loss, with some gain, however, to the general interests. Two guns were taken, but some caissons of reserve were abandoned.

When the combat ceased, at dark, I returned here, and finding that a courier is going, I add this hasty sketch of most memorable proceedings. When I have time I shall draw out a memoir of the whole operations since we quitted the Eger, with such

additional incidents as may occur before our return thither.

I must not omit to record that in the course of the day I saw Schwarzenberg. In a conversation with him I find that either he will resign, or make over the command, if his Sovereign wishes it, to the *military college* that accompanies the army. I think he is right, for without unity of direction it is impossible to command an army.

Sept. 1*st.*—I had been told by Prince Schwarzenberg on the evening of the 30th that he would attack Vandamme next morning: a plan which I greatly approved, upon a principle which made me adverse to our movement into Saxony—viz., placing the defiles immediately on our rear.

Stuart and I rode out early, and as the action was commencing we were passing to the right of our position to advance with the Austrians when a shell fell close to us and burst. The splinters flew around, but not finding myself hit, who was nearest to the spot where the shell burst, I hoped that Stuart had escaped; but almost at the moment he said to me that "he was hit." I found that a piece of the shell had struck his thigh. Cooke and Kinnaird coming up we led him off: as he complained much of sickness we took him off his horse and placed him on the ground; but the shells came so thick around us that we were obliged to set him again on horseback and conduct him to a greater distance, when he was again taken from his horse and dressed by a soldier, aid to the regimental surgeon.

The blow was severe; and it appears from Wiley who attended him in the evening, that the sharp point

of the splinter had entered deep but done no serious mischief. After the dressing, and when the sick feeling had passed, Kinnaird accompanied him to Töplitz with two soldiers whom I obtained to attend him; and Cooke and I returned to the field.

I refer to my military report for the transactions of the day. As far as concerned myself, I was not idle; and I was enabled to lead a charge, with several Austrian squadrons of cavalry, into the flank of the enemy on retreat, while General Radetsky led the Austrian infantry. Our success was complete, and several battalions were broken and taken.

Here I very nearly lost my life from an act of humanity. I saw some of my dragoons pursuing an officer who most gallantly defended himself, but who kept shouting like a madman. On approaching, I recognised him as a Cossack officer. I cried out to the dragoons to desist; but the unfortunate man flew forward (in the hope of joining some Russians), followed by the dragoons one of whom fired into his horse. The animal rushed on impetuously, breaking over the pole of an ammunition-waggon, and almost immediately afterwards fell and expired. The Cossack was instantly again on his legs. Seeing his peril I rode to him and parried several cuts which the dragoons aimed at him; but at last one fell on his hand, and another cut off the flesh from the right temple and made a terrible gash on the head. It was only then that I could persuade the dragoons that he was our friend. They galloped off, and I remained a moment to give him up to some Cossacks whom I saw approaching. The man, however, mad with vengeance and pain, seized at my horse's bridle and told the

Cossacks that I had wounded him. In a moment their lances were couched at my body, but another Cossack darted forward and cried out, "He is our English General!" The others withdrew their pikes, and I preserved my sword, which a Russian dragoon was attempting to wrest from me; but I was not altogether extricated till Prince Galitzin came up with other officers.

After this I rode up the Peterswalde Mountain in pursuit of the enemy passing by that route, who either threw down their arms or were making a faint resistance. To my astonishment, however, I also found the road covered with the Prussian artillery. I could not believe my own sight, and therefore I do not wonder at the King's being astonished when I sent to him to say that we had recovered the Prussian artillery but wanted several hundred horses to remove it. The King, in the evening when I went to him, told me that he was never more astonished, and could not for some time make out what had occurred; but that in consequence of my message the Emperor had lent him the Russian artillery-horses for the occasion.

It is almost incredible that a body of cavalry should charge up such a mountain, at least two miles of ascent, force through a hostile column on march, and effect its escape, while thousands of flying infantry should profit by the panic and also pass.

It was a great fault in General Kleist to descend the mountain with his guns. He should have remained on the height with them, and only sent down some carriages to barricade the road, as thick wood prevented passage to the right or left. The general should moreover have sent some troops to line the

wood, and take post at points which in a few places commanded the road through openings in the wood. But with all these faults of the general, the troops also behaved extremely ill, according to the report of their own officers who all denounced them to me as I came up; and indeed they were as much in disorder as the enemy. Many of them also were killed by the Austrians and Russians under the supposition of their being flying French. I released, moreover, numbers who were marching as prisoners by the Austrians.

If the Prussian corps had been well posted, not a man of the two French corps could have escaped. The plan was admirable, but unfortunately that part which required the best troops failed by the employment of the worst.

I must be just, however, and add that the greater part of Kleist's corps is composed of Landwehr and raw recruits.

The whole scene was most extraordinary, and the day most memorable; presenting another subject for tacticians to treat upon hereafter.

The Emperor was obliged to keep aloof. Count Osterman, who had lost his arm, had been presented in the morning with the Order of St. George; but he returned for answer, that if the Emperor wished to reward him; it must be in another manner. The Emperor wrote to Osterman to know his wishes; when Osterman, and a number of generals, implored the Emperor not to expose himself, as he had done, to the hazards of the combat, and finally obtained his word of honour that he would not.

On my return I went to Stuart, whom I found in pain, but soon afterwards Wilcy arrived. I then

went to the King, who was in high spirits having just received Blucher's report of a victory in which he took fifty guns. But I must pause to know all the particulars before I can believe that the Prussians obtained this success by force of arms against anything like equal numbers; so low do I esteem the Prussians, from want of officers and experience.

The cry now of the Russians and Prussians again is—"Advance!" but they forget how much is due to circumstances and the errors of the enemy.

It will require three weeks to reorganize the army completely, and provide it with shoes, &c. The best thing we could do would be to detach more aid to Blucher, or threaten a descent by the pass of Zittau, on the other side of the Elbe, while we struck a blow in Bavaria with the corps now on that frontier reinforced by such troops as could speedily be added.

Buonaparte would be greatly alarmed if we made much progress on that side without weakening too much the army destined to protect Austria.

All the details of what has passed in the mountains cannot yet be collected, but it appears that Wittgenstein by tackling his cavalry to the guns has saved them all.

I fear that the Austrians have not been so successful. The baggage, however, of the whole army has been nearly all taken or destroyed; and the enemy must have made an immense booty, but not easily transportable. One of their columns is already on this side of Altenburg, but I presume must soon retrograde from yesterday's occurrences.

I understand that the scene in the mountains was most horrible from the shot of the enemy which occa-

sionally fell among the baggage, and the confusion which the terror of the drivers, &c., created when no enemy was near.

Sept. 1*st.*—This morning many more prisoners were brought in. The total number exceeds five thousand, and above sixty guns have been drawn through the town. It appears also that seven generals were either killed or wounded.

Vandamme has been sent to Moscow. He made some complaints against some supposed indignity of treatment; gave offence to the Russian officers by complaining of the Russian Emperor to the Austrian Emperor; and after being exposed in a cart to the view of all the passing Hungarian grenadiers, as he pretended on purpose to make a spectacle of him, he had his sword taken from him by a Cossack at the Grand Duke's order.

I dined with Prince Schwarzenberg and had a long conversation with him and Count Stadion, by which I am further convinced that the connection with the Allies is very delicate. The Austrians will not give up the command to the Russian Emperor. The weight of war presses heavily. The country is in process of ruin; the inhabitants complaining—and with reason—of pillage; the troops constantly grumbling; and no unity of opinion as to the conduct of the war. All parties will gladly profit by the first opportunity to clinch any favourable offer Buonaparte may again make.

After dinner I saw the Duke of Cumberland, who to my great surprise was very courteous: so much so that, on a Russian officer asking whether I had been in the action yesterday, the Duke replied, "Oh! I

will answer for him never being out of one if within possible reach!" In various other instances he was equally civil, and begged of me to go over the ground of battle with him in the morning, which I must do if no attack is made on Marmont's troops, who have been pursuing the Austrians and Wittgenstein, and who are now themselves embarrassed with their spoil in the defiles.

I shall, however, keep well on my guard, and take care of every word I utter. I could not refuse his civility altogether; it would not only have been personally injurious, but nationally improper. The Duke will, I presume, remain with the Prussians.

Stuart is to-day feverish, but I still hope his wound will not be serious. He will go to Prague as soon as he can be removed.

Moreau is, I hear, worse this morning. All the French officers taken express great interest in his welfare.

2*nd*.—This morning a messenger arrived with letters to the 10th of August, but none for me. He gives us also tidings of Lord Aberdeen's arrival at Prague.

I have received advice of my servants and carriage, which retreated by the route of Freyburg. The carriage behind them was taken, and the French were coming to mine when they espied four pieces of cannon which they preferred. My aide-de-camp, Brinken, is taken, and Charles's baggage is lost. Dawson's baggage is also taken, and his servant in flight passed fifty Austrian cannon abandoned. I have no doubt that the Allies in this retreat have lost above a hundred guns and several hundred ammunition-waggons;

amongst them some Russian. The carriages lost must exceed three thousand. I wish a note of this to be sent to a *certain friend of mine.* I had sealed my letter to him before I was sure of the fact, and I did not choose to mention mere hearsay.

This day we have a grand Te Deum, a review of the guards for the Austrian Emperor, and in the afternoon an attack on Marmont's troops in the mountains, if he does not previously withdraw.

Stuart passed a bad night, but will do well; he only wants quiet.

We are every moment expecting news from Blucher. We fear that Buonaparte has fallen upon him unexpectedly, and that the swollen rivers and bad roads which occasioned his success may prove his bane.

We do not understand the Prince Royal's report. There seems to be *something untold about the centre and right operations.*

Töplitz is celebrated for its mineral water, and is a very pretty town; but most of the inhabitants have fled, and there is very general distress for provisions.

6*th.*—After the action with Vandamme no military event of any importance occurred on our side. The news from other quarters began to pour in with many favourable details till yesterday, when going to Peterswalde I brought back tidings of Buonaparte having marched the preceding day to Bautzen with his guards, leaving about twelve thousand men in Dresden, and St. Cyr's corps on the Peterswalde road. It had been the intention to dislodge this corps from its position in front of Peterswalde: I went to see an operation which I disapproved, being satisfied that the enemy would find the least inconvenience from a movement

into this part of Saxony, and we the greatest. The columns, however, destined to pass out of the mountains upon Dippoldiswalde and menace the enemy's rear at Bautenau and Velser did not move—perhaps could not move—with sufficient speed, and the enterprize was abandoned. The spies which came out of Dresden further informed us that about thirty thousand prisoners, including wounded men, were in the town, and a vast quantity of spoil; many cannon, &c., had also been brought in with much parade. I had reason to believe this statement not exaggerated, and my former statement of the Allied loss underrated; for the Austrians estimate theirs alone at above twenty thousand, and I know that of the Russians seven thousand wounded have reached the environs of Töplitz. Add their prisoners taken with their baggage, three battalions on the Peterswalde road; their killed; and the Prussian loss, with the subsequent casualties by sickness; and I fear the total will fall little short of fifty thousand men. It is true some will be restored from the hospitals, but at least a force of forty thousand men must be extinguished.

On my return to Prince Schwarzenberg with Barclay's message, I found the Prince very anxious to make a movement on the other side of the Elbe to check Buonaparte's progress into Lusatia. As we could not pursue our own plans and were obliged now to confine ourselves to the counteraction of the enemy's, certainly this was the most feasible measure, the least hazardous, and the most immediate in its operation. I went to gain the Prussian assent, and Schwarzenberg undertook the Emperor's.

After a long conversation with certain personages

and Hardenberg I perfectly succeeded in convincing them of the propriety of the project, and as the Grand Duke called me up to drink tea with him as I was passing his balcony I gained another friend; but I was happy to find that he was still more anxious for a movement to the left, where we could in our turn resume the offensive. Schwarzenberg's contest was more difficult; but after hard battle he obtained sanction to move with sixty thousand Austrians, in two columns, by Leitmeritz and Aussig towards Zittau. The Emperor of Russia would not let his Russians march. Certain political views in Saxony, I believe, retain them on that frontier. The Austrians had wished to throw the Russians on the right, hoping to get them out of Bohemia; for it is now a fixed principle with the ministers as well as the generals that the armies must act separately, as otherwise the discord arising from disputed command will not only occasion the greatest detriment to the general interests but prevent the possibility of political union for six weeks longer. I found the Austrians at day-break this morning in transports of joy at the idea of separation, and the morning in consequence has been quite a jubilee.

Schwarzenberg and Radetsky both cheered upon it as if a victory had been gained. As this movement promised to have the greatest interest, and as the Austrian service was more immediately connected with my personal views, I obtained from Lord Cathcart permission to accompany this corps, and Schwarzenberg to my application answered, "You come not by favour but by right, and I only hope you will consider yourself inseparable from us."

In a previous conversation with Lord Aberdeen,

he had told me that he should apply for my transfer to the Austrians, an idea which originated with himself before Stuart communicated my wish; I therefore of course found no difficulty in that quarter.

The Austrians, near sixty thousand strong, have begun their march to cross the Elbe. The Russians remain at Nollendorf and Peterswalde, &c., with the Prussians. Prince Lichtenstein with three thousand Austrians remains at Altenberg, and General Kleinau with twenty-eight thousand has orders to advance from Commotau on Marienburg and push on parties with discretion towards Chemnitz that Thielmann's corps, &c., may be sustained.

Among the Austrians are some new battalions of Landwehr. They really are apparently as effective as their Line, and composed not merely of boys as the Prussian Landwehr are, but of grown men rather under prescribed military height.

I have just seen the troops pass, and certainly they are in better order than could have been expected after what has occurred; but still many shoes, &c., are wanted.

The Prussians, all of whom I have seen, are in the very best condition; and the day before yesterday, the Duke of Cumberland, after he had viewed their infantry, cavalry, and artillery, said to me, "It was really worth coming from England to see such troops."

No man can form a conception of the vigorous state of the remnant of the Russian army now here. No man ever beheld such guards and such artillery. Infantry, after two successive seasons, is rarely in similar order; and the cavalry is in as high condition

as if it had never marched more than five wersts a day, and never encountered a cold or wet night.

The Prussians here, being chiefly Landwehr, and *Silesian* Landwehr or recruits, are not fit subjects for notice, especially after their late misfortune.

They are, however, diligent, and if not too hastily brought again into the field may become useful; but youth is the great fault of Austrians and Prussians, so that a winter campaign is almost impracticable. Five-sixths of both armies after six weeks would be in hospital or the grave.

Buonaparte has sent a letter to his father-in-law acquainting him with his safety after two actions fought against the *Russians*. I however suspect that other more important matter accompanied. Certainly the desire for peace has not diminished, but has greatly increased in Prussia and Austria. They both see and tremble at the delicacy of the Russian connection. Russia also begins to doubt of the success which she anticipated; and from disappointment as to command, and other causes of disagreement, is not inclined to recommend perseverance when the struggle becomes more doubtful.

These opinions thus given in *précis* are not the opinions of one or two persons, but of *all the highest and most important personages* who are in the fields of policy or war.

Since I wrote the above, I find that Metternich considers the Austrian loss to be thirty thousand "*tout y compris*." General Kneisbut, the Prussian Quarter-master-general, assures me that their loss is ten thousand "*au moins*;" and the Russians admit twelve thousand killed and wounded, exclusive of prisoners

who must be in very considerable numbers. Stuart indeed has information that Wittgenstein's corps, which was rated at forty-two thousand, does not now exceed twelve thousand; but I calculate that it originally had thirty-six thousand, and can now muster under arms, from what I saw yesterday, eighteen thousand. At any calculation these are heavy losses which must seriously influence. In a day or two I will have the correct returns.

If Blucher evades the impending danger, all may yet be safe; but if he remains to await the shock, or cannot clear himself from it, the consequences must have extensive mischief.

From Italy we have accounts that Fiumé is occupied by the Austrians who await four thousand English; that Beauharnois has a nominal eighty thousand men at Udine, but not much more than fifty thousand effective. The Austrian force in that district amounts to between forty and fifty thousand men.

The co-operation of Murat with Buonaparte has excited the greatest surprise in the Austrian Cabinet. He was considered there, and I believe also by the English, as a certain ally to them. He proves his good-will now by heading the French cavalry and remorselessly using their sabres; but I am told that he has obtained Buonaparte's promise to make the earliest practicable peace.

The Emperors are still here, but I believe the Austrian will go to Aussig and the Russian to Duchs. The King has not fixed his quarters. Yesterday Hardenberg sent for me and asked whether I would receive a Prussian decoration. I answered—"As an honour conferred by itself, and further as a mark of

favour from a Sovereign so highly entitled to esteem." He told me that he was desired by the King to put the question.

I do not recollect that I mentioned the Emperor of Austria's having told me the other day not to get another cross for the one I lost in the redoubt, as "he would charge himself to replace it." I only mention these incidents to show that the former gift has not been forgotten though delayed, and that I rather make progress in Royal favour than otherwise, which is not a *low ambition under my circumstances.*

The Duke of Cumberland, strange to relate, has also added his meed of approbation, and assured me that he shall represent to the Prince Regent that I am acting here no insignificant or useless part.

I can truly say this change in the Duke's own sentiments has taken place without any *strategy* of mine. I sought it not—I expected it not: it was perfectly a feeling created by the evidence of the senses. I think the eulogy will astonish friends and foes in England.

Among some of the pleasing incidents of these bitter-looking days, I must also note Lord Aberdeen's arrival, which has not only been grateful to my wishes but has afforded me the opportunity of expressing certain political opinions on foreign policy which have been approved. I hope they will ultimately produce an effect for the benefit of Europe at large as well as particular States immediately interested.

It is impossible for me to trace all I see, hear, and do. My life is most incessantly passed in action; and in these times a thousand incidents occur daily which might engage the attention of others more remote; but

to record them I should need a warehouse of paper, and friends would be years deciphering the narrative of the events of a few hours. Much may be imagined when it is recollected that in a small village three Courts, Cabinets, and Councils of War are assembled, and that within the eyes' range three armies of three different nations are in position.

Moreau's death cast a great gloom, and is too memorable a catastrophe not to excite lasting regret. Stadion and Metternich passed the last four hours with him, and he died dictating a letter to Alexander.

I had great pleasure in meeting with Merfeldt yesterday. He now commands a corps and will march with the troops destined to pass the Elbe, which renders his expedition more agreeable.

It is my intention to go to Theresienstadt to-morrow to inspect the fortress which Chastelier now commands, and to join the Prince-Marshal next day.

I take Charles with me; but poor Brinken has never yet appeared or communicated, so I much fear more than capture for him.

Stuart, who is getting better, will remove to-morrow to Prague. He has given me a beautiful English blood-mare, and I hope that I have not been wanting in liberal regard towards him, as the 'Gazette' in a short time will show. He is an excellent fellow, and merits all good-will.

Charles is just returned from Wittgenstein, where I sent him. The enemy have fallen back on Pirna, whence probably they will retire on Dresden, if pressed. Schwarzenberg tells me that the object on this side cannot extend further than the blockade of Königstein and the beating in of the Dresden posts. The

more I see the more I lament that our offensive did not commence with a movement from Eger into Germany with at least eighty thousand men. The position of Austria piercing behind the Thuringer-wald was more valuable than her numbers, and we have not in any way profited by it.

September 9th, Leitmeritz.

On the 7th I left Töplitz to join the Austrian army in these environs. Stuart went to Prague with the intention of proceeding to the Prince Royal when a little more recovered. I separated thus from a friend and *camarade de guerre* with whom I had associated in some pleasures and more perils, of which we mutually entertain a durable impression. I found, however, in Lord Aberdeen not altogether a new acquaintance, but a man with a spirit of good-will towards myself which engaged reciprocity of interest, and established, as I hope, the solid foundation of a permanent friendship.

I have seen too much of the errors into which a hasty judgment of men leads—I have known too much of the difference that frequently exists between the first presentation and the real character of men, not to hesitate in forming new attachments until time has afforded sufficient opportunity for full investigation; but in the few days in which I saw Lord Aberdeen I had such conversation with him as assured me that his general views of foreign policy were enlightened; and his application for my transfer to Austria, "as a special favour to himself," after these conversations, was an incontrovertible proof not only of concurrence in sentiment, but of personal partiality created by the can-

dour and tenor of our opinions. In communicating with him I cannot but gain, as his mind is highly endowed—in service under his superintendence I cannot lose, as he is a man of honourable feeling and just principle.

Before my departure I dined with Lord Cathcart and took leave of the Emperor, who expressed to me his wishes confidentially as to the execution of the projected movement. I also made my best bow to the Duke of Cumberland, who bade me farewell as if I had all my years possessed his affections.

The day was the 280th "Pluviose." The roads were knee-deep in mud; the sky yet black with the accumulated vapours which drenched us thoroughly as they discharged their condensed waters.

Waggons with dying horses—waggons without horses—waggons without wheels—waggons with waggoners imploring the thunder of Jove to smite all men including themselves, and all beasts *also themselves included;* guns which had been spiked by the fugitive French, and which were being withdrawn to be made capable of redeeming their honour; Hungarians without boots—Austrians without shoes—men without energy—women without spirits (in their barrels which they *carry on their backs*)—and Cossacks without mercy,—covered the road. It was a scene of utter devastation.

I had ordered Allen and my Spaniard, with my two best horses, to proceed to Theresienstadt, which I wished to see, especially as the Marquis de Chastelier commanded. I could not reach the outer gate till half-past nine, as I had waited for the servants who accompanied me, above an hour. They had stopped

behind to pick up and re-pack the things which had fallen off one of my led horses.

All the shoes had also come off my own horse, and for the last mile he had gone consequently lame on all fours. In this condition to be at the outer gate of a fortress with rain still pouring furiously, and my servants as I supposed within with the parts of my dress most necessary for a change, was certainly a military misery; and it was aggravated by the apprehension that I might not be able to enter at all.

My fears were realised, or rather my patience was exhausted, and I turned my horse back to Leitmeritz, where I should find Schwarzenberg if he had left Töplitz.

The Burgomaster sent me to the Bishop's palace where the Bishop received me; and, as Prince Schwarzenberg had countermanded his staff, &c., I occupied his apartments.

Some tea consoled me for the past; but as I could learn nothing of Allen I apprehended the morrow, foreseeing that the garments which I drew off could not be drawn on again in the morning. Necessity sent me to bed, and a thick feather-bed as a covering kept me in sweltering wretchedness all night.

The next morning at daybreak Allen was sent for to the fortress; but no Allen had been there.

I would rather have dressed as a bishop than lain in my bed any longer, so I rose and with Herculean toil got on my boots, for, as ill-luck had ordered, I had sent Allen forward with my short untwisting boots and trousers to get others made by them, and I had ridden in pantaloons and tight half-boots.

It was a day of thanksgiving for the preservation of

Leitmeritz from the enemy by the defeat of Vandamme, and the Bishop had very wisely judged that the physical man should be cheered while the spiritual man rejoiced. His Sanctity therefore ordered a sumptuous banquet, which was served in a very magnificent hall with the most splendid accessories.

I am told that the Bishop, who has seven hundred and twenty thousand souls in his diocese, is a most excellent prelate, and I can testify to his being a most worthy president.

After dinner I went with Chastelier to examine the fortress, the new fortifications, &c. I have sent the copy of my report, which will give some notion of this interesting place d'armes; but in case of siege Chastelier will be himself a bulwark of powerful value.

This morning at seven I went again to see some experiments with artillery. Hand-grenades were thrown from three-pounders with three ounces of powder only, and went, at an elevation of five degrees, five hundred yards. Grenades from six-pounders were then fired, with six ounces of powder, and they ranged to a distance of one thousand yards, with twelve and a half degrees of elevation.

Chastelier attributes much value to this discovery, as he proposes to fire his hand-grenades from the casemates against the enemy's first parallel. The enemy cannot silence the fire as they cannot see the guns, although the rising smoke may indicate the place.

I returned to dine with the Bishop, and have been employing my subsequent time in finishing the perusal of 'Le Tableau de la Littérature Française,' a beautiful work; but I think the author has not attached suffi-

cient importance to the influence of letters on the public mind.

It is true there is more relation between the genius and bent of writers and the temper and taste of the age than is generally supposed; but if they do not create they continue public feeling on certain topics: and they substantiate floating and vague general ideas and present them with a tangible reality for the grapple of the mass, under the sanction of a recognised power. Men are gregarious—"*ignavum pecus*"—seldom thinking for themselves, but adopting traditionary sayings and doctrinal aphorisms as their moral and political code. The author of the 'Tableau' expresses himself with good taste, and his *raisonnement* is both liberal and acute; but he fails in establishing his position, that the French Revolution was not in great part the production of the writers of the eighteenth century. The faults of sovereigns gave life to the principle of opposition, but the pen certainly dispensed material and excited to action. Now I wish to know who is the author.

I have been reading other works, brochures, &c., which Stuart and his establishment have received. On the whole I find that England is maintaining her prosaic honours, and striding onwards to the higher regions of Parnassus; but yet by the number of editions advertised of certain poems I think her taste is still too *spritely* and her love of slip-shod versification not yet sufficiently corrected.

Sept. 13th, Töplitz.

I was called upon to mount in the middle of the night of the 11th, as the enemy had driven back the

Russians with some loss from before Pirna, and the Austrian army was directed to return by a flank march to Töplitz. I found the enemy, on my arrival at Töplitz, near Peterswalde, and learnt that on the preceding evening he had broken out unexpectedly from the mountains near Töplitz, almost seized the high ground, and surprised the Sovereigns, &c., in the town. The panic had scarcely subsided when I came here.

In the evening I rode out and found the enemy pressing back the Russians, and already masters of the height of Nollendorf. Before dark he had descended the hill and reached our abbatis that had been made nearly at the foot. His force was stated to be thirty thousand in front, and Buonaparte was declared to be following with his Guards, and a force which made the total a hundred and thirty thousand. The half of the Austrians only had arrived, and the Russians had been diminished in the combats before Pirna three thousand men. The night presented a magnificent scene of illumination in the positions of the hostile armies. The hills were lighted to their crests, and the valleys blazed with a sheet of fire. This morning, as I—and I believe I almost alone—suspected, no attack was made, and the remaining Austrians have now time to file through the passes and gain the position between Töplitz and Moden. But I much fear that, exclusive of Kleinau's corps guarding our left at Commotau and Marienburg, the Allies cannot bring into the field more than ninety thousand effectives; and a great portion of the cavalry included in this number are almost exhausted.

I have been of the constant opinion that Buonaparte was endeavouring to draw the Prince Royal and

Blucher near to the Elbe that he might strike his blow and not be removed far from the base of his operations. And I suspect that he has only thrown a force here to mask his march against them. The têtes-du-pont at Königstein facilitate his rapid progress. There are others who believe that he is retiring altogether, and found this belief on the removal of his hospitals, &c., from Leipsic. I see in that arrangement only proper precaution, and expedient relief of the capital which must need supplies.

This morning we had advice of the Prince Royal's victory near Wittenberg. It is strange with so much success as is announced on the other side of the Elbe that Buonaparte should still be able to present the powerful force he does. *I hope we shall not at last take more prisoners than ever there were enemies.*

The ministers all remained here during the last anxious few days; but from all that I see and learn peace is still the desire, and Hardenberg told Stuart that it would be made before the winter.

I have heard from Brinken, who is a prisoner at Dresden. He had some grand conceptions if ever taken; I hope he will execute his designs. I shall remind him.

I had the satisfaction of finding Allen and my horses. We have been moving at cross purposes, but the pleasure of recovery makes me forget my vexation.

12*th*.—The enemy have not attacked, and Buonaparte, it is said, is returned with his Guards to Dresden, but I have just been out and I find the hills and Nollendorf still occupied by them. Victor's, Augereau's, and a part of Vandamme's corps have

been here. What number remain is not known. If the enemy withdraw, Prince Schwartzenberg tells me that he will move by his left—the only judicious movement he can make.

On reading the Swedish details I find that the Swedes have not lost a little finger! The Prince Royal has got the Grand Cross of St. George.

15th.—The day before yesterday Vyse suddenly left the Duke for England. His departure was too rapid for me to take advantage of so favourable an opportunity. Dawson also went to Walmoden, weary of his service here. Yesterday Prince Schwarzenberg ordered a grand reconnaissance, and went himself to superintend. The enemy's posts were found at Nollendorf. Their force in the environs amounted to ten or twelve thousand men. These retired by the high Dresden road. In front of Peterswalde two squadrons of Lyonn* and two squadrons of Lubreski gallantly charged a French column of infantry, and cut down a hundred and fifty, *truly* told. In front of Guttleube, about a German mile and a half further, the enemy took post on a very favourable height with salient woods on the flanks. While the main body was ascending, a strong body remained on the open ground to cover the movement and maintained a very resolute stand. The Russian light guns, however, dashed forward into the line of tirailleurs, and by their intrepid and active fire beat back the enemy, who had fired several volleys with good but not sufficient effect. The enemy retired with slow pace, and seemed to quit with reluctance their dying and dead, who strewed the ground, until they reached the flanking woods. The

* This name is very doubtful in the MS.—ED.

conduct of these troops was the more meritorious, as the greater part consisted of the débris of Vandamme's corps: Bonnet now commands them. The position of the enemy was too strong to be attacked in front, and the Russians had already lost seven hundred killed and wounded; Prince Schwarzenberg advised, therefore, that the attempt should be abandoned.

This order was given after the Prince had personally examined the position, which others, charged with the immediate execution of the day's service, had not done: a trait which I mention to the Prince's credit, against whom there is a very great clamour raised and maintained for inactivity and bad disposition by the Russians, and by Lord Cathcart to please the Russians. I conducted Prince Schwarzenberg, and therefore can testify to his zeal and surveillance under circumstances that gave me pain for other friends who ought to have done this duty before his arrival. I certainly was very glad when I restored the Prince to his suite. Such charges of safe direction are very anxious, especially when chiefs like Schwarzenberg are rather inclined to expose than preserve themselves. Count Colloredo, with nineteen thousand Austrians, was to have dislodged the enemy from Furstenau and Breitenau, where two corps d'armée were posted. They evacuated Furstenau, but the Austrians could not arrive before sunset, and the attack was not thought advisable. Various prisoners asserted that Buonaparte had on the 13th gone over the bridge at Dresden with the intent of attacking Bernadotte, but Prince Schwarzenberg on his return from a ten German mile ride, received advice that he was at Dippoldiswalde; and various accounts tended to inspire the be-

lief that he purposes a movement by the road of Commotau on our left and in rear of our left if we keep our present position, which is not probable. General Thielmann, who has taken twelve hundred prisoners at Weissenfels, writes that the French are forming a large corps at Erfürth which is, in such case, likely to enter Bohemia by Eger; and several prisoners, with the truth of men grateful for preservation, assured me yesterday that two corps d'armée were on march to reinforce the grand army. We presume that the Erfürth corps is included.

Buonaparte has no doubt sustained heavy losses; but he is not yet disposed to prostrate his arms and sue for mercy, although Berthier has certainly counselled peace in the strongest terms, and although it is proved by an infinity of intercepted official and private letters that his troops are shattered by fatigue, disorganized by various discomfitures, and morally enfeebled. The cry is also universal for "peace;" but Schwarzenberg told me yesterday that Buonaparte had replied to one of his observations, "Bah! vous ne connoissez pas la France. Ce n'est pas la guerre que je crains, mais la paix: une paix déshonorable peut seulement me casser le cou." And the Empress, in a flood of tears at the apprehension of the Austrian war, said to Prince Schwarzenberg on another occasion, "The Emperor is in a position extremely delicate. He cannot do as other Sovereigns: if he makes a discreditable peace, opinion sooner or later will ensure his ruin."

15*th*, *evening*.—I now understand that the Austrians are to march upon Commotau and Saxony by the Freyburg route. There is a defile at Zschopau

which I much dread, and I think the whole movement very critical. As Wittgenstein and Kleist remain here we shall be very weak. Good *intelligence* and *mobility* may, however, preserve us from a *coup-de-maître*; although I speculate upon an early retrograde movement. I shall go to Kleinau, who commands the advanced guard. The Emperor of Russia is to move with the Austrians; this causes great dissatisfaction as they hoped to be disembarrassed of the weight of the Courts—for no doubt all the Sovereigns will follow. The whole of the Austrian army in Bohemia, *including the garrisons*, amounts to a hundred and thirty-five thousand. Of these, about ninety thousand can be moveable from their stations. The Russians have *nominally* forty-five thousand, and the Prussians eighteen thousand. I do not, however, believe that the Russians and Prussians can muster under arms more than fifty-five thousand *tout y compris*. I just learn that Beningsen, with the *corps de réserve*, is ordered here. This will give fifty thousand men. The Austrians are greatly pleased with this, which they did not expect. I presume in such case that the Emperor will remain here.

More contradictory reports are come about Buonaparte, who seems to be playing a card with the movement of his own person.

> "I think there be six Richmonds in the field.
> Five have been seen to-day."

I have just received my Maria Theresa Cross, with a very handsome letter.* The Red Eagle, as Hardenberg tells me, awaits but arrival from Berlin.

19*th*.—On the morning of the 17th, I rode with the

* See Appendix.

Prince-Marshal to reconnoitre the enemy, who had reached Nollendorf with fifteen thousand men, and whose camp in the rear contained about fifty-five thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry.

As the enemy appeared quiet, I returned with the Prince in his droska, and profited by this opportunity to receive many more curious anecdotes of incidents that occurred in Paris, &c. Among them I learnt that Buonaparte had intended to avoid battle with the Allies when they marched upon Lutzen, until he had crossed a strong corps and gained the right bank near the new town of Dresden. Buonaparte had even said to Schwarzenberg, "If the Allies have not two hundred thousand men, *I will turn their right* and make Alexander repent of his playing the general." On Schwarzenberg observing that he thus exposed himself to be thrown upon the sea, and to lose his communications, he replied, "Bah! Est-ce que je ne suis pas à cheval sur l'Elbe, à Magdeburg et à Wittenburg?" "And as to communications, what ill can result if I am obliged to draw my line from Wesel? C'est à l'ennemi de penser à sa ligne de communication." I note this because it proves my opinion to have been Buonaparte's, as my reports will certify.

We had scarcely sat down to dinner when the cannon commenced briskly. We were obliged to return to the field, and found the enemy pressing the Prussians—who had given way at the abbatis, and thus encouraged the enemy's advance to Culm—with about thirty guns altogether, and eight thousand men. The Russian reserve checked the enemy's progress, and the Marshal having ordered Count Colloredo with his corps to attack in flank, which movement was executed with great

steadiness and intrepidity, the enemy fell back and regained the hill. The Prussians lost some men, though not many; but a General Kreutzer was taken, whose people abandoned him, when he thought they were following to charge. Kreutzer signifies a piece of money worth about a farthing, and this *équivoque* gives occasion to many severe *calembourgs*. The fact is, that the Prussians did not make a proper defence, and even the King censured them; but they were so very raw and youthful, that pity is rather to be excited than resentment. Thick rain and almost substantial vapour prevented much observation. The flame from the guns was, indeed, the only means of direction to the troops.

We returned about ten at night, wet to the bones, and leaving the poor troops in all the miseries of a hard bed under their bodies, and water from the heavens occasionally pouring upon them "in pailfuls."

Many expected a general battle on the ensuing morning—I did not, and proved right. It happened that Buonaparte only came on to see what we were about, and probably with a hope of crushing some rashly-advanced corps. He had been in the affair, and had his horse wounded in the shoulder. I have spoken with a soldier who saw the accident and his exchange of horses with a lancer of the Guard.

The next morning, when Merfeldt advanced from Klein Kreitnau, and took the village of Kitzin, he was also present and ordered the troops forward, which rendered it expedient for the Austrians to withdraw.

During the day I rode to see what was going on, and met the Grand Duke, who obliged me to return to dine with him at twelve o'clock, which assured me a

meal without an appetite; but I fortunately overtook the Emperor, with whom I had a long conversation of great utility; and I had the satisfaction of hearing the Emperor say that he now saw the danger of a new Saxon invasion, at least until the arrival of Beningsen, and that he approved of Schwarzenberg's reluctance to make it.

This gave me an opportunity of doing justice to Schwarzenberg, and of engaging the Emperor's influence with the King of Prussia to effect a reconciliation between him and the Marshal, which is now done from this and other measures which I took. The King was certainly *trop vif* and severe in his expressions: he wounded the feelings of the man, and the dignity of the chief; but Schwarzenberg happily has good sense enough to set due limits to the excitement of his *amour propre et fierté soldatesque*; and the King, with an ardent temper, has an excellent heart and sound understanding.

I dined with the Grand Duke, or rather went through the motions, as Hutchinson used to do at the King's table, but in good earnest partook of Aberdeen's later entertainment. This morning news has reached us of the enemy having fallen back to Peterswalde. It is impossible to predict what his next operation will be, except very vaguely. I suspect that he wishes to deal a deadly blow at the Prince Royal, if he approaches within his spring; if not he will nurse his troops, wait until his forces are formed at Erfürth, to secure his Franconian communications and *Bavarian influence*, and then, if he cannot make peace, undertake some operation of magnitude.

The alarm for the passage of the Baltic will facili-

tate his movements against Dresden; but it is only by alarming Austria that he can negotiate more successfully.

The Allies, in consequence of the loss of thirty-six thousand Austrians, forty thousand Russians, and twenty-six thousand Prussians of the Bohemian force, cannot at present undertake more than the operations of *corps volants*, and that not to a very great extent, as our cavalry is extremely weakened and in bad condition. It will depend upon what Beningsen actually brings up, whether we can detach to our left on a greater scale. This is the sole operation that can dislodge the enemy from the Elbe; but I apprehend that Buonaparte's corps at Erfürth will be ready to check us before ours is able to march. I see no positive success within our command except the capture of Modlin, Stettin, and Glogau, which can be effected before Buonaparte can reach them, and which would be of infinite value in negotiation or for future war.

The news from the Tyrol is satisfactory; but Austria, afraid of displeasing Bavaria, will enter into no engagement for its union or independence. I presume that Bavaria will temporize and await the issue of events on the Elbe. There is another expected incident favourable to the Allies, which will cause great astonishment and, I should suppose, dismay in the enemy's head-quarters. I dare not mention it, and would not even have it made the subject of guess, for fear of doing mischief; but I shall be an infidel as to the execution until I see the result. I think, however, much good may come of the scheme, although not in the exact way proposed.

With prudent War Councils and moderation in the Cabinets we shall prosper. Impatience and extravagant pretensions can only mar our progress towards settled improvement.

In Berthier's letters it is said, "We have to do with a strong party, but Buonaparte hopes that the Allies will make some fault." He would not have been disappointed, but might have said, "The Lord hath delivered them into my hands," if Schwarzenberg had yielded to the Russians and the majority of the Prussians.

We have taken another courier; and the Grand Duke in turning over some straw at Peterswalde in the apartment of Buonaparte found some rent pieces of a letter which have been placed together and can now be read perfectly. It is the order for the retreat of the rear-guard, with some interesting instructions about burying the French dead, and making such a disposition if the Allies pursued as would oblige them to deploy their force. On another piece of paper was written, "Le Duc de Rovigo prie les ordres de votre Majesté à l'égard des événements de Marseilles, auxquels il attache beaucoup d'importance."

It appears from the evidence of the peasantry and the actual state of many dead horses that the enemy have either from necessity or Moscow *gout* been making soup and steaks of *la charogne*. I presume that there might have been a partial want of meat in this expedition, but in general there has not been more than a deficiency of bread, and potatoes have been supplied as a substitute. I calculate that even this need arises rather from want of transport than from scarcity in the magazines.

In the mail which was taken, the returns of the French army were found; according to which there are four hundred thousand men between the Saal and the Oder. The Austrians think he has not more than two hundred and thirty thousand, exclusive of garrisons, and some pretend not more than a hundred and eighty thousand effective; but from all that I can learn I estimate his force at two hundred and twenty thousand disposable.

I adjoin a sketch* of the memorable projected movement, which was so much urged, upon the *Pinar Merst.* When the length of his line of march is added I think the tableau ought to have terrified even an *Australitzer* état major: but it did not; and "Leipsic!—Leipsic!" was the constant cry of the shepherd and his flock, as if it were the promised land in which the French were to lay down their arms. My plan may not dislodge the enemy—although I think it would oblige him to shift his ground with the mass and favour the siege which Blucher and the Crown Prince might undertake;—but it would avoid disaster and that *coup éclatant* which would not only ruin our military power but dissolve at one blow all political connection between the Allies.

"*La prudence et la nourriture*" ought to be our watchword. We cannot fail under that system, and Buonaparte must in the end consent to pacification on disadvantageous terms.

We expect now daily England's answer. If she accepts the congress proposition Austria will accept it also; and negotiations will recommence with or without an armistice as may be then determined by considera-

* Not found among the papers.—ED.

tion of new circumstances. I am rather inclined to think with armistice.

Count Metternich does not conceal his choice for peace, nor do the Austrians. They see the impossibility of protracting the war through another campaign and support Metternich's views so far, which enables him to pursue them with assurance. Before the war he stood almost single: now he is sustained by the army and nation. The Russian pillage daily augments the desire for pacification; but great care must be taken in the arrangements, for Buonaparte will certainly meditate vengeance, and profit by any hostile political separation of the Allies—if Buonaparte remains chief of the French empire three years after peace is signed.

The bulletin of this day is satisfactory. The Austrian Colonel Schreuter has taken Freyburg, General Beaupère, and four hundred hussars who shut themselves up at night in the town and did not leave one sentinel outside, although there is a great faubourg. The surprise was complete. No enterprise was ever more gallant or more ably executed.

I received letters from Dantzic this morning. The Duke of Wurtemberg, with the loss of about two thousand men, has taken a very important faubourg: it enables him to proceed with his plan, at which I have hinted in my report, and which will in the attempt excite great admiration among all military men.

I spoke to the Emperor about the Duke this day, and I had the satisfaction to find that he was much pleased and would give him a proof of his favour.

The Duke of Cumberland has left us, very angry

with the Emperor, and in great hatred of the Russians; hatred augmented by the fear of their power.

I had the pleasure to find that I had exactly attained the position which I wished and ought to have in relations with him as the King's son in a foreign country.

20*th*.—Last night we were making a calculation of the loss of the Allied army which formed in Bohemia; and it appears that there is a deficiency of thirty-six thousand Austrians, forty thousand Russians, and very near thirty thousand Prussians up to yesterday, including killed, wounded, and prisoners of all descriptions.

The Austrians in Bohemia, including their garrisons and Landwehr which have joined their armies, have still a hundred and thirty-three thousand; the Russians muster forty-thousand in their *lists*; and the Prussians little more than fifteen thousand.

With the weather which daily becomes worse, we shall soon have only skeleton battalions: the more especially as the Austrians are ill shod and clothed, and the Prussians are almost children.

Blucher's loss since the 17th of August is estimated at twenty-five thousand. The loss of the Allies under Bernadotte at fifteen thousand, and the little finger of a Swedish chasseur. The whole comprises a tolerable expenditure of men.

Beasts, however, have not suffered less in proportion; and we have now no longer that mass of cavalry which swarmed not only on this plain but in every plain between the Saal and the Vistula. The reserve cavalry is in good order; and has not suffered greatly, but the light cavalry is now not sufficient for the service of the army; and these, from the difficulty of

procuring forage and the constant soak of their bodies, daily diminish.

I doubt whether the enemy's cavalry suffer equally. He is in a better country, has better lodgment, and does not employ it so much as we do ours. I always fear that he is nursing the main body to re-appear; as he did after the battle of Eylau with a force which by numbers and condition gave him at once the superiority.

His infantry is certainly hard pressed, but still he affords them relief by constant exchanges of garrison, and sustains them by the neighbourhood of his magazines which contain sufficient means, although we say here that the enemy are starving.

23*rd*.—I had yesterday an opportunity of ascertaining the strength of the Allied cavalry. The Austrians commenced with near sixteen thousand; they have now about ten thousand. The Russians have but thirteen thousand six hundred left, and the Prussians about fifteen hundred.* Of course I confine this return to the Bohemian army. It will be full three weeks before any more come up from Hungary; and Beningsen, exclusive of some Tartars and Besquins, only brings up four regiments of Cossacks. The French cavalry at the lowest computation is estimated at thirty-seven thousand. As he has the barrier of the Elbe to oppose to the Crown Prince and Blucher, the greater part could have been assembled in the square between the Bohemian frontier, the Saal, Leipsic, and the Elbe, if we had been mad enough to redescend with the numerical hundred and fifty thousand which could have been collected for that operation.

* This last number is very doubtful in the MS.—ED.

I lament, however, much that the Prussians oppose our movement towards Hof. While Beningsen remained here and Kleinau connected with him, and the Grand corps d'armée advanced to the left, Blucher, at a certain epoch was to pass the Elbe. Whether the King fears that Blucher may be *entamé*, or—what I more apprehend from a conversation which I had with the King two days since—he is so suspicious of the Prince Royal as to wish to keep him in surveillance by Blucher's neighbourhood, I do not exactly know; but the opposition to the movement is very prejudicial to the general interests, and the plan of remaining inactive at Commotau and Brix until the enemy moves very unsuitable to the present state of affairs: and this, whether Bavaria is friend, foe, or neutral, which will be decided before the departure of the present courier.

The partisan war continues successfully, but the enemy has now detached sufficient cavalry to render further success a prize of honour.

Last night there was a tremendous conflict of the elements. Sickness increases now rapidly.

25*th*.—Yesterday we received advice of Buonaparte's having passed the Elbe and marched on Bischoffswerda. Some suppose on Blucher, others on the Crown Prince. If I were in his position and did not think it necessary to secure the Confederation of the Rhine by the aid of my presence I would sweep through Berlin, revictual the fortresses, and return via Magdeburg. The Allies seem to regulate their military movements by the ministers' views, and will not commit their armies to any decisive operations until the events of the next fourteen days are known.

England's answer may come in that time, and Bavaria will be, according to present appearances, an avowed friend. The King has already written to order his troops to retire in a body or individually from the French; but in his proposed treaty he requires that he shall be made the organ of some pacific proposition to France, so as to have the pretext of a breach with her. This proposition has been refused.

The whole proceeding is very curious, and in my opinion still very mysterious.

Yesterday I received a very handsome letter * from Count Metternich, Chancellor of the Order of Maria Theresa, as well as minister.

I have sent it through Aberdeen to Lord Castlereagh for presentation to the Prince Regent who must be interested in the approbation of his generals. By the next courier I shall send a letter from Count Hardenberg, through Stuart, announcing the gift of the Red Eagle for services of a remoter date.

My pacific negotiations have completely succeeded. Schwarzenberg and the King, and Radetsky the Austrian Quartermaster-general and the King, are now quite reconciled; and all is proceeding in that quarter with *important good-will.* The service is felt and acknowledged by them and many others, among whom are Stuart and Aberdeen.

I am anxiously expecting a Government answer to my application for a transfer to Austria.

I adhere to my original resolution on that subject. It is not worth my while, nor consistent with my credit, to play an under-character as I have been so long doing.

* See Appendix.

8 o'clock.

The news of Buonaparte's march is confirmed, but as yet his object is not manifest.

It is strange that he should feel himself sufficiently safe in his rear while Bavaria is refusing his control.

The more I consider the importance of Bavaria the more I am sure that we are but imperfectly informed.

I saw the Emperor of Austria this morning, who was remarkably gracious and pleased with what he had heard from Schwarzenberg and others.

To conclude: in the middle of last night I dreamt that I saw preparations for the assault upon this town. I beheld the cavalry mount—I *heard the trumpet* sound the charge, and the crash upon the pavement. I jumped up—seized my sword—rushed to the stair-head—awoke—and found that at the precise moment a courier blasting his horn was rumbling by my window in a waggon at full trot!

27*th*.—In the interval of war we have been occupying the time with chivalric banquets. Yesterday the Russian Guards gave a dinner to the Sovereigns on the festival of the Emperor's coronation. Previous to the fête there was mass. A tent perched upon a sloping hill was the temple of worship, and about nine thousand men, picturesquely grouped in columns, formed the congregation. After the service these troops filed by and merited much admiration from the *belle tenue* in which they presented themselves. The Prussian Guards were particularly clean and well appointed.

After this inspection we went to the hall of entertainment, and really it was one of the best constructed fir, mat, and woodbine salles that ever was made.

The taste of the artificers deserved the highest encomiums.

About forty or fifty persons sat down at the principal table, and about two hundred more at other tables. I was fortunate enough to obtain a place not merely at the first, but between the two Princes Lichtenstein, who are two of the most interesting persons I ever met in any land. They would have honoured King Arthur's Round Table.

We had scarcely sat down when the kitchen fired, and the flames approached so closely as to cause inquietude to the guests, but happily the wind changed and the store-room as well as the banqueting-room was preserved.

The accident greatly distressed Schwarzenberg, who remembered the fate of his sister-in-law at Paris.

We made excellent cheer, and broke up about five o'clock.

I must note here some particulars with reference to the order of the "Red Eagle." Hardenberg gave me, at a banquet at Sir C. Stuart's afterwards, his own insignia, as a compliment additional to his master's bienveillance. It has been obtained without any other interest than that which my own services have created. I have won it from a Sovereign who has been gracious enough to consider those services as worthy of the reward of a decoration which the bravest of his warriors heretofore on the scene of Prussian glory have been proud to win, and which he now gives with a very sparing hand. This war not more than six have been given; and he proposes to render it as scarce as possible consistently with legitimate claims. The "Black Eagle" is more general, though higher, as it

extends to diplomatic services, and shadows those on whom other Sovereigns smile from whatever cause. I was not within its reach, because my rank in the army was not that of a Lieutenant-General. The "Red Eagle" is rather considered as the badge of the House of Nassau, and this in my eyes augments its value. In the last war I had obtained the Fourth Class. In this war how many toils, how many perils, how much privation, what extremity of climate have I not encountered before I received this reward! I have indeed had it measured out to me with an extraordinarily distinguishing favour, but not without an approving army and empire.

[TRANSLATED COPY.]

"GENERAL, "Töplitz, 27th Sept., 1813.

"It is with very great satisfaction that I fulfil the King's commands, to transmit to you the insignia of the Grand Order of the 'Red Eagle,' in public testimony of his esteem, and as a mark of justice which his Majesty renders to the valour you have uniformly displayed in his presence.

"His Majesty has at the same time granted the Cross of the Military Order of Merit to those officers whom you recommended.

"Receive, General, the assurances of my personal attachment and of my highest consideration.

(Signed) "HARDENBERG."

I have had the good fortune to force my progress through formidable impediments. When I think on

all my difficulties, I scarcely can believe the success that I have realized.

Children ought to be very grateful to parents who give them hereditary consideration. It levels many obstructions, and ensures many a helping hand; it makes those payments gold which abstract merit would receive in baser metal.

This day the Emperor gave a grand dinner to all the English. About thirty assembled, and the banquet was sumptuous. The Emperor wore the star of the English order of the "Garter," recently conferred, and the "Garter" *above the knee* as the boot came up to the top of the knee-cap. It was probably the first time that it was ever so worn. I could not help thinking that the place of the "Garter" where I had seen the Legion of Honour marked a strange revolution. I am now going to the King *en cordon* to perform my part of chivalric ceremony, and I truly have great pleasure in appearing before the King as one of his knights.

I hope, however, to prove my sentiments by *deeds rather than words*,* and add honour to the "Red Eagle," so that I may feel acquitted of every military obligation before the campaign closes.

I had the great satisfaction to see Beningsen at dinner. Time is a powerful corrector of ills. What a variety of considerations is connected with his return to the Emperor's head-quarters.

I was glad to see him looking rather younger than he did even at Moscow, where I left him in prime appearance.

His troops have, I understand, suffered much en

* "Res non Verba" is the motto of the family of Wilson.

route. He describes the roads as almost impracticable. We have had, however, two days' fine weather, and I hope it may continue for a week, when the road will become a little consolidated.

The Austrian army made a short movement yesterday, but brought up at anchor very near this town as it appeared that Buonaparte had concentrated at Pirna.

I do not believe he will invade Bohemia except under some new circumstances, but his lingering so obstinately on the Elbe creates great uneasiness.

12 o'clock, Sept. 27th.

I have just come from the King, who told me that it was necessary some time or other to treat; and that when Buonaparte showed most pliability was in his opinion the fittest occasion. I observed that, at all events, the Allies ought to avoid a line of conduct which would rally every Frenchman and every ally of France round the Government and its chief; for although the desire of peace was prevalent, the enemy was not prepared to lay down his arms and surrender at discretion as a preliminary. After some conversation on this subject, the King told Stuart he was very glad that he was going to the Crown Prince's army, as distrust as well as difference of opinion was rapidly gaining ground in that quarter, and threatened great inconveniences to the general service. We then spoke of Metternich's displeasure at the concealment of England's acceptance of the Congress proposition. The King admitted that it was done from a fear of its influencing the Austrians to protract negotiations.

The fact is that Metternich is justly furious at this

deceit; and it was a want of candour for which I fear he will one day or another pay the Allies in their own coin *with interest*. Ramus, the messenger, brought out the assent of the British Government. It was expedited to Hardenberg, the Hanoverian minister, then at Prague; but Cathcart was persuaded by the Council of the Allies to advise that the communication should be postponed, and I understand that Aberdeen was the first person who let the great cat out of the bag.

Stadion, it is said, was sent away in disgrace on the discovery, either for joining in the conspiracy or being ignorant of it.

Honesty is truly the best policy. Expedients at the expense of integrity never can be beneficial to any cause; some time or another there will be an injurious reaction.

I rather think that I noted the transaction at the time. I became acquainted with it about the 10th of last month, and Ramus had come through a day or two before from England with the advices. We shall hear more of this hereafter.

I have been with the Austrian Quartermaster-general this day, advising that Zamosc should be a neutral fort during the war, that is, garrisoned by Prussians in the first instance, and until the fate of the Duchy is determined. It is a very important fortress, greatly affecting Austrian interests. Its transfer to Russia should not be lightly admitted at the present moment if the balance of power in Europe be the real object of the other contending parties.

Aberdeen has the same view and works in his own *foyer* of action. I don't believe that we have yet

differed on any one subject; and if we should do so, it would be only until the truth was ascertained, for that is the object of his researches as well as mine. Neither he nor I admit any bias from partial feelings. He is, however, the only countryman of my own on the Continent yet encountered with whom I can with safety and advantage candidly talk on war and politics. All others, without exception, have either limited understandings or narrow principles on these subjects. I have resolved, therefore, never to trace a line or open my lips to any one of them on these matters beyond mere narration of facts.

The King of Prussia has just sent Charles and Brinken (unfortunately now a prisoner) his Order of Merit. James (Sir Charles's aide-de-camp) also gets it for service under my orders.

I rejoice that these are honours which distinguish brave friends whose merit I have witnessed.

Dawson also will get a decoration for his service with me, and he truly deserves it.

I transmit a piece of my new order ribbon. It is not in itself beautiful, but it becomes so when cannon-smoked.

Stuart leaves us to-morrow for the Crown Prince. In addition to his ministerial duties he has the superintendence, &c., of all the troops in the north, surveillance of the Crown Prince, &c. Government, I suppose, thinks him gifted with the powers of omnipresence.

29*th*.—The military arrangements are to proceed. Beningsen will move here with his army to guard the Töplitz route. The reserve will go to Commotau and Brix. Kleist, Wittgenstein, and Kleinau will go

to Marienberg. Maurice Lichtenstein to Gera, and parties will be pushed forwards toward the left.

The Crown Prince proposes to pass the Elbe. He has already thrown bridges at Roslau and Ackern.

Tauentzein having been pressed back, Blucher has marched to sustain him, and will keep bearing to his right. A cannonade was heard yesterday in that direction, but the report of the action is not yet received.

Tchernigow has gone to Cassel: I regret that movement—first, because we have the copy of an intercepted letter from Buonaparte to his brother, advising him to withdraw everything from Cassel that was valuable; as Cassel was liable to be approached by an enemy, which might inconvenience him but not affect his (Buonaparte's) communications; and second, because an attempt will be made to excite the people. The bravest and most zealous will rise—the insurrection will be quelled, as no troops are near enough to sustain them—and the expedition will terminate in a predatory success, execution of our most valuable friends, and the consequent augmented strength of the enemy.

The diplomatic news of the day is important. There has been a letter to the Emperor of Austria, from Buonaparte through Bubna, and by the hand of General Flahault, Buonaparte's first aide-de-camp. I have detailed the contents to Edward, in a private letter.

This measure I have been daily expecting, and, with the exception of the proposal for the surrender of Zamosc, I almost framed to Lord Aberdeen the language.

Buonaparte is pressed in his military arrangements; but his greatest fear is the discontent of his chiefs and soldiery at the idea of the war being carried on to gratify his own views to the detriment of better French interests, and to the destruction, sooner or later, of themselves in this contest of extermination. They also think that his policy must be bad, when Austria, Russia, and Prussia can coalesce, notwithstanding their varying views.

To arrest the progress of this feeling, Buonaparte offers negotiation on terms that assure the support of every Frenchman and every reasonable man, whatever may be the latent feeling as to his dynasty. If peace be the consequence, he will certainly separate Prussia and Austria from Russia. He cannot fail in this object. He already announces his disposition to aid their interests. They will not be false to themselves. Personal friendships have little to do in great political transactions; personal animosities have far more influence. The passions, more than the sense of duty and obligation, control the judgment.

I have strongly urged to Lord Aberdeen the necessity of meeting this amicable proposal with amicable spirit. I have represented to him the importance of extricating Austria, &c., out of many difficulties with honour and advantage; of restoring (France therein aiding) the balance of power, which her conquest would render more difficult since Austria would not gain the ascendancy. "Non *illæ* imperium terræ" in her present military condition. I have also pointed out the military obstacles to success which exist, in addition to the chances of the war. I have pointed out, further, that the coalition cannot exist during

the winter; that we are hourly impairing rather than improving our strength in the enemy's proportion. And I am happy to find that he knows there are limits beyond which France will not be beat back, and that it is the part of a statesman to ascertain those limits; to remember in prosperity the lessons of moderation, and not to force down public spirit to that point where the bounding spring destroys the hand that so unskilfully compressed its elastic power.

We are not able to drive France from the Elbe, if the enemy remain *true* to themselves: there *were hopes that they would not do so.* The rejection of the pacific proposition would rally the most disaffected. Bavaria and others would renew their allegiance; they seek peace and the preservation of what they have—not to see their country made the theatre of war, their treasure and blood expended, with the *chance* of losing *much,* and the *assurance* of acquiring *no more.* Remember, when I put these marks of emphasis, more is known than expressed.

It appears to me impossible that peace can be far distant. It will be an evil genius, indeed, that directs the affairs of the Continent, if the olive tree is hewn down instead of being cherished by Europe, for whose benefit it would grow to maturity.

Oct. 1*st.*—Sir C. Stuart, who leaves us to-morrow for the Crown Prince, where he will have more care than pleasure, dispatches a courier this night to Gottenburg; so that our present letters will almost reach England at the same time as those sent yesterday. In these times, however, twenty-four hours make much difference, and afford always some interesting novelty.

The news of the day is Platow's success, which will

be sent *en bulletin*, so I do not enter into details. Platow does, however, deserve my notice. I was guarantee that he would win the Cross of Maria Theresa: to-morrow he will wear it, with the Emperor of Russia's picture—a most distinguished honour among the Russians. General Thielmann, who was in the neighbourhood, writes that he has taken two guns, and made some prisoners of the fugitives from Altenberg. The Saal covered them from further pursuit. Buonaparte, it is said, has gone to Leipsic. The distribution of his army on this side the Elbe is said to be as follows:—Thirty thousand men on the Töplitz route; fifteen thousand men in Dresden; fifteen thousand near Freyburg, Chemnitz, &c.; thirty thousand Meissen and Torgau; one hundred thousand Leipsic, where he has taken up his own abode, since the 28th, and where he proclaims, "Gare à celui qui m'approche trop près et à l'aventure!"

At Erfürth he has not many men, but it is now certain that fifty thousand men from the Rhine are to march there between the 14th and 20th of this month. They are half of the arrière-ban, and have been organizing by Kellerman.

I always suspected and insisted that some force was forming to supply the vacancy between the Maine and the Saal: it was only this day that I could ascertain the fact. Buonaparte has committed faults, and occasionally adventured desperately, but in general he has made scientific war, and attended to the consolidation of his military distributions. He particularly values support, and prefers successive aids to a superior advanced line. Bavaria, however, greatly astounds me. The news from the negotiators received this day

assumes that the treaty only awaits the King's signature, and that this signature will be given immediately. How Buonaparte can suffer that negotiation to proceed and appear indifferent, quite baffles my calculation. The defection of Bavaria appears, in my judgment, to *secure Germany* to the Allies. It is an event of such magnitude, that until the deed is irrevocably done I must be an infidel.

It is possible that when Beningsen's whole force comes up, a movement may be made on the Töplitz route to favour the operations on the left, which will be pushed with caution; for Beningsen is of opinion, with myself, that any fault would ruin our affairs, and that to advance into Saxony to give battle would be that irreparable fault. He scouts the *Leipsic* councillors. His information respecting the Silesian operations is very unfavourable, but as I suspected. He declares that Blucher has *in toto* made more than six thousand prisoners; that the military operations have been of inferior character, but that the conduct of the campaign has been sufficiently able. He estimates Blucher's loss at thirty thousand men since the 17th of August. As he passed through Blucher's country, was in constant connection with him, &c., he must be a good judge in this matter.

His report of the Crown Prince is consonant with what I stated; but I learn from another quarter that the Crown Prince has declared that he will not pass the Elbe, but look to operations which may secure him Norway. We shall rue, ere the winter is over, that gentleman's connection. Already he checks Prussian movements by the fear of his views, and thus more than nullifies to the general interests the forces under

his command. His stanchest friends here now admit that he is a "fanfaron and egregious liar."

This day twenty-four thousand five hundred of Beningsen's infantry passed the Sovereigns. They are well-armed, efficient men, in martial but not in parade order. Their toilette arrangements seemed to mortify the Russian Emperor, but every one else was highly gratified at the sight of such a reinforcement. In five days the bearded twenty thousand under Tolstoy will arrive.

This morning the Emperor's answer to the letter of Napoleon went to Dresden by the high route. It was well drawn out. He refers the treaty about the surrender of Zamosc to the respective commanders (*having the Emperor of Russia's assurance that it shall be given to the Austrians*); and it meets the pacific proposition, but insists upon the necessity of a general and not a partial arrangement; it therefore defers negotiation until the answer from England arrives. The language is very energetic. This evening a letter of felicitation on his birthday (the coming 4th October) has arrived from the Empress. I have not yet seen it, but I presume that there are some expressions of her distress at the war, as Buonaparte in his letter mentioned that she was greatly pained at the contest. This intercourse is judicious in Buonaparte; it naturally operates to soften asperity.

Prince Schwarzenberg, as a proof of his favour and confidence, has ordered that I shall daily have a copy of the report he makes to the Sovereigns (and the Sovereigns only) on the changes made in the location of his own troops, and the intelligence he has received. This trait of amity and consideration is of great value.

I, of course, shall give the reports to Aberdeen, and they will be regularly transmitted to Government, who will thus be able to check the published accounts, and keep a correct *tableau militaire*.

It is an additional pleasure to serve with men who feel an interest in promoting every wish I frame, and who put so much liberality in every transaction. If ever I were to quit the British army, I certainly would take an Austrian uniform.

I have this evening received another proof of Russian favour. A most flattering rescript has been sent me by the Emperor, stating the motives which induced him to give me the Order of St. George, and that in the manner he did. It is almost too flattering to send home; but I shall do so by the next courier, that it may be inserted in the Herald's Archives with the grant of the Order by the Prince Regent. There it may rest for posthumous consideration; but I desire the boys may have a first perusal, that they may ambition to merit higher encomiums under more favourable British auspices.

"A Töplitz, ce $\frac{15}{27}$ Septembre, 1813.

"Monsieur le Général Wilson,

"Lorsque je vous décorai devant la troupe des marques de mon Ordre militaire de S. George de la 3me classe, je rendais justice à ce zèle infatigable qui pendant toute la campagne vous a constamment fixé aux avant-gardes, à la valeur brillante, et au dévouement dont j'ai été témoin à la bataille de Bautzen, et à tant d'autres preuves d'intrépidité attestées par tous les braves des armées combinées. Il m'est agréable aujourd'hui de vous répéter par écrit des témoignages

auxquels vous avez des titres aussi marqués, et de vous assurer de mes sentiments.

"ALEXANDRE."

Lord Walpole leaves us to-morrow for S. Petersburg.

We have despatches to the 10th of September, but no letters.

I have read with pain in the papers the *forgery* signed "*Moreau.*" Never was a document more unworthy the supposed writer.

Oct. 13th, Altenberg.
130th Pluviose.

On the 11th we quitted Penig. Rain as usual. We came to Altenberg, and I was glad to find myself again among the *Vandals.* On the 12th I rode with Prince Schwarzenberg to Borna and Espenheim, that we might reconnoitre the enemy. My military reports note the posts, occurrences, &c.; but not an observation which I made of the advanced guard being most rashly hazarded and liable to total extinction. Marshal Murat might not see the occasion presented for his glory, but if Buonaparte had been present I am sure the Russian army yesterday evening would have had seven thousand men minus. When we came back to Borna, drenched and covered with mud, the Prince thought it better to relieve our horses and go in post-waggon, so I accompanied him; but we soon regretted the change, as we were obliged, from the shortness of the carriage, to sit with our knees almost up to our breasts. Good-will, however, produces conformity, and in a short time we thought no more of our

posture. In the course of our journey the Prince repeated to me various anecdotes which greatly interested me. Among them was a conversation of Talleyrand with Buonaparte, after his Moscow campaign. Talleyrand told it to the Prince at Paris.

"It is now, sire," said Talleyrand, "the general hope that you will make yourself King of France. You are Emperor of the French, but your conquests and that title belong to the army, not to your people. Your people have not known you as a sovereign, only as a general. If you will show some concern for them they will support you and your dynasty—if you will only be a military chief, your own reign is doubtful and the loss of the sceptre to your family certain." Buonaparte was displeased, and T. remains in disgrace.

On another occasion Berthier told the Prince that he had said to Buonaparte, "Sire! it is time to make a peace that will allow others to live as well as ourselves. It is natural that when sovereigns feel humiliated and nations distressed they should seize every occasion to improve their condition. Hence these perpetual defections and wars. Besides, Sire! if you fall during some contest it is almost certain that your child will not reign. The spirit of the people of France is awed, but not conciliated as yet." Buonaparte answered—"Berthier, you know nothing about the matter," and turned the conversation. "But," said Berthier, "I return frequently to the charge, for if these wars go on Jacobinism will sooner or later again prevail."

Schwarzenberg assures me that the Empress also feels great apprehension that her child will not succeed

to the throne, or rather that a greater misfortune than that may occur in the troubles of the times which would follow Buonaparte's death. And Buonaparte is himself convinced that the Jacobins are still a most powerful party in France; not the sans-culotte Jacobinism, but consular Jacobinism, which the want of a pre-eminent chief to assure the suffrages of the army would extend through the troops.

On our return we heard the joyous news of Bavaria's accession. This is indeed a substantial acquisition: well managed, it is decisive of the independence of Europe. If we will only ask Switzerland to form defensive connection I am sure she will grapple to the link, and then the equilibrium of Europe is almost re-established. I presume that Buonaparte calculates upon the advance of new troops from France to secure Franconia and his line of communication by Mainz and Wesel, but we ought to be masters of the field before they can take solid post, although Kellerman is already in march with some troops. If I commanded the Allies I would not attempt to dislodge Buonaparte from the Elbe; on the contrary, I would do all in my power to keep him there, and uncover Prussia to bring the troops from thence and place them on the other side of the Saal. I would have échelon on échelon to the Rhine.

This moment Prince Wolkonsky has brought me a letter, which comes from Blucher, and enables me to act as I wished. Blucher and the Prince Royal are at Halle, Merseburg, Rothenburg, &c. I think, however, battle will be preferred; and as it is not *one army* with *one chief*, perhaps it is better to make use of the opportunity and bring matters to a speedy issue. With

such a concentrated force against him Buonaparte cannot acquire more than a *ruinous* victory; and if he is beaten he perishes.

This may appear contradictory opinion. I may be accused of "blowing hot and cold with the same breath," but it must be recollected that we are now but one army; we are not acting from three separate points. Judgment or Fate has produced an union and given us but one base.

There is also a letter from Narbonne, dated "Torgau, 5th." It has this remarkable paragraph:—"L'ennemie compte sur toutes les trahisons du monde, et si vous saviez. . . . ."

Metternich has just arrived: he brings the treaty between Russia, Austria, and Prussia for signature. Each party is to have always on foot thirty-six thousand men for co-operation.

14*th.*—I rode yesterday eight German miles to see men greatly fatigued, drenched to their bones, and doing nothing but what ought not to be done. The fact is, that Wittgenstein did not choose to make the reconnaissance, and therefore marred it expressly.

This morning the Prince-Marshal having seen an officer from Blucher, as my report notices, wished me, as I was acquainted with all the parties, to ride and stop the action if circumstances permitted. I went like the wind more than four German miles, and arrived in time to stop the infantry before it advanced from the village of Gossa, and to be in several brilliant charges: in one of these I thought I saw Murat, and was making to him, when a body of French horse charging in flank threw us into complete disorder. The two Austrian dragoon regiments then darted in

and saved us, or we should have been all spiketted I verily believe. I never was in greater melées; and when in them and out of them we were all covered with mutual shot, shells, and grape, so that it was in good truth "multum in parvo." When the action ceased I clapped spurs into my best horse and rode a race against time to Borna. There I put four horses into a little calash, almost too light for two, that I made fly like the famous Queensbury car: but "man proposes and God disposes;" before I had gone a werst one of my wheels locked in a cart. I was thrown out and the axle-tree broken. I had no alternative but to mount one of the postilion's horses and ride him to Altenberg, tackled as he was and unfortunately, as I still feel, with a piece of wood as a stirrup leather to the right stirrup, that the pole of the carriage might not break the leg; but it appears to me that if I had ridden twenty miles in this way instead of ten I should have had a wooden leg all my life.

The troops, &c., passing in the wood stared not a little. The inhabitants of Altenberg were astounded, but I clattered on quite indifferent to their regards and thoughts until I met the Emperor in a droska, to whom I first told the tidings of which I was the herald, and then joined with him in a laugh at myself: for certainly I was a strange figure, and the more from being covered with mud from head to heel. He was, however, much pleased, and, as good or ill luck would have it, when I went to the Prince-Marshal's he and Metternich were looking out of the window, so I passed another review.

The Marshal was much delighted with the manner in which I had executed his wishes; and, although he

had dined, would not let me stir out of the room before his cook had produced samples of his active skill.

I have been obliged to write my despatch to Lord Cathcart, and I am not a little tired; but if I were not to snatch the few moments when I am not on horseback or employed on indispensable business, I never should be able to keep my diary.

I must not omit to note that the Crown Prince has had a battle royal with the foreign generals and ministers about his person. He told them that he wanted no counsel, and would have no counsellors; but Blucher will not obey his order to retreat.

I must be just, although I do not like the man. I think the sacrifice of his communication with Sweden is too much to require of him. He has natural cause to fear such a position, as it may affect his royal interests and personal security. I am more inclined to think so, as I do not believe his thirty thousand men would win a battle. After what I have seen to-day I am sure we shall have more on our hands than is generally expected, and that we shall find the enemy more powerful, as well as more numerous, than is encouraging. If we fight in a semicircle from Ackern to Naunhof, a distance of at least seventy-five wersts, I am sure we shall be beaten. Concentration and échelons can alone give us a chance; and with these a new formation of cavalry is necessary, or the enemy will ride masters in the field.

For the benefit of *country gentlemen* I must state that the enemy has not less than two hundred thousand disposable men, of which above forty thousand are cavalry, and that Leipsic is a walled city with a castle and a wet ditch.

Oct. 15th, Pegau.

We changed our quarters and arrived this day. The news of the morning principally interested the Crown Prince, who has lost his communications, and could not execute the passage of the Elbe as he proposed, the enemy having driven Tauentzein from Dessau with a loss to him of one thousand prisoners, and nearly forced him to burn the bridge rather than see it fall into the hands of the enemy. The bridge of Ackern was also cut away. I saw a letter from General Vincent,* stating this "catastrophe," and adding that the Crown Prince was furious against those "who had advised him to press to the Elbe, and thus neglect the principles of war." Vincent says the Crown Prince thinks of how he can get across, not how he can assist in the intended battle. I should not be surprised if he treated with Buonaparte from fear and resentment; for he certainly must know that if the French had not attacked, his *bridges would equally have been destroyed.*

We are now to give battle to-morrow to Buonaparte. The events of war are most uncertain; and events frequently contradict—and in the public estimation shame—good counsel. But certainly if I were Commander-in-chief I would not have fought Buonaparte in his position, where I believe him to have one hundred and eighty thousand men. I would have opposed, as I have before said, successive *barrières d'ailes* to his communications with France. I would have forced all the states of the Rhine Confederation to have acquiesced in the wishes of their people and armed against his passage; and then when I had

* Austrian Commissioner with the Crown Prince.—Ed.

proved that he could not with reasonable hope of success attempt to force my ramparts, or in any case derive succours through them, I would have proposed to him terms of peace. If he accepted them—and they should have been such as he could not refuse,—or refuse without revolting all the chiefs about him —I would have left to the indignant spirit of France and six months' time the completion of what would have remained to do that the world might have better chance of tranquillity.

He now has great advantages, especially since the troops from Magdeburg—probably Davoust's advanced guard—have taken Bernburg. His communication



with Magdeburg and Wesel is now assured, and I still presume that he will form a screen against us,

keep turning the left of the Swedes, and, when he has sufficiently advanced, throw a corps out between the right of Blucher and the Austrian left to prevent Blucher's junction with us. If he makes this attempt, and succeeds, Blucher and the Crown Prince must soon disperse for want of ammunition, &c. The Austrians will, no doubt, in the interim be driving back the screen; but the screen keeping its right upon Leipzic can roll upon that pivot and recede as the main army advances. The Allies extend from left to right above a hundred wersts! and Bubna with ten thousand Austrians, and Beningsen with twenty thousand Russians, from the corps blockading Dresden, cannot be up for three days to co-operate. They, however, secure our right and communications at this moment, and so far they are very useful.

To add to our difficulties, there is great variance in opinion between the Russian fainéants and the Austrians. Disputes run high frequently, and Schwarzenberg cannot obtain obedience to his orders, much less preserve subordination.

This morning he was obliged to send Wittgenstein a very severe but merited reproof, as he pretended that the order which I carried yesterday prevented his "*extermination* of the enemy;" whereas I particularly told him that he was not to desist from the combat if he was likely to lose any advantage or experience any detriment. The fact, moreover, was that man and horse had had as much as they could digest for the day, and failed in appetite. Three Prussian weak regiments of cavalry alone lost twenty officers killed and wounded.

Perhaps what I have written here with regard to

my apprehensions may be realized; perhaps my fears may have been premature. Fortune has so much influence in war that calculation is more frequently in error than in unison with events; but I submit my judgment to the awful test which is to determine its value; and certainly if occasion offers I shall make the same efforts as I did at Lutzen, at Bautzen, and at Dresden, to help a conclusion different from my predictions.

If the worst come to the worst on this occasion, it will be some consolation to think that nature is not idle in our cause. Buonaparte we are assured is grown so fat and unwieldy that he cannot get on horseback without help; and he is so averse to exercise that he now always accompanies the troops in a carriage. He is thus *Kutusoffizing* very fast.

I shall conclude this medley by noting that Ney advised Buonaparte to fall back on the Rhine, recruit during the winter, and give the law to Europe in the spring. Ney received an answer brought by a French colonel, chief of the staff of Berthier, who was taken yesterday, and to whom Ney having told what he had written said, "And the Emperor has sent by you that it is 'Des sottises.' I am sorry to have offended the Emperor, but I am too much attached to him and France not to retain and repeat the same opinion."

Berthier continues too ill to transact business, but perhaps the cannon will rouse him from his couch.

The country through which we are passing is in great distress. The Cossacks have devoured or destroyed the little that the stagnation of commerce had enabled the inhabitants to provide.

The needy manufacturer trusting that the ports will

be opened by our arms, and thus his losses be repaired, shricks through his famished throat "Vivas" to the Emperor, who salutes with the courtesy of a Bolingbroke even the workhouse paupers; but in the districts which are not commercial "on n'entend que des faussettes," as was once before said in Italy when boys and girls were applauding Philip of Spain.

In many parts of Germany it is said that the Cossack terror is so great that prayers are put up, "*De Cossaquibus, Domine, libera nos!*" In other churches they have added the term Cossack to the original Devil as more expressive of his mischievous proceedings. It is a great pity that they should be so lawless, for they counterbalance the service which they render. I would forgive their pillage of eatables, but not of raiment, trinkets, and indeed all transferable property, although *Love* is the motive.

Oct. 16th, Rotha.

We marched at three o'clock this morning. I accompanied Prince Schwarzenberg. The soldiers rent the air with voluntary cheers as he passed. This compliment was usual to the Grand Duke Charles, but it was the first time that Schwarzenberg had been honoured by it.

The military incidents of the day are noted in the other memoranda.

MEMORANDUM OF THE BATTLE OF THE 16TH OF OCTOBER, 1813. LEIPSIC.

General Blucher and the Crown Prince having passed the Elbe, and General Beningsen having joined

the Grand Army in Bohemia, the operation against the enemy's position at Leipsic was resolved upon, and on the morning of the 16th the Allies marched to the attack in five principal columns.

General Giulai, with eighteen thousand men, had orders to move on Mark Ranstedt, take Lindenau, and approach as near to Leipsic as possible.

General Merfeldt, with twelve thousand men, had orders to throw a bridge across the Elster at Connewitz, and was supported by the reserve grenadier divisions, twelve thousand strong, and four thousand cuirassiers, as Connewitz was presumed to be the key of the enemy's line.

General Wittgenstein was instructed to form the Russians and Prussians, about sixty thousand strong, into two columns of attack and march against the enemy's position at Wachau.

General Kleinau, with twenty-five thousand men, was directed to take Libertwolkowitz, and move upon General Wittgenstein's right against Leipsic.

General Beningsen was in march from Colditz upon Grima, with twenty thousand Russians and ten thousand Austrians, under Count Bubna, of which three thousand were hussars; and Count Colloredo was to be at Borna, with eighteen thousand men, in the evening of the 18th.

The Allied force actually in the field thus amounted to one hundred and thirty-one thousand men, and the total moving from Bohemia upon Leipsic to one hundred and seventy-nine thousand men.

The action commenced about nine o'clock by a cannonade in the centre, and soon became general along the line.

General Giulai attempted in vain to take Lindenau. Prince Maurice Lichtenstein, who commanded his advance, gained a part of the post, but was obliged to withdraw after considerable loss.

General Merfeldt made repeated attempts to throw a bridge at Connewitz, but could not succeed, although many brave men sacrificed themselves for the object.

Prince M. Lichtenstein, who commanded General Merfeldt's advance, then moved by the right on Delitszch, where he threw a bridge across under the enemy's fire; but, the enemy augmenting their force, he was obliged to withdraw the three battalions which had passed and destroy the bridge. General Merfeldt's column lost about three thousand men, and the General was himself taken prisoner, as he advanced with an orderly near to a column of the enemy which he mistook for Prussians.

General Kleist, who marched on the Russian left, moved towards the right of Wachau, but was checked by the enemy's position, when a severe combat commenced and General Kleist with difficulty maintained himself, although his troops immediately under the command of Prince Augustus with a Russian brigade on his right, fought with the most exemplary bravery.

The enemy's cannon, at a distance of not more than two hundred paces but separated by a ravine, could not repel them, nor could the movements of the enemy's cavalry in rear of their right flank shake their steadiness.

The enemy observing that there was a great deficiency of artillery and cavalry on this point to support the infantry entirely *en l'air* upon the plain, advanced a considerable body of lancers, cuirassiers, and hussars

against the Russian and Prussian squadrons, but without decisive effect; although the Allied cavalry, with the exception of four squadrons of the Russian Hussars of the Guard, were thrown into disorder and continued to act without regular formation for some time.

When General Merfeldt could not force Connewitz, Prince Schwarzenberg had directed the Austrian reserve divisions and two thousand five hundred of the cuirassiers to march and support General Kleist, who had reported his pressure.

A most difficult defile and a deep stream retarded the march of the infantry and cavalry; but, so soon as the latter could file through, it formed column of attack and advanced against the enemy's cavalry, charged, and, as the enemy retired upon their supports, advanced their own supporting squadrons; and thus made successive charges, pressing the enemy upon and between the masses of their own infantry, who had formed in rectangular position so as to throw a cross-fire, and ultimately succeeded in driving the enemy's cavalry out of the field.

More conspicuous courage with order never could be displayed, but of two thousand five hundred men seven hundred were killed or wounded.

The Austrian infantry reserve relieved General Kleist some time afterwards, and, advancing against the enemy, took eight pieces of cannon, but lost sixty-two officers, killed, in one division.

The Russians under Count Wittgenstein had been exposed to a heavy fire during the whole day, and could make little progress as the enemy had a superior infantry and artillery opposed.

About three o'clock, the enemy, observing that the

Russian reserve was at a great distance in the rear, advanced two considerable masses of cavalry and charged through the centre of the Russian line; several Russian regiments of cavalry took panic, fled, and abandoned the infantry and several batteries. Happily, the infantry stood firm.

Already the enemy's horse had reached the rear of the advanced position and began to cross the dyke which passed over a marsh in this part of the field, when the Cossacks of the Guard and the Russian reserve cavalry charged forward, obliged the enemy to a rapid and destructive retreat, and restored the fortune of the day.

A heavy cannonade continued, and towards dark two battalions of Austrian grenadiers stormed a couple of farm-houses, isolated in the plain but in advance of the Russian line. These houses the enemy had occupied during the success of their cavalry, but they were now dislodged and many put to death.

General Kleinau had taken Libertwolkowitz, but was obliged to withdraw and throw his right back upon Lifenhayn, as the enemy had turned his *point d'appui* by a considerable body of infantry and horse.

In this retrograde movement, one gun, firing to the last moment, was taken.

The action ended at night, when both parties occupied nearly the same positions. The loss of the Allies was not less than twenty thousand, and such had been the carnage at particular points that Prince Eugene of Wurtemburg's division lost one hundred and forty-four officers and nearly four thousand men killed and wounded out of six thousand.

The enemy had about one hundred and thirty thou-

sand men in the field, and Buonaparte commanded in person.

His troops, and particularly the Poles, fought with great courage.

The Emperor, the King, and Prince Schwarzenberg had several persons killed and wounded in their respective suites.

It was proposed to renew the battle this day, but General Beningsen could not arrive in time to take share, and his force was required.

The wet weather, the fatigue, the state of the soil, and want of food, rendered the condition of the troops deplorable and some rest necessary, but still the spirit of the army was by no means depressed.

During the day accounts were received of the success of General Blucher at Möckern on the previous day, but with very little loss. The corps of Yorck alone was stated to have had eight thousand men hors de combat.

Robert Wilson.

October 17th, 1813.

Sir Robert Wilson to Lord Viscount Cathcart.

My Lord, Jena, October 23rd, 1813.

The Prince Marshal estimates his Austrian loss in the field operations before Leipsic at thirty thousand men. Fifteen thousand Russians and Prussians were also dressed for wounds, according to the returns. The loss of General Blucher and the Swedes, if any were lost, is not included.

The return of captured persons, including twenty-two thousand sick and wounded, amounted, as I am

told, last night, to thirty-four thousand; but the official return is not yet given to the Prince Marshal.

I have the honour to be your Lordship's
Most obedient and humble servant,
ROBERT WILSON.

17*th*.—The events of yesterday proved that I did not estimate inaccurately the strength of the enemy's position, &c. It was a most hardly contested battle throughout the line. This morning I went to the field in a droska with the Marshal, and met Merfeldt on his return. I dispatched Charles immediately to Aberdeen with a pencilled protocol. I wrote it under shell fire; but I hope it does not betray a trembling hand or agitated mind.

[PROTOCOL.]

SIR ROBERT WILSON TO LORD ABERDEEN.

(Most private and confidential.)

On the field in front of Wachau during action,
MY DEAR LORD, Oct. 18th, 1813.

General Merfeldt, who has just returned from the enemy, saw Buonaparte yesterday.

Buonaparte spoke to him earnestly on the subject of peace, but declared that he had two hundred thousand men with him, and a far more considerable cavalry than the Allies expected.

He proposed, on the condition of an armistice during negotiation, to evacuate Dantzic, Modlin, Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, Dresden, Torgau, and even Wittenberg; but he made some difficulty as to this

latter point. He further agreed to go beyond the Saal. He said, as to terms of peace, that if England would make peace, and give up colonies, he would give up Hanover, Lubeck, and Hamburg, &c. That if she would agree to the neutrality of the flag, the independence of Holland might be arranged, and Italy be made an independent monarchy.

He hesitated as to the restitution of Mantua to the Austrians, and repeated that Italy must be kept entire. Merfeldt said that the Allies might object if Murat was to be the Sovereign. He replied that it was not necessary to anticipate the arrangements. He again and again, however, declared that he did not believe that England would make peace, or at least without a condition to which he would never submit—limitation as to the number of his ships of war.

Merfeldt asked him if he would give up Erfürth at this moment, as well as the other fortresses. He hesitated. Merfeldt then said that the resignation of the protectorate of the Rhine Confederation was necessary. Buonaparte answered that it was impossible; but on being told that Bavaria had withdrawn from his protection—with which he was unacquainted, the courier from Munich having been taken—and that the other States were negotiating, he said, "Then the protectorate of the Confederation ceases *de se.*"

Spain being mentioned, he observed—"It was a question of dynasty—Je n'y suis plus—thus that question is decided."

He was inquisitive about the point on which the Bavarians were to act. Merfeldt told him, "on that which would be most injurious to him."

These are the principal topics, but the accurate report of them. Merfeldt was desired to report what had passed, and propose the armistice.

I heard him communicate the detail to Prince Schwarzenberg. At the time I am writing the Emperor and Count M. are unacquainted with the propositions.

Merfeldt's opinion is, that Buonaparte wishes for peace, and perhaps would go to the Rhine as a preliminary. He says he looks fagged, but that otherwise he is in good health.

I should think your courier would go to England as a welcome messenger with this news. We are now in action, but unless some very decisive event occurs during the course of the day, I believe negotiation will open for an armistice.

The enemy seem to maintain themselves, but have withdrawn into position behind Wachau.

Blucher and the Prince Royal are recommended to attack on the side of Taucha.

Yours ever faithfully,

R. W.

P.S.—Omitted remarks of Buonaparte's. "In the spring I shall only have to do with Austria. It is against her alone that I have to prepare war. Russia will not have an army, and Prussia will be equally destitute of military force."

Endorsed.

"Report of Prince Merfeldt's conversation with Buonaparte.

"Sent to Lord Aberdeen from the field of battle; but Charles, not finding him, gave it to Stuart, who sent it to England on the day Leipzic was taken. Captain James was the bearer."

This information Sir Charles Stuart sent to England unknown to Lord A. and Sir R. W., and received in return the *Regent's thanks through Lord Castlereagh* for "*his extreme vigilance and valuable intelligence, &c.*" *

Oct. 20th, Leipzic.

On the morning of the 19th the Allied army advanced. The disposition of attack as follows.

Giulai guarded the route of Weissenfels and had his post at Mark Ranstedt. Merfeldt's corps commanded by Prince Lewis Lichtenstein was charged with the attack on Connewitz and Delitszch. Colloredo's column moved upon the Elster. Wittgenstein and the Prussians upon Leipsic by the route of Probstheyda. Kleinau upon the right by the villages of Holyhaum and Zukelhaum. Beningsen upon the right of Kleinau in the direction of Leipsic viâ Stetenitz, and Platow connected the right of Beningsen with the Swedish Prince's moving from Taucha, and which was in connection with Blucher.

The enemy fell back with some loss to the village of Probstheyda and Stetenitz, but there they defended their line with the right thrown on Connewitz, from which they could not be dislodged. Delitszch, after being lost three times, was gained by the Austrians in a fourth assault. Colloredo was kept in check by a superior force. The Russians and Prussians lost an infinity of men against Probstheyda by unskilful management, but *not the fault of the Prince-Marshal.* Kleinau and Beningsen were unable to force Stetenitz. Platow took two regiments of Wurtemburg cavalry

* See Appendix. Letters of Captain Charles to Sir R. Wilson, and Sir R. Wilson to Lord Aberdeen, relating to this despatch.

and about a thousand infantry prisoners: and three thousand Saxons, including seven hundred cavalry with fifteen guns, joined the Allies during the action; but not without losing many men in the passage, from the enemy's grape which was profusely thrown at them. The action ceased with night.

The Allies, exclusively of Beningsen and the Crown Prince, had to lament the loss of at least twenty-five thousand men at the lowest computation. The enemy had suffered largely, but not to the same extent. They had, however, lost three guns in front of Probstheyda, and had so many horses killed that they were obliged to blow up several parks of ammunition-waggons and bury about twenty guns which were found this morning. During the day Giulai had reported that the enemy were debouching on the Weissenfels and Merseburg route with such force as to oblige his flank movement upon Merfeldt's corps. The enemy's retreat was therefore opened, and this morning at daybreak the army advanced against Leipsic; but about ten o'clock a great portion was sent on the route to Pegau that the enemy's retreat on the Saal might be checked. The remainder approached the Faubourg, and, after some cannonade, a flag of truce was sent by the King proposing to surrender the town if the troops in it were allowed to retire. This was refused, and the King given to understand that there was no treaty to be made with him, since, as the Emperor loudly declared, he had broken his word, having signed a treaty with Austria which three days afterwards he violated. The attack continued, and, notwithstanding an obstinate defence, the Allies forced the suburbs. A momentary confusion ensued, as some cuirassiers to

effect their retreat had to pass through the advanced parties of the Russians; but order was quickly re-established.

When the city gates were opened and the market-place reached, the King was found in one of the houses, and all his guards with his Baden troops assembled under arms. They had refused to fire upon the Allies. Vast numbers of Polish officers and other officers also streamed out of the houses in which they had concealed themselves. On the other side of the town the enemy still fired from the houses of the suburbs, and an open space round the wall was full of abandoned cannon, carriages, tumbrils, horses, men and women, prisoners, wounded, and dead. The retreat of Moscow did not present a scene of greater confusion and ruin.

The distress of the enemy had been rendered greater by the road out of the town being very narrow, and on the right of it ran the Pleisse with steep *boarded* banks. In the stream many horses and cattle were plunging, and many bodies were floating. Here also it is said that Poniatowski perished, suffocated rather than drowned. After some time the enemy who escaped fell back behind the Elster and burnt the bridges, so that they have remained all the day unmolested since this operation. But they keep firing cannon upon the Allies debouching.

Fortunately the Swedes and Prussians only, supported by Beningsen, will pursue the enemy; for the novelty of the dress causes great embarrassment. The rest of the Allies will take flanking routes. It is impossible at the present moment to state the extent of the enemy's loss, but it exceeds a hundred guns, five hundred ammunition-waggons, and five

thousand prisoners, exclusive of former wounded. Lauriston and several generals are taken already, and it is to be presumed that many persons of note are still concealed.

Buonaparte himself left the city at ten in the morning.

To the credit of the Allies it must be stated that they were guilty of very few excesses, and none in the city itself. They are entitled too to much admiration for their humanity. Very few of the enemy were put to the bayonet.

As I was one of the first who entered I immediately went up to the King and assured him that protection was ordered to the inhabitants, and I gave a Russian company as a guard for himself, his equipages, &c. He seemed much affected, and said, "This misfortune was not to be foreseen."

Having followed the enemy to the Elster and aided the general dispositions, particularly for the re-establishment of order, which was very difficult, I re-entered the city as I had entered it amidst "Vivats," while handkerchiefs waved over my head, and garlands fell on it. *C'était un brave moment.*

On returning into the town, and while I had five very pretty French women clinging to me, and four officers of rank, a horse, and a superb mule which I took from a mounted infantry-man, in my train for protection,—I met the Emperor, the King, Crown Prince, &c., and announced the capture of the artillery, which was a much greeted intelligence. Some time afterwards Blucher joined this distinguished assemblage.

When the Sovereigns had paraded through the streets

and had retired, the Emperor Francis came into the town and I accompanied him to show the spoils. At the same time I made use of the opportunity to speak to him and Metternich on more important matters. The principal subject was Dantsic. Very much is concerned in the occupation of that fortress. The fate of Europe depends much upon its falling into Prussian hands *by convention* at this time; since the opportunity is offered *now* but cannot return.

The Emperor greatly approved; and never could a sovereign greet a subject with more cordiality.

Wittgenstein instantly seized my idea. As the Emperor passed, the King of Saxony stood at his window. The Emperor felt for his situation and much commended my attentions.

The enemy is now in full march for the Saal; but it is probable that Giulai's and Merfeldt's corps will distress him before he passes, although Weissenfels is only six German miles from Leipsic.

Buonaparte's pressure here has tarnished his military credit,* but previously he had acquired and not lost reputation. Indeed I should rather say that he baffled us in both days' previous combats. He certainly moreover proved that if we had entered Saxony without Beningsen and the passage of the Elbe by Blucher we should have been annihilated.

Schwarzenberg has the merit of having saved the army intrusted to his command. No doubt our success will be greatly exaggerated; and again we shall be at the Rhine in a fortnight *per courier*, but much is yet to be done. We may achieve great advantages,

* It was not then known that he had ordered three bridges to be constructed.—Note by Sir R. W. in after years.—Ed.

but yet we may be unable to make great progress. Much will depend on the ability of the enemy to retire from Dresden and join Davoust at Magdeburg, and the number of men actually on march from France under Kellerman. After our reduction of numbers we cannot cope with any very considerable reinforcement, except on the defensive.

Had the enemy not wanted provisions, I even doubt whether he would now have retired so precipitately; but for eight days there has not been a bit of white bread in Leipsic, and the troops lived upon the charitable donations of the inhabitants.

When I calculate all the political and military disadvantages of a coalition such as ours—the want of zeal to continue the war in the Russian army—the inability of Prussia to repair her losses—and the certainty of Buonaparte being able to acquire great strength before the spring, I have no hesitation in giving my voice for peace on the terms which Buonaparte offers.

If we are now too elated and direct our view to encroachment on the natural boundaries of France, or to change of dynasty by compulsion, we may find that extravagant pretensions diminish our power of enforcing them. I wish to secure the future while the force of Europe is concentrated. Opinion in France will achieve then what remains to be done.

By present arrangement we can make France herself useful to the views which statesmen ought to entertain. By the extinction of the French power we should find victory a misfortune, since the proper balance could not be secured and the variety of interests at issue would assuredly produce new wars, prematurely for Prussian and Austrian interests.

I am an anti-Buonapartist and a soldier, but not a *grenadier politicien—un homme d'état enragé*, sacrificing general interests to personal passions.

21*st.*—During the night there was a cry of "Fire!" and I went to assist, as it was in the neighbourhood of an abandoned French park of powder-waggons, &c. It burnt several hours before it was got under.

This morning the Emperor of Russia sent for me.

Mistaking something I had said yesterday he answered rather sharply at the time. On my entering this morning he expressed his distress, declaring that it had been on his conscience ever since, and that he could not feel comfortable until I declared that I bore no pained recollection towards him on that account.

On my saying what I really felt on the occasion he kissed me again and again, and certainly showed a very good heart, as well as an amiable manner.

I know very few men indeed in the world who would have taken such pains, and so liberally acknowledged error.

The discovery of men, booty, &c., continues, as I anticipated, and to General Lauriston we may add General Regnier; but unfortunately his maps have all been torn or destroyed by the Cossacks, which is a very great loss, as many were manuscripts.

I find that Buonaparte told the King he could do no more for him than send back his troops—which he did. An English merchant tells me he quitted the town about half an hour before I got in, and passed through with a very cheerful countenance.

I do not digress to trace his probable line of military operations, because events will be known in

England before my letter can be there; but I repeat again that he has been driven from his position and lost a rear-guard, but he is not deprived of the power of further resistance if his army remains true to him: I do not mean the contingents, for they to a man will leave him, but his French troops. Whatever may be their discontent, they certainly have fought like brave men, and this is universally acknowledged. Beningsen tells me that his column alone, on the preceding day, lost five thousand men, and that unless the Saxons with the artillery had come over the attack would have cost him very much more.

I did not estimate his loss at more than three thousand. I cannot as yet obtain the returns of Blucher's and the Crown Prince's losses; but the grand Allied army, exclusive of them has, I am satisfied, been reduced since the 15th of October fifty thousand men.

9 *o'clock* P.M.—Blucher lost in the corps of Yorck alone on the 17th of October eight thousand men.

It will now be undeniable that the position of Buonaparte was most advantageously chosen. In it he resisted all. In it he wounded all; and he was enabled eventually to secure his retreat with the sacrifice of a rear-guard.

The news from Dresden is that Tolstoy has been obliged to raise the blockade and retire upon the Töplitz route. S. Cyr might thus pass rapidly by Freyburg and gain Coburg, whence he could reach the Thuringer-wald, doing much mischief in the line of march; but I think he will prefer the right bank of the Elbe.

Sir Charles Gordon arrived this day from England; four couriers also. I received only a short note from

Robertson,* praising Henry highly. There are two other couriers *en route*, so I have still a chance of letters.

I am most impatient for the answer to Lord Aberdeen's application, as it is the "fiat" for my stay or departure.

I read Stuart's despatches about our Dresden affair. He has finely glossed over our losses; but John Bull loves to be humbugged, and they are enemies to themselves who write, speak, or seek truth.

Sir Charles Stuart has greatly offended Cathcart by sending off a courier, or rather aide-de-camp, yesterday without saying a word to him.

Jockeying is, I see, diplomatic fashion. If cabinets continue to hold military councils, the camp will be corrupted—where honour and policy hitherto have preserved the ascendancy with inseparable bonds of union, or at least the reputation of duration.

I am a little vexed that I was not let into the secret so as to pass a certificate of safety after a few additional hazards.

The Emperor of Austria has made me very happy by conferring on General Nostitz, who commanded the Austrian cavalry with which I charged on the 17th so repeatedly, the Cross of Maria Theresa, in virtue of my testimony.

The General had a substantial claim which his enemies would have recognised; but still it is flattering to my integrity and chivalry that I should be deemed sufficient authority.

Oct. 22nd, Zeitz.

Before I left Leipsic I read the newspapers and saw two errors. The first was, that it was stated in the

* Tutor to his son Henry.—Ed.

despatch of Lord Cathcart that "the Emperor waited by Moreau until he was lifted on the pikes;" the second, that I wrote to England that "the retreat from Dresden was conducted with very little loss." I have a reason for recording this my dissent from both statements.

I had sent Charles off the field on the 17th with the protocol of Merfeldt's conversation with Buonaparte, that he might find Aberdeen, give him one copy and send another for me to England. Charles never found Aberdeen, but gave the memorandum to Stuart, which causes a series of untoward accidents.* This morning I rode with Merfeldt here and again talked over the matter with him, and heard various other minute but interesting details. I was much struck by finding that Buonaparte had on various subjects expressed himself nearly word for word as I had done, and that many of his avowed views have long been mine. Dr. Sale might discover a conformity of organization.

Merfeldt and I both agree as to the necessity of finishing the war this winter, and before division of opinion and further loss reduces the Allies below the quantum of force sufficient to maintain our present attitude. We both desire to curb France, but not to raise another power which may become more formidable to Europe. We think that Buonaparte will add Mantua to the Austrian acquisitions, and then Austria will have no legitimate object of her own unaccomplished.

Metternich has sounded the Emperor Alexander, but he seems to wish for delay. He probably hoped to

* See above.—Ed.

have the command and march a conqueror to the Rhine. He indeed proposed himself as General-in-chief yesterday; but, professing not to understand the métier sufficiently, he said he would have a council to direct him. Metternich frankly told him that he never would obtain the consent of Austria; that he had declared himself, moreover, unqualified; and that a council on the field of battle was a project that would never be productive of any other result than misfortune and disgrace.

It is true that Schwarzenberg did not close all the avenues to Buonaparte's retreat, but he proposed to Blucher to close the Weissenfels and Marienburg routes. Blucher declined; and then Schwarzenberg, as the next best arrangement, proposed his movement by Taucha. Schwarzenberg, however, has saved the army and secured all as he went on.

Tolstoy's suffering himself to be defeated at Dresden, with the loss of his cannon, &c. &c. by S. Cyr, is no charge against the Marshal, who left at that point thirty thousand men. But these incidents more and more prove the necessity of early arrangement; and I am happy to find that Metternich is of the same opinion and this day is in conference with Lauriston, who will probably be returned to Buonaparte as Merfeldt was to his Emperor.

The arrival of the courier with England's acquiescence in the Congress will give Metternich courage; he is naturally slow and has become very fearful of exciting suspicion.

Nesselrode has said that negotiations ought not to commence until the enemy are at the Rhine. It is very well for Russia to hold that language who

receives pay for one hundred and sixty thousand of her men, and who has certain objects that are not yet attained; but if Buonaparte is pressed to the Rhine he will not treat. It is then that his strength will hourly improve and ours hourly diminish.

His passage of the Rhine by arrangement is not doubtful. He has even permitted Wurtemburg to treat with Austria, and he now seeks that the title of Protector should cease, &c. &c.; but there are certain limits to his submission, beyond which he relies on French pride and patriotism. He knows, moreover, that every Frenchman is a soldier in six weeks—an advantage appertaining to no other state.

All this language may appear cowardly, but I have seen with my own eyes all that has passed. I am capable of appreciating the military powers of all, and of estimating mutual means and disabilities. Those who write to please must hold different language and call measures of prudence and need, traits of pusillanimity or ill-judged mercy.

These men will boast of captured lazarettoes as if they were conquered garrisons, and receive the plaudits of the wilfully deceived, while "Truth's steely bones look bleak in the cold wind." It is no small advantage to be with a chief, as I now am, who thinks what he speaks, and only writes what he knows—who banishes all mystification as unworthy and unprofitable.

Yesterday the Emperor Alexander went to the Queen of Saxony who wept very much; but I am told that she was more satisfied before the Emperor left her. I hear that the King will be re-established, but I suppose he must pay *garnish*.

Prince Poniatowski's death is universally lamented:

he deserved a better fate. His conduct of the Polish contingent, and their corresponding conduct, has been splendidly distinguished.

I fear the "Polar Star" has sunk to rise no more; but England could make a satisfactory arrangement if she were inclined to interfere on the subject.

The Crown Prince was still in Leipsic when I went away, dressed like an opera-master. Stuart is outrageous with him, and has omitted all compliment in his despatches. He had, indeed, introduced some strong animadversions, but these he has erased. Stuart decidedly says that he not only did nothing but wilfully avoided doing anything, although he might, by co-operating with Blucher, have crushed a great portion of the enemy's forces; and yet for such a fellow we are to pay one hundred thousand pounds a-month, and sacrifice our best interests and another nation whose enmity will be eternal. I would rather see more than I choose to write than Norway ceded to Sweden.

I omitted to note that, after passing through the city, I went on with some Swedes against the enemy. One party covered the retreat of others, and were lodged in several houses beyond the river Pleisse. These fellows fired sharply and all the Swedes ran away as hard as they could; I was obliged to go back into the town and take a Russian company to dislodge the enemy. They did the business in the most masterly as well as intrepid style. I am sure that the Swedes are a brave people, but they do not appear to me well organized. They seem rather like armed peasants than the martial compatriots of Charles XII.

The town in which I now am has paid dearly for its deliverance. It has been thrice plundered; but

most efficaciously by the Cossacks, who have dispatched from hence waggonloads of cotton goods and kerseymeres to the Don. Here, as everywhere else in Germany, the first question is—"And when shall we have English goods?" and "Do you know Mr. Humphrey or Mr. Goodison?" &c.; for they all suppose that we are in intimate union with the traders. Had Buonaparte not adopted his continental system he might have ruled over very willing subjects in Germany.

I have just been suffering martyrdom. The daughter of the house imagines that she has a melodious voice. Unasked—she began to play a guitar, and then chant, by way of *amusing* me, a death-song of Schiller's comprising at least forty stanzas. Without giving herself time to breathe, as soon as she had concluded she rushed into a funeral-hymn on the Queen of Prussia's interment, and then galloped into a la-la-la-lara ditty, which had not ended when I quitted the room; although I had waited patiently twenty minutes for its termination.

Merfeldt tells me that I am in great favour with the Emperor Francis, who expressed his strong approbation of the views I entertained, and the candid manner in which I spoke as we passed through Leipsic. These encomiums on me do me honour, but they are also much to his own credit, for they prove him to be a lover of truth and loyal frankness. I have no interested motives: I win what I get and I court no favours. This independence entitles me to the respect of Sovereigns, and enables me to speak what I feel; but to hear, digest, and commend to others is the merit of those whom I address.

Oct 23rd Jena.

Before I left Zeitz this morning, which was soon after daybreak, I called on Merfeldt to know what had passed between him and the Emperor after our conversation of yesterday. He told me that he had repeated nearly verbatim all that I had said, and that the Emperor *goutéd* the whole with the greatest satisfaction. A demand of the Emperor of Russia to transfer the King of Saxony to Prussia, which is a step preparatory to the measure I have so long and so frequently announced, has awakened the greatest alarm. Merfeldt thinks the Emperor will not consent, and I hope he will not. The Emperor of Austria should give asylum to the King as Protector of Germany as well as a relative, during the time that the States of Saxony are under the administration of the Allies. He becomes, *ipso facto*, a state prisoner in the hands of another power, and his acts will be forced without regard to general interests. It is a most critical epoch. An erroneous policy at this moment may render Europe more unhappy than ever she has been. If England had but a respected and wise Government she might command the arrangement most suitable for the common welfare. To her Poland might owe tranquillity—to her the Continent might be indebted for a re-establishment of the balance of power. Feeble as the Government is considered, still it will have weight, but not that commanding voice which is necessary to achieve what ought to be done without resistance to her will.

I had a long ride here, and the Marshal who went to Naumburg yesterday has not returned, so I know no military news except that the success of S. Cyr at Dresden against Tolstoy has obliged the Mar-

shal to detach Kleinau with his corps, above twenty thousand strong, to Altenberg, and to send General Knoring with about two thousand horse on Freyburg.

I had, however, opportunity on my way to ascertain that the number of prisoners—including twenty-two thousand sick and wounded and the troops who passed over to us—amounted in Leipzic yesterday night to thirty-four thousand men; and that the Russians and Prussians in the three days before Leipzic had fifteen thousand wounded dressed.

In a private letter to Stuart, who was one of those who urged the re-advance into Saxony after Vandamme's defeat, I stated that I considered the enemy to have superiority of force, position, and success; noting that "*force* was not always *advantage of numbers* but *power of concentrated action*." This opinion has been cited by Stuart against me since the late events, but I have replied that he must refer to dates. That at the time he urged the invasion of Saxony, Beningsen, with fifty thousand men, was in Silesia; that the Prince Royal and Blucher were on the right bank of the Elbe—the one not willing and the other having orders from the King not to pass; that Bavaria had not joined and Wurtemberg had not made preparations—both of which events Buonaparte only knew by the capture of Merfeldt; and that the Saxons had not quitted the French standard. But with all these untoward incidents against Buonaparte, and this change in the relative positions, unless the enemy had superiority of position could he have resisted the concentrated weight pressing on him with the success which he obtained in the first day's battle, and with the firmness and

tenacity he displayed in the second, and finally retire, although contending against three hundred thousand men, with only the sacrifice of his hospitals and a few thousand men who defended the faubourgs? Could he have kept his ground three days and encircled himself with above sixty thousand killed and wounded assailants? Could his corps at Dresden have beaten thirty thousand men, and obliged us now to detach above twenty thousand to prevent his ravages upon our communications?

The misfortune is that few persons will be accurate; but to give themselves consideration they confound past, passing, and future events, although the opinions they arraign were limited to a specific state of things.

I must, however, here again note, lest others should fall into the same unwarranted conclusions, that no military opinion can be recorded as to that which is to abide the issues of war, *without the proviso of war's vicissitudes annexed.* The more experience a soldier has, the more will he pay deference to the chapter of accidents in the field.

On coming to Jena (which is a memorable town in Prussian annals) I read French papers to the 13th of October. These give two very important articles: the advance of Kellerman after the recovery of Cassel, and the draw for two hundred and eighty thousand conscripts, which will produce about three hundred and fifty thousand. Taking this, however, at the specified amount, there will be a sufficiency to give Buonaparte again a powerful ascendancy, if we are not now wise. Buonaparte said, and said very truly, "I know that before the spring, either by defection or casualties, Austria will have but a handful of Russians and Prus-

sians to aid her, if she has any, and I have only to prepare war against Austria!" It is a speech full of the most important truth.

With regard to the evacuation of Cassel, I remember expressing my regret at its occupation; for I foresaw that it would end in pillage, flight, and the execution or ruin of the bravest adherents of the Allies.

I hate tumblers and jugglers who cost so dear to humanity and our cause.

The road which I passed this day was again, I regret to say, full of unfortunate inhabitants bewailing the loss of their mites, but those mites their all. I passed tribes of poor wretches almost suffocated with tears, and unable to utter the gratitude which they felt at the interference which restored them some portion of their property. My comrades, the Cossacks, lead the van; the Prussians tread on their heels; and the Hungarians affiliate fast with the band.

Oct. 24th, Weimar.

Yesterday the Marshal had the returns of the Austrian expenditure of shot in the two days' battle, by which it appears that fifty-six thousand cannon balls and seven thousand shells were fired from the three hundred and twenty Austrian guns engaged. Altogether, including the enemy's cannon, one thousand six hundred guns were in action. The rattle may therefore be calculated, but the thunder can scarcely be conceived.

The news of S. Cyr's march from Dresden on Torgau arrived during the night. S. Cyr seems to have shown great address. He first beat Tolstoy, and on the 19th, when he was filing his baggage, &c., forced him back farther by a demonstration.

I presume that he will march on Wittenburg, unite with Davoust, and if they are active they may then pillage Berlin, and withdraw the Oder garrisons; especially those of Stettin and Custrin.

At all events, fifty thousand men, exclusive of Danes in the position about Magdeburg, will awe the Prussian capital, control Holstein, and intersect the Swedish communications. We shall be obliged to appropriate at least eighty thousand men to check their offensive operations: Germany does not present a more strategical point of mischief for the Allies.

Beningsen has already had orders to march to the Elbe, and I presume that the Crown Prince will follow. Probably neither will arrive in time to prevent S. Cyr's march, or save many stores, &c., which he will fall in with and either take or destroy.

Kleinau is ordered back to us, as the enemy seems inclined to make a stand here, having received about fifteen thousand new troops and found stores of all kinds and artillery at Erfurth. He has this evening indeed caused us some alarm here by throwing forward eight thousand horse. Blucher has endeavoured to turn his left, but he is entangled now in the worst roads of Germany. When we advance we shall move by his right and march by Meiningen on Frankfort; but I suppose that movement will await either the enemy's further retreat or the Bavarian army's arrival at Wurzburg. It is certain that the enemy has been but very little pressed in retreat, and perhaps has broken more heads of ours than we have broken of his, especially at the bridge of Gorschen, where we lost six hundred Austrians.

Among the prisoners taken the three last days there

are about five hundred Wurtembergers, but they will not enlist, as their King had given them orders to temporize with all parties.

Schwarzenberg may be blamed because S. Cyr passes from Dresden securely: but it is just to note that Schwarzenberg in writing entreated the Emperor Alexander to detach Beningsen, instantly after the capture of Leipsic, on Torgau; but the Emperor refused. He now asks the Emperor to besiege Torgau with Tolstoy's corps; but the Emperor replies that Tolstoy MUST OCCUPY DRESDEN, and proposes that the garrison of Theresienstadt shall quit Bohemia, pass twenty-five thousand Russians in the Saxon capital, and undertake the operations against Torgau. This the Marshal has peremptorily and most properly refused.

Such is the march of our political and military affairs. Every hour proves the need and increases the Austrian desire of peace. *Il faut finir l'affaire* while we can. Delay is replete with interior as well as exterior peril. I only fear that the enemy may get too timely intelligence of the situation in which we are and too soon feel in sufficient strength to retrieve their military fortunes.

The Duke of Weimar gave us a grand fête this day. The entertainment was magnificent, and the whole establishment upon a splendid scale. In the evening I went with the Marshal to the theatre, but we only remained during one act. The building and decoration are in very good taste, and the performance respectable; but affairs do not admit of protracted amusements.

I have just sent the King of Prussia my noble mule,

as he has a set and wants a recruit. I have also given him a detail of Silesia made by a Frenchman after three years' labour, such as I am sure no governor possesses of any province.

The work, which is in manuscript, not only contains all general matter, but the actual rent-rolls and net produce of every estate and property in the country. It is a most curious document—an evidence of French industry and searching political investigation. I should have wished to keep it, *as such*, but I thought it was so interesting that I ought not to withhold it from the Sovereign whose territory it concerned.

25*th*.—The enemy have fallen back behind Erfürth, but the intention to abandon it to the defence of the garrison is not fixed, although the Bavarians and Austrians, sixty-one thousand strong of which twenty-four thousand are Austrians, under General Fresnel, have reached Wurzburg this day by a most extraordinarily rapid march, as they only left Braunau on the 17th. Wurzburg is strong, but Wrede proposes to push on to Frankfort. We move to-morrow to Eisleben on the left of the Erfürth road.

The Emperor of Austria has peremptorily demanded the Saxon contingent to be put under his orders. He said, *de haute voix*, that he was "resolved to have the Saxon troops. They came over to him, and he was their protector, as well as the friend of the Allies." That "Prussia's cause was his and his cause Prussia's; so that she could not object, and no one else had any interest in the matter." The Emperor Alexander was obliged to admit the right of his claim. "*Red Breeches*,"* I am glad to find feels his value and

* The Emperor Francis's popular nickname.—Ed.

will keep his own; for much as I like the Russians I do not wish to see them masters in Germany. "Every man to his own, and God for us all;" but I am against cosmopolite appetites: *et l'appetit vient en mangeant* —so that no limits are at last respected.

On going to dine with the Duke of Weimar to-day I found the Emperor Francis and the Grand Duchess together, and without any attendants, so I had nearly half an hour's conversation with them. In the course of it the Emperor said, "He came to me by attachment and I will take care to keep him."

This remark I note, as it assumes Lord Aberdeen's wish; but without that remark I was well assured that no difficulty would arise in that quarter: on the contrary, that there would be the greatest *empressement.*

I suppose that Lord Aberdeen will arrange the matter somehow or other. I have written to him—"That I wave all personal feeling in the matter;—that I am ready to go to England, but am sure that my presence at this important crisis is of advantage to the public interests; that no one but myself can be *au fait* of what is passing, and no other person instantly, if ever, enjoy that confidence which I have from all."

Nothing is done militarily or politically that I am not told instanter; nothing arrives that I do not see; nothing is discussed that I do not hear. There never was an ambassador more valuably aided.

I mention these facts as public features, not with any petty ostentatious feelings.

I should hope Lord B.* would be reasonable. Italy

* Lord Burghersh—late Lord Westmoreland.

must be as good to him who has no immediate connection with the German army.

Lord Cathcart would not now object to my transfer. He knows that I am resolved on returning home otherwise. This is not his wish, and he will rather be inclined to arrange *à l'aimable.*

Lord Castlereagh begins to be more conciliatory, according to Aberdeen's letters; but he certainly should have respected my claims before he gave a precise appointment in my teeth. The letter of Aberdeen was so strong that I presume he could not refuse altogether.

To-morrow an officer will be sent to the enemy with a letter to General Berthier, in answer to his proposition for an exchange of prisoners. Austria agrees to an exchange as far as five thousand, and will give Regnier and another General for Merfeldt; but this intercourse is only an introduction to more important communications in consequence of Merfeldt's interview with Buonaparte. Peace is the desire of all reasonable men, but a peace which will enable Austria and Prussia to make head against the enemy after three years' repose. Such peace will secure the advantages we have obtained, whereas obstinate war to obtain impossibilities will only give the enemy next spring repossession of Germany, and probably possession of the Austrian states.

The hasty Austrian bulletin of the 19th states two matters inaccurately. The first, that the Saxon and Baden troops turned their arms against the enemy in the city on the day Leipsic was taken. I can certify to the contrary and the Baden commander has protested against this assertion. The second, that we

only lost ten thousand killed and wounded. This error is so gross that it is to be contradicted, lest an otherwise sufficiently accurate statement should be considered throughout as false.

The whole truth cannot be told; but I have given accurately the general returns, and will send home the certified returns of the loss of each army as soon as they are received.

In the interim I note again, the Austrians lost in the two days thirty thousand men hors de combat, and the Russians and Prussians had fifteen thousand men dressed for wounds, exclusive of Blucher's army.

Oct. 27th, Gotha.

During the night of the 26th Lord Aberdeen arrived with Morier, and could get no other quarters than the room in which I and Charles were sleeping, as the town was overflowing full.

The next morning we went to Schwarzenberg together and had a long conference. Schwarzenberg confirmed all that I have written about the difficulties of his command; the hazards which hourly endangered his affairs, and the necessity for peace so soon as it could be made with reasonable chance of security. He particularly lamented the Russian arrangement with the Saxons, or rather their derangement; for all the Saxons have refused to serve if their King is made prisoner, or if they are detached from Austria to the Crown Prince. I strongly urged also the dissatisfaction that a war of vengeance and premature partition would excite in England; and reminded Aberdeen and Schwarzenberg of the impression which the elevation of the Austrian flag at

Valenciennes and the Dunkirk expedition had still left on our country.

The Emperor of Austria has remonstrated against the King's imprisonment in Prussia, or indeed anywhere; but hitherto Austria is only in struggle for the direction of German affairs, and not yet in the direction. It is to be hoped that the British Government will now add the influence of England to gain Austria the needed supremacy, or she must ultimately unite with France to prevent Russian preponderance.

Metternich has, in consequence of England's acceptance of congress, resolved to commence communications, but he wishes not to negotiate publicly until the enemy has reached the Rhine.

It appears to me that Buonaparte will certainly endeavour to get a hundred thousand men on the Lower Elbe with all expedition, that he may oblige a great division of our force; and if he succeeds he may yet recover much consideration in Germany.

One hundred thousand men at Magdeburg would cause very serious uneasiness, and do the enemy more good than a hundred and fifty thousand at any other point.

Radetsky, the Austrian Quartermaster-general, is convinced that the enemy will be able to assemble means that will require the Allies to oppose five hundred thousand men in the spring. He calculates that Austria can give one hundred and eighty thousand, Germany with Bavaria one hundred and twenty thousand, Prussia one hundred thousand, Russia one hundred thousand. The Crown Prince's force is never considered as a component part: his conduct is too uncertain.

I think the calculation is not extravagant, if Germany be not rendered hostile by present mismanagement. The project will be drawn out to-morrow.

Buonaparte will certainly now reach the position that he purposes to fall back upon with eighty thousand effective men of the Leipzic army. He will find about thirty thousand under Kellerman, &c., and Davoust and S. Cyr will collect, without the Danes and the garrisons, about fifty thousand more. The new conscription will assuredly give two hundred thousand, and most people portend fifty thousand more than the number required. Besides this force Buonaparte will call out every man in France capable of bearing arms, to defend the country; and when they are under arms he will get a portion somehow or other to his disposable forces. He has certainly not been distressed in his retreat; and he will be able to make a parade so as to prevent panic in France, which might check his arrangements.

The defection of Bavaria will always save the *amour propre* of France as to the subject of the retreat from the Elbe; and if Buonaparte does lose credit in Europe as a Captain, in consequence of general failure in the campaign, I verily think it will be most undeservedly. He has fought a most gallant and skilful fight. His Lieutenants only have failed.

I came here this day to track the enemy and see the town: the dead and dying sick were numerous on the route, but there was no other vestige of distress.

I called on the Duke, a man of about forty years of age. He was dressed in the ancient style of German princes, his ancestors, according to the pictures ranged in his spacious galleries. He seems, however, a sensible

man, and bears a very good character with his people, who were living comfortable and happy until war devastated their tenements and lands. He did not conceal from me that personally he thought Buonaparte a most interesting and great man, and greater in misfortune than in success. He had with him, on passage through here, much conversation, on which it appears that Buonaparte showed that he did not feel humbled or apparently grieved at what had occurred.

I was taken, bespattered as I was, into the grand dining-hall, where I found the Duchess and Court in full gala dresses at table. The animal appetite would have preferred a household second dinner to the remains of the state banquet; but the Duchess was particularly amiable, and the presence of an Englishman really did diffuse here a very general satisfaction.

After dinner I went through the palace, which is a very fine building, the rooms splendidly furnished, and the whole establishment noble. I felt more interest about Gotha, as Morrison was long here, and often talked to me about the agrémens.

I hope, for the sake of his friends, that the minister Stein will not come here; I am sure his fingers will itch when he sees all the glitter of this ducal property.

I omitted to make a memorandum of a serious loss which occurred to me in Weimar. I had taken the chain and seals off the repeater which I sent to Jemima, and absenting myself for half an hour from my room the whole disappeared. The daily inconvenience that I shall experience from the loss of my seals will be very great. I have advertised them through the armies, but I fear without any prospect of success.

This, added to a very cold dark night's ride to our

first quarters from Weimar, and reflections arising from a letter of Lord Castlereagh to Lord Aberdeen, rendered the gaiety of Gotha and the extraordinary appearance of the sun on Sunday very necessary to restore me to good humour.

The 27th of October is a memorable day in this year, for it passed without rain; indeed, the weather seems to be changing altogether—a heavy frost, and winter setting in. Snow has already appeared, and there is fresh ice every night.

I have mentioned Lord Castlereagh's letter. The paragraph relating to me commences by promising to write again to Lord Aberdeen by the next messenger, but continues—"I have no objection to give you W. if you wish it, but it must be after B. is well fixed. I promised B. that he should go to Schwarzenberg's army, and it would not be fair to change his destination unless he approves. I foresee great difficulties unless he will voluntarily go to the South, but W. and he must not have any connexion together or there will be a *blow up*."

It is thus evident that B., with the rank of Lieut.-colonel and no service, has had a superior military consideration to myself in the Foreign Office; and that all my claims are but secondary to his pretensions: all the wishes of Lord Aberdeen, the Emperor, Count Metternich, and Schwarzenberg—as they have *officially* communicated them to Lord C., but subservient to his pleasure.

Oh, Justice! thou art without respect *dans les bureaux des gouvernemens.*

B. had the appointment to Schwarzenberg's army because it was thought the best; but here, with his

rank and forced presence, he must play a minor part. It is different with me who have the consideration of a General officer, fellowship of long services, bond of distinction, and the established confidence of the Sovereign, the minister, and the chiefs. From me nothing is withheld connected with public interests —from him everything will be withheld. From me all opinions will be cordially accepted and attentively weighed—from him no suggestion will come with any weight, or inspire any kind feelings towards him from superiors.

At this important epoch it is of the utmost consequence that Aberdeen should be daily informed of passing events, projects in contemplation, &c.; that he should be able to work with a person conversant in all matters interesting to him, and who possesses the breast-key of the magnates. He also considers my comments of value, since they embrace the subjects in a way that affords him the full view. With a stranger, and that stranger a comparative subaltern officer, he is deprived of these aids. Were the war about to commence instead of closing, knowing what I do of the *state of Italy*, the great springs already in action there, and the intentions of Government, I should prefer the appointment; with the proviso that I should reap the harvest if I toiled successfully in the cultivation of the field.

I foresee important responsibility political and military, eminent consideration, extensive intercourse, and most advantageous ramifications of action. Independence to a great degree, and numerous opportunities for brilliant service are inseparable from the station: but how could I expect to keep the post when

the Government entertained the same views of its value? My experience in Portugal, and in Russia and Germany, is very deeply impressed, and I know that my income is too limited to enable me to keep the establishment that would then be necessary, and which Lord William Bentinck, &c., found to be so *even at the onset.* "Vestigia nulla retrorsum" in these matters.

Lord Aberdeen insists on my staying with Schwarzenberg, and, after the Emperor's recorded desire, he thinks himself authorized to keep me. We shall see the issue. At all events, I rejoice in the assurance of my discharge from Cathcart with whom I may then live on good terms, and who will begin to acknowledge the good service I have rendered under his orders.

While at Gotha I heard more anecdotes about the Crown Prince, who is now daily becoming more generally unpopular. Pozzo di Borgo, indeed, says that his soldiery only await the moment to get rid of him altogether. It is impossible that they should not feel ashamed of him, for he is ridiculous to the highest degree. He, however, offends at the same time by his affectation. In the field he ordered Löwenheim to go *ventre à terre* with some order. The Count said that he had already two horses killed, and he found that his third was quite knocked up. "Allez à pied!" was the reply. In one of his speeches before Leipsic, he said, "The Swedes are now about to have the glory of fighting under the eyes of their Prince!" and then turning to them, he concluded with the climax, "*Allez, vous faire tuer—vous faire tuer—tous!*"

Stuart, however, has greatly shocked some Swedes by answering to an observation that prayers were put

up in the churches for the Crown Prince's safety, "N'ayez pas peur pour lui. Il se conservira."

Speaking of Jerome the other day the Crown Prince said, "Oh! he must have a kingdom: he is my friend!" And seeing some Swedes leading some French wounded, he exclaimed, "Vous voyez quelle sympathie! quel instinct!" These words have startled the Norwegian *disposers*. On the whole, all despise him, and some fear him. The French decree about Guadaloupe will tend to shake him still more in Sweden.

Oct. 28th, Tambach.

Before I quitted Gotha I went to the Electress of Hesse, who was much pleased to see me. She is the wife of the present Elector and a member of the royal family of Denmark, which particularly induced me to pay her this attention. I then took leave of the Duchess of Gotha, and passed a very agreeable hour with the Duke, who, though eccentric, possesses a fund of intelligence and good sense, with a passion for the *beaux arts*.

I seldom have heard truths better expressed, or more philosophical remarks from high personages, than I heard from him especially as to the military *métier*. Nevertheless, he has a twist, or, as the Scotch say, a *craze* on the subject of dress.

On arriving here I was told by the Marshal that Metternich was made a Prince, and certainly he deserves the highest distinction for the ability with which he has conducted the march of Austria, so as to preserve the political ascendency which circumstances thrust upon her.

The Marshal also told me that Count S. Aignan, the late minister at Weimar, who was taken by the Cossacks at Gotha a second time, is to be sent back with secret instructions to commence demi-official negotiations. The answer to his communication will determine what is further to be done.

I have had the sad misfortune to lose my superb Turkish sword. Allen was charged with the care of the carriage. Like a good-for-nothing fellow, as he has frequently proved himself in the care of my property, he quitted the carriage, and in the interim my sword was lost. I have dismissed him from my service, and he may now find his own way—he has passport and money, but no blessing from me. I am grieved beyond measure, but I endeavour to act like a philosopher though I cannot feel like one.

Oct. 29th, Schmalkalden.

We arrived here this forenoon. The ground was covered with snow, which rendered the celebrated wild Thuringia Forest more bleak in appearance than ever I anticipated. This town is remarkable for the Protestant league against Charles V. It belonged to Hesse, but now to Westphalia. It is built in the most antique fashion.

We had intelligence, *en route*, of Wurtemburg having joined Bavaria, and I saw a Wurtemburg officer who was allowed to leave the French army with a thousand men without any impediment being opposed by Buonaparte.

This is a further proof of Buonaparte's desire to make peace, and his willingness to sacrifice the Rhine Confederation Protectorship.

Buonaparte seems to be taking the direction of Frankfort, in which case Wrede will fight him; but he may still turn on Wetzlar.

By a return of the Austrian force which I saw this morning, it appears that the Austrian army now under Schwarzenberg, including Bubna and Kleinau, still in the neighbourhood of Dresden amounts to one hundred and six thousand men. To this force may be added twenty-four thousand, with Wrede, of the original army of Prince Reuss. The Austrian Italian army is now sixty-four thousand men; but Schwarzenberg tells me that Austria will be able to have in Germany one hundred and sixty-four thousand men in the spring.

The Russian and Prussian returns are not yet received. However, the wish for an arrangement rather than a further prosecution of the war daily increases; so I presume that unless Buonaparte turns very testy peace is not far distant. If it is to be, mutual understanding will be far advanced before the receipt of this in England.

I understand that Buonaparte's bulletins of the Leipsic battles are here, but I have not yet seen them. He may certainly say that he baffled us the first day, held us in check the second, and lost his rear-guard the third day by the misconduct of his own people in cutting the bridges too soon. He may truly say all this and add great encomiums on the bravery of his troops, without detracting from the able dispositions of Schwarzenberg and the courage of the Allies.

We shall march on without any rest-day to Frankfort. The army will then repose if the enemy permits.

In two more days we shall quit the bad cross-roads; but the bad weather will not leave us.

30*th*.—The Emperor, Lord Aberdeen, &c., came to us yesterday. The Marshal, Metternich, &c., go over to the Emperor of Russia to settle various matters of business.

The wish for peace increases with all reasonable persons. It is thought that Count St. Aignan cannot arrive for several days. It is therefore wished to send some one else. Merfeldt was proposed, but the fear of too early publicity in England opposed his mission. Some one will be selected this day, and Buonaparte will probably be invited to send some person direct to negotiate or at least to state his intentions officially.

St. Aignan told me at Weimar that he thought the French would insist on Buonaparte's acceptance of the Austrian terms; that if he did not they would revolt; but he much feared that Buonaparte would be obstinately bent on retaining some military power before he subscribed to peace on the very conditions he proposed before the Leipsic discomfiture. We are to reach Frankfort on the 7th of November.

Nov. 1st, Fulda.

Yesterday, after passing a very interesting private evening with Aberdeen, Merfeldt, and Humboldt, and discussing subjects on which we eventually all agreed, I made a double march and reached Hunfeld *en triste endroit*. This morning the Marshal sent for me to show me some papers taken on a courier intercepted by some of General Wrede's partizans and to communicate the news of Wrede's action, the general *précis* of which I have noted in my report to Lord

Cathcart. The battle seems to have been very obstinate; but an Austrian regiment of cuirassiers and three Bavarian regiments of cavalry having given way the Bavarian cannon took flight, and the enemy, instead of being battered by forty pieces of cannon in the centre, found only a feeble and inadequate musketry fire.

The combat proves the good order and strength of the enemy, on which I always insisted; and the issue verifies my constant prediction that Wrede would be beaten if he disputed the passage. I calculated upon the deficiency of his armament and the looseness of his march after such forced expedition, upon the reports I had collected of the enemy's state, and finally upon the certainty that Buonaparte would never make the experiment unless he was morally certain of success.

The loss of officers in the Allied army has been extremely severe, and the probable events of the next day excite justly much uneasiness.

The intercepted papers which I read are very curious. I could only make brief sketches of their contents, but I hope Aberdeen will get the originals of Soult to send to England, and also of Decaen, which are full of important matter.

Soult writes in addition to what I have stated, that if Lord Wellington had pressed on the 7th he would have taken S. Tol de Luz. But Suchet appears to be preparing a warfare of great power and strategical science, with the confidence of superiority in force and energy of spirit in his army to counteract the inferiority and dissensions on the Bayonne frontier.

The letters from Italy are also highly interesting. They unanimously represent the Italians as still

friendly to a government which was oppressive to them, and show that Austria with all her errors of administration has more influence than France among the people. Venice and Milan are particularly noticed as ill-disposed to the French system.

The notice of the intended attack on Antwerp has been conveyed by a merchant in London to his correspondent in Paris apocryphally.

The discovery of the *avis* is ingenious, but Bernadotte is suspected of having given the plan, as he was charged with the defence at the epoch of Lord Chatham's expedition.

There is great abuse against Tchernigow for taking some private French property at Cassel, and Savary writes, "Toute la societé à Paris s'indigne de cette conduite." The Parisians and France in general are reported by Savary to be resolved to make all possible sacrifices for the protection of France.

Switzerland has her neutrality guaranteed by France; but France appears to me to be seeking quarrel with her.

The inspection of this correspondence coupled with the facts therein specified and the events at Hanau incline the Austrians to consider this as the favourable moment for peace, and a moment not to be neglected.

We arrived here after passing over a route packed by dying and dead Frenchmen and horses. The hospitals have the Siberian panic, and remain untenanted. Now the most emaciated sick crawl on the highway to the rest of death. This is one of the many evils of the uncivilized system of war which has characterised modern times.

Blucher sent a despatch here noting his intention to

turn off our road, which is a great benefit to us, as he leaves famine as his legacy; but the most memorable paragraph is, "The Crown Prince is advancing to Cassel *under the protection* of General S. Priest, who entered on the 30th."

This is an old town, much attached to the House of Orange, but poverty-struck by the war, pillaged by the passing enemy, and replete with misery. In one hospital we found three hundred and fifty dying and one hundred and twenty dead.

I learnt this day that Stuart had received the Order of the Sword from the Crown Prince. The Crown Prince has here shown himself skilful: "Il à préferé ses interêts à ses passions."

The Emperors of Germany receive their crowns at Frankfort. I am there to be decorated with my Theresan Collar, and I shall be as proud of it as any prince has ever been of his insignia. In England this feeling might create a philosophical sneer, but through continental Europe this badge is justly appreciated. To reconcile, however, the *English philosophers* I shall add, that it is not only ornamental: it cannot fail also of being useful.

2nd.—The messenger from General Fresnel arrived as we were about to march on Schluctern. He has postponed our journey two hours. The tidings he brings are most important, and on the whole very unfavourable. The Allied army has certainly been forced and very much shattered. Fresnel's words were "our loss is *sehr empfindlich*," which signifies sensible as well as considerable; and I understand that the loss of officers is extraordinarily severe. I am sure from the details I have gathered that if Buonaparte

estimates the loss at twenty thousand he will be within bounds.

The death of Wrede will be a fatal blow to us. He was the life and soul of the alliance. Mongelas will now again have the supremacy, and the military exertions of Bavaria will languish. Fortune has not yet deserted Buonaparte, and I repeat, he merits her favours more than ever.

After all his losses it appears that he has still eighty thousand men under arms, and Kellerman writes, that "between thirty and forty thousand had already passed the Rhine." With Kellerman's force, the *Hesse* Cassel forces, &c., he cannot have less than one hundred and thirty thousand men to defend the frontier, and, as I think, keep footing on this side of the Rhine in the neighbourhood of *Mentz* Cassel (I prefix *Hesse* and *Mentz* to prevent mistakes by similarity of names).

Davoust's, St. Cyr's troops, the Danish troops, the garrisons, &c., still engage portions of the Allied armies; and the new conscription of one hundred and twenty thousand men, without including the war conscription of one hundred and sixty thousand, will make him very respectable, and in my opinion intangible at present on the Rhine: for it may well be imagined that after thirty days' incessant marches on such bad roads, and in such weather, the effective state of the pursuers is not good; especially as the country is entirely ruined through which they pass. To make these exertions with comparative impunity the men must live well and have shoes. Neither of these needs can be supplied; and it only astonishes me that without them we should muster so strong and look so cheerful as we do.

Nov. 2nd, Schluctern.

We arrived here this afternoon. On the road we had passed two hundred and seventy dead horses and one hundred and seventy bodies of men—the distance three and a-half German miles; and many half-dead men were not included in this hundred and seventy. I did not see one carcase wounded—the whole had perished from disease and famine. Here we found Russian and Polish misery: a scene of general desolation and exterminating poverty.

Before we sat down to dine (which dinner consolation is always provided by the Prince Marshal *à table ouverte*), Prince Salkowsky gave the Marshal an account of himself and his mode of quitting Buonaparte's army. He stated that, after the death of Poniatowski, Buonaparte wished to give the remainder of his Poles not exceeding one thousand five hundred, to Dombrowski; but the colonels remonstrated and required that Prince Salkowsky should be their chief, to which Buonaparte acceded. Salkowsky, however, finding that affairs went ill, and that the passage of the Rhine was probable, asked, with various others, his dismissal, upon the ground that they had not engaged to serve France but the cause of Poland and the King of Saxony. They also stated that they would now return and plant cabbages, but not serve any power until there was again the prospect of a Polish independence being established by Polish exertion. Buonaparte attempted to dissuade them, saying, that the King of Saxony was only nominally their Sovereign; that he himself was their Duke; that the Duchy always existed; that he would show his means to preserve it, and at all events assure

them protection in France. Salkowsky persevered in his request for dismissal, when Buonaparte answered, "Allez donc . . . . . Vous êtes indigne de votre état!" He then called the Poles together and harangued them. He commenced by saying, that he had been "betrayed by all the world from Prince Schwarzenberg to the lowest of his allies; but he would show them that he was still what he was, and had power to become as great as ever." "Est-ce que je suis maigri? Croyez vous que je n'ai pas un" . . . . . &c., &c. Then addressing himself to Dombrowski, he said, "Respectable vieillard! prenez là commandement de vos braves. Ce jeune homme —ce polisson là—ne les mérite pas! Suivez moi; je vous guarantie le bonheur."

This speech, although not such as Tacitus, or Polybius, or even Q. Curtius would have made for their heroes, nor such as Plutarch would have recorded of the most unfavoured of notorious chiefs, nevertheless produced the desired effect; and not a man but Salkowsky quitted the standard again leagued with the French eagles.

With such effect obtained, it may be disputed whether bad taste or the knowledge of his audience gave the tone to his discourse. At all events, this scene shows Buonaparte to be a *man of mettle*; and if he had not murdered the Duc D'Enghien and Hofer, massacred his prisoners and poisoned his sick, I should have some respect for him; but now I regard him as a *giant* of *the first class*, whose power of mind, force of character, ambition, and malevolent spirit, are unmatched in modern times.

If death does not smite him, *il se fera reparaître*

before we are much older (be it peace or war) in terrific magnitude; but peace gains time, and time composes all things sooner or later—often by concerted and complex, but always by infallible processes.

Nov. 5th, Frankfort.

On the 3rd we marched to Gelnhausen, where General Hack, the Prussian general, contrived to give a general fête in the midst of poverty and desolation.

Yesterday we made a forced march, passed by Hanau where I saw with pain a monument of Wrede's incapacity as a general, and entered Frankfort in triumph.

We were well received; although Buonaparte gave the inhabitants warning not to commit any follies, as he should reappear in the spring, and particularly cautioned them against importations of English merchandise.

It was the Marshal's *name-day*. After dinner I rose and said—"Cest le jour de nom du Prince Maréchal. Je ne porte pas le toast à sa gloire, il en a assez; mais je porte le toast à la santé et au bonheur du Chef digne de l'Empereur qu'il sert et les braves qu'il commande."

The Marshal was loudly cheered, and I received the most affectionate thanks from the society when we rose. No man can be more, or more deservedly, beloved than the Prince. It was quite a high gratification to see the martial aspects of the grenadiers, throwing the joyful smile from their hearts into their countenances, as he passed through the streets. It was a proud welcome.

The Captain Hesse has delivered the Marshal's

letter to Berthier at Hochheim. He saw Bertrand, Mortier, and other officers. Bertrand particularly urged peace, and the error of the Austrian connexion with Russia. It is, I think, certain that Merfeldt will succeed in his mission: but if England will not, as she pretends, make peace without the cession of Norway to Sweden, England will have *war*, and the pleasure of making it for so very worthy an object as the Crown Prince and so important an interest to her welfare as that of making Norway, *tôt ou tard*, a French colony.

The complaints against Tchernigow in person, and all the Cossacks, increase and multiply so fast that the whole of Germany seems to have been swept already by their scourging brooms. "If the Cossacks will but pass the Rhine and destroy two or three villages, it will be worth a million of men to me," Buonaparte said, ungraciously. The Prince Marshal, however, knowing the effect not to be overrated, refuses firmly permission to the Cossacks, who are anxious to revel in the nest of the Moscow vultures.

Almost the first words Wrede said yesterday to the Marshal related to some arrangement for the removal of the Cossacks, on account of the mischief they do the cause and the army by their devastations.

The Prince Primate, like a war-priest, has taken one million four hundred thousand florins in gold with him to Constance, and proposed the cession of the Duchy of Frankfort to the King of Bavaria in favour of Beauharnois on whom it was last year entailed by Buonaparte.

5*th*.—Yesterday the Emperor of Russia came into Frankfort. He wished to enter before the Marshal,

but was disappointed; the people received him *well*, but with no extraordinary greeting.

Metternich gave us dinner. I happened to sit next to him, and had a very interesting conversation. He said that if the Allies would be cordial as to their real objects and put confidence in him he would engage to make a satisfactory peace or deprive Buonaparte of the support of France, which could alone enable him to make the necessary efforts.

He further said that he would extricate us from that most *injudicious* and *impolitic* engagement and present embarrassment—"the Norway cession." He particularly condemned that measure as unwise and inexpedient even at the time; and he said that it would always have been fraught with ill as a temporary measure entered into at the expense of permanent interests. He did not, however, tell me his project of extrication.

He spoke highly of Aberdeen, but hoped that we should, as well as Russia, state our "ne plus ultra" and "sine quibus non," without endeavouring to extract more as negotiations proceeded to the hazard of pacification and confusion of the negotiators. It is evident that he wishes to be charged himself with the full powers; and I verily believe he would attain all the legitimate objects of the Allies, or throw the responsibility of further hostilities on Buonaparte.

During the day Captain Hesse returned with Berthier's answer to the proposition for Merfeldt's exchange. The style was remarkably friendly to Schwarzenberg, and the exchange was accepted. Another letter came from Caulaincourt to Metternich, thanking him in the name of the Emperor for S. Aignan's pro-

mised return. Both letters indicate an anticipation of further correspondence and cordiality on the presumed subject.

This day the Emperor of Russia, the Prince Marshal, and all the minor powers, rode out to meet the Emperor Francis, who entered the city amidst the most joyous cheers, &c., of a people who evidently felt what their cries and gestures expressed. Since he gave up the sceptre it has not been "a piping time of peace" for the inhabitants of Frankfort. They have paid pounds where they only paid pence, and, what was worse, they were never sure of what remained.

Te Deum followed his entry, and we froze for two hours in a cold church. The troops then filed by the Sovereigns, and this ceremony was almost as chilling. We then went to dine with Mr. Bethmann, who gave *grande fête*. Afterwards we passed to the opera, where 'Titus' was performed before the Emperors and an overflowing house by some very able actors.

I should swell my diary into an encyclopædia if I were to note all that interested the eyes and ears in these eventful days; but I must not be too concise, as I wish to give a real *tableau* of the state of things according to the most accurate observations.

It appears that Buonaparte said, on passing, that "the Continental system was a chimæra;" and the merchants of Frankfort consider that system at an end, whatever warlike changes may occur.

Mr. Müller, the great banker, on being asked by me whether he thought Buonaparte had the means to complete his conscription, informed me that he had been about a month since in France, and that the men were to be had and would be produced; but that

great discontent prevailed at this never-ending war and that the peasants began to group together and, in defiance of Savary's espionage, express their ill-will and dislike of Buonaparte, to whose name they generally applied some disrespectful term. He further declared to me that when he was in France, an order was given for some prayers to be recited for Buonaparte, and that in the village where he was all the people quitted the church after the usual prayers and left the priest and his clerks to sing the appendix.

These are strong and expressive traits; but still Mr. Müller thought that France had great power.*

All the persons here assure me that above seventy thousand effective men under arms passed through Frankfort with Buonaparte; and General Fresnel, who commanded under Wrede, this day said publicly at table in answer to a question from me, that Buonaparte had not less than eighty thousand effective men after he quitted Hanau; and that with the preceding stragglers, &c., he would have a hundred and twenty thousand men in a fortnight under arms, of the original Leipsic force. This *calcul* tallies with mine, and I am sure it is accurate.

Count Löwenheim, the brother of the Minister, came this day from the Crown Prince. He tells me, that Colonel Cooke assured him that Tolstoy had lost between six and seven thousand men in the sortie of S. Cyr; that S. Cyr continued firm at Dresden; that Davoust was on the Streknitz with twenty-three thousand French and two thousand Dutch troops, that he was supported by fifteen thou-

* The remainder of this Journal of Nov. 6th and the commencement of that of Nov. 7th are missing.

sand Danes, and that he thought it not impossible that at this season Denmark would augment his force to forty thousand; that the Crown Prince wished to attack Davoust and not move into Holland until the canals, &c., were frozen.

I had news from Brinken, who passed through here. He told Mr. Bethmann that he saw Buonaparte and was well treated by him, until he said that he was my aide-de-camp, when Buonaparte said, "Oh! if you are aide-de-camp to an English general you must be a spy," and ordered him immediately into France. His treatment from that moment became harsh.

8th.—Yesterday morning Lord Burghersh came here. We dined together, with Aberdeen. I was always resolved not to make mine a personal affair with him, and he presented himself in the same disposition, so we met and parted good friends.

This day Lord Aberdeen, having received another application from Prince Schwarzenberg (a copy of which accompanies this), spoke to Lord B. on the subject of his appointment; and in addition to the Emperor's, Metternich's, and Schwarzenberg's opinions, expressed his own conviction that my removal would be prejudicial to the public service; and he begged him to go to Italy, notwithstanding that Lord Castlereagh had appointed him to reside with the Commander of the Austrian army.

B. replied that he had no idea of being thrown into a secondary position—that he had the highest post and was resolved to keep it. At the same time he hoped I should not conceive that he acted with any ill-will towards me: he disclaimed all such feeling. Lord Aberdeen in vain urged the delicacy of forcing

himself *malgré le souverain*, &c., and in spite of the public interest; but B. was inexorable.

On Aberdeen's mentioning his conversation to me, he said that if I could not be placed here and would not go to Italy—which he could not recommend, as I had been superseded by a junior officer—he would make it a *sine quâ non* with Government that Burghersh should not remain at head-quarters so long as the Emperor, and himself consequently, were with the army; for Burghersh has instructions not to be in any way under his control.

I endeavoured calmly to judge what best became myself and what my friends would most approve. I have desired Aberdeen, therefore, to request Lord Burghersh to await another letter from Lord Castlereagh, which Lord Castlereagh notified his intention of sending. That letter will give an ultimatum which may settle the question *à l'aimable:* if not, the very arrival of a new courier will enable me to find a pretext for withdrawing to England without the unpleasant attraction of public observation to the real cause.

I have no shame to apprehend; but I cannot, as an Englishman, wish to excite an interest to the prejudice of a British Government in a private matter. I do not wish to become the object of such conversation. I have run my course without a spot in my character. I shall present myself to my country free from reproach and loaded with proofs of approbation. I shall return no Government debtor: I shall carry with me testimonies that I have more claims on them than they on me; and their own friends—their most intimate friends—shall sign my certificates of unrequited labour.

Certainly I have been most harshly and undeservedly treated—most offensively slighted. The appointment of a junior officer is an insult as well as an injury. Government cannot plead ignorance of my wish. I will, however, keep on the high ground which now supports me, and not lose my footing by any rash and unadvised step. I have Aberdeen as my counsellor, who will regard my honour as well as my interests in all his opinions.

We have no letters later than the 12th of October; so there must be a courier in a few days, and then we shall come to issue.

In the evening we went to Bethmann's house and had an agreeable soirée. Metternich was there. Madame Bethmann is a Frankfort beauty, but she is not much of a Venus: although *on dit* that the Emperor of Russia has pronounced her to be *the goddess*.

This day we dined with Cathcart. To-morrow we attack Hochheim, where the enemy have an advanced guard, which is not very strong but it may be supported by his troops at Cassel.

Merfeldt is not to go to Buonaparte. St. Aignan has arrived and is to be charged with the first propositions.

The Allied army cannot be ready before 20th of November to march, as is proposed, by the left, leaving sufficient force to keep the enemy in check at Cassel; but I speculate that an understanding with France will be far advanced before that date. The wish for peace increases and extends.

10*th*.—Yesterday I accompanied the Marshal in his droska to the ground near Hochheim: we there mounted. As the action advanced I could not refrain

from putting myself at the head of his troops with another general, and entering the town on foot through the palisades.

I was prompted to do so from a military motive, as our presence restrained the firing and the confusion which it would have occasioned when crossing our own columns piercing by other points: and again I was anxious to take an honourable farewell of my brave comrades, to show them that I embraced their fortunes to the last with undiminished zeal.

Altogether it was a fine spectacle; and I really could have cried, as the men cheered on our return, from a variety of highly-excited feelings.

We came back as we went, and, after a journey of more than forty miles and so much exercise, sat down to dine with hunters' appetites.

This morning I gave my report to Lord Cathcart, who promised, for the first time in his life, to send it to England.

About midday we had a parade. The Russian guards entered: they looked as well and turned out as complete as if Frankfort had been S. Petersburg. The Prussian guards bore them company, and have much improved by the association. They had marched from Aschaffenburg to be looked at, and were marching back again as we have more troops here than we can feed.

Aberdeen, Metternich, and Schwarzenberg have all expressed pain at my expected departure. Metternich will not hear of it, and Schwarzenberg is equally vehement in protest. Independently of personal feeling they represent it to be most mischievous to the general interests and prejudicial to Austria and Eng-

land; for I have a confidence with a consideration that no one else can enjoy, since there cannot be similar opportunities to found it.

This is their language, and far weaker, indeed, than theirs, as Aberdeen will certify. Metternich even said that I possessed the military good opinion of Prince Schwarzenberg so much that he thought, as an officer, my presence was of the greatest value to him

EXTRACTS FROM LETTERS ADDRESSED BY LORD ABERDEEN TO LORD CASTLEREAGH.

"Nov. 11th, 1813.

"Schwarzenberg and Metternich have frequently spoken to me on the subject"—of Sir Robert Wilson's removal.—"The first has written to me in the most pressing manner; the latter has told me that he had it in command from the Emperor to express his sense of the great services of Wilson, and to state his wishes that he should continue with the army. Schwarzenberg told me that he would as soon part with Radetsky, the Quartermaster-general; that Wilson was admitted to all their councils; that they had the most entire confidence in his zeal and talents. His services in the field have been most conspicuous. On the 16th at Leipsic—which day was saved by the brilliant conduct of the Austrian cavalry under Noztitz—Schwarzenberg declares the success to be chiefly owing to the intelligence and able dispositions of Wilson. In short, to enumerate his military services would be

endless. Great as they are, however, they fall short, in Schwarzenberg's estimation, of those which he has rendered out of the field. From his intimate knowledge of the Russian and Prussian armies and the great respect invariably shown him by the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia, he is able to do a thousand things which no one else could do. He was the means of making up a difference between the King and Schwarzenberg which was of the utmost importance." * * * * *

Again—

"Nov. 17th, 1813.

"The Emperor of Russia has flatly declared that he will take on himself the responsibility of *making* him" —Sir R. Wilson—"stay; and that he will write to the Prince Regent accordingly. The King has been equally kind; and old Blucher has pressed him to come and share his quarters for the rest of the campaign, where he shall be treated as his son. But in the Austrian army, from the first to the last, the feeling is the same, and as strongly expressed. Schwarzenberg more than once in speaking of it"—Sir R. Wilson's removal—"has absolutely cried with vexation: a pretty good proof that he was in earnest. He says, that in the disagreeable sort of command which he has over Russians and Prussians, if it were not for Wilson there are many things which he should never venture to propose. In the field it has frequently happened that he has sent Wilson to *persuade* Russian officers—nay! even the Emperor himself—to do what he would not otherwise have thought of." * *

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CONTINUATION OF JOURNAL.

Aberdeen agrees with me that I cannot remain or go to Italy without sacrificing my own consideration, Burghersh being with Schwarzenberg ex-officio. I should be acting as a make-shift public servant: one who would bear all insults and all injuries, and be thankful for the bread of humiliation.

Metternich told me at dinner this day, that I should not go—that he would charge himself with the arrangement; but, although most capable to do all possible things, I suspect this undertaking is above his power.

We have no letters later than the 12th of October; the delay therefore cannot be very long if the courier has not been taken.

Count S. Aignan goes this night. Spain free; Germany and Holland independent; and new arrangements for Italy are the *sine quibus non*. I have little doubt of peace, particularly as the government of Holland is to be matter of discussion. Everything tends here to increase the desire for peace if this basis can be obtained, and the greatest sceptics now begin to see the shoots of the olive-branch.

Another attempt is making to gain Denmark. She is only now required to cede Drontheim. I was likely to have been employed in this negotiation; but I do not expect that it will be successful, as I presume that Denmark will speculate on general negotiations, and thinks herself now strong enough to make head until their issue.

Nov. 11*th.*—The days pass as if it were the "piping

time of peace." Courts, galas, parades, banquets, &c. &c., have succeeded the iron age. Last night there was a grand ball. All the Sovereigns were present, and a sufficiency of *beauté bourgeoise* to ornament the scene.

The theatre and stage formed the salle, and the boxes might have afforded a contemplative seat for a philosopher, but I did not see one at this interesting post.

I could make some remarks on the *new* congregated chiefs, but discretion buries them as they rise. Every *preux chevalier* will however image them and feel as I have done.

To investigate motives of action would be unprofitable at this season.

Although the note of warlike preparation is not heard in Frankfort, still Mars is in the field. The columns are marching to their given stations, and the maxim is in force, "Si vis pacem para bellum."

The Allied armies are considerable—I send their estimate; but the enemy is also making gigantic efforts, and all the tales respecting the want of men in France now bear their just character of fallacy. Never will France have had such a force on foot, and it must be remembered that it will be, with very little exception, a *French* force.

We shall now see that *central* exertion which, *if all be true*, is the palladium of every nation. We now touch the bounds of that elastic force which wisdom only would dare to *feel*, and the highest wisdom would not dare to press upon.

Switzerland will, we believe, preserve her neutrality: it is her natural policy, and it is Buonaparte's

interest to grant it fully on his side. Denmark, by her proclamation, indicates adherence to France as the protectress of her integrity. That Norway policy is the bane of the Allies, and nothing astonishes us *all* here more than the illusion which prevails in England as to the character and conduct of Bernadotte, who is the greatest charlatan that ever appeared on the public stage.

The capitulation of Dresden, with eighteen thousand effectives and thirty-six thousand sick and wounded, is a propitious event; but the non-ratification of the capitulation is a manœuvre which I presume will excite much discussion in Europe. I have not yet read all the papers, and cannot form a correct judgment accordingly; but I gave as a general opinion, and so did Lord Aberdeen, that the preservation of military faith and public law will be more beneficial to our interests than a deviation from those principles, however momentarily advantageous that may be; and I am sure that the Prince-Marshal has in his mind not sacrificed the *honestum* to the *utile*.

My proposed departure for Italy has excited an extraordinary sensation. Monarchs, ministers, generals, all combine to form a phalanx of support; and the Government of England will learn at least that an individual, without their favour, may acquire by loyalty of conduct to his country a consideration that is not to be overborne by the oppression of power.

I cannot write what has been said on the subject by the Emperor, the King, and others, but they all tell their ministers in England to hold the same discourse; and Aberdeen will be the recorder of the aggregate as well as of much valuable detail. Nor is it a feature of

minor credit that I have obtained the friendship, and from public motives command the zeal of this personage in my cause. I may not be reinstated in my post, but I tower above the humiliation proposed.

17*th*, *evening*.—I went to the Emperor at six o'clock. I shall not enter into all the details of our conversation, but note these words: "In Russia you rendered me the greatest and most essential service. You told me the real truth. I owed to you, and to you alone, a knowledge of what was passing. On my arrival at Wilna I verified all that you had written. I found all exact as to fact and accurate as to opinion. I never but once imagined that I had any occasion to feel displeased with you. *I was told that you under-stated the numbers of my army, and thus would weaken the confidence of England in my power. I soon found out that I had not been well informed.* Your zeal and the gallant efforts that you made proved still more my error. You have continued without intermission to augment your claims on my esteem and protection. I regard you as my friend—as one whose good services I shall never forget. I shall immediately dictate a letter to Count Lieven, in which I shall desire him to express these sentiments to the Prince Regent, and solicit that you may be at the head-quarters of the Allies as heretofore. Indeed I shall take upon myself to prevent your departure for Italy."

Some conversation then passed with reference to a certain person, and also to another person who has been writing to England for my removal from the Russian head-quarters, as I discovered by accident.

His charge against me was that I approved the armistice and recommended peace, if Austria did not join.

As he is a Prussian subject, I mentioned the matter to the King, who said:—"To the armistice I owe my throne, but, with regard to that said person, he is a mischievous meddling being who requires constant surveillance." The King then proceeded, and told me that he should make his minister express his sentiments, *without committing names according to my request.*

Of this aforesaid person the Emperor said:—"He is a man with a wild, heated imagination, and most intemperate. He has two or three times nearly ruined our affairs with the Crown Prince. He was an agent of the Hanoverian interest. His connection with Count Munster, as proved by the letter containing the accusation against you, shows that this agency exists. He requires watching, and it is most fortunate that he has a Sovereign with judgment and circumspection enough to weigh well his character and observe his conduct."

Of the same person the Prince Schwarzenberg told me he had every reason to be *néfiant*; that it had been long evident to him that he was influenced by some policy foreign to the common interests; and General Radetsky said to me, before the subject of this charge was mentioned to him, "I have received such and such a plan, and have had such and such conversation, but I have told the Prince that this man is not counselling by his head but by the necessities of his purse. He is, I am sure, a *mauvais sujet* in some foreign pay."

I now name my accuser—Gneisenau, an able officer, but such a man as I have described him, and who wrote to Count Munster a note in the sense I have stated, because he knew me to be a loyal friend to the Allies and an uncorruptible public servant.

There is no excuse for Government in giving credit to such a mercenary on his *ipse dixit.* No man is safe if such agents are respected as authority for condemnation.

I note these heads that my defence may remain on record, if the accusation be made public at home hereafter as a defence for Government; but I request that the matter may not be brought into notice through my information, as I am under promise to forbear and preserve silence. When I can notice the transaction I shall do so with astounding éclat.

I must not omit that when the Emperor spoke of the armistice, he said:—"Your Government is always several months in arrear. It writes now as it might have been excused for writing on the first news of the armistice, but not at a time when we owe to that armistice all the success that we have obtained."

There is no answer yet from France, and the plan of campaign is not yet settled, but it will be in a day or two.

Count Bellegarde, who is going to Italy as Commander-in-chief, will be here in a few days, and then, I think, notwithstanding the Emperor's veto, I shall make an excursion there for a short time.

Letters and papers have been received from England to the 26th of June, mine reach to the 17th of October. I send the papers to the Queen of Wurtemberg, whose communication is not yet established with England. The Wurtemberg Mars charges himself with them.

I forgot to remark that the Grand Duke of Baden spoke very kindly about Louisa,* and Mrs. Tharpe.

* His brother Edward's wife and her sister.—Ed.

I suppose I shall soon see the Queen of Sweden at Carlsruhe.

The Emperor's and King's letters will not go for a few days from hence; but Aberdeen writes this night, and so do others.

24*th*.—The calm of a few days appears the repose of years. Already the restless spirit murmurs at the tranquillity which has succeeded the perpetual motion of the last eighteen months.

The arrival of the King of Wurtemberg produced some novelty to dissipate the thoughts of a day, and the entrance of the two Grand Duchesses yesterday enlivened the scene; but a change of locality only can satisfy the military craving of the army.

If the 'Morning Post' had sent an imp here he would have found, however, much matter for his columns. Grand dinners, bon-mots, &c., afford a vast field for the journalist caterer.

The day before yesterday I should have been noted as the first in the order of the day: Metternich, Schwarzenberg, &c., being my guests.

Yesterday, Metternich gave the dinner. It was his *jour de nom*, and I was desired to give the appropriate toast. I thought a prelude suitable, and in an audible voice, but probably in very bad French, I began:—

"Je demande votre indulgence pour quelques momens.

"Je viens de recevoir des ordres que je serai très-fier d'exécuter, quoique craignant que je ne sois pas assez digne.

"Il faut d'avance vous annoncer que ce jour-ci est très-intéressant pour nous tous qui composons la grande famille de l'Europe à présent indépendante.

"C'est le jour de nom de celui qui a su si bien choisir le moment pour faire déployer les vertus militaires de sa nation—toujours guerrière, toujours illustre, quoique pas toujours heureuse; et qui a ainsi présenté l'occasion de couronner par des victoires éclatantes et solides l'ouvrage dont sa sagesse a posé le base.

"L'Europe, le monde entier, témoignera une reconnaissance éternelle aux souverains qui ont fait briller par leur exemple dans cette lutte les hautes qualités qui l'ont distingué; on ressentira la même reconnaissance pour le chef digne des braves qu'il a menés, pour ces braves dignes de leur chef, leur souverain, leur gloire nationale, et la cause pour laquelle ils ont combattu: mais jamais on n'oubliera ce qui est dû à celui qui a pendant cette époque présidé aux conseils de la monarchie autrichienne; et pour toujours comme pour aujourd'hui on portera avec le même empressement et du fond du cœur le sentiment.

"Au nom du Prince Metternich, le restituteur de sa patrie!"

The English critics may find fault with the language, but the whole society applauded this expression of their feelings, and if I was not voted an eloquent, I was regarded as a faithful orator.

I have mentioned the King of Wurtemberg, a most portentous Prince! He received me very graciously however, and said that his Queen was much obliged to me for my attention in sending the newspapers. I had received a similar message from herself by Prince Eugène of Wurtemberg previously. The King's corpulence does not seem to affect his spirits or dull his intellect. He is certainly a *clever*-headed man; but

not *sound*-headed, or he would not be in the constant broils which agitate his government.

His magnificence exceeds—and far exceeds—that of all the other sovereigns. His state establishment is splendid to the greatest degree.

The arrival of the Grand Duchesses afforded opportunity for the display of some gallantry. The Prince-Marshal, the Austrian general, and myself rode out to meet them. We bivouacked for an hour in a wood with most chivalric patience, and, when at last they came, we formed an escort to their equipages. The dames were, of course, much pleased, and their smiles, &c., restored that glow of which the bleak air had deprived us.

Before dinner at Metternich's, Aberdeen and I spoke to Count Nesselrode about the letter written by the Emperor to Lieven, and he told us that the Emperor had expressed himself in the strongest manner as to his approbation of the past, and the importance of my continuance at head-quarters for the general interests. It was in fact a personal as well as a sovereign request to the Prince Regent.

This matter, of course, must be kept quite secret: the fact and the issue may be dexterously ascertained from Lieven, but not communicated so as to transpire. The credit of the transaction must be dispensed with.

I am the more anxious for prudence in this matter, as I have heard again that the publicity of my private letters has been one of the principal causes of the hostility of the Government.

I note events and opinions as a record and a justification of myself; but these opinions should be very carefully preserved from appearing as accusations of

the directors of affairs. Even in my own personal concerns I would wish to avoid irritable expressions, although it is difficult to repress one's feelings.

The arrival of Marshal Bellegarde, who is daily expected from Vienna, may determine my journey to Italy; but the message from Buonaparte, which is now on its way from Mayence, and which will be known before the departure of the present courier, may have more immediate influence on my movements.

The answer from Government cannot be received these three weeks at the soonest—perhaps it will not arrive till much later, as we are now nearly five weeks without advices from England; but I propose to employ that intermediate time, be it peace or war, in the most profitable way, and I conceive that there are several fields open to my exertions.

I should have been charged with a diplomatic mission to the *Boot of Europe*, but I wish, first of all, to keep *chaste* from any of the new King's embraces, and, secondly, the Englishman sent from hence would only play an under character.

Great military discussions still continue. On that subject I am drawing out a memoir, as I think it right to keep such a document of my counsels. If the war does recommence it will be on even a more gigantic scale than the last operations. The Allies will certainly not have in the field less than six hundred thousand men. The enemy—but I leave that calculation to the English calculators.

The Dresden convention is not yet terminated. Our first information as to the number of the enemy was incorrect.

It appears that there were in the city twenty-seven

thousand marching men, and seven thousand sick and wounded, near two thousand officers, thirty generals, and two hundred and forty cannon, of which eighty were field-pieces—a tempting booty, but I feel confident resistible, if not tangible with honour.

Evening.—General Clausel came last night to Hochheim with some propositions for the surrender of the fortresses on the Vistula and the Oder.

It was presumed that he was the bearer of an answer to S. Aignan's communications, but this does not appear to have been the case.

No treaty will be entered into for the fortresses as a partial measure.

The news from France is that great preparations are making, but still I think there must be peace on the terms proposed by the Allies.

We are anxious for advices from Switzerland. Thirty-six thousand Austrians will be ready to enter Basle on the 7th of next month, *bongré malgré*, but I hope with the consent of the people, as I fear mountain opponents.

Nov. 28th, Frankfort.

A letter came from the Duke of Bassano the day before yesterday, stating that his master saw with pleasure the dispositions which the Allies had expressed and that England had adhered to the principle of a Congress; that he recognised as the basis the independence of continental and *maritime* nations; and that he augured auspiciously for the result of the conversation which had passed between Monsieur S. Aignan and the English ambassador (at Frankfort). He proposed Manheim as the place of assembly, and,

Manheim being neutralized, he agreed to the passage of English couriers viâ Calais.

The object of his answer is evidently to throw on England the responsibility of the result if not pacific; but Metternich conceived that it was not sufficiently explicit as to the proposed basis, and an answer has been written, in which the desire for negotiation is strongly repeated. But, in order to avoid the inconvenience of a Congress assembling to dissolve from the misunderstanding of a common basis, reference was made again to the basis stated in the written memorandum given to Monsieur S. Aignan, and an explicit answer was requested to these propositions. In case of the affirmative, negotiators would be sent to meet the Duke of Vicenza, &c.

I conceive that the words, "independence of all nations" implies acquiescence with the demand for the independence of Italy, Holland, Spain, and Germany; and that in fact nothing is *assured* by a more precise definition, Buonaparte having it in his power to break up Congress on one pretext or another, if he prefers another experiment of force.

Ten days are lost by the dispute.

The words "*maintain* independence" are no doubt formidable to England. They require all our consideration, and convince me more and more of the propriety of my ideas at Reichenbach, that the Continent had better, if it could, make its own peace.

The British *sine quâ non* of the cession of Norway has not been mentioned. It would have prohibited all negotiation, and it would have prevented the Allies from making common cause. Austria will never stipulate for that *wrong*. Stuart, when he was

made acquainted with the transaction, urged the omission of Norway as a great breach of instructions, but Aberdeen was perfectly right to consider the general interests, and not the partial interests of Lord Castlereagh, the father of that measure. I think, whenever the question is agitated, that he will find strong support for this part of his conduct; and in my opinion he deserves it for the whole of his proceedings.

The different views of Stuart, Cathcart, and Aberdeen have determined the Sovereigns to propose that Aberdeen should alone be charged with the concerns of the negotiation and the great common objects. Pozzo di Borgo goes to England with this mission, and to open the eyes of Government to the Crown Prince's character.

I have now lived to see Lord Cathcart officially recognised as that nonentity which he wished to represent me.

The Emperor even demurred to letting him know S. Aignan's affair, the Austrian, &c. The same reluctance was shown to the communication with Stuart; and Aberdeen was obliged to state the inevitable necessity.

I still think Buonaparte will admit the basis, but with comprehensive phrases, and that Frankfort will be connected with England by the shortest route, in which case I shall endeavour to profit by the occasion. If Aberdeen is named negotiator he will remain; if not, he will positively go to England, and perhaps, at all events, proceed there for instructions.

The war is to continue, and Switzerland is, I hear, to be forced if she attempts to maintain her neutrality —a measure replete with important consequences; but

be they for good or ill, I shall not approve the violence.

The Crown Prince is *snailing* towards the Elbe.

Holland does not remain quiet, as is said.

Saxony is greatly uneasy at the captivity of her Sovereign.

S. Cyr refuses to re-enter Dresden, and protests against the infraction of his capitulation. It is an awkward affair.

28*th.*—Aberdeen has resolved to go to England. He does right. I think he ought not to await the answer from Paris, but proceed there direct. He will not return; unless he is charged with the negotiation, and unless the views of Government meet his views as to *peace* instead of *chicanery to protract the war.*

Metternich has agreed, provided that he will pledge his reappearance.

By principles Aberdeen belongs to *us.* He is a liberal politician and a man of high independent spirit, with a very reasoning mind, in which there is no inextirpatable prejudice. I should have thought that Lord Grey and he would have been inseparables; and they would have been, if accident had favoured nature and brought them more in communication.

I should not be surprised if Aberdeen's return induced Sir C. Stuart to take a leave of absence, but with very different views. At all events I do not believe that he will long remain a minister. He is tired of his position, and will daily become more so as his sphere of action is reduced.

Aberdeen's departure greatly embarrasses me, although I stimulated it. I lose a friend and a protector. I should have wished to go with him, but we

both fear that the measure may be injudicious. I suppose it will end in my taking a provisionary trip to Italy, but I am very anxious for letters previously from England. They are now due for six weeks. One word of counsel to return, from that quarter, would put an end to all my forbearing plans. The news from Switzerland is that the Diet is immoveable, but *on dit* that the people are better disposed to receive the Austrians. The experiment will, I understand, be made with the sword in one hand and the olive-branch in the other.

If I commanded the armies I would make the capture of Mayence the first feature of my winter's campaign with the central force.

There are news from Constantinople. The Turks are picking a quarrel with the Russians. The Servian success has made them bold. The battle of Leipsic will suspend their ardour, the winter adding its chill; but in the spring, if the war continues, they will, I think, march to the Dniester while they are negotiating for Asiatic frontier ports.

This morning I passed in a most interesting tête-à-tête.

This afternoon I dine *en grande societé* at Metternich's, who adds to the talents of a minister all the accomplishments of a liberal host, a gallant gentleman, and *bel esprit*; so that his table and his soirées are very delightful points of rendezvous.

28*th, at night.*—Stuart has sent home his resignation, in anger at not being trusted, as he conceives, by the Prussians with full confidence.

Dec. 3*rd.*—This morning was the fête of one of the foot-guard regiments, on which occasion there is

always a gala. At the parade the Emperor came up to me, took me by the hand, and asked why I did not wear the new medal for the campaign of 1812. I replied that "I awaited his orders to be nationalized." He answered that no one deserved the medal better, and said other flattering words, which, as relating to that campaign, was most interesting to me.

PRIVATE LETTER TO EDWARD WILSON, BROTHER OF SIR ROBERT WILSON, REFERRING TO THIS AND OTHER EVENTS OF THE TIME, BUT NO PART OF THE DIARY.

With regard to the odious *self*, so often noticed in the Journals, I must repeat again that this correspondence is only meant for yourself and Jemima. I have always calculated on your extracting and new dressing the matter if you thought it worth communicating; but if you sent it in its original state to any friend, you certainly have exposed me to the imputation of a very vain egotism.

I do not enter into any defence of my military opinions, because I cannot refer to the letters. You should always cite the contradictory paragraphs, but bear in mind, as I have before written, that—as in the case of Bavaria—when I state a controlling event, and then argue the main probabilities of the proposed operations, I consider the action of the joint causes to be always understood, though not expressed in the instance of each special argument.

I did not think that Buonaparte could have been dislodged from the line of the Elbe by a direct central attack; and if it had not been for the Bavarian movement in Franconia and the defection of the Saxons,

we should see now a different state of things, although Bavaria did join us and the Crown Prince was obliged to co-operate *demonstratively*.

It is possible that I may judge wrongly, but I am sure that my statements are correct, and I shall yet see the day when my opinions in Congress will be respected as having been judicious and suitable.

Revert to my plan of campaign. See Buonaparte with an army now in France.

Do you think that he would have extricated himself so well if we had formed between him and the Rhine in three lines?

Think also of our losses in the battle of Leipsic, the Austrian loss alone amounting to 50,000 men since the 10th of October. All this is, however, a *tale for posterity*, which the present generation would scout.

I did think it doubtful whether Wrede could accomplish the Bavarian alliance.

Schwarzenberg, Radetsky, &c., were all of the same opinion; but I expressed my doubts on *authority*, not on speculation.

I judged peace wise if Buonaparte would make it on the basis which he professed, and on what we could obtain, as I thought, in addition.

Mark the event.

Peace may now be made, but not before Buonaparte has a more formidable force again on foot than France ever had. Years formerly were necessary to create armies, now days suffice.

With regard to "*prophecy.*"

There is a despatch of Lord Aberdeen's on record on the subject of the Bavarian alliance and its conse-

quences, which will prove me neither a false prophet nor a gloomy one, for I sanctioned as far as my military opinion would go every word therein contained, the fact of the alliance being assumed.

With regard to the Crown Prince, I again repeat that you are all gudgeons to the "Courier" and the "Post." It is a lamentable proof of the slow progress of truth, and the proneness which exists to prosper charlatans.

I leave that subject, however, to Sir Charles Stuart, to Lord Aberdeen, to Pozzo di Borgo, and to time.

Note, however, to my friend that I protest against his remarks that the Crown Prince has done more than I expected.

Lord Aberdeen wishes me to go to Switzerland and join the guarantee of England for the integrity of her territory and her ancient system of neutrality at a general peace. I should also endeavour to seize, if I could, by an act of exertion and the aid of the Swiss themselves, the passes into France. I shall thus, at all events, kill time, which is a personally important object, and I shall not fail in the general objects from any want of public zeal and enterprise. I am not quite sure, however, of the ground that I propose to tread upon. It is very delicate. Our only pretext is that a partial neutrality granted by the necessity of the enemy, and which retards or hazards the re-establishment of the general system of the balance of power, is in fact a measure of hostility to Europe.

There may be different views taken, but I consider this as the most tenable, and likely to influence the Swiss *raisonneurs*.

The movement is, indeed, much opposed, and this

night its adoption or rejection is to be decided in Grand Council. Some propose the passage of the Rhine and siege of Mayence. I should have preferred that measure if winter were not pressing on our noses, and two months had not elapsed since the decree for raising the first 200,000 conscripts.

There are others who think that nothing can be done, for that any attempt will be fatal to the attitude of conquerors in which we now stand. These advise immediate peace; and certainly, if peace is to be made, it is better to make it while the enemy is feeble than when he feels himself lusty and saucy.

Buonaparte, if France stands by him, must have a more powerful force than ever he had, with the advantage of its being *national*. In the whole of his wars he has always found a hydra nature morally inferior in force to its specific physical power. I know that it may be said, "He wants officers," &c. Our own *tableau militaire*, however, presents far more embarrassing inconveniences. And where is money? Where are stores and provisions to be found next year, if we cannot live in the enemy's country?

To give you a notion of the prevailing abuses in the commissariat arrangements, I know a corps of 9000 men, which draws rations for 16,000 men and 36,000 rations of forage daily!

You yourself think my tone rather too pacific. In the intimate intercourse which exists between us I wish you to be put in possession of my real feelings that you may form your own opinions more accurately. As a soldier war is my passion and *ought to be* my interest; but if I were to have the assurance of every recompense that could gratify ambition or avarice, I

could not entertain or express to a friend a warlike opinion at the cost of my judgment, knowledge, or integrity.

To secure what we have, I still pronounce my belief that peace is necessary. Without the loss of 100,000 men, I believe we might have had the peace which is required for the attainment of the objects of Europe. If it is proclaimed that we are to make a crusade against France, and not sheathe our swords until we have planted our standards in Paris and struck off Buonaparte's head, then I should not talk of peace on the Rhine but very cheerfully make war all my life. If, however, the balance of power is the desideratum, then I must make my grenadier ardour subservient to the statesman's consideration and respect his "ne plus ultra."

Marshal Bellegarde is come. He is an old acquaintance, and a chief with whom I would very cordially serve under other circumstances.

I have just come from a grand banquet given by the Emperor to his brother Sovereigns, the Grand Duchesses, &c. It is necessary that I should feast myself into a little more *embonpoint*, for otherwise I shall not have sufficient carcase to suspend my tackling upon.

A new medal has been given for the campaign, 1812. The Emperor on parade came up to me, and asked why I did not wear it, observing that no one deserved it better; and before dinner he came up to General Aratchiew, and ordered him to find me one. The General begged me to accept his, but the Grand Duke interfered, desired me to send back every other person's, and to accept only of his own.

This certainly is a very friendly compliment. Indeed, the kind manner of the Emperor, who said much more than I have noted, his cordial gestures before every one, the interest shown by all the officers that I should wear their national decoration, &c., &c., afforded consolatory feelings to counteract other impressions.

I shall be the only English officer with this badge of a memorable service, but the motto is, I think, rather *too true*. "Non nobis Domine," though it is engraved in Russian characters, will compel me to recite our own condemnation to each enquirer.

If you expect in England a great demand for goods you will be disappointed. If the Government were more friendly to English commerce, the general poverty would prevent the consumption. Every state looks to England for money. If we cannot supply "*the needful*," the war must end *de se*. The merchants assure me that Buonaparte and all France feel certain that we must be bankrupt.

Dec. 3rd.—Before dinner the Emperor again spoke to me on the subject of the Moscow medal, and desired General Aratchiew to send me one, who immediately asked me to accept his. But the Grand Duke, overhearing the Emperor, desired me to "chasser" all others and wear his own, as he "did not care for the Tory frowns." I answered that certainly by this distinction he "added *valoir* to the Whigs." This joke about Whigs and Tories is always on the tapis whenever he sees me or speaks of me; and, indeed, he always asks as his first question of every Englishman, "Are you a Whig or a Tory?" Some one had told him that Whigs

were Jacobins, and this greatly tickled his fancy; so much so that he made the Emperor once join in his badinage against me on the subject. I have at last made him understand that the *outs* are always the Jacobins; and I am sure he would gladly hear of a change of administration, that he might hail Lord Cathcart in his new character.

I should not be surprised, however, if his wit were some day repeated in England as serious proof of my being *partout* recognised by my language as an *elève* of Bernadotte's school.

The banquet was really magnificent. The Grand Duchesses and Prince Louis of Wurtemberg were present, with all the Sovereigns, Princes, &c. Of the English, Lord Cathcart and myself only were guests.

At length we have received papers to the 12th of November.

John Bull is always honest John, but not wiser than before. Experience has the least influence on him of any of the moral powers of direction. I am sorry to observe, however, more bad language, more filth than usual passing between the antagonistic parties.

The contest whether Buonaparte is to be killed, and if killed, *eaten*, &c. &c. &c., amuses us much here. We all wish either or both events, but we recollect that the direction of Mrs. Glasse is, "first to catch him."

Much is done; more may be done; but we shall all be *undone* if we do not investigate causes as well as effects.

If I were member of a Government, I would grapple to my friendship with hooks of steel that man who *could* tell me and *would* tell me *only* truth; but I

remember what old Lord Lansdowne always said to me. when he spoke about public life—"Never give a minister counsel, and above all avoid unpleasing information. When you write it, you sign your sentence of excommunication. Agreeable fiction will never be cited against you except as patriotic and laughable errors of zeal. Unsatisfactory predictions when verified will only create or aggravate ill-will and accelerate its effects."

MEMORANDA OF THE AUTUMN CAMPAIGN, 1813.

The Allies opened the campaign on the 17th of August, with the project of lodging an army exceeding two hundred thousand men on the enemy's communication, in the direction of Chemnitz and Leipsic.

The army of the Prince Royal, about ninety thousand strong, was ordered to assume the offensive at the same epoch, and endeavour to pass the Elbe so as to connect with the Grand Army.

General Blucher, with a force exceeding eighty thousand men, was instructed to avoid a general battle, but to follow and press the enemy in any retrograde movement towards the Elbe. Count Bubna and General S. Priest, stationed with small corps at Zwickau and Romberg, were directed to guard those passes and connect with General Blucher's left, as circumstances permitted.

The French army, estimated at four hundred thousand strong, and by some at a higher number, commenced their operations on the right bank of the Elbe; and it was only after a successful but partial action with General Blucher and the penetration to

Gabel with one of its corps, that its march eastwards was arrested by information obtained of the movements of the grand army.

The grand army passed the mountainous frontiers of Bohemia and Saxony in various columns: the right being thrown on the Töplitz route, the left on the Marienburg and Freyburg routes.

The corps of Gouvion St. Cyr opposed some feeble resistance in the camp of Pirna, but was driven back upon Dresden.

As it appeared that Buonaparte had engaged in a serious operation upon the right bank of the Elbe, and might, perhaps, enterprize towards Prague from the pass at Gabel, it was determined in progress to suspend the movement upon Leipsic and by a conversion to the right appear before Dresden, with the assurance of either taking the place which was valuably stored, or of bringing back the French army to its defence.

Had the city been attacked in the evening of the 25th, when all but the corps of Kleinau reached the position above Dresden, it is possible that success might have crowned the operation; but the attack being deferred until the next day, when the whole corps of guards reinforced the garrison which already consisted of eighteen thousand men, the capture by storm was scarcely possible.

The Prince Marshal's order was limited to the assault of the exterior redoubts. The generals commanding at the different points were to judge of the practicability of further operations from the character of the further defences which they could then examine, and from such new circumstances as might arise.

Soldiers, animated by a primary success are always excited to the full experiment of enterprise; but the most persevering intrepidity could not force an entrance even with the aid of cannon placed at twenty paces from the wall, gates, and palisaded entrenchments; and if an entrance had been obtained it is certain that the enemy within were too numerous and too strongly posted in long-prepared barriers for progress to have been made to the bridges with sufficient celerity to prevent the passage of the army hourly arriving.

A gallant and judicious sally of the enemy obliged the assailants to withdraw from their position.

As the chief attack had been made on the eastern angle of the town, which from thence extends in a northern direction, and as the enemy sallied from the central gate on the southern front, the maintenance of the acquired redoubts was impossible.

Courage, zeal, and ability, could achieve no more. The combat had lasted about two hours after the assault of the redoubt.

The combat on the next day—unfortunate on the left from the rash advance of two divisions,* but successful in the repulse of the central attack which might have assured brilliant military features to grace the arms of the Allies if the Russian general† had obeyed the orders of the Prince Marshal to retake the prematurely-evacuated village of Strehla—proved the

* These troops were almost all taken and killed by a combined attack of Cavalry and Infantry.

† The Marshal twice ordered General Barclay to attack the enemy—but was disobeyed, although Barclay had the corps of Kleist and Wittgenstein, as well as his own, to dislodge the enemy with—while the Marshal undertook to attack the village in flank with the Hungarian Hussars and a powerful Artillery.

impracticability of any decisive advantage against the enemy, who could manœuvre from flanking fortresses on the communications of the Allies; whilst the defensive means were multiplied by a fortified centre which enabled them to carry all their active force to the wings of the position for an offensive operation.

The Allies had no alternative—as the enemy had advanced from Königstein on the Töplitz route, in rear of their right flank, and upon Freyburg in rear of their left flank—but to *flank* about on the Saxon territory without any base of operations, without any possibility of obtaining needed stores, dependent for food on the supply which the ground they occupied afforded; or of regaining with all possible haste the Bohemian territory by the defiles, which the peasantry with difficulty use in the mountain-line between the Töplitz and Marienburg route.

Extreme severity of weather rendered the condition of the soldiery deplorable, and increased the embarrassments of the march.

The corps which had been left before Königstein had unfortunately been ordered forwards during the day to join the grand army.

The ground during its absence had been occupied by General Vandamme debouching from Königstein; and Count Osterman, who commanded the corps which now was ordered to form the advance of the column falling back upon Töplitz, had been obliged to force his way through three different posts which the enemy occupied.

Count Wittgenstein, General Kleist, and General Barclay, who had been ordered to retire by the same route, deemed the passage impracticable, and turned

into the mountains to debouch in front of Töplitz, at the pass of Eichswald, about a mile in rear of the subsequently celebrated village of Cülm.

The main Austrian column retired upon Dippoldiswalda and Altenberg, pressed by the enemy; and General Kleinau, leaving Freyburg on the right, gained the route of Marienburg. But he was obliged to force his passage, and abandon, as well as the other column, some guns, many ammunition-waggons, and much baggage.

General Vandamme, at the head of twenty-five thousand men, pressed the corps of Count Osterman, whose advance he had unsuccessfully attempted to bar, and on the morning of the 30th drove it down the hill of Nollendorf, and through the village of Cülm.

Count Osterman could not assemble more than nine thousand men, to resist the further advance of the enemy. The enemy, having left nine thousand on the hill of Nollendorf to secure the command of the pass, strove to force his way to the pass of Eichswald with sixteen thousand, working his progress chiefly by the right along the wooded base of the mountains.

Each party fought with a resolution suitable to the magnitude of its object—the preservation or ruin of the Allied army.

Russian fortitude, however, prevailed; and, after a combat of eight hours, in which the Russians lost five thousand of their corps d'élite, and the enemy probably more as two considerable columns were cut down by the Russian cavalry, the Russians remained masters of their interesting ground; and the heads of the columns of the Allied army began to debouch on

the plain and to advance to the support of their preservers.

The Prince Marshal having towards the evening reconnoitred the enemy, made a disposition for attack for the ensuing day. Orders were sent to the Prussian column advancing by Maxen and Grossubel, to march on Nollendorf. The Austrians were directed to turn the enemy's left, and the Russians to press on the right and centre.

General Vandamme finding himself weakened by the action, and calculating on support from Marmont's corps moving on the route of Altenberg, ordered during the night the nine thousand men that occupied Nollendorf to join him in the position of Cülm. This arrangement completed his ruin. About ten o'clock the attack commenced by the Austrians rapidly turning his left; soon afterwards the cannon of General Kleist was heard in the rear below Nollendorf, and the enemy's resistance which till then had been gallantly maintained, momentarily weakened until retreat, disorder, and flight, extended through the whole position, when the Allies broke in in every direction. Unfortunately General Kleist had left no corps on the height of Nollendorf, but had descended the mountains in columns of march with a huge train of artillery.

The enemy's cavalry four thousand strong, preceding the infantry, endeavoured to gain a passage along the high road. The Prussians, unprepared for this effort, broke off from the road and dispersed in the flanking woods.

The abandoned artillery opposed no barrier, but, on the contrary, afforded some objects for vengeance.

Part of the enemy's infantry followed their cavalry with impunity by the same route; and a greater portion, turning by their left, climbed the mountain and gained Nollendorf.

The Prussians on the arrival of the Allies presented the extraordinary scene of an army routed by the vanquished. Not ten men could be assembled together for a long time; many then arrived without arms, and many wounded.

Although the imperfect execution of a well-concerted plan had thus saved near half of the enemy's corps, nevertheless the success was brilliant and most useful. It rallied the spirit of the soldiery; it restored amicable relations between the chiefs; it contributed materially to counteract the depression of the friends of the Allies, and it checked the enemy's progress on the right bank of the Elbe: it permitted an honourable defensive, and very necessary repose, but it did not — as has been pretended — give the power of resuming the offensive.

The loss of the Allies since the 17th of August, at that epoch had not been less than seventy thousand, and the whole material of the army was greatly disorganized.

The theatre for offensive operations was also distant, except in the case of the Prince Marshal being persuaded to complete the wreck of his army by advancing them again through the mountains or by the single road of Peterswalde, to reappear before Dresden and return with aggravated misfortune.

The Prince Marshal made the only movement which the means and position admitted. He marched to the right with the Austrians, in the intention of acting

against the rear or the right flank of the enemy if he persisted in pressing General Blucher, (as he seemed inclined to do after his success at Dresden), while General Wittgenstein moved towards Königstein.

The enemy heard of the movement, and hoped by a forced march to attack the force left to cover Töplitz during the absence of the Austrian column.

While his main body advanced on Peterswalde and Nollendorf, he entered the mountains with eighty pieces of cannon, gained Kraupen, whence he commanded the view of the valley of Töplitz and the whole Allied position.

An advanced guard was thrown down on the plain suddenly in rear of the Allies posted in front of Cülm, and for a moment occasioned much uneasiness at Töplitz where the Sovereigns had remained.

A force being assembled the enemy re-ascended the hill, and the first Austrian column, which had never advanced beyond Auscben, entered early the next morning into their original position.

The next day the second column arrived, and General Merfeldt was detached with ten battalions to Aussig.

Buonaparte in person had passed to Kraupen, in the hope of being enabled to debouch from thence in rear of Cülm; but his officers assured him that the passage with cannon was impracticable. He therefore withdrew his army, after a sharp affair the preceding evening below the hill of Nollendorf, in which both parties suffered.

The Russians readvanced to Peterswalde, obtained some partial successes, but were checked at Grossubel by a strong position commanding the road, and by the camp of Bautenau commanding the left of the road.

The wreck of Vandamme's corps here acquired a just title to admiration, as did also the Russian artillery by their extreme intrepidity.

On the ———,* Buonaparte, hoping to surprise the Russians and crush some advanced corps before the descent of the Nollendorf pass, re-appeared with considerable force and pressed to the mountains. He obtained only trifling advantages, but the confusion was considerable and proved the danger of the position on the crest of the height.

The next day about eight thousand men descended the hill, and encouraged by the weak opposition of the Prussians at the abbatis, advanced to Cülm. The Russians here checked their progress, and the Austrians, under Count Colloredo, attacked the enemy in flank with great steadiness and intrepidity; but a very thick fog enabled the enemy to withdraw without much loss.

The next day but one the enemy fell back and re-occupied the camps at Bautenau and Grossubel.

It appears that it had been the enemy's intention to debouch and engage in a general action, and that he had justly estimated the force with which he had to contend; but the disadvantage of debouching in the presence of more than one hundred thousand men, covered by a most powerful artillery and posted on ground favourable for every arm, determined the enemy, anxious as he was for a general and decisive battle, to avoid it under such circumstances.

While the Allies were moving from Dresden, General Blucher had encountered the first offensive operations of the enemy commanded by Buonaparte in person, and could not extricate himself before he had sustained a loss of more than five thousand men.

* Blank in the MS.

The intelligence of the descent of the grand Allied army into the plains of Saxony suspended the pursuit, and an order for the retreat of the enemy's army upon the Elbe quickly succeeded.

The activity and energy of General Blucher were favoured by the heavy rains, which rendered the roads almost impracticable, and swelled streamlets into unfordable torrents.

Eighty pieces of cannon, a considerable number of ammunition-waggons, and one entire division, unable to pass the Bober, fell into the hands of the Prussians; many prisoners were picked up along the route, and the enemy's corps gained Bautzen in great distress.

It is calculated that Buonaparte received intelligence of his disaster during the action of Dresden on the morning of the 27th: and on the morning of the 28th, as soon as he was assured that the Allies had entered the mountains, he repassed the Elbe with his guards and endeavoured to repair his misfortunes by falling on the Prussian columns with an overwhelming power, at a moment when he supposed that they might be unacquainted with and unprepared for the movement.

General Blucher's intelligence and able dispositions baffled the enemy's design: in repeated attempts to engage him in retreat, he has known how to evade circumventing dangers, and to convert offensive into defensive operations and *vice versa*, with an activity, skill, and steadiness, which entitle chief and corps to high estimation.

General Blucher's campaign seems to merit study, but more details are required than have yet been made public to enable us to ascertain the real extent of its influence on the enemy's principal plans and

movements. A person of the highest consideration assumes that not more than six thousand prisoners were made altogether from the enemy, and that the combats were very partial.

The Crown Prince had been attacked on the 23rd by about seventy thousand men debouching from Torgau and Wittenberg. The action took place at Trebbin, about ten English miles from Berlin. The left of the Allies only was engaged; the centre and right remained spectators.

The French were repulsed, and withdrew with some loss augmented in pursuit. Marshal Davoust had at the same time moved along the coast to menace the rear of the Crown Prince, and, forcing back General Walmoden, had advanced to Schwerin.

After the combat of Trebbin the Crown Prince detached to support General Walmoden, and assumed a partial offensive, conducted with an address and courage highly creditable to the Prussians.

After the battle of Dresden, Marshal Ney again advanced with four corps to retrieve former failures and take Berlin.

The Marshal fell in with the Prussian column near Juterboch; and after a very severe combat, in which he had gained interesting ground, was on the point of obtaining a complete victory, when the Crown Prince entered the field with seventy battalions and a powerful cavalry, re-established the fortune of the day by the appearance of his columns, and in a few moments saw the army which had been confident of success, panic, struck, and flying with great loss from those who before had been assured that they had lost everything but their honour.

It appears that the Crown Prince had been induced

by erroneous information to make a false movement; a peasant corrected his error, but the Prussians still assert that he might have reached the field of battle three hours earlier.

It is certain, that here, as at the combat of Trebbin, the Swedish troops contributed only by the shadow of their lines to the victory; and it is said that even they murmured at this systematical preservation from danger which should have been common, but which the Crown Prince had avowed that he would not permit them to share; as "if he did so, he might then be without an army, and perhaps without a kingdom."

Only one Swedish battery was brought into action.

The Prussian loss had been very severe, since five thousand were buried in the field; and the survivors, although justly proud of the achievements of the day, considered that the greater part fell an unnecessary sacrifice.

The news of this failure made a great impression on the enemy: it obliged him to concentrate on the Elbe, to reorganise his broken troops, repair his losses, and multiply his power of action by the assured facility of transporting his army rapidly from one side to the other of a river on which he held four fortresses with fortress têtes-du-pont on the most strategical points of passage, and several other bridges covered by field-works; whilst the Allies had no bridge except at Leitmeritz in Bohemia, under the guns of Theresienstadt, to and from which the roads were almost impassable for guns in bad weather.

The advantage of such a position, where the enemy was also aided by arsenals, hospitals, magazines, cantonments, and the power of solacing his troops by frequent exchange of garrisons, was justly appreciated

by the Commander-in-chief: but the majority of the Allies imagined that the enemy would abandon the line of the Elbe, on which he still could manœuvre with two hundred and thirty thousand men, and retire by the Saal, if he did not fall back behind the Thuringer-wald and limit the warfare to manœuvres on the Mayn as an ultimate effort for the preservation of a footing in Germany.

The cry was almost universal for a march upon Leipsic, to prevent the enemy's *escape;* and in the fear of losing the prize, the still operating evils of the mountain passage, the danger of a flank march for several days in the presence of a superior force, the experience of Austerlitz, of Krasnoi, and the more recent lesson of Vittoria, were all committed to oblivion or contempt.

Fortunately the better genius of the Allies prevailed. Light troops only were sent into Saxony, and the army was kept upon the line between Commotau and Aussig.

The Austrians had entered the field with one hundred and thirty-five thousand men in Bohemia, exclusive of garrisons; they were now only one hundred and thirty-three thousand with garrisons amounting to twenty-four thousand men and with a reinforcement of twenty thousand Landwehr.

The Prussians had entered Bohemia with forty-four thousand. Their present total did not exceed nineteen thousand, and not more than fifteen thousand could muster under arms.

The Russians had entered Bohemia with eighty-two thousand. They *returned* now but a total of forty-six thousand.

The army of General Blucher had lost in killed and

wounded between eighteen thousand and twenty thousand men; and the season and fatigue had moreover greatly enfeebled this force, especially the Prussian portion.

The army of the Prince had not lost less than fifteen thousand at the lowest computation, since the opening of the campaign.

The Allied powers had thus diminished, in one month, one hundred and forty-six thousand men.

The enemy's loss had been considerable, but it was not of equal extent. He had experienced disaster, but not commensurate with what the Allies suffered before Dresden and during the retreat through mountains.

In Prague (the depôt for the grand army's prisoners) on the 23rd of September, there were only fifteen thousand French prisoners collected, including the wounded; and from certain inaccuracies in the bulletins of the other armies, and from private intelligence, it is certain that the computation of the enemy's total loss in these quarters has been erroneous. In one of the Crown Prince's bulletins, he advertises the capture of four thousand prisoners by the grand army, and seven guns, when *not forty men and not one gun were taken.*

The Austrian bureau calculate the minimum of the enemy's loss in killed and wounded at sixty thousand, and the maximum at seventy thousand.

The enemy, however, retained the superior advantage of being able to concentrate the residue, and move it, when so collected, *en masse* on either side of the Elbe, for several days' march in every direction; being assured of their passage, and that in ten days the Allies could make no impression on his têtes-du-pont.

It will, no doubt, excite some surprise that no

movement was made by the Allies towards Hof, from whence the enemy's position in the Thuringerwald could be menaced. From thence operations might be directed against Wurzburg and the interesting country in that quarter, where the Allies would have found a friendly people and, in the first instance, very insignificant opposition.

It may be presumed that this movement would have excited the enemy's jealousy and influenced the surrender of the line of the Elbe sooner than any incursion nearer the fortified base, or any menace to dislodge him by violence; and it was certainly the great fault of the original plan of campaign that while the Allies moved into Saxony to intercept his retreat, no force was detached into Franconia under the protection of such a screen.

The operation was in such case sure, and could not have failed in producing very important advantages, whatever might have accrued to the grand army.

Political circumstances on the side of Bavaria certainly rendered the movement to the left, after the battle of Dresden, even more expedient: but there were counteracting political apprehensions on the side of Prussia which made her inimical to any plan that might remove Blucher from the neighbourhood of the Crown Prince, and his force would have been required to supply the vacancy on the left bank of the Elbe.

Among other causes for inquietude, the Crown Prince declared that he would invade Holstein, and thus uncover Berlin, &c.

These considerations induced the Emperor of Russia to order General Beningsen into Bohemia with the force under his command.

CONTINUATION OF DIARY.

December 4th.—The Swiss operations being determined upon I am to proceed on the day after to-morrow to join the Allied commission near Basle. As we shall move with the advanced guard, I thus combine the two services of general and minister. My Russian colleague is Count Capo d'Istrias, the Austrian the Chevalier Lebengettern. The Prussian is not named. The appointment ought to lead to personal advantages if there were any equity at home; but I always expect that the instant Government finds the post I am filling of some importance a new nomination will be made, to remove me with aggravated circumstances of mortification. However I hope to improve my cause by fresh pretensions to approbation from those who employ me, before I can be dismissed by orders from home.

Count Bubna commands the advanced guard, which will consist of his corps, seven thousand strong, and Merfeldt's corps about thirteen thousand strong. He is to pass the Rhine on the 13th, near Basle, march by Berne, and, if he can, is to reach Geneva on the 17th of January.

The rest of the Austrian army will successively move on Berne and then take a new direction towards France as may be expedient.

The Russians pass the last, and their move will depend on circumstances.

Blucher is to cross the Rhine and blockade Mayence.

Such is the proposal. Many circumstances may occur to prevent the execution.

Buonaparte's answer will also, no doubt, much in-

fluence; and in addition I suspect that a movement by the French left will direct more attention to our right flank than is now given, although Bulow and Winzingerode are to move on Holland.

The Crown Prince is not in the scheme of action, although he has announced his attack on Davoust for this day. All parties seem desirous of requiring from him only a suspension from troublesome interference. If he does anything useful, it will astonish friends and foes.

Our advices from France assert that Buonaparte finds no resistance to his will, but great zeal in the execution of his arrangements. As six weeks now create armies from nothing, he has had the needed time. The first conscription was dated the 10th of October; his supplies, therefore, must now be daily pouring in. We shall soon know whether he feels himself buoyant. In my opinion past moments were irredeemably precious for war or peace. I fear all coquetting with time.

The article in 'The Corunna Gazette,' translated into 'Le Courier de Londres,' and shown to Metternich by Aberdeen, has procured Lord Wellington the Order of Maria Theresa, which grant was therein anticipated. Lord Wellington will no doubt honour the Order; but the mode of obtaining the gift was curious: it must, however, be kept secret.

Lord Aberdeen has himself been offered the Order of S. Etienne, but it was not in his power to accept it, as a regulation was received the preceding day that Orders should only be accepted by military men for military service. I must, however, bear testimony that it was his intention to have declined it, as non-

acceptance was more suitable to the independence of a British Minister. He told me this when I hinted to him that there was a design, of which I had heard, to confer this distinction.

Metternich, however, declares that Lord Cathcart and Stuart had their Orders only as ministers and not as generals; although the Sovereign, to secure them the Orders, now states that they were given militarily, and he insists on Aberdeen having the S. Etienne.

It will be a curious matter of discussion in Downing-street, if pressed. There is no doubt that Metternich is right as to the original gifts. The accompanying Crosses of St. George of the fourth class, with the letters, are decisive; and the military pretension to the S. André or the Black Eagle, for services performed, would be quite ridiculous: but if I were Aberdeen, I would persevere and refuse; I am sure that he would acquire more credit in England; and on principle I think the precedent of decorating our ministers a bad one—it may be injurious hereafter.

Stuart did not send his resignation as he intended, and Aberdeen's departure seems to be delayed; but Stuart will not long, I suspect, remain a minister, and Aberdeen will go speedily to England.

8th.—The answer came from France the day before yesterday. The basis was accepted in the most unequivocal language; but the sacrifices which France was prepared to make were to be met by sacrifices from England for the re-establishment of continental and maritime independence and tranquillity. I never read a more emphatic or clearer diplomatic exposition of intentions and views. It made a great impression on all the *first* Council. A messenger was sent off with

the advice to Paris of the negotiation being accepted by the Allies, and of a messenger being sent to England with these tidings. At night Pozzo di Borgo was despatched.

The whole transaction was kept concealed from Aberdeen, *because it was feared that he would communicate with his colleagues, who might object and throw difficulties in the way of the pacificators.* Stuart got notice early in the morning, and sent off a messenger to England with the news, and copies of Lieven's and Jacobi's instructions which he had obtained. He afterwards communicated to Lord Aberdeen and Cathcart what he had done, and thus there was additional strife and contention among the triumvirate.

The rulers here say that they act, in all their diplomatic proceedings, as one; but that England has three legislators here, and makes herself the fourth. They pretend that this multiplicity of supervisors and conflicting deliberators is fatal to the common interest, and cannot be tolerated.

I am sure that the concealment from Aberdeen proceeded from the cause that I have assigned; and Aberdeen himself is now satisfied that there was no intention to deceive him in the act itself.

The basis, as I before said, is the Alps, the Rhine, and the Pyrenees, with the independence of Italy, Switzerland, Germany, and Holland; but without any positively defined arrangement for these countries.

The restoration of Spain to Ferdinand was specifically stated, and is included in the general acceptance. No doubt Buonaparte will endeavour to sow dissensions in progress, introduce malicious maritime discussions, and seek to wrest all conquests from us, or make the

Allies consider England as the selfish cause of protracted war.

England will endeavour to obtain the Scheldt as frontier against France, and perhaps train on negotiations in the hope of favourable accidents; but I think the Allies wish for peace, and will make it while Buonaparte is weak and pacifically disposed, whether England will or not. They certainly have more immediate interests at stake, and they hear the note of preparation through France, while they possess a true knowledge of the past and present means. There is no doubt, however, of the importance of the Scheldt line for British interests.

It appears that the principal French force is assembling at Strasburg, and that many troops are marching upon Maestricht and Venloo to re-occupy Holland. I suppose, in fact, that quarter and Italy will be the most active theatres.

The Swiss plan will not, I believe, be persevered in, unless the Swiss invite occupation, which is not very likely on the eve of general negotiation.

Buonaparte is himself coming to Strasburg, which is another reason for caution in all movements.

Lord Cathcart objected to my going on the Swiss mission, which was indeed rather a pretext to continue with the Austrian advanced guard until Lord Castlereagh's answer to Lord Aberdeen's letters, &c., could be received.

I discovered that both Lord Cathcart and Sir C. Stuart deem me too friendly to Austria, and think that I have too much influence with Aberdeen; they therefore seek to remove me. Cathcart offered me to go to the Elbe or Italy, but under most confined in-

structions and *his* orders. Stuart thinks I might do political mischief with Bellegarde, and he wishes me to remain with the Russian advanced guard, as I was serving previously to the Austrian campaign.

The Emperors, &c., wish me to *gain time*, and with time I am assured the position I coveted; but a letter from Lord Castlereagh to Aberdeen, dated the 30th, evidently supposes that I have accepted the Italian service, and explains to Aberdeen that private arrangements prevented any alteration of Burghersh's appointment.

Stuart, indeed, told me that it was a very old political engagement, almost coeval with Castlereagh's own appointment; and he is very angry at the measures which have been taken to show the inconvenience resulting to the service from its maintenance to my exclusion, as it embarrasses his brother.

The Austrian Emperor, Metternich, and Schwarzenberg, Duca, Radetsky, &c., &c., are very seriously displeased at a transaction which they think proves ill-will to them, as I was their friend and a common friend. The same feelings prevail in other high quarters; but it is impossible for me to resist power under the action of political and personal jealousies; and I see no alternative but to accept the Italian service, and linger on the Continent in the hope of a more favourable gale to conduct my vessel where I would moor her. I fear from a paragraph in Jemima's letter of the 22nd of November, that if I resigned and went to England I should be shipped off to some remote settlement.

Patience and suffering must, in the long-run, make my public claims more conspicuous. Cathcart's plaudits,

so long withheld, have more importance than if they had been noted in detail; but I suppose I am the first instance where the services of two years have been suffered to aggregate in silence.

I hear that Cathcart is to be made an Earl and Stuart a Peer! He deserves it most, I think, for converting the Hanau defeat into a victory with a loss of thirty thousand men to the enemy. These are services of magnitude rendered to a Government, and they merit adequate recompense. Cathcart has been the attendant upon a successful Emperor, and I think his elevation not unsuitable.

I have just seen another note of Lord Castlereagh's, which observes, that "if I have the confidence of all other Governments, &c., I want that of my own." There is no harm in that remark. I expect and seek no intimate connection: I would have none that even appeared to be a party tie. I require only justice, and that good or ill should be meted out to me according to my merits or demerits as a public servant.

Bellegarde goes to-morrow. He has given me a most cordial invitation, and I think we should be good friends.

9th.—I expected that Lord Castlereagh would have written to Lord Cathcart to relieve me, but he has not done so.

I am afraid there will be some difficulty even yet about my going to Italy under Aberdeen's instructions; and of course he will not allow Cathcart to control in his field. If I see no chance of creditable and satisfactory arrangements, I shall apply for leave of absence, get despatches from Aberdeen, and go to England that I may there obtain instructions and come to an understanding on all matters.

I foresee difficulties at home—perhaps detention altogether; and if I am to come out, I do not feel assured of the power of debarcation on the Dutch coast. But to remain a non-entity at the Russian head-quarters until answers arrive to new applications, or go to Italy under disreputable restrictions, and in inferior station to Burghersh, cannot be required of me by any liberal foe.

The acquiescence of Government in my claims for losses, &c., on the 30th of November, proves that there has been at last a more liberal feeling prevalent. I suppose Cathcart's letter has had considerable influence, since his approbation could not be suspected.

The Emperor of Russia goes to Carlsruhe on the 15th; the Emperor of Austria to Wurzburg. Schwarzenberg sets off this night for Freyburg; and Metternich follows him in a day or two.

Dec. 17th, Freyburg.

On the evening of Saturday the 12th, General Merfeldt and I left Frankfort. We slept at Darmstadt—a most excellent town. On the 13th we proceeded to Manheim, the best-built city in Germany; all the streets at right-angles. The enemy's posts were on the opposite banks of the Rhine.

It is here, perhaps, that the European olive-branch may be planted; in which case the parties should subscribe to the rebuilding of the palace which was burnt during the siege.

The next day we passed through Carlsruhe, which is now the chief residence of the Grand Duke. Here were assembled the King and Queen of Bavaria, the deposed Queen of Sweden, and the adopted daughter

of Buonaparte as Grand Duchess—Stephanie-Pagani. Notwithstanding the beauty of the ladies and the interest of the group, I did not think it the moment to pay my court. I was assured a most cordial reception, from various reasons, and particularly from the favourable impression which I know remains of Louisa and her family; but I had more potent considerations which determined me to defer the interview. Hereafter I shall be very desirous of having that interview with a part of this family. I should have thought that the Emperor Alexander would rather have declined a residence in this quarter, but he will remain here for a few days.

After a short rest at Carlsruhe, to look at the palace, &c., we went on to Eppenheim. The next day we passed Turenne's Pyramid near Katspach, and the village of Ettlingen whence the Duc D'Enghien was carried off to be murdered at Paris.

Yesterday morning we reached Freyburg, after a journey through one of the finest countries I ever saw, and which presented all the characteristics of a Government well administered for the mutual interests of Sovereign and people.

The Emperor Francis had arrived the day before us, and had been received by the inhabitants of this town—which had long been the property of his House—with a joy that, if possible, exceeded all preceding greetings.

Schwarzenberg, &c., have already been here several days, and our meeting was a most sincere pleasure to me; and, I believe, to all, since my absence had excited an apprehension that I had been detained altogether by Cathcart.

The news of the day is, that the Rhine is to be passed near Basle on the 20th, when the siege of Huningen, where the French have a garrison of five thousand men, is to be formed. Giulai's corps is to undertake the siege, and the main army is to cover it by advancing into France to the River Doubs.

It is pretended that the Swiss will not oppose the passage; that the enemy are very weak, and only preparing the formation of an army at Beauvais; that there is nothing to fear on the side of Kehl, &c.; and that even the French will join the Allied standard.. I state what I hear, not what I believe or calculate.

The Allies will muster about a hundred and forty thousand men for the operation if the Russians acquiesce in the movement.

Aberdeen is sent for, and I hope he will bring up some definitive instructions from England, subsequent to his second letter, and the applications sent from Frankfort for my residence with the Austro-German army. At Carlsruhe I wrote to Lord Cathcart that Lord Burghersh's letter of service rendered it necessary that I should either go to England or have an independent service; and at Frankfort I desired Lord Aberdeen to inform Lord Castlereagh that I should solicit to be recalled, rather than in any way remain under Lord Cathcart's authority. I await the issue with impatience.

19*th*.—The day before yesterday two thousand Austrians passed the Rhine near old Breisach, with the hope of taking new Breisach by surprise. The passage had been delayed too long. Day broke before the troops could reach the ambuscade, and the plan failed but without any loss.

The last two days have been anxious, as there was much uncertainty about the Swiss movements; but this day a courier has arrived with the advice that the Swiss Government have invited the Allies to take possession of Switzerland *pro tempore*, and Basle is to be occupied to-morrow.

Another courier announces the proposition of Murat to join the Allies against France, provided that he is made King of Italy; and the third courier brings the intelligence of the King of Denmark having agreed to cede Drontheim to Sweden, and to await indemnification under the auspices of Austria at the negotiations.

Murat's design I should have suspected to be in unison with Buonaparte's project as mentioned to Merfeldt, and which either obtained that object or secured the interested co-operation of a long-wavering vassal; but a letter has come from Murat's wife, which intimates that her husband will sign anything to keep the throne he has! "Ainsi va le monde!"

The Danish news is excellent; but it is to be seen if Carl Johann will accept the conditions. He had better do so, as he has but a harsh alternative.

The Austrians will have one hundred thousand men in Switzerland, and they think that with aids from France by *forced* contributions they can maintain their army there during the winter, which they could not do here.

The Sovereigns assert that they will not invade France, *mais* '*L'appetit vient en mangeant*;' and already we have many persons booting, as well as Lord Liverpool, for a journey to Paris.

Our news from France announces preparations; but as there have been no tidings of official operations on

the side of Bayonne or Holland, I must presume that the force of the enemy is not yet applicable to his need.

My own destination is still uncertain, as we have no advices from England subsequent to the 30th of November.

We may find winter in Switzerland, but it is here hot rainy weather, and we have scarcely seen snow.

I shall the day after to-morrow go to Basle. Some of our patrols will soon, I presume, enter Belfort,* and perhaps Nancy. I should feel great pleasure in being of the party and proving that I have a regard for both towns; one for its name's sake, and the other for its having been the habitation of my Donna, whose imagined wishes I make my law.

Aberdeen, not believing that he will be named the negotiator, is preparing to go to England. I envy his power.

20*th.*—The French often proclaim the power of British gold. I shall not affirm or deny their assertions; but I know that the *Dutch infantry* has been more powerful in Switzerland than any other force. High and low, rich and poor, have all itching palms, and the altars of Plutus are adored in every canton. I suspect that Annibal's vinegar was a metallic diffusion among the Alpine tenants.

This day Schwarzenberg moved his head-quarters to the neighbourhood of Basle, and Bubna, with Prince Lichtenstein, was to pass the Rhine at Basle and blockade Huningen. Schwarzenberg's head-quarters are to be at Berne on the 26th.

* Lady Wilson was the daughter of Colonel William *Belford*. She resided, during some years of her early life, at Nancy.—ED.

Troops will push on to Lausanne and Geneva, where the enemy are in strength; but Schwarzenberg will turn to the right at Berne with the mass, and manœuvre in Franche Comté, in the direction of Besançon, which has a strong citadel.

Wrede, with the Bavarians and Russians, will besiege Huningen and push forwards towards Belfort and Strasburg, where the enemy is forming a large corps, and, *on dit*, his principal army.

Schwarzenberg proposes to live in Franche Comté if he can, but Switzerland will supply him provisions for one hundred thousand men. He told me last night that he proposed to manœuvre, not to make conquests; that he thought the enemy could not have a disposable force of any great strength before February, when negotiations would be far advanced; but that if the enemy pass the Rhine at Kehl, he should return and repass the Rhine to oppose his progress on the right bank. The enemy, however, would have a good start and a better communication to favour his operations.

I shall go to Basle to-morrow, to witness the siege of Huningen, &c. &c., and pass my time in a useful manner until definitive instructions arrive from England for my ultimate destination.

I shall be able to ascertain, in executing this intention, what is the real state of the enemy's present means and resources, and what is the temper of the country. I am, however, as usual, more scared by what I see and know than confident by what others hope and say.

The Crown Prince's refusal to assist Walmoden in checking the march of the Danes from Kiel—by which failure of co-operation the Danes passed defeating

Walmoden with the loss of two thousand men—will, I should think, be considered a trait not very favourable to the royal favourite. He refuses to let any of his troops march to Holland, but says that if he gets Holstein he will go himself in *March*, with one hundred thousand men.

He does not yet know that the Allies have engaged to make peace with Denmark if Denmark will agree to cede Drontheim to Sweden, which she has already done.

It is presumed that he will be outrageous and take some violent measure; but I understand that he has only fifteen thousand Swedes, and therefore his force is not very formidable. Still the rupture may cause many strange events.

We are all curious to know what Lord Castlereagh will say to the approbation pre-anticipated by Lord Aberdeen on this subject, which concerns him so personally. No doubt the Crown Prince will call upon him for his support and claim the British guarantee; but will England continue a war with Sweden for objects which the other Allied Powers no longer regard?

Lord Aberdeen thinks that he shall be disavowed in this transaction, but I cannot suppose that any partial feeling will be allowed to predominate to the prejudice of such great public interests as those connected with Denmark's peace. However, the dilemma is serious and will give weight to some remarks which the Duke of Gloucester made in a letter to me, to which I replied with concurring sentiments and a prediction as to the issue.

The King of Denmark wished to make an armistice,

but his urgent command to the Prince of Hesse was intercepted by the Crown Prince; and on the faith of the therein stated necessity, he has asked Gluckstadt as a security, stating with ingenuity that he wished for the possession of that fortress to favour the British trade.

Murat, it appears, did not require the whole of Italy, but only the Papal States. He will not, I hear, have his pretensions admitted; but it is said, with assurance, that he will, nevertheless, turn his arms against France!! However useful the treason, what must be thought of the traitor? Buonaparte, when he heard of Wrede's defection, said to Merfeldt, "After that ingratitude, talk to me no more of men and integrity!" He has now more confirmation of his view of the perfidy of human nature.

Dec. 22nd, Basle.

I quitted Freyburg this morning. Our time had passed interestingly: every night Stadion received, and all the political and military chieftains assembled.

Wine is said to unlock the heart, but I thought that a pipe on this occasion answered better. I am sure that it will pick the most diplomatic German Bramah.

I had promised Cathcart to come direct to Basle, without visiting Schwarzenberg, whose head-quarters were on the left of the route at Löerach. Burghersh's unhandsome remonstrances against even my appearance in Schwarzenberg's presence induced my commander, for the sake of keeping the peace, to urge this request.

On coming near Basle I was told that I must pass through Löerach, as the guns of Huningen played, at half-grape distance, on the regular chaussée: but I

preferred keeping my word. I confess that the passage was nervous,—more so than when running the Glogau gauntlet, as the distance was less and our horses were knocked up. I calculated on leaving my carriage at least as a target, but, fortunately, the enemy neither fired musketry nor cannon against us, although they had before swept everything in motion from the road, and although they had a good quarter of an hour's command of our track.

The people here would scarcely believe that we had passed as we pretended, and the incident has augmented the number of predestinarians.

Basle seemed to frown on us all as unwelcome guests, and I understand that when the troops entered there was no sign of good will.

I have already spoken with several well-informed men of various classes, and they all declare that they feel ashamed of the situation in which they are placed by the variance of their conduct with the decree of the Diet.

The whole population publicly express their consciousness of a sale having been made of their Swiss neutrality by the Berne deputies; and they already denounce the presumed traitors, among whom they name Count Salis (but I believe there they are wrong, for his motives were not avaricious), and they boast that they did not dare to pass through Basle in the daytime.

From what I hear and see, I think it not impossible that there will be even yet an insurrection in Switzerland; but I am sure that, if we retire, woe will betide us and our agents in retreat.

Unfortunately, the Cossacks began last night to

pillage, and three houses in the Basle district were sacked. A few repetitions, and Buonaparte need not employ a Frenchman against this army.

I presume that the siege of Huningen will begin in a few days. I passed the 18-pounders and the mortars four miles from this place. It is, however, hoped that a golden shower may beat down all the bars to our entrance before iron shot is hurled at them.

Huningen is yet a virgin fortress. Vauban built it, and the site is excellent, but the works have been neglected. If the garrison, however, do their duty, it will be difficult for our 18-pounders to make any impression. I should hope more from escalade.

Basle is an ugly old town, but I am lodged in one of the best houses with fire-places, and nothing but the pleasure of riding *en maître* in France would console me for relinquishing them during the month of January...

I still feel the icy paw of last year's winter in the ancle injured by the droska summerset, and the Lutzen impression has made the bone of my left leg quite a barometer.

25*th*.—The day before yesterday I went to dine with the Marshal, and yesterday reconnoitred the fortress of Huningen very close and with usual good fortune. The Marshal came to dine with me, but, just as we were sitting down, the enemy made a sortie. It was, however, of small importance: I had in the morning predicted the intention, and warned the posts which I thought required better arrangement.

In the evening I received instructions from England which appointed me military resident at the Italian army to correspond direct with the British

Government; and only to keep the Ambassador of Austria informed but not to be under his control. This is a clause of no consequence while Aberdeen remains, as we are on terms that require no such powers of independence.

Lord Castlereagh also notes that my income will be suitably augmented by a bât and forage allowance to meet the exigency of extraordinary expenses. On the whole, neither the spirit nor the letter of the instructions is liable to objection; but I thought it right to record the feelings of regret which attend my removal from the allied army. I hope that I have done so with temper and success.

I shall send Charles to-morrow to Lord Aberdeen to learn where I shall present myself, as the head-quarters of the Emperors may be moving and I have no wish to wander about—losing time when interesting operations are before me.

I went this day to communicate the instructions to Prince Schwarzenberg, and he has settled to come and dine with me the day after to-morrow, when he will bring me the letters which his friendship will dictate and note the line of march which I must take and the one by which I must send my horses, &c.

I do not dwell on the regret my departure occasions: it is sincere and most flattering.

I presume that I shall leave this on the 28th, and be fairly on my road about the 2nd of January. The leave-taking at the Imperial head-quarters is a ceremony full of pain which I would avoid if possible, but I cannot do so.

I shall endeavour to keep myself in the thoughts of all, though separated without the prospect of reunion

in the course of this war, and finish my Continental career with the approbation of sovereigns, chiefs, and soldiery abroad. By a paragraph in a letter accompanying this Memorandum, I see that such popularity may affect my interests at home,—at least, so I understand the phrase. I do not despair, however, of ultimately registering a triumph in the palace of my own country and in the archives of the Foreign department.

The movements of the enemy on the side of Strasburg have induced the Prince-Marshal to forbear from entering Switzerland in person. It appears that an attempt is probably in progress for the relief of Huningen, which is to be besieged in three or four days.

Three thousand horse have already fallen in with Colonel Scheubler's cavalry detachment, wounded him and many other officers, and put their whole party to flight. This occurred yesterday near Colmar. Wrede also, who has forty thousand men to besiege and cover the siege of Huningen, had detached ten thousand to Belfort: these are recalled. If the enemy can muster an equal force to Wrede's before the Russian reserve is up to support him, I speculate upon Wrede's being beaten: for, although a most gallant, he is a most unskilful officer. I do not feel confidence in any of his dispositions, nor much in the military conduct of the Bavarians. The Commandant of Huningen has made several gallant sorties, in which he has worsted them; and if his stores are not deficient or *his aids perfidious*, he will make a memorable defence should they be the only assailants. The Commandant has begun like a chief determined to do his duty. Although an enemy, he is entitled to this encomium.

The instructions from England prevent my going on the expedition, as I proposed; but I had intended to attempt the destruction of a manufactory of arms near Strasburg and to gain the high road on which I might have reason to believe that Buonaparte would be travelling. I have, however, taken several rides in Alsace, and the country presents no features of distress. The towns and villages are partially such as would honour any district in England, and in none is there any appearance of decay. The land is universally cultivated, and there seems no want of husbandmen or deficiency of children from infancy to manhood.

I do not believe that the *damsels have suffered any privations from the war*.

It is true that I have not been over a considerable tract of country, but I have seen enough to enable me to judge of the accuracy of what I have heard from others, and it is quite at variance with British general opinions as to the state of the French empire.

[PRIVATE LETTER.]

I agree with you that Buonaparte is likely to make a push in Italy, and all the accounts advise great reinforcements to the army of the Viceroy. The conduct of the King of Naples is, however, yet so mysterious that it is impossible to judge what may be the plans in that quarter.

I do not expect that Buonaparte will now make a diversion on the Lower Elbe. S. Cyr failed him, but the Crown Prince acts as if the diversion had been made, for he keeps one hundred thousand men in that quarter, whereas one-half would have occupied the Low

Countries. You are still blinded to the real character of this charlatan and useless ally.

We certainly have not been very moderate in our official sallies.

I acted as you have wished me to do relatively to a certain transaction.* I considered it another person's business, but I let my knowledge of it reach the offender; and I have, in a private letter to H—— hinted that I had been more generous to Lord Cathcart than he has been to me, by forbearing to inflict a wound that would pain him, but I entered into no details: I imagine that he will guess from Aberdeen's letters. "It is an ill wind that blows nobody good."

I suppose negotiations will soon vigorously commence. There is still a great desire for them. Buonaparte will, in my opinion, gain much in France by publishing *les précis* relative to the proposals for negotiation. They are written in his bureau *ad captandum* the moderate of all countries.

I still fear that in a very short time he will have sufficient force to hold higher language than he does at present, and that we are losing the golden opportunity. He boasts some successes at Bayonne. I do not believe in his victories, but I suspect that he will make our maintenance of a position in France very costly.

Metternich still calculates on peace about March, and he is no despicable prophet. I shall be again widely separated from intercourse with England, but I hope you will be a more diligent correspondent than you hitherto have been.

R. W.

* The drum-head despatch from the battle-field at Leipsic, *ante*.

Dec. 30th, Freyburg.

Last night the bombardment of Huningen commenced; about fifty guns opened their fire. I went into the trenches (the first parallel), and remained until near three o'clock this morning, being ashamed to leave them, although I was very much vexed at seeing them so ill-constructed as to present scarcely any defence. The town was fired, but about the time I went away our guns relaxed their fire, and in a short time the cannonade was very partial. The principal batteries of the besiegers (all Bavarians) were on the right bank of the Rhine, whence they never can make any serious impression; and through the whole plan I never saw more unskilful arrangements. Huningen will never be taken by such means as are now used, since gold will not combine, and science is wanting. The whole operation is Bavarian, no other interference has been allowed hitherto.

The return was not very easy on an unruly horse through a cross-fire of apparently *singing and skipping Moons;* but notwithstanding that my steed, like the Russians at Borodino, was "unable to stay and unwilling to go," I at last got him with myself disentangled, and at daybreak I set off for Freyburg to pay my last devoirs and receive farewell honours.

I found Aberdeen, who, as usual, imparted pleasure by his society, though he could not impart comfort. *It appears that Lord Castlereagh considers the application that has been made for my stay as an unwarrantable interference, and that these proofs of esteem here are additional causes for my removal.*

There was a grand ball given to the Sovereigns;

but having read my letters, and seen the papers announcing poor Bosville's death, and a great blank in the future comforts of my London residence by the loss of a friend whom I sincerely valued, whose real worth I know to have been great, and with whom I had such habitude of intercourse, I had no heart for public amusement. In the evening I went to Stadion's, and rejoined the circle of the *élite*. My announced early departure was received with regret.

I was of course asked many questions about Switzerland, &c. I could not say that all was well; but I nevertheless think that all may yet be well, if Metternich succeeds in getting the proclamation of the Berne oligarchy rescinded which threatens otherwise—nay ensures—civil war, and if arrangements are made to secure regular supplies to the troops whose otherwise necessary pillage will occasion early hostility of the inhabitants in a country which renders that hostility most formidable.

Indeed Radetsky, as I was passing through Löerach, entreated me to tell Aberdeen that the want of food was so great and the consequences so fatal, the enemy's augmentation of force daily so considerable, that he expected an early and serious check; that the only way to avoid it, in his opinion, was to lose no time in negotiations *pro formâ*, but to expedite peace on such preliminary arrangements as would enable the dislocation of the army on the principle of attention to subsistence. He thought that provisions could not now be procured in time to sustain the military operations, even if the money were forthcoming; but Aberdeen having granted 200,000*l.*, I am not sure that, with suitable efforts, a sufficiency might not be col-

lected to admit of an union of force to strike a blow against the force assembling on this side of Strasburg. By this means enough supplies may possibly be obtained in the enemy's country to enable us to conceal the necessity either for peace or its alternative —an actual retreat behind the Rhine.

This view is, however, rather expressed, if I really examine my own conscience, to prevent the opinion being entertained that I always look upon a dark horoscope. When I examine the facts that pile up to favour Radetsky's and Schwarzenberg's fears, &c., I must own complete accord with them so far as this result, that the term of successful military offensive operations against the enemy is nearly arrived. I do not enter into the detail of the consequences of this incipient change of our fortunes, because the positive ills and the probably contingent inconveniences must be manifest.

I rather suspect that Metternich will go to-morrow to Schwarzenberg and have an interview with Talleyrand, the Swiss minister, who is at Basle on his return to France; and that this interview will expedite an understanding of the enemy's real intentions as to peace now that he has escaped the most difficult crisis.

The cold weather has been rather favourable than otherwise to the troops; but sickness is still prevalent, as most of them are very young.

When in the trenches the night before last, I found that the men had been forty-eight hours on duty in them without fires or warm food during the whole of that time, notwithstanding severe frost and dense cold fogs. With such service it is impossible but that at last there must be a considerable sick-list.

I was sorry to find on my arrival here that the Crown Prince had refused to accept the terms agreed to by Denmark; that Russia had again supported the claim to Norway; and that the Austrian Government in despair had abandoned the subject. Norway loses us the Low Countries, and probably Holland.

Every day increases the political difficulties of our edifice. The Swedes, the Swiss, the Saxons, and Poland, are all intricate embarrassments; and the King of Wurtemberg has augmented the chaos by carrying on, it is said, a correspondence with the enemy. His ill-will had long been expressed.

The Tyrolean insurrection is quelled for the time, but it cannot long be repressed if the annexation of the Tyrol to Austria is not assured. I shall pass by Inspruck on my way to Italy, and then shall be more accurately acquainted with facts gone by than I am at present.

My route runs through Schaffhausen, Constance, Inspruck, Brixen, Trent, &c., to Vicenza, where I expect to find the Austrian head-quarters, notwithstanding Murat's reported co-operation with the Allies.

I am to take leave of the Emperors to-morrow, and shall set off at night or very early the next morning. I think Aberdeen will accompany me as far as Schaffhausen.

Aberdeen is in hourly expectation of a negotiator being named, when he returns to England; but he will be much regretted here.

As I am now an accredited personage, or shall be when I reach my post, my correspondence must be more limited and my notes more circumscribed, lest I be deemed a trespasser on official confidence.

Hitherto I have been a nobody in the eye of the law, and therefore was entitled to the free exercise of my observation.

I do not give any minute report of what I have seen in Switzerland or in the French territory, but, *en gros*, I must acknowledge my conviction that Switzerland has not much suffered by the connection with France, and that the distresses of the enemy's country, *sous tous les rapports*, have been greatly exaggerated.

My next letters should contain reports of my last interviews here, and I shall be disappointed if they do not furnish satisfactory proofs of the goodwill which I have preserved to the moment of separation.

I do not consider, however, the whole matter as over until I bid adieu to Schwarzenberg at Löerach and those friends around him from whom I separate with very sincere regret, and some of whom I probably shall never see again.

Jan. 2nd, 1814.—Yesterday morning I went to see the Russian grenadiers pass with sixty cannon. When it is recollected whence they have come, what they have done, and where they are, the order and condition of men and horses is quite marvellous.

The Emperor of Austria gave a dinner to the Emperor of Russia. I had in the morning been with Aberdeen to be presented as accredited to the Italian army, and had a long conversation on the subject of peace and war, &c. The Emperor spoke with much good sense; saw the difficulties of protracted contest, but the necessity of such a peace only as would assure some time of repose and make the future chances of war equal at the outset. He said, that Buonaparte having agreed to the basis, and proclaimed to France that

he had done so, could not retreat; but that preliminaries of peace might be signed by the negotiators in three days if they chose to avoid forms which are by no means requisite.

I could not help observing that Buonaparte was *ab origine* and emphatically a military chief, and that if the term of pacification was protracted until he found himself again at the head of an effective army it was to be apprehended that warlike feelings would prevail over political considerations.

The Emperor perfectly agreed and said, "The sight of an army is a temptation that Buonaparte never can resist."

We had but a small party at dinner. In the evening I went to the Emperor of Russia to take leave: the Grand Duke was present. The Emperor would not believe that I was ordered away, and expressed much dissatisfaction, until I told him that my instructions were dated the 10th, and his letter did not reach England until the 13th—which Balachiew told me. He felt confident that I should be recalled, and asked me to return if he sent for me, which of course I promised to do. He then added, "You have always proved yourself my friend. You have in the field shown the ardour of your regard; and you have in your communications always told me truth. You have maintained the credit of your country, and at all times proved how much you have respected its interests." He then, as is usual in like cases, kissed me several times, and so did the Grand Duke afterwards; but the Emperor did not choose that his brother should give the last greeting, and so repeated his salutations.

I had scarcely got to Aberdeen's, who, of course, feels much interest in all these *soutiens* of his representations, when I received the Grand Cross of the Order of St. Anne from the Emperor, and had an *avis* that the letter would be transmitted in the morning.

LETTER OF THE EMPEROR ALEXANDER TO SIR ROBERT WILSON.

"MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

"Au moment où vous quittez les armées où j'ai été si souvent à portée de rendre justice à votre zèle et à la plus brillante valeur, pour suivre une autre destination, j'ai voulu vous donner une nouvelle preuve de ma satisfaction en vous décorant de mon Ordre de Ste. Anne de la première classe. Vous en trouverez les marques ci-jointes. Les braves avec lesquels vous avez si souvent combattu vous regretteront. Quant à moi, je me rappellerai toujours votre courage et votre infatigable activité; et si les événements vous ramenaient près de vos anciens frères d'armes, je le verrai avec plaisir. Sur ce, Monsieur le Général Wilson, je prie Dieu qu'il vous ait en sa sainte et digne garde.

"A Freybourg, ce 24 Décembre, 1813."

I put on the star in compliment, and went to the ball given by Lord Cathcart (strange to record). I then made my bow to the Emperor, and expressed my acknowledgments.

The Emperor of Austria during the evening engaged me again in a long conversation, which ended by the observation, "I have a consolation in thinking that

you will not make a long sacrifice, for the war must speedily end; and I beg you to come to Vienna on your way home, although even then I hope your absence will be short. The oftener you come to the continent the better."

He then hinted that he should send in the morning some public proof of his regard.

I mention these speeches not from any silly feeling, but to show that I have preserved the good-will of the chiefs under whom I have been serving, and to offer some consolation for the hostile measures of my own Government....

I know in general that phrases are not sincere, but such phrases, accompanied by acts, after a knowledge of my position at home, certainly evince sincerity and substantial bienveillance. Government may consider these favours, &c., as an additional evidence of my being "*un enfant gâté*," but all here know that I have not acquired them without connecting the honour of my country. I owe nothing to a crooking knee or a false tongue—nothing to any conduct which can stain hereafter.

5th.—Metternich not having returned, I was obliged to remain the day in a species of incognito as far as concerned the Sovereigns, since I had avoided all further interviews, dinners, &c., by announcing my early departure; but the Chancellor Hardenburg required me to dine with him, and I complied in order that he might see that, although I had much cause to complain of a Prussian general's conduct, I did not extend any ill-will. I gave the Chancellor a letter for the King, in which I alluded again to the representations of General Gneisenau as the principal

cause of a failure in the attempt to alter my destination; but added that this inconsiderate accusation did but augment my ambition to promote the general interests, and particularly to prove that my attachment, &c., to him was invariable.

We assembled at Stadion's and Metternich arrived, but too late to transact a business in hand, yet I would not remain any longer; so, obtaining my letters of accreditation, &c., I set off at one o'clock in the morning. I had withdrawn from Stadion's without bidding the last farewell—I could not; but it was otherwise with Aberdeen, who accompanied me home. Lord Castlereagh will find, I think, when he arrives at head-quarters, that he will not be able to dislodge me from that regard.

We passed Huningen very much dependent on French forbearance—which we found; and at this I confess myself surprised after our nocturnal bombardments.

On arrival here I received the accompanying letter from Schwarzenberg. It is an additional painful though proud evidence of his esteem and affection: the why and wherefore gained expressed so as to touch friends and foes sensibly.

"Bâle ce 3 Janvier, 1813.

"Vous recevez ci-jointe, mon cher Général, une lettre que je vous prie de remettre à M. le Maréchale Comte de Bellegarde.

"Puisque le sort vous sépare de moi, je suis au moins consolé de quelque façon vous sachant auprès d'un homme aussi respectable, que je me glorifie de compter depuis longtemps au nombre de mes amis, et qui m'a

donné des preuves de son amitié dans les occasions où j'en avais bien besoin.

"Je ne puis vous cacher que je suis peiné de voir que votre Gouvernement vous destine un autre poste que celui de rester à mon armée; je perds en vous un général dont je sais apprécier, et les talents militaires, et la grande expérience, et la connaissance la plus exacte de tous les individus marquants qui se trouvent dans les troupes étrangères qui forment une grande partie de l'armée que je commande.

"Enfin, je perds en vous un franc et loyal ami; mais notre état est celui de privations, ainsi, mon cher Général, il ne me reste qu'à vous dire que je me flatte que vous comptez à jamais sur mon amitié comme je compte sur la votre.

"SCHWARZENBERG."

I have sent a copy to Aberdeen that he may show it to Lord Castlereagh, and I wish that the Prince Regent or the Duke of York could see it.

If Lord Castlereagh had been in England, I should have made it demi-official through Hamilton.

Schwarzenberg had moved his head-quarters to Altkirch, in Alsace, and, moreover, had withdrawn himself for the day in a reconnaissance to so great a distance that I could not attempt to reach him. I therefore resolved to wait until I heard from himself where we should meet in forty-eight hours, as he had begged me not to go without seeing him, and as he had commmunications from Bellegarde to justify my stay for that time.

Pour me distraire, I went after dinner into the trenches, which are improved, but not advanced. I

fancy that the siege will now be abandoned, and a blockade only attempted. The place has provisions for four months. I am, however, vexed to see the enemy in possession of the town, domineering our parallel. The Bavarians attempted to carry it the night before last, but failed, with some loss. I would, however, undertake to be in possession after one night's labour. It is a point of honour that merits the *coûte qui coûte*; but it may be obtained without any sacrifice.

I shall also suggest the construction of some entrenched redoubts between Basle and the parallel; for if our army were suddenly obliged to retreat, such a camp, to cover the passage of the Rhine and movement through Basle, would be indispensable. The more I see of war the more I am satisfied that precaution is the surest mental instrument of success. Had Buonaparte attended to his original principle of fortified communications, he would have repassed the Beresina without loss and gained the Austrians at Minsk. Had he kept a reserve only of thirty thousand men in Franconia, he would have precluded the defection of Bavaria and all the ills which it produced for him.

6*th*.—This morning, as the firing increased, I went into the trenches; but I found that we were only endeavouring from the opposite bank to destroy some boats, and that we had made no progress in the works. I wished to reconnoitre along the bank of the river as there are some who pretend that the place is vulnerable on the water-line. My stars, &c., however, were too refulgent, and I was obliged to get back again into the trenches to the regret of the enemy, who wished to mount me to Paradise either on great or small shot.

On my return I took post and went to Altkirch, where I dined and took leave of Schwarzenberg, Radetsky, and others: each giving me a cordon of Maria Theresa and a farewell that is indelibly stamped on my memory.

Circumstances have made my removal more sensibly felt and rendered the arrangements of the British Government more unpopular. There is an expression in Schwarzenberg's letter to Bellegarde which I cannot help recording:—"Vous trouverez en lui un Anglais assez fier pour croire que sa patrie s'etend sur l'Europe entière, et que le bonheur insulaire ne doit pas être l'unique bon action du vrai patriote Anglais."

I was much pleased with the country. It was highly cultivated. A woman told me that the inhabitants had been much vexed that they had cut off a king's head to diminish their taxes, but they had now double imposts with the sacrifice of all their children. I observed, however, that she had at the table while speaking, a fine tall boy of eighteen, and on it a good soup, two dishes of meat, white bread, and wine. A tray on a table close by was full of mixed meats, and the oven was stuffed with pudding, cakes, &c.

The Alsatian conscription for the three hundred thousand levy has not been completed, and the cohorts of this province have all returned to their homes; but, notwithstanding this state of things, the embryo thunder is perceived to be gathering, and peace is loudly asked for at the army. I fear that Schwarzenberg, who has not one hundred and twenty thousand men with him, is too weak to make it in the enemy's territory.

My horses marched off this morning. It is a ruinous expedition for them and my purse. The Emperor of

Russia's letter conferring the Grand Cross of S. Anne is unfortunately gone to Italy. Metternich's will, I hope, give satisfaction to my friends.

" MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

" J'éprouve une satisfaction particulière à pouvoir vous annoncer que Sa Majesté l'Empereur, désirant vous donner une marque particulière de l'estime que vous lui avez inspirée, autant par les services que vous avez rendus comme militaire que par la conduite loyale qui vous a distingué pendant votre séjour au quartier-général, que Sa Majesté Impériale vous voit quitter avec regret, s'est décidée à vous accorder la Croix de Commandeur de son Ordre de Marie-Thérèse.

" Chargé en ma qualité de Chancelier de cet Ordre de vous transmettre la décoration ci-jointe, je me félicite, mon cher Général, de trouver une occasion de vous réiterer l'expression de tous les sentiments d'amitié et d'attachement que je vous ai voués depuis longtemps, et que ne sont pas moins partagés par une armée qui a été si souvent témoin de votre conduite brillante, que par tous mes compatriotes qui ont été à même d'apprécier les *qualités de votre cœur*.

" Recevez, mon cher Général, les assurances de tous mes sentiments aussi distingués qu'inviolables.

" LE PRINCE DE METTERNICH.

" Fribourg, le 4 Janvier, 1814."

Jan. 9th, Inspruck.

On the 6th at night I left Basle with a heavy spirit. On the 7th reached Zurich, dined with Lebengettern, admired the lake, &c., and then journeyed forward

to Bregenz; proceeded upon Kempten, and reached Inspruck with Charles very ill.

Here I find the people now quiet, as they have succeeded in dismissing all the Bavarians, civil and military, out of their country, and guard its passes against them.

A small Austrian garrison occupies Inspruck, which is a clean good town, with some buildings worthy of the best cities.

I am now about to re-enter the carriage and scale the Brenner. Charles is very ill; but he will not stop, and I cannot.

Jan. 12th, Vicenza.

After a tremendous journey, with all the ills that snow and cold in an open carriage can add to an Alpine route, I arrived here this morning. Charles, who had eaten nothing, not even a morsel of bread, since the 8th, was obliged to remain thirty miles from hence at Bassano, where I got him a bed, warm wine, medical aid, &c., and I hope he will be enabled to get on in forty-eight hours. If not I shall go and visit him.

The passage of the Brenner was most formidable. The snow had fallen so deep that with difficulty we got through. It appeared to me as if we were scaling the rampart of a new world.

At Trent we sallied out of the Tyrol, which is a majestic bulwark, proudly manned; but we did not quit our mountain course before we arrived within a league of Bassano. It was the most dreary, desolated, and yet stupendous route I ever traversed.

At Bassano I hoped, as we had gained the plain, to feel the genial warmth of a milder climate, and that at

Italian sun would in some degree diminish the regret of withdrawing from the glow of friendship; but the rain had fallen for ten previous days in torrents, and I conducted frost and heavy snow to Vicenza this morning as a new year's gift.

Marshal Bellegarde received me as a brother: he read me Metternich's letter, in which he recommended me, as he would have done by a brother, to the Marshal's friendship and full confidence, stating that he should consider such cordiality as personal obligations rendered to himself.

I dined with the Marshal. Since then I have been writing, and now—after six days' and nights' misery, partly owing to my own ill-applied economy—I am about to enjoy a full length's repose on a sofa.

13*th*.—Charles informs me that he is better, but cannot join for some days. His absence overwhelms me with writing. I wish Warner could get leave to join me as a military secretary. I shall feel the want of such an aid very much, as I must now attend to form as well as matter. Marshal Bellegarde continues to lavish his kindnesses and afford the highest proofs of confidence; so that, malgré the shortness of time, I think I know all that he knows, and I hope have by these means been enabled to present a satisfactory maiden despatch for the critics, notwithstanding their evil eyes.

I have gone out nowhere but to see and dine with the Marshal, so I can give no account of society, operas, &c. The town I have before described en route to Egypt,* and it still maintains its title to be called La bella Vicenza.

* In 1801.—ED.

Our movements *en avant* are likely to begin in ten days; but military operations are always liable to contingencies, and ours to very problematical ones. When we do move it will be with a quick step.

20*th.* — The snow has continued until this day, when it began to melt and render the streets almost impassable; for the architects have contrived to project gutters of such various dimensions from the roofs of the houses that torrents fall inevitably on the heads of the passengers.

This morning I went to the Théâtre Olympique, built by Palladio two hundred years since, and the glory of Vicenza. I could not but admire the proportions and the style, which is truly classic; but I could feel no envy of the proprietors. It is said that the cost of lighting, &c., is three thousand ducats. Buonaparte and the Archduke Charles have had the honour of its illumination.

The extreme bad weather has prevented all military operations. The mountains are covered with impracticable snows, and the lowlands are impassable bogs. Move we shall and soon; but before we reach the Po we must go through much fire and water.

The Viceroy remains steady, notwithstanding Murat's defection. I wish Buonaparte ill; but I cannot refrain from approving, *en homme*, the fidelity of this Chief, who really has suffered wrongs and experienced comparatively but little reward from the Sovereign whom he now refuses to abandon in misfortune.

It is certain that Buonaparte's own sister, as wife of Murat, persuaded her husband to disconnect himself with France. She wept, it is true, bitterly to Neüp-

perg; but the regal honours prevailed over her sisterly affections.

We have lost precious time in coquetting about his recognition if we are to acknowledge him King at the last; and, if we do not, we lose the co-operation of thirty thousand Neapolitans, the Austrian corps of observation ten thousand strong, and the disposable force of British under Lord William Bentinck.

I begin now to think that there must be a battle in Burgundy or a retreat in Switzerland, before peace is signed. The advance to Langres has, in my speculation, counteracted the object of the Allies and too strongly tempts the enemy.

I wish I could give a good account of the general health of the armies; but great sickness prevails. We have no less than ten thousand in Italy; and two battalions, which arrived this day from Presburg, left one thousand sick en route.

I have endeavoured to ascertain the Italian spirit. Repose and pleasure seem the general desiderata. They say, *de cœur*—

"For forms of government let fools contest."

The country seems to have suffered much. Poverty is general.

The more I see of the Marshal the more I esteem him. All about him are of good *ton*, and every Austrian who presents himself but augments the number of my well-wishers. I cannot, however, obliterate recollections, or forget that I am removed from a field where I had some personal influence in the great interests of the world.

I avoid, nevertheless, as much as possible, these

reflections, for they exasperate me and make me feel violently, until I am sometimes almost tempted to act violently. It is fortunate that I did not await the arrival of a certain person at the Imperial head-quarters. I never could have brooked that presence. To soothe this temper I fly to the "concord of sweet sounds."

The opera is tolerable. The music, when the trumpet joins, exquisite. The ballet is *marvellous:* a "naked Pict" would, I am sure, blush at the exhibition. The finest gauze, with a few silver spangles on it, alone covers any portion of the person. And what portion? One inch above the ceinture, and six below. When in movement, and particularly in what is called I believe the "Volta," the whole collects into the breadth of a ribbon, and then Paphian Venuses, and Hottentot Venuses, and all descriptions of Venuses are *aimables à la Nature.*

21*st.*—This morning I rode to see the Rotunda, which was the model, I believe, of Lord Bristol's experimental château near Bury. The building is very fine, divided into four compartments, like the "Temple of the Winds," with a central hall that throws up its dome to a considerable height.

I admired, however, much more the site and the view which the eye rests upon when regarding the country from the large folding-doors which open upon the different points of the compass. I never saw more interesting variety; every description of scenery is embraced in the circuit. On descending I passed by the Church of S. Maria del Monte and its magnificent corridor or piazza, on the declivity of a hill. The church, in its two fronts, extends the distance of seven hundred yards, *on dit.*

The recollection of the misery of the people, however, much weakened my pleasure. I considered these works as in a great measure contributing to give false notions of national glory; as making the arts the ambition instead of the ornament of a state. I would rather see in this land manufactories and arsenals than painting-brushes and chisels.

23*rd*.—The Marshal dined with me yesterday, and gave my cook his *casserole d'honneur*. I really have found a treasure; for, as the deed must be done, it is better to have it well done. For my own part, I consider the whole charge as a great addition to my cares, and I would prefer a soldier's ration to the trouble of culinary direction. "*Le dieu Ventre*" will never receive any worship from me. I keep, however, my cover at the Marshal's table, and hope five days out of the seven to enjoy, either at my house or his, a society which embraces all that is agreeable and instructive. The finest manners, knowledge, experience, and gaiety of mind, with philosophical reflection and independent spirit, combine in his character. We are *au mieux*, and cannot, I hope, be otherwise, for the basis of intimate friendship is formed in mutual candour and loyal sincerity.

His situation is painful. Nature herself is hostile. Italy does not remember such a wintry season. Alternate snows and rains render communication almost impracticable. The lightest carriage coming from Camisano requires twenty draught oxen.

I have done my duty honestly in my correspondence with Government on this subject; but I am not sure that I shall not be voted *an incorrigible raven*.

I have not heard from head-quarters at Basle since

the 6th of this month, when I quitted it; but we hear that Schwarzenberg is acting at Langres, which, as I have already noted, we understood to be the intended movement. I should have more expectation of success if the Allies would push on; but further progress is not projected, or was not when the last courier came away. If there is sufficient force already in hand to check, every day that force must be on the increase. I can conceive no possible maintenance of a position under such circumstances as those in which the Prince now is. He must advance or retire, unless peace is signed. There is an "*or*" in Buonaparte's answer, which is very important. He is there stated to have used it with the view of showing the Allies his desire to sign even while they remain on French territory. These humiliations will, no doubt, cause great popular exultations; but I see through a different horoscope. The state of distress may be satisfactory; but, *if it does not accomplish the whole*, those will have cause for regret who profit by it only to stamp a record of disgrace on a vengeful chief and a vain nation.

Charles continues ill at Bassano. Extreme weakness has succeeded his attack. I much fear that his constitution is mined.

Last night I went, for the third time, to the opera, malgré the gutters and spouts. I would rather, however, have gone through the same proportion of fire, as I have more salamander than dolphin properties.

A new singer, sixteen years of age, made her *début*, and obtained great plaudits. I enclose a poem in her praise, which was distributed by some admiring rhapsodist. She will, I think, succeed in the *beau monde*, particularly as she is very pretty.

28*th.*—On the 26th I went with General Stuttenheim to Padua; here we saw the curiosities: dined with the Austrian commandant, General Marshal; went to the opera; heard the celebrated Marcolini sing, who really charmed the ears; took a bath; went to bed; rose at 4 A.M., and proceeded to Mantua. Reconnoitred within three hundred yards the fort of Mejahlon on the terra firma. Observed the enemy to be extremely on the alert. Reported to the general, Myers, there commanding, my idea of a preparing attack. Sat down to breakfast *à la fourchette.* Had scarcely finished when a report was brought that the enemy was making a sally. A short affair took place preparatory, as I believe, to one on a greater scale which must succeed, as the enemy has the power of concentrating at least four thousand men, and the Austrians, in a distance of sixty miles, have only three battalions.

Returning to Padua we had some alarm, as a soldier assured us that he saw a battalion of the enemy on the high road, and we had no power of breaking off canals and inundations covering all the land, but we persevered and passed before any lodgment was made.

Dined at Padua. Returned at night to Vicenza. Went to the Marshal; passed an hour with him, and concluded by another hour's entertainment at the opera. I do not know that I ever saw and did more in forty hours.

Charles had come to Vicenza. I found him weak but in rapid convalescence.

This morning we had a budget of news by the arrival of Count Vodeck, one of Schwarzenberg's aides-de-camp. The Marshal suffered me to read the

Prince's and Metternich's despatches. The latter's was very interesting. He announced the arrival and *amiability of Lord Castlereagh*, the summons of Caulaincourt to Vesoul to treat of the *Yes* or *No* to the *conditions of the Allies*. His letter concluded by saying "In eight days we shall have Buonaparte's answer. If *Aye*, in three weeks *peace*; if *Nay*, I do not know what will become of France. We shall then give her an *honourable capitulation, and she will return to the state in which she was before the French revolution*" !!!

If such is the need of Buonaparte and such is the military influence of the Allies, notwithstanding their extended line, the fortresses which intersect their camps, &c., then I am really the most ignorant officer or the most unfortunately prejudiced *raisonneur* in Europe, except the Marshal, and—as I gather from Vodeck—Schwarzenberg himself and my friend Radetsky. We are a quartett of miserables who have no longer a right to sit in judgment seat; and for my own part I shall feel so outwitted and so shallow-pated that I shall turn Capuchin, and endeavour to supply sense by a cowl.

We continue here *in statu quo*. Beauharnois receives reinforcements, and we are aided by improving weather, but I do not think we shall move until the Neapolitans are completely fixed in our interests. On this subject I have embarked in Bellegarde's boat: and, sink or swim, I shall not regret anything that occurs in his association.

29*th*.—The Marshal dined with me yesterday and we passed a very agreeable day. In the evening a Neapolitan courier came, who brought us the news of Lyons having been occupied by Bubna.

Still I am an infidel as to his conquest of France and the subjugation of Buonaparte's mind. He may perish, but after what I have remarked in his last campaign, I feel sure that he will not kneel to receive the yoke.

As we have orders to consider Italy as belonging to its respective original rulers, with the exception of the King of the two Sicilies, and as I presume that the same alienation and appropriation is ordered for Brabant, &c., I consider battle inevitable, even if Buonaparte could have subscribed to the original conditions while we retained footing in his territory.

The Italian division from Suchet has reached Milan, which will greatly augment our difficulties; and as the orders for the armistice to Lord William do not include the recognition of Murat as king, I much fear that we shall not profit by the Neapolitan aid in our first operations: but, come what may, Europe may rely on this army doing its duty with reference to its means.

Feb. 6th, Verona.

On the 3rd we received advices at Vicenza of the enemy's preparations for retreat. On the 4th we marched, and our advanced guard the same evening entered Verona, which Beauharnois quitted in the morning.

The head-quarters were established here early on the morning of the 5th.

It appears that Murat's arrival at Bologna determined the Viceroy's retreat. He had hoped to remain a few days longer, expecting decisive intelligence from France, but feared to lose his communications. Pre-

viously to his departure he published three proclamations—one to the Italians, one to the Veronese, and an order of the day to his army. I made them all *official*, as they are interesting documents.

Murat, in my opinion, had better never have been born to his high fortune than have subjected himself to the reproof which the Viceroy has justly given, and which posterity will record with more painful comments. Murat's objects were to remain king and to humble his supposed enemy and avowed rival in Buonaparte's favour. But he has not attained *either* object. He has accelerated his own catastrophe and given opportunity for the highest honour to his foe by the contrast of conduct. *All* here regard the one as a despicable deserter of his benefactor and the other as worthy of royal establishment.

With such sentiments is it likely that, in case of the overthrow of Buonaparte, *he will be retained on the throne?* and if Buonaparte is successful, will he not prefer even to restore the ancient dynasty?

The world will approve the catastrophe of the melodrama which metes out signal punishment to Joachim the First in the last act of his life. The treason has been useful, but in so much is the traitor odious.

Our entrance into Verona was not hailed *con amore*. I finished my despatches in time to go for half-an-hour to the opera, that I might see that touchstone of Italian joy. There were not twenty non-military men in the house.

I did not at first think that the Italians concerned themselves much about their political existence. I was wrong. They *did* feel the value of nationalisation.

Fifteen years' connection under a good government would have formed Italy again into an independent and powerful State. The edict for its dissolution has at length been issued. I lament the *fiat*, although I cannot wish its failure at this time.

I should have preferred to see an arrangement by which Austria obtained the Oglio as frontier, and the House of Savoy the throne of Italy from the Alps to the Apennines.

Beauharnois has thrown three thousand men into Peschiera, fifteen hundred into Legnago, sixteen thousand into Mantua, and has retired himself towards Placenza (where he has a bridge, by which he can sally upon the Neapolitans) with thirty thousand men. Exclusive of this force, he has between five and six thousand men at Milan and several thousand at Alessandria. Those at Genoa and Turin I do not count, as we neither know their number nor their power of movement.

We follow with about equal force, but if our sickness continues to increase as it is doing we shall soon have less. The army is too young and too ill-clothed for winter service, and we have encountered the rains of Portugal and are now suffering the cold of Russia. After this comes the vintage with all its evils.

Florence is evacuated by the Princess of Lucca, Regent of the kingdom. She has fled to Leghorn. The Neapolitans have taken possession of the country, as they say, *pro tempore*. If Beauharnois does not defend the Mincio or the Po, I presume that we shall at first have to make war on the Riviera de Genoa. I do not attach much importance to the occupation of territory in Italy when we are not at the same time

besieging the strong places. The open country belongs always to him who is strongest in the field; and, if peace is not made, I calculate that Buonaparte has a belief in his power to rescue his territory. If the Allies once repass the Rhine, he can detach thirty thousand men here, and then we must go to the right-about. What can be done with thirty-four battalions, mostly boys, our only disposable force of infantry? The Neapolitans I count little upon when in line of battle, and I do not suppose that England can feed the casualties of an army in Italy, Holland, and Spain.

The Marshal has shown me a copy of a suppressed 'Moniteur' of the 20th of January. It is, however, believed to have been printed non-officially by the connivance of government. It is a curious collection. St. Aignan's report was the only piece new to me except the last note of Metternich's. The Marshal agrees with me that if our arms do not prosper we are damned for political apostatism.

If Buonaparte weathers the present storm he is more master than ever of the destinies of continental Europe, because he will find support in public opinion.

I have just been approving the terms on which the Commandant of the Château of Verona offers to surrender. The possession is useful for the navigation of the Adige, and indeed indispensable: at the same time it was a point of moral *ralliement* for the inhabitants (of whom there are sixty thousand), since it terminates the High Street, and daily recals to their view French connection and the possibility of the Viceroy's return.

Feb. 7th, Villa Franca.

Yesterday evening the Marshal went to the theatre. The house was lighted, and there was a better show; but I believe rather because it was Sunday than in compliment to the new rulers: although the Marshal having been a long time governor, and a most amiable one, retains much personal good will. The singing was good, the dancing very bad—the performers all had *mammoth legs.*

This morning I rode here, changed my horse, and proceeded to Valeggio, on the Mincio, where I reconnoitred the enemy's line, which we shall attack if he remains to-morrow. Returned to dine, and found a very friendly letter from Admiral Freemantle.

I forgot to mention that yesterday evening I went into the ancient Roman amphitheatre at Verona, and saw one of Buonaparte's best acts—the reparation of the interior. There is in the under gallery, where the wild beasts, gladiators, &c., used to den, a modest inscription to record the act of restoration, and it is an annal which the greatest anti-Buonapartist ought to respect.

Feb. 9th, Valeggio.

Yesterday, at 4 o'clock in the morning, we were on horse and en route to Valeggio, where the operations commenced which I have described in my official letter. I presume that this letter must be published, although not entire, for there is confidential mention in it relative to Murat, &c. It was a very anxious day, but the Austrian grenadiers behaved as nobly as the Russian guards at Culm, and perhaps as usefully for our general fortunes. It is madness to attempt

the conquest of Italy against a force so posted as Beauharnois' with our limited disposable means. The Neapolitans are hardly to be reckoned upon even if Murat is in the end *honestly* with us, or rather *truly* with us, for honesty is not the term suitable to his conduct; and the French have a reinforcement of nineteen thousand men at Alessandria, of which we had no knowledge until two days since, so that numerically they are now superior.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM SIR JAMES GRAHAM TO SIR ROBERT WILSON.

"In the absence of Lord William Bentinck, I cannot hesitate to declare that I know his impression to have been that on a trying occasion at Valeggio, by your signal personal courage, you saved the Austrian army.

"The post to be defended was the key of the position —the greater part of the Austrian army having crossed the Mincio. The Hungarian guards were wavering, the French advancing with their utmost energy. You walked backwards and forwards, I understood, between the Austrian ranks; and by your encouragement, and still more by your example, you prevented them from giving way. In short, at this critical moment, which so few are able to seize and to improve, you were found at the post of danger; and as previously at Dresden and at Leipsic, so on the Mincio with Marshal Bellegarde, in the face of contending armies, your personal daring and cool courage were conspicuous and greatly contributed to turn the fortune of the day.

"I can say no more than repeat the opinion entertained by Lord William Bentinck, that never was the

honour of the British army and character more signally upheld than by you at the battle of Valeggio.

(Signed) "GRAHAM."

I tired three horses in yesterday's action. I never worked with more zeal, because I was prompted to resist a menacing ill-fortune which I felt was not merited by the Marshal. I had also extraordinary preservation. Two orderlies and myself went forward to head, as I thought, some Austrian tirailleurs, that I might dislodge the enemy's right from a house on which it was appuyé. The tirailleurs ran as we approached, and we all went on together until we came upon the reserve masses. It was then that I saw the French eagles in their caps. I called out to the orderlies, who were a little behind, to save themselves. All endeavoured to catch at me. The officers cried out "Surrender!" others cried "Fire!" and in the confusion I wheeled round, clapped spurs to my horse, and ran the gauntlet. The shot flew like hail, and the falling sticks of the mulberry-trees (for all this part of Italy is mulberry-groves, with grain land, at this season of the year laid up in ridges, under them) covered me and my horse, but contributed to his panic and speed. The Austrians, when I rejoined the line, did not believe it was myself, and I almost doubted my own identity.

It is the worst country I was ever in, because I never believe what I do not see with my own eyes, and to see with my short sight I am forced to approach very close.

I was much flattered by the unbounded confidence of the Marshal in my reports, suggestions, &c. Every

idea became an immediate order, and he had none that he did not communicate to me before execution.

It is a greater satisfaction to me to reflect that I offered no counsel and gave no active interference that I should not repeat again in the same circumstances.

We had news from Germany this morning to the 31st of January. Blucher's retreat seems certain; the report of a subsequent victory vague. The 'Moniteur' of the 27th, which has reached Murat, states that Bulow has been obliged to raise the siege of Antwerp with loss, that Lyons has been evacuated, and Lord Wellington obliged to fall back on St. Jean de Luz. I lament to see my conceptions realising. I would have wished to put on a friar's cowl, but after the scientific action of yesterday and what is probable in France, I do not think that time is yet come. If France, forced to an effort of self-preservation, does assume the attitude of victor, those who have pressed her to elastic re-action when they might have confined her power of recoil have a most serious responsibility.

Defeat, added to the chicane of the negotiations, will unite dishonour with disloyalty; and then innumerable evils will arise.

There is only one with whom I can converse on these subjects, and that is the Marshal. He feels all the reproach and foresees all the mischief.

Feb. 12th, Villa Franca.

On the 10th the enemy attacked our advance on the right bank of the Mincio. The Marshal had ordered the general to retire his troops into the village of Borghetto, which forms the tête-du-pont, if

seriously pressed; but the Austrians would not go back until they brought on themselves a very superior fire, by which above five hundred were most uselessly lost.

It was one of the best fought affairs on a small scale I ever saw.

During the combat we received news from the head-quarters at Dieuville, after the action of Brienne. The intelligence by no means changed my opinion or the Marshal's.

My private advices informed me that Blucher had, on the 29th, been surprised, and that his horse had been killed as he was descending from his room to mount; that his loss exceeded five thousand men; and that notwithstanding that his cavalry had taken ten guns he himself had lost twenty; that in the action of the 1st both parties had under fire only eighty thousand men, but that Buonaparte had at least forty thousand out of fire; that the French fought with desperate courage; that the guns captured were left in the swampy ground, except about fifteen taken in the field; that the enemy retired in the best order, and that they on the next day beat off the advanced guard until they were in danger of being turned; that the Austrians lost on the day of the 1st ten thousand men, and the Russians a considerable number; that the Austrians alone have forty-five thousand sick in the French territory; that Bubna is driven back into Switzerland, and the left flank of the Allies totally uncovered.

It is true Metternich talks of peace on terms of "ancient limits," or restoration "of ancient dynasty," and considers the detachment of Macdonald to Chalons

and the retreat of Buonaparte on Troyes as the evacuation of Paris, and as proof of desperate but ruinous resolution to fall back on the Loire; but he admits that the left of the Allies is vulnerable, and urges the Marshal to press forward and cover it.

Schwarzenberg considers this support essential, and expects that we can detach thirty thousand men across Mount Cenis to occupy Lyons, &c., and secure his line of communication. *We* are expected to do this *who have but twenty-two thousand men to march with*, although we leave ten thousand to blockade Mantua.

It is true that Nugent, should he have the power of joining, could reinforce us with ten thousand men; but supposing an uninterrupted career of success, how many survivors of thirty thousand would reach the French frontier?

Schwarzenberg, however, is wise enough to see other embarrassments. He knows that the enemy is rapidly forming his levies *en masse*; that he has selected Soissons, Meaux, and Troyes for his reserve camps; and that his forces are gathering daily strength on every point, and particularly on that point where he has most to fear. He states that the capture of Paris is not so wise an object at present as a safe peace, and he is aware that the enemy's repulse of his attack will not merely be discomfiture but annihilation. He does not conceal from his own mind—in the estimation of probabilities—that he is more likely to lose than to win; because his means are rapidly wasting, because his blockading forces are inadequate, and because his army of reserve is not yet forthcoming, while the enemy is hourly more sensible of the precarious position of the Allies.

These I know to be the Prince's views and opinions, but there seems to be a maxim in the Councils of State which excludes all military calculations that do not fix the Allied head-quarters in the Tuileries.

What confidence can be reposed in the plans of men who, without reference to hostile numbers, position, or circumstances, decreed the conquest of Italy and the invasion of France by thirty thousand Austrians who had not at that time passed the Adige?

We are told that we shall find aid among the Italians. We receive none. We have not an individual who voluntarily gives the slightest intelligence; much less a body of friends active in our favour.

Murat's perfidy might, if earlier embraced, have been useful; but now that Beauharnois has received strong reinforcements and has had time to work on the minds of the Italians, I rather think that he and his Neapolitans (who were never liked in Italy) will do us more harm than good. The publication of the suppressed 'Moniteur' of the 20th, which has had a wonderful sale through all parts, excites, moreover, a strong sentiment of animadversion against the Allies. It has this effect even among the Austrians themselves, who are most implicated by the chicanery. If the war ends immediately and favourably, the world will be satisfied: but, if not, great responsibility and heavy penalties will fall on all concerned in the rejection of the most advantageous opportunity that Europe ever had for solid arrangement of the political edifice.

By a letter from Frankfort I hear that the Mentz garrison, nearly thirty thousand strong, made a sally and occupied Hockheim for two days; and in another letter from Basle I have advice that in the last days

of January the garrison of Huningen killed and wounded seven hundred Bavarians, and very nearly took Basle and the only bridge the Allies have on the Rhine. I note these incidents because I suspect that they will be novel in England, although rounding great part of Europe to reach it.

We are now thrown completely on the defensive. If the Neapolitans do not pass the Po, we must collect near Verona and wait there to give battle; but Beauharnois is too well-conducted to use his bayonets when he can dislodge us by a movement, and gain the chance of an attack on our retrograde column of march. From Mantua to Legnago is the shortest line on Vicenza, and that will be Beauharnois' route when his time for resuming the offensive is come.

On the 11th we remained at Valeggio, and all was still. At night we went to Somma Campagna. At 4 o'clock in the morning remounted our horses, as an attack was expected, and, hearing some firing, pressed at speed to Valeggio through one of the thickest and coldest fogs I ever saw. About two hundred men had sallied from the tête-du-pont of Monzambano, but they were quickly repulsed. About mid-day, as all was still, a flag of truce was sent to acquaint the enemy that we should fire a *feu de joie* for the victory of Brienne. After we had done so we returned here, as Valeggio was too much advanced for head-quarters, and Somma Campagna too intricately situated for communication.

13*th*.—It appears now that Murat will not co-operate. He has discovered—what was the real fact—that the British Government wished to make use of him, but with the intention of finally dethroning him.

Lord William was instructed not to commit England by any treaty; as eventually—if the King of Sicily was not suitably indemnified—she would declare war against him: but he was desired to conclude the armistice with him and profit by his service. This is an episode to the Frankfort policy. I think Murat richly deserves such treatment, but it does not become us to adopt the maxims of our traitors.

Be it as it may, we are thrown altogether on our defensive by the new defection of Murat. The Neapolitans were to have been up on the 10th at Reggio, *eighteen thousand strong*. They have *only two thousand*, and five thousand at Modena: the rest are all far behind, some blockading Ancona, some the Castle of S. Angelo at Rome where there are two thousand five hundred French, and some in Florence where there are four hundred French in a château.

Murat himself is at Modena, and feigns sickness to avoid signing conventions, &c.; but he declares that he cannot move on as the enemy have a tête-du-pont on the Mincio at Borgoforte, and he cautions Nugent against doing so; but Nugent, supposing that we want his aid, is in progress without him. I hope, however, that a courier whom I sent after the battle on the 8th will induce him to act with necessary prudence.

The Marshal will now fortify the Adige and throw bridges across at various points. He will then assemble his force and endeavour to cover the siege of Legnago, that the shortest route to Vicenza may be taken from the enemy; but I suppose we shall have to fight a battle for it, as Beauharnois cannot suffer it to fall under his nose with a superior force. We have no more than thirty-two thousand men on the Adige

and the Mincio, *i. e.* with the blockading forces of Peschiera and Mantua! We shall do our best; but, unless fortune favours our arms or our policy in France, we must in the end run; and who can tell when we shall bring up? for we have not a man in reserve between the Adige and Vicenza. The Duchess of Piombino is the Amazon of the age. She has collected six thousand men, and is resolved to defend herself to the last in Leghorn, if forced. But, although she calls Murat traitor, she suffers seven hundred of his men to remain quietly in Florence, which is a circumstance that throws great suspicion on *her* zeal or *their* enmity. Another danger is menacing from the sea, but, as that is separated into two divisions, I do not much count upon its dislodging his Highness.

Graham,* Lord William's private secretary, arrived this day and goes on to head-quarters. I took him this evening to look at Valeggio, &c. He departs with the idea that the "*Reges delirant*," &c., &c.; but perhaps when he gets to the madhouse he also may be infected.

There are still, however, a few reasonable men in the world and they await with patience, their age.

I am not one of the patient; and, if I did not feel the esteem I do feel for the Marshal and a sense of duty to share his fortunes, I should make for England very quickly: for no good can come from such a state of things, nor can one have the satisfaction of believing that credit or utility can result from devotion where such counsels prevail.

I am sorry to find that our loss in two days is not two thousand or three thousand, but very near five

* Sir James Graham, Bart., G.C.B., of Netherby.

thousand, men. One whole battalion took a wrong road on the 8th, and were taken near Mantua. Still it was a battle memorable for the courage and science displayed on both sides, and will be always recognised as such in future military treatises.

15*th*.—This morning Colonel Catterelli arrived here from Naples, Bologna, &c., with a plan of combined operations, which would be commendable if it did not presume upon the Marshal having a very superior force, and not only that superiority but ability to dislodge the enemy wherever we present ourselves. I have put Lord William *au fait* of the truth, and now he must choose his own line of action.

Count Neüpperg arrived in the evening and gave us very important details: the greater part of these I have communicated in a despatch (No. 21) to Government, and I much wish that it could be seen by others. At all events, I should like to have the office personages sounded as to the effect, and particularly with reference to the paragraph where I express my desire to "confine myself to the letter of my instructions, and not subject myself to further proof of the displeasure of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent;" but say that "I prefer rebuke to neglecting what I conceive to be a duty, the omission of which could possibly be prejudicial to the public service." I cannot but feel all the injury that has been done me from the commencement of my mission; and I am still more chagrined because Lord Castlereagh, although on the spot, has never deigned to acknowledge one of my letters. I am very indifferent about my employment, and shall not feel the least regret if the Government recalls me.

They will be the losers manifoldly. I shall have no detriment to any interest to bewail, but I shall have far better chance of surviving until I can more satisfactorily put my all daily to the hazard, and devote hand and head to my country's service.

Murat will positively not co-operate until his treaty is ratified, or until a letter in the handwriting of the Emperor, promising that it shall be ratified, has been received. This letter ought to have been sent twenty-one days ago, and Murat justifies his inactivity on that pretext, and he is right in this. Although I hold him in contempt for preferring the monarch's interests to personal ties of duty, still I am not a prejudiced judge. All these details are given in the despatch to which I have alluded, and they are most interesting, much of it being protocol of his and his wife's conversation. Prince Pignatelli has just reached here with the official communication that if Buonaparte does not sign the peace proposed, the Allied Sovereigns have resolved to dethrone him. This will decide him, I think, to act against us, in which case we shall have much more than we need on our hands.

We are now acting upon a strict defensive, but we hourly expect news subsequent to the 2nd from France, which may influence some change on one side or the other.

With twenty-two thousand disposable men, calculating only ten thousand to blockade, sixteen thousand in Mantua, and not including Nugent's corps, which has perilously placed itself on the Taro beyond Parma, contrary to Murat's advice and in defiance of the enemy's tête-du-pont at Borgoforte near the confluence of the Oglio and the Mincio, we must have

great events in our favour before we dare again show our noses in the enemy's line.

By accounts from various parts we find that Beauharnois lost a great many men in his late actions with us. Every day increases our return, and I am now assured that five thousand will not cover the loss of the two days.

The battalion of S. Julien which I brought to the front and with which the left of the Allies was first sustained and the right of the enemy turned, has been highly rewarded. The Lieutenant-Colonel is to have the Chevalier's Cross of Maria Theresa; the Major is made Lieutenant-Colonel; several officers are promoted, and various gold and silver medals, ducats, &c., are distributed to the men.

The First Lieutenant, whose guns I also carried up and posted nearly at pistol-shot from the first mass of the enemy's reserve, is made Captain. It may be imagined how warm this post was when two hundred and thirty men were killed and three hundred and fifty wounded: but this was a necessary sacrifice. I lamented it, but it causes no remorse. I do not wish my name to appear as having been the *primum mobile* of this effort, or, indeed, in any shape; but among the various letters I have received I enclose the Lieutenant-Colonel's, as a specimen of a loyal soldier's just but modestly-expressed pretensions. It is remarkable that thirteen years since I was much indebted for many kindnesses to this officer, who was the Commandant of Fiumé: but the pleasure of conferring is far greater than that of receiving favours.

18*th*.—We have been since the 4th without any news from the grand army, which greatly disquiets;

and the more so as the enemy this day fired a *feu de joie* for a victory stated to have been gained over Blucher on the 9th at Sezanne.

Murat sent us word, in a letter dated the 15th that he will join us with two divisions when we have passed the Mincio. This promise is only conditional, indeed, and reminds me again of Mrs. Glasse's directions for dressing a dolphin.

The weather is cold enough for bears to go to sleep in. The occasional sun scarcely damages the ice. It is a melancholy season for the mulberry-trees; they are hewn down by hundreds. In one hour the growth of fourteen years is consumed.

These periodical destructions and plantations will be so many historical data.

The Marshal and myself, when not occupied with the immediate interests of his own army, revolve all the past and imagine the probable future. Our reflections and our views are in perfect unison.

I yesterday examined all the returns of the Austrian armies. The grand total is four hundred and seventy-seven thousand: of which, on the 1st of this month, seventy thousand were sick in hospital. Schwarzenberg's grand total is one hundred and seventy-seven thousand, of which, previous to the battle of the 8th, he had forty-nine thousand in hospital. Bellegarde's grand total, comprising Dalmatian jurisdiction, &c., is eighty-three thousand, of which twenty-three thousand, on the 14th of this month, were sick and wounded in hospital.

The army of Beauharnois opposed to us has on the line of the Mincio disposable thirty-four thousand five hundred and fifty; in Mantua, Legnago, and

Peschiera, thirteen thousand five hundred at this time, but, if he must leave the Mincio, he would probably increase the Mantua garrison. Exclusive of this force, he has at

	Men.
Osopa	650
Palma Nuova	2,600
Venice	8,000
Ancona	1,000
Castle of S. Angelo and Civita Vecchia	3,000
Tuscany	6,000
Placenza	8,000
Alessandria	11,000
	40,250

and garrisons in Genoa, Gavi, and Piedmontese forts and fortresses, the amount of which we do not know. Yet we were expected—*propriis viribus*—to conquer Italy, and detach to protect the left of the Allied army,—we, who after spinning our cobweb blockades cannot muster thirty thousand effective disposable, including Nugent's ten thousand.

20*th*.—A courier arrived last night from Troyes, which city he left on the 10th. At that time there were no tidings from Blücher, or from Wittgenstein who formed the intermediate column and who was to march on Mery. Nor was there any positive information of the enemy, but it appears that he was supposed to be at Orleans when he was gaining his victory of Sezanne. Want of provisions, joined to ignorance of the enemy's operations and presumption on invariable fortune, must ruin any army: even the Israelites could not have conquered with such contempt of human aids. It will be fortunate for the Emperors, &c., if the movement

on Sens was not continued on the 11th, as proposed. They may reach Paris, but their *triumphal arrangements* will not be requisite.

Murat has taken Ancona, and expects to have Leghorn, S. Angelo, &c., on the same terms—return of the garrisons to France. This will not displease Buonaparte or benefit us. On the contrary, he will not let us have any footing in Tuscany; and having only divisions between Bologna and the Po, he very justly states his inability to undertake an offensive operation until we have passed the Mincio or name a day for doing so, which we cannot do in the presence of a superior force. Murat's business has been sadly mangled: he now sees what was his proposed destiny, and makes his arrangements to be "*utcunque paratus.*"

The enemy continue their rejoicings for successes subsequent to the 9th.

I had written my resignation, but the bad news suspends its transmission to Lord Castlereagh. I feel, however, that I ought not to serve such a Government as ours, especially after the affront of my removal from the grand army with the minor consideration of my present employment. I have but one regret, which is quitting Bellegarde. I shall now pause to see what turn affairs take.

25*th.*—The day before yesterday Captain Coppons arrived from head-quarters on his way to Lord William. He brought me letters from Lord Aberdeen, by which I perceive the march to Paris was, on the 16th, considered a measure of *doubtful policy*. I first deny the power of getting there, although that power is stated by Aberdeen to be universally admitted. I may be singular in my view; but although the Allies are almost

within sight of the capital, I do persist that the expedition will end in disgrace and disaster of irreparable magnitude, unless Buonaparte consents—and this I do not believe he will do—to a pacific arrangement, and for the sake of peace on improved terms foregoes all the temptations now offered to gratify his passion for military renown and his spirit of vengeance.

It is more than can be required of him. It is more perhaps than, as Ruler of France, he ought to sacrifice after the treatment he has experienced. His only security is the ruin of his enemies: a ruin that may terminate all future projects of dismembering his empire; which projects are not really in unison with the interests of Europe; for Austria would not be able to maintain her ascendancy, or perhaps to preserve herself in her present integrity.

It is a great misfortune that there are few statesmen in the world. The plans of all the Ministers of the present day (*except Russia's*) have no prospective calculations. They build like our New Road architects, without any regard to the public safety.

Captain Coppons tells me that all the enemy's territory which he passed through had been frightfully desolated, and that the inhabitants did not conceal their proposed revenge whenever the army retired.

I am sure by the tortoise-movements after the battle of the 1st, that success on that day was much exaggerated, and that already the doom of the Allied army is sealed.

If Paris was to be taken, it could only be reached *post haste*; but without having têtes-du-pont on the Rhine and a sure line of communication, the adventure

would have been puerile in the chiefs and fatal to the troops.

I remember a game at Westminster where the boys raced and strove to touch the goal, but no sooner touched than off again, or captivity was the consequence. So some persons, from vanity, desired to take a peep from Montmartre; but what interests have they not compromised! what mischiefs have they not done to public faith!

The invasion of France, under its circumstances, for the dethronement of Buonaparte, was unwise, unjust, and indecent.

I, who think Paris might have been reached from Bologna when Buonaparte was at Austerlitz or Moscow—I, who never forget that it was he who murdered the Duc D'Enghien, &c.—still record these opinions; and I rejoice to find that my passions do not render me insensible to rectitude, reason, and policy. Surely the people of the world will not be so besotted as to mourn the effect without inquiring into causes.

We are going on as heretofore. Murat clears behind him, and in so doing strengthens all before him. I expect a sally from the enemy in a few days. We shall fight a battle, be overpowered, outflanked, and obliged to leave Italy.

I forgot to note discord between the Emperors. It is said that they are completely dissatisfied with each other, and the Emperor of Austria is preparing a journey. His carriages are certainly gone from Basle to Vienna; and Marshal Bellegarde tells me he thinks that we shall have a visit from him.

The Cattaro business will probably augment the ill-

blood. Hoste* gave it up to the Montenegrins and the Austrians. The Montenegrins refuse admission to the Austrians, and invite the Russians; but that arrangement will not suit the "*Red Breeches*" or ourselves.

Everywhere the cold has been intense. Snow has even fallen in Naples, to the great consternation of the inhabitants and profit of the priests. A bottle of water in the room I live in was a mass of ice this morning.

28*th*.—We have received French bulletins to the 18th. Admitting one-half to be true, the ruin far exceeds my gloomiest predictions, for I did not expect that victory could be so cheaply or so early won by the enemy. I never thought that such great faults would be committed, low as I esteemed some of the grenadier and hussar generals notwithstanding their *Katzbach* triumphs and *deluge* trophies.

If such has been the loss at the outset, what will be the catastrophe?

The Leipsic manœuvres succeeded because the line of communication was weak and extensive; but it was madness to repeat the experiment against Paris, where all was reversed.

The corps at Château Thierry seem to have been without any connection with that at Chalons, and the Chalons corps as independent of the Nogent army, &c.

I pity the Prince Schwarzenberg: I know his views were wise, and his ambition amiably moderate. Indeed the whole army wished for peace, because they knew *past* causes as well as effects. They have been martyrs to journalists and visionaries—knaves and fools in aggregate.

* Captain Sir W. Hoste, R.N.

Yesterday evening Captain Fulsham returned. He left Chatillon on the 18th, where all was confidence and error.

The French have begun active operations on our side. Reinforced by the Tuscan troops, &c., they have sallied from Placenza, and forced back Nugent to the Taro. Murat advises him to fall back behind the Panaro, and forces him to do so by withdrawing the rideau of Borgoforte and the troops at Guastalla. We have no doubt of Murat having obtained the line of the Panaro from the enemy as his line of demarcation, and that Buonaparte hoped that we should pass the Mincio to sustain Nugent and the Neapolitans; in which case the Placenza corps would gain Borgoforte, shoot through Mantua or Legnago, and terminate our communication with the Adige; but we are too old mice to be caught by a *floured* cat; *vide* La Fontaine's Fables for that and many other sagacious maxims, which it would be well if all ministers, chiefs, &c., would read while they are so.

It is probable that the enemy will at all events make an attack from Mantua, and we are turning our eyes to the left. It is now that this army is likely to become important. Perhaps, weak as it is, we must become the Ægis of Austria.

My despatches with regard to Murat's movements, &c., contain much curious matter, and will hereafter interest in reading. I keep the copies in a book *legibly** inscribed.

* The emphasis is Sir Robert Wilson's, marking his sense of the extreme difficulty of his own handwriting. This difficulty must be the editor's apology for occasional inaccuracies, if any are detected, in words of single occurrence, or in names of places not found in the maps, and of persons not known to history.—ED.

March 4th.—The bad news from France is indeed very melancholy. I particularly lament that I am absent from Prince Schwarzenberg. This is a moment when I might have been useful. Example, fellowship of privation, and the knowledge afforded by repeated experience of disastrous retreats would have been valuable. I covet no friend's glory, but I envy the opportunity of showing friendship in need.

All the letters I have seen throw the blame on Blucher as chief and Gneisenau as his director.

Graham brought me the tidings from Chatillon. He left it on the 23rd, and arrived here on the 1st. When I went to Marshal Bellegarde I was like the messenger who undrew Priam's curtain. The Marshal's courier arrived next day. We were both sorry to find that ignorance, fallacy, and presumption, are still predominant features in diplomatic speeches and correspondence. Some denied, others were duped to the belief that Paris was still at the mercy of the Allies.

One person desired me to doubt my own judgment, after the opinion I gave at Basle, and he cited his authority for this advice: "The commanding attitude in which the Allies were placed in France *on the 23rd of February*"!!

The same *Mentor*, who really is a most sincere friend, begged me *to reject all sombre tints* from my despatches, and *suppress what ill was not essentially necessary to be communicated, as this would be for my interest.* Thus is truth trammelled; but I am, thank God, no conspirator against her, and I will do my duty to the public, be the personal consequences what they may.

The only safety for Germany is the instant assemblage of strong blockading corps at Wesel, Frankfort,

and Kehl. It is to be hoped that Winzingerode is not too far *entaméd* to regain the Rhine, and that the Crown Prince will consider, for once, the general interests.

The preservation of any great part of the army in France is rather to be hoped for than believed; and much of what is saved will be thrown into Switzerland, and probably forced to pass by the Vorarlberg into the Tyrol.

We have also our griefs and anxieties here. Prudence had regulated all our operations; orders upon orders had been sent to Nugent to avoid all serious action, unless the Neapolitans would seriously cooperate.

Nugent, however, chooses the moment that the enemy obtains great reinforcements, that Murat acquaints him with his having uncovered the rear of his left flank by withdrawing his troops from Guastalla and San Benedetto, and proposes to retire himself behind the Panaro, to engage on the Taro with less than half of the enemy's force. He even waits two days to receive his attack. We do not yet know the details of the action, but the spies report that Nugent has lost a park of artillery and *three thousand five hundred prisoners*, and that he is flying on Modena.

This comes of self-pretensions—of the desire "*pour faire quelquechose*," that the journalists may pass an encomium on activity, &c. Everybody feels assured that, successful or unsuccessful, he will be held a conqueror by these conjurers; and not a day passes that Marshal Bellegarde has not propositions from adventuring chiefs, by which, if he acceded to them, he would lose all his army in one hour

Science is no longer thought requisite in war; all her reflections and cautions are despised; grenadiers are believed to be the only captains, and "keep moving" the only useful maxim.

Perhaps what has lately passed may restore a little more respect to the art of war; but the Materialists will still find numerous advocates, and Europe may yet rue their influence.

No man likes a fight better than myself; but I hate these would-be-doing chiefs, who not only ruin armies, but empires. We are now wincing under the scourge, and perhaps have lost all the fruits that might have been gathered by the system prescribed with reference to the general interests.

Objects of the very highest importance, such as I am not at liberty to note here, have probably been marred; and I have great reason to be personally chagrined, for I had the fairest expectations of rendering *most useful service* to Austria and England.

8th.—We have received a concise account from Nugent. The evil was not exaggerated. The action was most unjustifiable, ill-conducted, and disastrous. His excuse is that he wished to preserve some detachments. To save a few companies, he lost battalions. Certainly there are not less than three thousand men hors de combat. Murat, however, happily received on the 4th the ratification of his treaty with Austria, and he at least does not immediately join the enemy—on the contrary, he pretends to assume a vigorous offensive; but Beauharnois seems to have no fear of his movements, for he has collected all his army on the Mincio, leaving only the new division of Grenier to

watch the Neapolitans and the movements of the residue of Nugent's corps.

The Marshal, in consequence of this concentration, is collecting his own army, and we probably shall take a position near Verona, that we may be able to bear our united force against the enemy attempting to manœuvre either on our right or left flank. "Nous reculons pour mieux sauter." And we hope to obtain a different result to that which has been the consequence of a different principle in France. We keep nevertheless advanced parties on the Mincio.

It is high time that the troops also should be more sheltered. The weather has continued to be so inclement that in two days we had seven hundred sick, and the sick of the *whole* army now exceed *twenty-eight thousand men.*

On the 6th we had such a heavy fall of snow that the whole country was covered; since then cold rain.

We have no news from the grand army direct since the 23rd of February. The enemy's accounts come down to the 27th. I suspect that the acceptance of the proposition of the armistice is only designed to inspire confidence in the Allied chiefs, and promote delay in the retreat till Augereau's army joins the line of operations; but I am sure that if Duca* can supersede the Chatillon congress, he will make his military communication the real *pacificatoire*, as he was one of the Cassandras from the commencement, and knows the whole story of our *fortunes* as well as *misfortunes.*

Merfeldt flourished, another Cassandra: but I was

* An Austrian general—a great favourite of the Emperor Francis.—ED.

distressed to hear that for a moment he recanted his predictions after I left him. I hope it is a calumny. I beg to have his answer. No man can accuse me of fluctuation in my prognostications of the event.

March 13th, Verona.

We transferred head-quarters on the 9th to this city. The troops are also brought back into cantonments, that they may not all perish from the most inclement season ever known in Italy. Our advanced posts only remained to watch the Mincio and guard the tête-du-pont of Borghetto. On the 10th the enemy made various strong reconnaisances with no important result; but they will have more than they calculated on, and without obtaining the expected advantage, for they imagined that we should fall back on the Adige altogether. On the 12th they made another experiment, more feeble but more inconvenient to myself, as I was drenched, not with spring showers but with wintry storms, and the ground was, before and since, covered with snow.

Yesterday, in going at half-speed through the town in new red coat and very best attire, my horse slipped while turning a corner, on the flags which run in three lines across the street to let the Theatre pedestrians pass conveniently, and we both fell on our sides. There was, fortunately, mud to save fractured limbs, but I was much bruised from head to heel, and cut a little on the ancle; and my horse was also injured, for the fall was with velocity and force enough to make our own graves.

I rose a most deplorable beau, but I did not long expose myself to pity or sneers. I was remounted

almost as quickly as I fell, and without suffering myself or my steed to feel pain or consider power of movement, I gained my quarters in a gallop.

No fine lady with rent train ever grieved more than I did. My servants talked of my leg, but I directed their care to my skirts and sleeves. A child seeing a splash on new red shoes could not feel a greater interest, but I had somewhat better reason, for having sent to England my blue *Astley*, and having only one red plain coat, I could not repair the misfortune for many a day.

After some time I began to be more patient, and at last my thoughts became so philosophical that I am not quite sure that the accident was not a benefit. I am at all events certain that it was the least possible evil of the possibilities or the probabilities.

Count Bergen, one of Schwarzenberg's aides-de-camp, arrived from head-quarters the day before yesterday. He had a tale for the credulous and a whisper for the friend. When the whole conduct of the operations in France is known it will astound mankind. It never can be credited that such great measures should have been committed to such hazards and have been subject to such fatal influence.

The Prince wisely does not repose much confidence in Blucher's new operations, and he feels the greatest alarm at Augereau's progress on the side of Switzerland, where he will find great support from the inhabitants. His army, however, stretches well to the rear, and suitable precautions are taken for a rapid retreat.

Metternich writes that the "political and military position of affairs is the *happiest that could be desired.*" In this paragraph, however, he concludes by a more

sensible proof of improvement—"The Emperor of Russia and other allies, after *les écarts* of Blucher, are of opinion that defeat is possible, and so much moderation is the consequence that there is every reason to hope that a peace will terminate *très incessamment les maux de l'Europe.*"

The "status quo" of 1792 was the base required after the dereliction of the Frankfort conditions. The success at Brienne maddened the heads of certain persons; and a further humiliation—the occupation of Paris and perhaps the dethronement of Buonaparte—became almost a *sine quâ non* of peace *with France.*

Buonaparte told Prince Maurice Lichtenstein at Troyes—"If the Duke of Vicenza had accepted any other than the Frankfort conditions, he would have lost his head." "I will make peace on these terms, although I might now demand more, but never on any other."

Buonaparte ought, however, to be very grateful to his foes. They have established his supremacy and immortalised his fame for power of mind.

We are here about to commence a very sanguinary war. Beauharnois, at Guastalla, took some Italians. He ordered them to be decimated, and nine were shot at Mantua.

England also is raising Italian subjects to fight in Italy with a rope round their necks, or to be protected by a threat of reprisals: this must end in the *no-quarter* system, and the calamities of war are thus rather on the increase than the decline.

It is singular that we should hang in our own country as most heinous offenders those who are guilty of crimes the commission of which we are encouraging in

other countries. Thus are right and wrong mere matters of convenience in the action of governments.

15*th*.—Yesterday another courier arrived, and this morning a third — three in three succeeding days. Blucher has retreated, but where is his line of communication thrown?

Are not all fortresses between Manheim and Mayence and the right and left wings of the Allied armies uncovered, and Blucher rendered a partisan without subsistence, supplies, or retreat?

Schwarzenberg has not between *Nogent and Langres fifty thousand* men. How can this force profit by any temporary absence of Buonaparte's main force? I should be miserable if I did not know that Metternich writes — "The negotiations at last become active" —that is *serious*, for until this time nothing was commenced, because Paris and the dethronement of Buonaparte were expected to supersede the need of the Chatillon pacification.

If Blucher gets clear of the column moving through Rheims, he will be fortunate, but he must suffer greatly. This mode of carrying on war resembles a battle between boys, which is often continued after it is won by one of the champions butting his head with bull rage and closed eyes to receive punishment from his collected and skilfully-manœuvring antagonist.

I am quite delighted to hear that the Norwegians are in arms.

Lord William Bentinck has landed at Leghorn. He is invited by Murat to join him, but I have no idea that he will consent to the proposition, although it certainly would be most advantageous. With his own force he can attempt nothing against Genoa, and if

he remains in Tuscany the King of Naples will not commit his political fortunes to the hazard of military operations on the Po. While his flank is galled by a doubtful ally he will not abandon his line of communication, or weaken the army which is to preserve it.

Beauharnois has proposed an armistice to him, but this he has declined unless Marshal Bellegarde makes one also, but of this there is no possibility.

We are in a few days again to attempt the offensive, but as this attempt depends on Murat's zealous co-operation, I am no great believer in the execution of the design.

The weather continues wretchedly bad, but the troops are happily more under shelter than they were, and our sick-list has not yet passed THIRTY THOUSAND; it is, however, within five hundred of that number.

Our news from Switzerland is very unfavourable. Civil war seems inevitable. The world is yet far from general repose.

It is impossible to see this state of things without pitying the unfortunates who would live quiet if they could.

Ruin is universal, either by violence or exaction.

Lord Burghersh may write that there is no licentiousness in the Allied armies in France, but I believe pillage, burning, and all sorts of military atrocities were never exceeded. I have the fact from numerous eye-witnesses and innumerable documents. He will, however, find the tale popular at home, and profitable with the Government.

I pity Prince Schwarzenberg. He is the victim of these deceptions of the public; for after having been sacrificed by the insubordination of chiefs and licen-

tiousness of the soldiery, the causes of his failure are denied, and the whole responsibility is hurled upon him without regard to truth, justice, or charity. He has had but "an outward honour for an inward toil."

As I am of the species of anecdote collectors, I must note a speech of Beauharnois at Verona, which has made an impression in his favour, although it is not sufficiently towering for a hero's last struggle, and would rather suit a sixth than a fifth Henry:—

"Pour moi, je suis monté par un escalier si bas que je ne me ferai pas du mal en descendant. Je n'aurai que du chagrin pour ma femme, née et elevée princesse."

There are many others recorded equally meek; and this humility of spirit, combined with other good qualities and his present martial and military conduct, excites great interest in his favour.

15*th*.—Yesterday, Colonel Cattanelli arrived and brought me advice that Lord William and Murat were at *Reggio*, contending for and against the British occupation of Tuscany.

My despatch on this subject (which threatens to have the most pernicious consequences) will be a curious record, and will tend still more to show the difficulty of conducting coalitions.

Each party has different views—all publish adverse proclamations; but the result of the whole will be that Buonaparte keeps his ground until he receives sufficient reinforcements to preserve skin and carcase. It is not natural that Murat should suffer a power with which he has *only an armistice*, to possess itself of a country which flanks his line of communications, and, in case of hostility, intercepts the connection with his kingdom.

The Austrians, who have proclaimed the ancient order of things, cannot be supposed to give several thousand men, from a force already far too weak, to join in an enterprise which, according to the *device of the banner*, pledges "*Italian union*" and "*National independence;*" and that at a time when the proclamations confirm the views of Buonaparte in every respect, leaving only the nomination of his new *dynasty* to future arrangement.

I do not enter into the merit of the question—if I did, I should be an advocate for *nationalisation*; but I only note the absurdity of expecting concert (except from the enemy with the British) under such discordant systems of policy. I should have hoped that Sicily would have been a warning against constitutional crusades to paralyse military operations.

Despatch No. 41 will, I think, make a sensation in Downing-street.

Every day there is more reason to apprehend the war with Turkey. If it is declared, I shall expect an order of exile to that quarter; but there are bounds to conformity, and my submission will not extend so far. I would rather give my neck to the bowstring and salute with the kiss of obedience the Grand Signor's firman for a passage to Paradise.

20*th.*—We have no further advices from Reggio, but are most anxious to know the result of Murat's and Lord William's final conference.

Cattanelli tells me that Murat said to him—"Wherever I am in all the great battles, I have seen General Wilson. He is certainly one of the most distinguished officers, and, if it had not been for him, we should in various instances in Russia have got through

much better. He has done us infinite harm, but it is a fatality that he should always be opposed to me." He then continued his remarks, observing that I was an enemy to him, his family, the French nation, &c. Cattanelli told him that he had heard me extol his military conduct, which pleased him much.

The fact is that I have not written a line or given an opinion under the influence of personal feeling. I have not shown the smallest prejudice in conversation or official correspondence, although I consider Murat's conduct as very dishonourable with reference to his benefactor. I have always said that the Allies did not give his renegade zeal fair trial, and that our present propositions are inadmissible by a King of Naples having only an armistice with England.

There is a reason why, personally, I would wish to serve Murat. He now knows it, and will be satisfied that at all events I respect myself too much to wrong him. . .

It is strange that while the British Government refuse acknowledgment of service, the enemy should give voluntary certificates, and in a far stronger manner than I have expressed.

24*th*.—The day before yesterday, Lord William Bentinck arrived here with three officers in his suite. The Tuscan question seems a Gordian knot. King Ferdinand and King Murat are not likely to reconcile their interests and join forces against a common enemy.

The proclamations published since the landing of the British at Leghorn have indeed been of a character to prove to King Murat that there are "Warwicks in the field."

Murat has in consequence opened negotiations with

Buonaparte, and if the *commissioners of peace* at Chatillon are not very alert, Beauharnois and Murat will, with Buonaparte's consent, make a partition of this country, and defend it against all invaders with a very small auxiliary French force.

It only requires the signal of independent nationalisation for Italy to become the mistress of ample means of resistance.

We are luckless auxiliaries. There is always a *thistle* in the wreath entwining the swords which we present for common use.

25*th*.—Yesterday, the Austrian minister and an Austrian general sent on communication to Murat returned. The fat is blazing in the fire, and no extinguisher can be found.

The demand of Tuscany—the order of the day of King Ferdinand, issued on the 20th of February to the Neapolitan troops previously to embarkation and distributed profusely at Leghorn—the red cockade on the hat of Lord William—and a multiplicity of other acts, incidents, and observations have brought Murat's fears up to their full amount.

At night we received notice from Mantua that Murat had taken his resolution, that the most active intercourse was renewed with Beauharnois, and that the object of negotiation was an Italian league to expel English and Austrians, and to supersede finally the need of any French aid for the protection of the two Italian kingdoms.

Austria may say, "Defend me from my friends, and from my enemies I will defend myself."

The conduct of Murat was certainly never very encouraging, but he had a right to complain of non-

fulfilment of engagements. When Austria performed her promise, then new events had changed the complexion of affairs. Nevertheless, he was not without some utility. Beauharnois had always to fear the possibility of his excitement to action. Our arrival probably converts him into a declared enemy, and loses to Austria all that part of Italy which she at present occupies.

Austria will always believe that we landed to declare war against Murat, or we should not have disembarked Neapolitans under such orders as were issued.

26*th*.—General Balachiew, the Russian general who was in England, has arrived here, and is to make the Russian alliance with Murat, if he proves that his conduct has been loyal; but I am afraid that it is too late. Murat has indeed said that he was well aware that the Allies would not make war to guarantee his establishment, and he will now join that party which is most likely to prevail in the field. It has been altogether a most unskilfully managed transaction. Honour and policy when at variance seldom produce advantageous issue.

The conclusion is still the subject of much anxiety. There are six thousand Austrians, under Nugent, so divided that they may be dispersed in an hour; and the re-embarkation of Lord William's Neapolitans—if Murat will not grant Leghorn as a *place d'armes*, and a military line towards Genoa—is not likely to be easily conducted. If I had *read the book of destiny*, I could not have written more prophetic despatches.

Marshal Bellegarde has had no despatches from the grand army since the 9th. We suppose that they are ashamed to write and contradict their speculations.

March 29th, Bologna.

In consequence of the difficulties which existed and seemed to increase, I was requested by Lord William to negotiate with Murat. Constant to the principle of promoting public utility, I acquiesced, but I felt much personal reluctance. Yesterday morning I left Verona, embarked on the Po at Ostiglia, landed at Lago Scuro, and arrived here, by the way of Ferrara, at 6 o'clock this morning.

I found Lord William, who had preceded me six hours; and from him I learnt that the King, Murat, was in the city, and the Pope at Modena: his appearance had already occasioned much anxiety to Murat, for he had no expectation of his coming, and little inclination to let him return to Rome, especially without signing the cession of four hundred thousand souls, which the Austrians agreed should be given to him by treaty from the Roman States. This the Pope, however, would not do—at all events until he was reseated in the papal chair and assisted by his council.

Early in the morning the Duke di Gallo called on me. At midday I went with Lord William, and was introduced to Murat. He received me very amicably; and we had more than an hour's very interesting conversation on past military events, particularly those relating to the Russian campaign; and I acquired some valuable information on that subject.

Murat's dress was singular. Hair curled in Roman coiffure—two ringlets, or what, *à la Parisienne*, are styled "*pensées*," dependent on each shoulder. Blue uniform coat, red pantaloons, yellow shoes, with spurs; sword, with three pictures in the handle. His counte-

nance martial, his manners soft, his conversation easy and intelligent. I reserve further opinion until I have transacted business with his Majesty.

Before I left Verona, a courier arrived from head-quarters. As usual, the despatches were dated from the place *evacuating* without noticing the intention. Such is the love, or the habitude, or the imagination of the utility of illusion.

Metternich writes that "peace is nearer, *because* the Congress is broken up." A true conclusion, perhaps; but, to make it logical, we must supply the suppressed premiss—of which an element is the sure march of time.

Lord Cathcart and the war-party will, no doubt, conceive that the *quadruple treaty* is a sufficient advantage obtained by his Lordship. They *will* forget that the sword cuts through parchment.

30*th*.—I dined with the Duke di Gallo—a handsome entertainment and a well-chosen party.

In the evening went to the opera. Murat was seated as a Sultan—princes and dukes all standing behind his throne-chair. He is by far the best actor that has appeared in the *royalty theatre*. This morning Lord William is gone to have an interview with the Pope. I am left to negotiate. I find myself much like the Allies in France—without any base for operations, line of communication uncertain, various interests clashing, and no unity of direction.

For the first time I saw Nugent yesterday evening. His position is most uncomfortable. He owes some of the chagrin to himself; but he has also been placed in very difficult circumstances, which scarcely admitted of his harmless extrication. One of his errors is an

engagement to "*serve two* masters:" one of his misfortunes is a very general jealousy of his military pretensions. By late occurrences he has unhappily lost the support of the few friends he had among the higher powers, in the number of whom was Bellegarde.

April 1st.—On the evening of the 29th, at half-past six, I was at the dinner-table with Murat. The banquet was according to all the rules of perfect gastronomy. The master's manners were very gracious. It was impossible for Lord Chesterfield to have done the honours better. A certain high personage in England would, I am sure, ever feel a little jealous of his kingly courtesies.

There was somewhat more of ceremony in the arrangement of the table than I ever witnessed before in royal fêtes.

Murat occupied one whole side himself. Three persons sat opposite, and two at each end. With the exception of this distinction, there was no extraordinary attention paid to him, and the conversation was as general, fluent, and free as in private society.

After dinner was over we remained talking till near eleven o'clock. I fought with his Majesty all the battles over again which we had witnessed together. He was exceedingly interesting, very candid, and by no means a Gascon for himself or his brethren in arms. I profited by this opportunity again to acquire information on various subjects which he was best qualified to give, and which may tend to make a *posthumous* memorandum of the late campaigns more valuable.

Yesterday morning was passed in negotiations. My progress has been most favourable. I acquired in five minutes' time more real facts and useful knowledge

than had been obtained since Murat's recognition by Austria. Having fixed truth as the base, the work will be crowned with transparencies.

For three days the people had assembled to receive the Pope. His Holiness made his entrance yesterday, drawn by *men cattle*. The throng was immense that cheered him, and the sacred army formidable. These potent soldiers carried candles instead of muskets. Europe has often found them torches to fire the world.

I was at the window of the hotel called "Albergo Reale," or the "Sign of S. Mark," as the Pope passed. This sign is so curious that I send a drawing of it to England. The lion was always S. Mark's symbol, and "all the beasts of the field licked his feet to do homage:" but I never before saw S. Mark himself incorporated with the lion. I have sent another copy to Hamilton, in which I think the evangelical symbol is better depicted. For fear the head should not be recognised as the Saint's, a brown cap is put upon it by the sign-painter, or by those who first imagined the representation. It is probable that this zodiac figuration is of very great antiquity.

Soon after the Pope's arrival, I presented myself, kissed his hand, and, being seated on his left, had a conversation with him of some interest, Charles only being present. He is a shrewd priest, with the experience of seventy-two years; of an inflexible spirit, fortified by its success. His return has very much deranged Murat, to whom the Allies had given four hundred thousand souls of his population.

Buonaparte has also been offering to Murat Roman candle-ends. The release of the Pope, which is adverse to this proposition, is therefore presumed to be

a measure of imperative necessity, and perhaps a prelude to a peace.

I dined with the Duke di Gallo, and had the good fortune to be placed near the minister of finance, who is a very well-informed man. He assured me that Buonaparte had twice resolved to dethrone Murat, and indeed satisfied me with proofs.

It appears that Buonaparte is a most insatiable master and tyrannous benefactor. Service can only terminate with life, and all his views must be adopted with devotional obedience.

3rd.—I, yesterday, had a very long audience of Murat, and received his ultimatum on the subject of Lord William's demands. I begged, however, to have the statement in writing, and Murat promises to give it under his own hand.

I think his case a good one. *In foro conscientiæ* he is justified. He has had much reason to feel mistrust and suspect hostile intentions under the pretext of peace. I cannot enter into particulars of the subject, but if ever my correspondence comes under notice, I feel sure that the world will second my verdict.

With regard to his defection from France, more may be said in his defence than I supposed, and it is another lesson against condemnation without hearing the accused.

Buonaparte had actually signed the decree for the union of Naples with the kingdom of Italy, observing to Murat — "Ma politique fera toujours taire mes affections." Murat defied him to the issue of his decree; menacing, if he did, to overwhelm him with war "de dehors et dedans." The events of the war suspended Buonaparte's intention, but Murat saw the

danger still imminent, and therefore resolved to assist the Allies in making a peace which might detach the iron crown from the head of Buonaparte. Murat joined the Allies to effect that object, and presumed that the Allies would not press the war further than to obtain the frontiers of the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. He found, however, that success had mastered their wisdom, and that there seemed to be some hesitation to fulfil the engagements with himself; for his treaty was not ratified, and an autograph letter promised by the Emperor of Austria, was not sent, in lieu of the official documents as a substitute for which it was promised because there were not then means at head-quarters to *arrange parchment deeds and forms.*

After nearly two months, and when the Allies were sensible that defeat in France was possible, and success in Italy not probable without Neapolitan aid, the letter arrives, but then Lord William's business succeeds, and of the character of that discussion Government must judge. I have done my duty in the transaction. My reports will prove my justice, if not my judgment; and justice in such matters is of more value than ability or opinion.

In the evening I was invited to a casino. The assembly was select. Murat came *en habit bourgeois*, and obtained the smiles of all the fair. Several Juno amateurs, of high vocal powers, accompanied the piano skilfully played. After the concert, French dances commenced, and Murat performed, not like a master, but like a well-taught gentleman.

There was one English dance at which he requested me to perform. I did so, but it required more ear than I have to keep time with the indignant music,

which seemed to scorn such unscientific arrangement. I cannot record my admiration of Bologna beauty. The Cardinals do not seem to have attended to the quality of the fair sex in their establishments.

April 5th, Verona.

5th.—On the 3rd, Lord William left Bologna, after writing a most hostile note to the Duke di Gallo. In the morning, by Lord William's desire, I had another very long conference with Murat, and, unfortunately, was in the room when the Duke di Gallo entered and read Lord William's letter.

I wished to withdraw, but could not. Murat was very much shocked at the personality; and told Count Meyer, the Austrian minister, afterwards, that if he had only been a Marshal he would have called Lord William to personal account.

I must admit that the language was far too harsh. I did indeed, previously to the transmission, tell Lord William that the matter should be strong, and the expressions "reglées par la décence."

I dined with Murat—a party of six. The chief subject of conversation this day was Spain. I was inquisitive and Murat very communicative: indeed, I found no reserve on any topic; and I think we travelled over all the past, the passing, and the future, during the time we were together at Bologna.

I parted, as in duty bound, on the most amicable terms; and I know that he has commanded his minister to express to the Allied Sovereigns and Lord Castlereagh his highest satisfaction at my conduct of the negotiations, &c.

The truths which I spoke did not offend, because

they were not spoken with *malveillance* and rudeness of manners; but frankness could not be rude. When there is no care not to revolt the feelings, I doubt the sincerity of the complainant.

The next day I received Murat's *procès verbal* or memorandum of his transactions with Lord William—a most important state paper. I despatched a copy to Lord William, and have sent another to Lord Castlereagh. It is well drawn out and very simple. The comments on Lord William's conduct are severe, but the language is not coarse. I suppose it will come before Parliament sooner or later, since the Prince of Campo Chiaro, the Neapolitan minister, has orders to present it to the British and all other governments.

I am sorry for the discussion: it will do England much discredit. The views of England, as they are opened here, seem to have been invidious: although I must admit that the instructions of Lord Castlereagh to Lord William, as written in the *public* despatches, *but not as given in by Lord William to the Neapolitan Government*, were candidly and liberally worded.

Although I could not accomplish the Tuscan cession —which, to say the truth, I do not think was a very essential object under all the circumstances—I nevertheless succeeded in rendering the Neapolitan aid efficient and co-operative. I submitted three plans of operation to Murat. He approved chiefly the third, and I had already determined in my own mind that it was the best when I framed it; but he gave *carte blanche* to the Marshal as to the choice and the command of his troops in any way in which the Marshal desired to distribute them. He, moreover, agreed to

meet the Marshal, on the 7th, at Riviera, and make definitive arrangements.

The force which can be united to the Austrians amounts to above eighteen thousand, of which one thousand six hundred are horse. The cavalry, artillery, and infantry which I saw were well clothed, equipped, mounted, and arranged. *In toto* it is a young but very martial establishment.

I left Bologna on the evening of the 3rd, travelled all night, reached Padua yesterday, saw General Marshal, who gave me some hopes of the fall of Venice, which *much interests me,* and arrived here about 8 o'clock in the evening. Marshal Bellegarde hailed my return, and, having put him in possession of what had occurred, I received his warm approbation. He then told me he had received no advices from Schwarzenberg, but a letter from the Emperor Francis at Dijon. We were not duped with the whys and wherefores, &c., &c. By French papers up to the 25th, we learn the Bergen op Zoom disaster also.

9th.—On the 7th, the Marshal and myself went to Riviera and met Murat. Murat engaged to move as the Marshal desired, but the selected plan of operations was not the one that either he or I wished. It is a half measure, presenting commanding strength nowhere. Murat seemed much out of spirits, but was affable and conciliating. We returned at night.

A flash of lightning frightened the horses of the Marshal's carriage. All four plunged into a deep ditch. The carriage stopped happily on the brink. With difficulty the horses were extricated.

The good news of a great success obtained by Schwarzenberg at Ferre Champenoise was brought

by a courier who met us on the road; and Metternich added that Buonaparte had himself avowed that his cause was hopeless. Indeed he offered to sign the peace proposed by the Allies, but at the same time bade them beware how they made him sign a peace dishonourable to France. The intention is certainly to dethrone him. All depends on the firmness of Buonaparte's troops, and particularly the National Guard of Paris.

The Allies seem to have rallied great strength again, and to put their all on the die as well as Buonaparte: but I suspect that they have some intelligence with the Parisians which makes them more confident than they would otherwise be, and more tenacious of that object.

10*th*.—We are all in preparation for a movement. We received Paris papers to the 30th this morning, but not a word in them which indicates the movements of friends and foes.

12*th*.—In the night of the 11th, a courier arrived, and Charles entered my apartment with the news of the capture of Paris. The event was too fraught with subjects for consideration to permit further sleep. This morning, Wray arrived from Dijon, which he left on the morning of the 4th, and he confirmed the intelligence with many particulars. The decision of the capital in all probability will decide the provinces; but Wray says the people are all in arms, exasperated by the violence of the troops. It is a most critical epoch. I cannot yet discover whether Buonaparte voluntarily, or not, exposed the capital. His eccentric movement on Vitry has such a complexion, but the influence on public opinion is almost too great a counteraction to any military advantage.

No one knows whither he was bending his course. Some say direct on Paris; others, on Orleans; others, into the Cevennes, where he will unite all the forces yet left, or who will remain faithful to him. With the Catalonian garrisons he would yet muster strong.

The news, accompanied by the enmity expressed to the Buonaparte family, does not seem to have stimulated Murat's exertions in our cause. If he joined his force to Beauharnois' he would send us back with such a shock as would electrify all France and decide the scale of fortune in Buonaparte's favour, although it is more unfavourable than we yet know of.

15*th*.—The fever excited by the news from France has not yet been allayed. Italy is in her throes, and I think more pain than joy has generally been felt—not from affection to Buonaparte, but because all successful invasion is odious, and the future not less pregnant with ill than the past.

The *colours* may be changed, but the scourge of oppression will *still* last. Everyone believes in civil war as inevitable, and Beauharnois yesterday said to Count Neupperg that many of his general officers and his men would prefer expatriating themselves for ever to America to serving under the Buonaparte dynasty.

The Bavarian general, who arrived yesterday, assured me that the Allies could not have taken Paris without a secret understanding with the capital itself. They could only muster altogether one hundred thousand men, the Austrians alone having sixty thousand sick in France. That now they had not sufficient force to leave a corps to observe Paris and press on Buonaparte. That the Marshals all took a joint interest in his fate, and that they had been sent to propose his

abdication in favour of the child, which was a measure that would find many advocates. Whether all this be true or not, the French have had the misfortune to see a foreign force control their election and possess their seat of government, and I do not by any means think that this event will ultimately prove beneficial to Europe. I fear the "Great A" *à l'avenir* as much as the "Bouncing B."

Yesterday, a Bavarian general and Count Neupperg went to Beauharnois, and asked him to surrender Italy. He made a proposition, to which a *contre-projet* is now being sent. It will, I think, end in arrangement. We shall now get Venice, Poppi, Palma Nuova, and Legnago; some time hence the fortresses on the Mincio; and the French troops will go to France, free to choose their own master. It is strange that the Senate in none of their proclamations noticed Italy.

Murat, in conformity with his pledge to me, subsequently renewed at Riviera, has commenced his operations with some success; but Austria is now so fearful of his influence that she will endeavour to persuade his re-entrance into his own States. He thought, by Alexander's proclamation, that he was one of the family *déchue*, and sent to Beauharnois immediately, offering to divide Italy with him. Beauharnois refused, and told the fact of his offer, from hatred of the man as well as of the line of conduct which he has pursued; and which certainly will not be a brilliant page in the melancholy moral history of these times, although he is not without his grounds of palliation.

I hate, however, the person, whoever he may be, who aids the conquerors of his country, and Murat certainly assisted the invasion of France.

18*th*.—The arrangement is made with Beauharnois as I anticipated; but for ten days the Austrians are not to pass through the Italian territory, and then only by the routes of Brescia and Cremona.

The Austrians wish to get military possession of all Italy; but perhaps before ten days have elapsed an order may come to arrest the proposed march to Piedmont.

The Viceroy, on publishing the order for the return of the French troops to France, prefaced it by observing that "as a remedy for her ills, she had placed herself under the protection of her ancient Ægis, and that already the hope of tranquillity weakened the remembrance of past misfortunes." He then says that "he remains in Italy to share the fate of a people with whose interests he had been charged ten years." He has thus worked through an embarrassing duty very ably, and neither commits himself as a prince, a relative, or a Frenchman.

The abdication of Buonaparte is not officially noticed here; but we are told he is to have Elba and six millions of livres per annum. When he landed from Egypt he had but £20,000 and his ambition. How many degraded sovereigns have re-ascended from a dungeon to a throne?

Buonaparte is not without partisans, although he has no friend in affliction. His powerful talents will preserve him great influence.

The Cossack pike which presented the constitutional charter, and the bayonets of Russia raising the throne of Louis, are images which will, sooner or later, fret the people to madness. At least fifteen thousand Frenchmen are about to re-enter France, where they

will find chains more dishonourable than those which they have been bearing.

The insolence of victory echoing through Europe will inflame the sentiments of patriotism and wounded honour. The probable misrule of the new dynasty, which so unfavourably commences its reign—which accepts a kingdom that Buonaparte disdained to retain when so dispirited—will cause another effort to redeem character and recover empire.

Such are the arguments of those who consider the abdication of Buonaparte as a measure of hope rather than of pusillanimity.

On the other hand it is argued that France was not conquered; that Talleyrand had disposed the Senate and the people to a change of dynasty; that the will of the capital, and not the force of the Allies, uncovered its defence; that the iron government of Buonaparte had estranged all regard for him, and that the misfortunes of France augment the hatred of him as their author; that he reigned abhorred, and will in future live despised; that the love of repose will prevail over all other feelings; and that France, if she has lost her military fame, will console herself with the pursuits of commerce and agriculture.

In brief, the system is to be Utopian, and thanksgivings are annually to commemorate the blessings of that *salutary authority* which the Allies exerted.

Such is to be the state of France. But I fear that Italy will regret the iron crown. She certainly has been much benefited, was in rapid progress of nationalisation, and in ten years would have been an independent power.

In this country, Buonaparte has been a benefactor,

not only in the formation of a military spirit, in the construction of roads, erection of public edifices, &c., but especially in the establishment of a system of education.

I yesterday went over a public seminary for girls, which afforded me the most gratifying spectacle I ever beheld of that nature. *In all Europe* I never saw an institution where education, with all its collateral duties, was so successfully carried on. There were fifty girls, in three classes—the eldest not exceeding fourteen. The proofs of their powers and industry were produced. A party then danced in the most graceful manner, and there was not one who did not present herself, when spoken to, like a woman of the best fashion but still suitably to her years. To perfect the whole, joyous content was expressed in every countenance as the constant sentiment of the heart.

To-morrow I visit the pauper establishment. Since the Austrians have entered Verona there is an occasional beggar to be seen, but previously, I am assured, not one was to be found in the streets. There may have been great contributions, &c., levied, but these works of good, founding so solidly the structure of a nation, fully compensated. The pillage in future will not be less, but the benefits will cease. Demoralisation will be deemed a necessary duty in the work of denationalisation.

25*th*.—Events have streamed so rapidly that I cannot attempt to note their progress. Yesterday, Marshal Beauharnois agreed to surrender the kingdom of Italy. The insurrection at Milan and the intelligence of Buonaparte's cession of the iron crown, with other circumstances, determined that measure.

I have, in my despatch to Lord Castlereagh, rendered justice to his conduct as an administrator, a general, and a man.

I passed the whole of yesterday evening with Beauharnois and in Mantua, and enjoyed very interesting conversation on all subjects. He treated me with a confidence that very few friends could experience from a person in his situation, and earnestly begged that I would see him again to pursue our discourses.

There is unquestionably great satisfaction in a reception which gives proof of previous good repute, and shows the existence of unlimited credit on the heart's stores.

I was authorised to make note of the *military* memoranda, &c., and I have communicated them to Government as they are an ample justification of our proceedings in this part, although I am sure that the military critics will long condemn our respect for position and force.

The dinner was a most agreeable part of the day's entertainment, not only because we did not sit down till 7 o'clock in the evening, which is a great extension beyond 2 o'clock, but because the society was very select, there not being more than eight, including three ladies appertaining to the Princess whose presence embellished the company. The Princess was herself not visible, having been confined only eight days, but they say she is very handsome. Her children, four of whom I saw, are of the best appearance and manners.

Beauharnois asked much after the Duke and Duchess of Bedford.

He is altered, but has a great resemblance to

Moreau, and is as plain as Murat is gaudy in his dress. He is, in my opinion, just the man to suit some good Englishmen of my acquaintance.

When I was retiring, Assalini recognised me in the antechamber. He has long been the chief physician to the Viceroy. I was greatly pleased to renew his acquaintance, and I think he was gratified at finding this good-will towards him.

This day we have advice of the fall of Genoa. The capture is valuable. *On dit*, that the prize money will amount to 500,000*l*.

The people seem to have caused the early surrender, and probably the news from France and an armistice took from the defenders all stomach for the fight.

I shall inspect Legnago, visit Beauharnois again in Mantua, run along the line of the Mincio to Peschiera, and from thence proceed to Milan, where our head-quarters will be established in a few days, and where I have to receive orders for my discharge; since, as I have written to Aberdeen, "the post I hold is now better adapted for a minister than for a general."

27*th*. — Yesterday, Beauharnois and his Princess arrived here. The preceding day there was much reason to fear that there might be obstacles to his departure, as the Italian generals, &c., were greatly displeased with the second convention which surrendered the capital and the fortresses without any arrangement made for them, according to the express stipulation of the first convention to that effect.

I think, however, that Beauharnois does right; especially as Berthier desired him to withdraw, and the people had commenced a senseless and what threatened to be a very sanguinary insurrection, only to be re-

pressed in its first outbreak by the presence of an Austrian force.

The state of this country, however, requires the most prompt attention and the wisest counsels. If the political establishment is not in harmony with the public feeling, there will certainly be a general revolt. The Austrian Government is perhaps the most unpopular of all; for it is too poor to be liberal, and the manners of the Germans are at direct variance with Italian habits and character.

The Princess, although only brought to bed twelve days, bore the journey very well; but Assalini tells me that she is very delicate, and that he fears the more for her as her mother died after child-birth. I have just sent her a bottle of Tokay from the cellar of *John Sobieski*. It was given me when I was in Warsaw, and I have carried it about intact on the presumption that I might one day apply the nectar to a better purpose than the gratification of my own palate. If I have not, as I hope, combined the "*utile* dulci," I have at least combined in this instance the "*decorum* dulci," and this is more in character.

28*th*.—Yesterday, Beauharnois showed me a letter from his sister, the Queen of Holland. It was full of anecdote about Buonaparte, the Empresses, &c., and proved that she possessed much good sense and good feeling. One of her remarks was—"Fatality determined that no experience, no counsel, not even the Emperor's own intelligent mind should discover the bandage which it had bound over his eyes. The perception of the heart was wanting, and great geniuses rarely possess it. He has been abandoned almost by all. Rustan (the Mameluke) is even about to quit,

and when I saw the Empress Louisa the other day, she had not more than one *valet-à-pied* in her service. She came to the advanced posts to embrace her father before she followed her husband, but it is now said that she will not be allowed to go after him. It is true that he was not latterly kind to you, but I am sure you will remark only his benefactions at this time." The tears started in the eyes of Beauharnois as he read.

29*th.*—Beauharnois leaves Verona to-morrow, and we shall set out for Milan on the 1st of May, if no counter orders come from the Austrian government; but since the 14th we have had no advice whatsoever from France, and therefore are ignorant of arrangements in relation to Italy.

Milan remains quiet, but the people seem resolved on an independent government.

May 1*st.*—I dined on the 29th with the Prince Eugène, the Princess and three ladies of her court; no other persons present.

A conversation of five hours enabled me to travel over much matter, but without exhausting our subjects.

I had every reason to be pleased with the Prince, and to be assured that we did not separate without a mutual wish to meet again.

He was very anxious that I should be at Paris when he was there, but as I hate traitors and cowards —however beneficial their treason and baseness — I shall not sojourn in that city.

I would rather be Buonaparte, to have written his last bulletin, than any one of the *yet* prosperous renegades.

This day we received advice that a convention had been signed between Prince Borghese and an

Austrian and British officer for the evacuation of the French possessions in Italy, but General Grenier has received an order to halt with the column of French troops retiring from the kingdom of Italy in Piedmont. The order is dated the 17th, and threatens to cause embarrassment.

We have received no official advices from Paris since the 13th, and no news indirectly since the 18th, so that the Marshal is quite ignorant of the wishes of his government and the arrangements of the Allies, but he now proposes to be at Milan on the 4th, and he will be obliged to force the retreat of Grenier if he will not fall back voluntarily.

It is to be hoped indeed that some instructions will previously arrive to prevent unnecessary violence, but the pleasures of the capital seem to engross all consideration and time.

I have been obliged to report that the column of General Grenier, though mounting the *white cockade*, are adverse in the highest degree to the new government; and our accounts from all quarters represent that a strong feeling exists everywhere in favour of Napoleon, and against submission to the will of strangers. "The piping time of peace" is not yet come; those will rue who calculate upon its present existence.

Opinion begins to turn against the Emperor of Austria. The sacrifice of his daughter is suspected to be a territorial barter, and there is indisputably great indelicacy in his personal participation of the triumph which is so fatal to his child and child's child. There are some who think to diminish the weight of the charge against him as guilty of an unnatural act, by denial of the validity of the marriage. But I have

replied to them that it was sufficient humiliation for Austria to make a legitimate sacrifice of the Archduchess Louisa, but the injury of a concubine-connection would exceed all precedent in history, and consign family and nation to eternal shame.

The want of public and private principle is the fatal characteristic of these times. There is scarcely a man to be met with who feels his happiness and honour to be inseparably connected with the dignity and fortunes of his country.

The good old cause, as it is called, triumphs. Its insignia of victory are the fetters of tyranny and superstition. The power of Buonaparte could at the furthest not have continued more than thirty years. Death assured the termination of his iron rule at that period; but is not the advantage of his earlier ruin counterbalanced by the extinction of Poland and Italy, by the denationalisation of two such interesting portions of Europe, by the restoration of the evils of Papal domination, and by other reviving enormities which tend to the subjection and degradation of humanity? Contributions and conscriptions might vex the present race, but knowledge was in progress and liberty kept company.

With all his faults, crimes, and misrule, Buonaparte did more for the advantage of mankind than can ever be effected by the repeal of his acts and abolition of his establishments. The settlement of the kingdom of Italy alone entitles him to the highest consideration as the regenerator of a people. Time will render him in this respect the justice due, and he may live to view the eagles of France regretted on the shores of the Rhine and the Tagliamento.

The preservation of his life excites much discussion.

I remembered in Crébillon nine applicable lines, which I transmit.

"La honte toujours suit un lâche désespoir:
Il vaut mieux se flatter d'un espoir téméraire
Que de céder au sort dès qu'il nous est contraire.
Il faut du moins mourir les armes à la main—
Le seul genre de mort digne d'un vrai Romain.
Mais mourir pour mourir n'est qu'une folle ivresse;
Triste enfant de l'orgueil, nourri par la paresse.
L'exemple de Caton serait honteux à suivre:
Plus le malheur est grand plus il est grand de *vivre*." *

May 7th, Milan.

I arrived here on the 5th, having quitted Verona on the 4th. My route was through Peschiera and Brescia: the former, a fortress, which was in progress to considerable strength; the latter, a city with 80,000 inhabitants, and with one of the finest opera-houses in Italy, to which I went for half-an-hour and received great applause, as an English representative, from the public in and out of the house. Every feature of the country through which I passed bore, as I have remarked in my despatches, evidence of a well-regulated administration.

In Milan I found General Macfarlane, who had come up from Genoa to afford protection to the Regency. A few hours, from the avidity of party leaders, put me in possession of their views.

As I have stated to Lord Castlereagh—"independence is the unequivocal demand of the men of letters, the army, and the people. A provincial system will be accompanied with an uneasy rule, and assure finally a desperate struggle."

The Austrian party is limited to some few chamber-

* The two last lines in this quotation occur in "Le Triumvirat," act i., scene 4; the seven first lines in the same play, act iii., scene 1. The editor has preserved the dislocation for the sake of the happy sequence in the sentiment.

lains of the court and two or three Toisons d'Or; but, although the spirit of nationalisation is omnipotent, I think much time must elapse before a sober patriotism can be established. Passions are more likely to direct measures than state considerations.

The late insurrection which put—and which alone could have put—the line of the Mincio and the capital into the hands of the Austrians, is a proof of intemperance which Italy will long rue.

There never was an interference against the existing government worse timed or more pernicious. I have not seen Melzy. If he be a statesman he will be the first of that pretension that I have seen. Hitherto I have not found one fully meriting that title.

Melzy is, however, in much disgrace for supporting Beauharnois in his object—the Italian throne; for Frenchmen have become very unpopular here.

The government establishments seem to have been on a most splendid scale. The house of the Minister at War cost 50,000*l.*; and I am quartered in the house of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which is not so large as Carlton House but is more magnificently furnished. The proprietor of it is not a little astonished at my taking every pains to avoid the use of the silks and satins.

I have not had time to inspect the public buildings, but I have seen the exterior of the cathedral, a restoration undertaken by Buonaparte which is calculated to be one of the glories of architecture.

The Parisians may tumble his statues from the columns of adoration, and justly reproach his arbitrary character and government, if they flatter themselves that they *can live* free, but it is in vain for hatred to attempt the denial of his title to the characteristics of greatness. He may say with Busiris—

> "That I have lived, I leave those works behind
> Shall pluck the shining age from vulgar time,
> And give it whole to late posterity."

His conception of the French empire, his conquest of every capital in Europe, are lofty memorials, but his intention to re-establish Poland, with the creation and nurture of the kingdom of Italy, are magnificent traits of policy and intelligence which will secure him immortality, and prevent his offences and faults from being dwelt upon by future generations.

I much fear that the re-establishment of the Pope will have more fatal power to depress the liberties of Italy than all the efforts of enlightened patriots can counteract. I have expressed to Lord William Bentinck my fears on that subject, as he is one of His Holiness's great allies. "My friends," I wrote, "are encroaching by sap, but I much fear that *your friend*, the Pope, will use all the power of St. Peter's to enforce the maxim of the Church—'Divide and Govern.' It is on that point that you and I differ most. I regard the Papal throne as incompatible with Italian nationalisation and freedom. Beware how you extend its influence and extol its benefits to mankind. You never can hope to make that government philosophical or flexible to the times. Monarchs are sometimes young and generous, or old and timid, but the veterans selected for the papal chair are champions of the triple crown, whom philanthropy cannot persuade and whom menaces cannot daunt."

9*th*.—The Marshal arrived yesterday, and went to the theatre in the evening. He was not very much applauded, but Macfarlane and myself, on passing to and from his house, were repeatedly cheered by the populace, from the supposition that England is friendly to their independence. I am much alarmed, however,

at certain indications of a barter, which will ultimately extend Russian influence in the North Sea, and extinguish this kingdom, until "opportunity offers for a desperate struggle," as I have noted in my despatch, and which will assuredly be the consequence of disappointment. Europe has had sufficient cause to lament the partition of Poland. Are we to commence a new era by a similar crime? What is the "good cause" of which we have heard so much, if the annihilation of the rights, liberties, and even the name of nations is one of its prominent features? I trust that some friends to general freedom in England will quickly and loudly express their sentiments on these subjects, so that the echo may be heard through Europe with impression; but I almost fear that the bargain is too far advanced.

Buonaparte, in the Isle of Elba, has in this case only to be tranquil: his enemies will be his best champions.

This city has so many objects worthy of inspection, and there is such a demand on time from continual visitors on public affairs, &c., that I have not been able to undertake the rounds. I mounted, however, yesterday, to the cathedral top, and, for the first time in my life, saw a building of such magnitude entirely composed of marble. The view of the theatre last night was also a splendid novelty. The dimensions, as to area and altitude, exceed all others in Europe.

The Villa Buonaparte, where the Marshal resides, is another noble structure, and possesses the advantage of grounds laid out in the English taste, in a very favourable locality for its application.

Evening.—Circumstances have rendered it necessary to make one effort from hence to save Italy from the provincial system. I have sent an express to Lord

William Bentinck, begging him to despatch Macfarlane to Paris. His knowledge of the whole subject and his temperate character will render the act of extinction difficult after his arrival, for there can be no pretext of ignorance as to the views and feelings of this nation or of the want of sober and sufficient representation. I have, in the interval, sent a despatch, in which I have discharged my duty by putting Government in possession of facts and my observations.

It is for them to determine whether there shall be future tranquillity or revolutionary contest in Italy—whether Buonaparte shall be regretted and his influence restored.

Lord William can very well be here the day after to-morrow, and his adoption or rejection of the proposed measure will, in my opinion, be a decision of great importance to Europe.

13*th*.—I have been employing some of my leisure time in examining the new works of the fallen Government. The day before yesterday I went to the Arena, an immense oblong building in the interior of which there is space for horse-races and naumachia or sea-fights. I understand that it has several times been filled with water, and that twenty thousand spectators are comfortably seated around.

The triumphal arch at the Simplon Gate is on the first scale of beauty and magnificence. About one-fourth is completed. It is to be apprehended that the execution of the remainder may be arrested by motives of jealousy to the memory of Napoleon: but if it is a monument of his genius, it is also a memorial of his catastrophe.

The Puerta Nuova on the Pavia road is a marble arch, plain, but very elegant; and was designed to

commemorate the admiration of some subscribing individuals for the conqueror of Marengo.

The canals round the town, &c., are all well calculated for the objects proposed, and have contributed much to the prosperity and improvement of the city.

Yesterday, I went to the Mint, which has coined, since the year "8," one hundred and fifty millions of francs of France. The machinery seemed to be perfect, and the establishment to comprise every connecting branch—even a collection of coins, some of them most valuable. I was much struck, however, by the order and decency which prevailed, and the creditable appearance of all the officers, &c. As far as I could judge, there is in this establishment a considerable exhibition of science. I brought away some of Napoleon's money, coined while I was there.

During the day letters came from Lyons. In one of them it is said that when Buonaparte was speaking with Augereau, he remarked, "Monsieur le Maréchal —It is very certain that we did not study metaphysics in the same school. Your philosophy on the duties of suicide, as it is published in your proclamation to the troops, is not mine." His conduct throughout, it is added, has been characterised by great firmness and assurance.

I was astonished at not finding in the English papers any statement of the terms granted him and the general recognition of his title of Emperor, but I suppose by this time they are public.

When the British frigate which carried him to Elba saw his flag hoisted, she saluted it, which is infallible acknowledgment of his right to sovereignty

in that island. I understand that it is a white and red flag, with three bees.

13*th*. 8 *o'clock* P.M.—The Provisional Government having judged it expedient to despatch a courier this evening, at my suggestion, I am obliged to conclude my private correspondence.

The question of Italian independence engrosses all my thoughts and stimulates all my exertions. There is every reason to fear that the die is cast; but if Austria, tempted by the glare of the occasion, pursues a false policy—if she refuses to recognise the political existence of this kingdom, either by permitting an independent government, or by putting the iron crown on her own head—she will rue and justly suffer the penalty of her avaricious rage. It is impossible to extinguish the national spirit. Those who attempt it are enemies to mankind, and will prove the restorers of Buonaparte's influence in this country.

One word in Parliament is the only remedy for these evils. I lament day and night that I am not at least in England to excite that effort.

18*th*.—The day before yesterday the Velites of the guard (as fine troops as any in Europe) went *en masse* to General Bellegarde. A deputation was admitted, who demanded a general discharge. On Marshal Bellegarde asking why and wherefore, the answer was—"We will not serve under the Austrians." The grenadiers at Bergamo made the same declaration, and this day eight hundred chasseurs have come from Bergamo into Milan with the same demand.

It is dangerous in these times to force the *feelings of nations*. The day is passed for contempt of public

opinion. The expression of the Emperor of Austria to the deputation that "there could be no constitution and no independence in a country conquered by his arms," has been the occasion of this proceeding, which menaces consequences of a very serious nature, if the extinction of the kingdom be persevered in by the Allied Powers united to protect the liberties and secure the happiness of Europe!

Norway, Poland, and Italy seem likely to owe many blessings to this philanthropic society of disinterested arbitrators.

It is reported here that famine is considered too slow a process for the Norwegian rebels, and that a supply of "cat-o'-nine-tails" has been ordered from England, with drummers experienced in the Irish system of extorting confessions and scourging a whole people into submission.

I do what I can to keep up the courage of the chiefs, and have been of use in counteracting a despondency which was becoming an aid to those who would destroy them, but the vessel of state is yet too weak and untimbered to buffet the waves, and, although many would die for their national independence, there are few who have sufficient constancy to encounter extremities with increased energy. By fearing, they promote the worst. The champion of a country should scorn the counsel—"Pone animos et pulsus abi."

19th.—I proposed to quit Milan this day on my tour, but I remain until to-morrow, in the hopes of some advices from Paris.

The Marshal has given the discontented troops a *semestre*, or furlough. It was the best arrangement,

but, of course, these malcontents will spread dissatisfaction through the country.

A letter has just been received from Paris, dated May 11th. It is written by a minister. The account of great dissatisfaction among the French troops, whispers of treason long in secret action before the fall of Paris, and murmurs at the unmerited dishonour of the French arms are therein stated to be the general topics of French military discourse.

The troops of the line are, it is added, removed from the capital, because of their continual disputes with the Allies, but the National guards are represented to be no less at discord with the foreign officers and soldiery. It concludes with a dark prognostication. I only note the contents of this letter to show how the hue of affairs is represented: certainly it is in the colours I expected.

Murat seems to have played his royal game well. It is asserted that he read to his people the proclamation of Ferdinand, and offered to surrender the crown, if they wished it, but said that first he would secure them a good constitution. Unanimous "vivats" replaced the crown on his head, and he is now to be a constitutional sovereign, which may enable him to defy the Pope as well as the Bourbon hostility.

I rather think that I shall send Charles to Paris with my despatches, as I fear their interception if conveyed by other hands. Buonaparte seems to have forgotten no point of interest in his outlines for future military operations. Having experienced that troops obliged to withdraw from the Trebbia had only a precarious retreat, he ordered a road to be struck out

from Genoa direct on Placenza. This road is commenced, and, when finished, will render Genoa a base for the movements of an army acting in the heart of Italy, and, if Genoa had continued a French province, would have secured to France the command of Italy.

Reference to the map will show the value of this route and the genius of the design in its various ramifications.

There is here a letter from Captain Usher, of the 'Undaunted,' detailing many curious particulars relative to the ex-Emperor. Having ridden up a hill which commanded the view of his island, he burst out into a loud and long laugh, and said to Captain Usher, "Look at my kingdom!" The conversation then became more serious, and he continued at dinner and for three hours after dinner to discourse on all political and military subjects, in the course of which he observed that "he had done wrong to resign; notwithstanding Augereau's treachery and some others', he could have recovered himself; that the troops would have rallied round him, and that the Allies were in such a state of discord and discomfiture as to have rendered their perseverance for a month longer impossible." Turning to Colonel Campbell, he added—"I appeal to you for that fact: you know it to be true." He repeated that there would be new struggles in France; that if the Bourbons did not secure the commerce of France, they would not reign three years. He said that the "Allied Sovereigns had personally behaved to him so as to admit of no complaint except in the instance of his separation from his wife and child. This, however, was a great cruelty, and a violation of all law and justice."

His plans for Elba are on an enlarged scale. He has traced out two palaces and a lazaretto, which is to allow the reduction of fifty per cent. in the price of corn to the inhabitants.

Half of the garrison which he found on the island are engaged in his service, and eight hundred guards are arrived at Savona to share his fortunes.

Imperial ceremonies, honours, &c., are continued with undiminished etiquette. The imperial crown is placed in his apartment, and two thrones have been erected. All who approach him (British and all) style him Emperor, and he receives sitting.

This recognition of title gives him consideration, and tends to maintain his influence, although, for the moment, he is powerless. He knows its value, and will turn it to account in various ways. For my own part, I expect to see him surrounded with embassies from all parts of the world.

The mystery of Government with regard to the treaty made with him amuses us all here. It is so notorious that it will be very shortly sold in all the book-stalls of Europe.

Although Nesselrode signed only, all the Powers are participators. The employment of a British commissary, a British frigate, &c., to carry into execution the articles, is a virtual approval and guarantee of the still operating conditions by the British Government.

May 23rd, Genoa.

Yesterday, I left Milan. Near Pavia I examined the celebrated church, called La Certosa: gemmed altars, rich sculpture, &c., formed its just reputation. Buonaparte abolished the monkish fraternity, but no

damage has been done to the building, although soldiers occupy the drones' apartments.

Pavia and Tortona, through which I passed, are cities without present note, except that there is a foundry of cannon in the first, and that the fortifications of the latter are entirely razed.

Novi afforded me some most excellent fish. Gavi is a castle fortress, on a lofty mountain, very strong, but troops may avoid its fire.

It was night before we reached the Bocchetti. The storms of the day settled in thick rain, and finally such darkness prevailed as must have enveloped chaos.

The road was the worst in Italy, and one side had no protection but fate. With painful toil we surmounted all impediments to the preservation of our necks and reached the post-house, whence it was impossible to proceed until morning.

Charles took some steps in the stable for his pillow. I found in the barouche a much wished-for repose from threatened dislocation of bones.

At Genoa I found Lord William and many persons with whom I had previous acquaintance, but the 20th Dragoons had returned to Sicily, and the 14th was the only British regiment here.

One street of marble palaces entitles Genoa to the appellation "La Superba." The site is also very grand, but I should be sorry to live in this city. It is too magnificently dull.

When the British first came a cordial welcome inspired agreeable illusions as to the state and temper of society. I am now assured that first impressions have not been maintained. Various motives are assigned, but I believe it is thought that we came rather

to make prize-money than to concern ourselves about their prosperity; and they expect that when all the captured property is embarked we shall withdraw and leave them in the hands of the Austrians or Piedmontese, both of which nations they hate.

In the afternoon I rode round the fortifications of Genoa, which are very extensive. The French enfeebled the place by making a road which enabled a debarkation to be effected that took in reverse all the advanced forts and gave possession of a hill that commanded the city. Not calculating on the probability of an attack when employed in this work, they postponed the new defences that were projected to cover the points thus exposed. The garrison of Genoa might have held out, feeble as it was, a couple of days longer, but officers and men said—"Why should we fight for Buonaparte who is no longer an emperor, or for the King whom we do not wish to support?"

I could not but contemplate the position with sentiments of great admiration for Massena. There seems never to have been a more powerful combination of courage, activity, vigilance, skill, and constancy. These qualities and an original force of twenty-five thousand men are necessary for those who would in future defend this city equally well—above all, vigilance.

25th.—Yesterday evening, a great ball was given by Lord William Bentinck. Until the hour of supper, all those climate anxieties prevailed which customarily in England attend *fêtes à la belle étoile.* Rain poured and storms growled to the last moment. There were at least five hundred persons present, and the 'Morning Post' reporters would have found abundant splendid materials for two columns. Mesdames Larazzo, Brig-

nola, and Spinola—the two former sisters, nées Negroni, and well known to Lady Shaftesbury, were certainly the unrivalled representatives of Venus, but I should have given the *pomme d'or* to Madame Brignola for her grace as well as beauty.

Having promised Lord William to stand by him to the last, I remained until 5 o'clock, but then the fantastic *pediatons* moving with increased spirit, and the dance assuming an everlasting character, I threw myself on his lordship's mercy, obtained it, and withdrew. I do not yet know when Morpheus prevailed over Orpheus; I presume not before 8 o'clock, A.M.

Yesterday I received letters to the 27th of April and newspapers to the 11th of May. The former hurl at me erroneous predictions. I admit that the event differs from anticipation, but Buonaparte himself did not calculate on defection and conspiracy. I am satisfied that my stated facts were correct. The Allies had not the power of conquest in their own strength. Sickness, famine, and insurrection were, moreover, arrayed against them, and time will show whether the surrender of Paris was the work of a faction or the effect of the prowess of the Allies. I had often expressed my opinion that Buonaparte would succeed if he had only to cope with the military means of his adversaries. A revolt which deprived him of the base of his operations and seventy thousand men under arms, while the treachery of another chief paralysed the operations of thirty-five thousand destined to act in the rear of the invaders, are incidents that are not within the scope of *raisonnements*. Plans and prophecies founded on such casualties will generally end in

discomfiture and failure. *Schwarzenberg himself to the 20th of March had no thought of victory.*

In the newspapers to the 11th I read Lord Granville's and Lord Grey's speeches. They electrified me, and not only me but all others who have read them here. Thank God, there are few British here who do not feel their sentiments, and embrace the Norwegian cause with *their* fervour. For my own part, if I had but a hundred pounds in the world, I would subscribe fifty pounds of it to aid them; and if I could contribute to their success, I would not feel disgraced by being registered "traitor" in the Government archives. It is not Norway alone, but the cause—the principles on which the political and indeed the social human structure is built—that ought to engage every heart and every hand, if necessary. If I were not barred by bonds of duty from which I cannot be set free except by cutting through them without regard to morals, I would carry some military experience and an useful example to the Norwegian aid. I could repose in the integrity of my motives, and trust to God's Providence for the issue.

If this is the system which England is to pursue in conformity with the direction of Government, I shall, as it is, expatriate myself; for I abhor injustice and oppression too much to live under the gloomy shadow of their influence.

I cannot find that subscriptions are opened for the Norwegians; but I shall give 100*l.* as soon as I hear of it. The consequences may be personally injurious, but this is not a case where "Resolution should be sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought."

I wish Lord Grey had asked for the return of the Swedish killed and wounded during the war.

Blucher is now in England. There is an opportunity to certify my reports of Bernadotte's conduct previous to the battle and at the battle of Leipsic.

May 30th, Milan.

On the 26th we went to Voltai, to the house of Count Brignola, and dined there. I never saw a better campagne establishment abroad. The day passed without a cloud, in the atmosphere or on our brows. The next day we dined with Sir Edward Pellew on board the "Caledonia." I was very glad to see again an English ménage. After dinner we passed to the Opera, and from thence I entered my barouche with Captain Finecker, an aide-de-camp of General Oakes when I was at Malta, and subsequently of General Maitland. Charles mounted with my man Louis on the box-seat. The night was fine, but at day-dawn the rain commenced, and continued incessantly. I was resolved, however, to inspect Alessandria, and I accomplished it, but re-entered the carriage like a drowned rat. I did not, however, regret the penalty, for it did not exceed the value of knowledge acquired.

The more I see of Buonaparte's arrangements, the more I recognise his power of mind. We arrived at Milan about 3 o'clock on the morning of Saturday. At 10 I was with the Marshal, and he somewhat relieved my despondency by telling me that although the Constitution of Italy was abolished, her political existence would be recognised by the establishment of a monarchy connected with the Imperial Crown of Austria. The principle of nationalisation being se-

cured, *les droits du peuple* will not be a work of difficulty or remote success. There is a great difference between creation and improvement.

I afterwards saw the late President of the Regency, M. Melzy, and he showed me the private report of a conversation between Lord Castlereagh and one of the Italian deputation at Paris.

This deputy had commenced by expressing the favourable opinion that Lord William Bentinck, General MacFarlane, and myself entertained of the Italian people and pretensions; and stated that we had said that as Italy was only occupied by the Austrians for the Allies, Great Britain would certainly interest herself for her prosperity and political existence.

Lord Castlereagh replied that he must frankly admit that the British generals were in the habit of taking a direction and giving opinions not in accordance with the policy of the Cabinet. That they thought that her national honour consisted in affording protection, but he considered that it was best maintained by attending to the general interests; that the government of Austria had always been paternal; that he could do nothing in opposition to Austria, but would do all that influence could accomplish for the welfare of a country which certainly possessed the regard of his nation.

The deputation answered that the last twenty years had made a great change in Italy; that the people were no longer a divided body; that they had acquired a knowledge of their national power and, notwithstanding the iron yoke of the founder of the kingdom, had marched under it in progress to independence; that it was impossible to repress this spirit and energy; that a political existence and constitutional establish-

ment could alone secure public tranquillity; that the government of Austria might be paternal, but the character might change with the ruler; that at all events Austria had always caused the misfortunes of Italy by involving her in wars without the ability to protect her.

Lord Castlereagh observed that *Spain*, Norway, Holland, &c., were raging for Constitutions; but said, "the experiment in Sicily has proved that all people are not qualified to live under them."

A variety of other remarks, but of a similar tendency, were made, and the conversation ended with the conviction of the deputation that Lord Castlereagh could not examine the question on its own merits, because he was fettered by engagements with Austria. Lord Castlereagh may draw his distinction between *protection* and *benefaction*, but he will find that man in this part of the world requires some consideration of his moral dignity; and that the power of existing under the fatherly care of an arbitrary government and finding themselves under the Ægis of aliens, will not content the inhabitants of a country endowed by nature with every qualification for the enjoyment of independence.

His allusion to the Constitutional rage is not applicable. It is not proposed to make an experiment, but to preserve institutions which have prospered.

Last night Dr. Augustus Bozzy arrived from Paris with despatches for Lord William and Lord Exmouth, but not one line for me in answer to my application for discharge. It appears that there is no anxiety to see me in England, but there I must and will go. My position here becomes daily more distressing. I cannot beguile the time by looking indifferent and fettering my thoughts. My emotions are too strong.

This morning I sent Charles with despatches to Venice, and I had the pleasure of sending another courier to Genoa, with the tidings of Sir Edward Pellew's elevation to the Peerage. Crowns and coronets seem dropping on the multitude.

30th.—I yesterday went to see the mosaic-work which has been executed in this city under the auspices of the late Government. The picture now copying is Leonardo da Vinci's "Last Supper." The figures as large as, and indeed larger than, life. The price when finished was to be 8000 louis-d'or. This sum has already been appropriated for payment. There was a magnificence in the past order of things which embellished the ills of the connection. What a contrast with the present! Even Prince Eugène, who gave Austria the line of the Mincio and the capital with the facilities which followed for the adoption of the system now established, cannot clear away a few horses and some miserable articles of private property appertaining to him. Delays succeed each other, and the spirit of possession is too strong for generosity, and almost for justice. Before such a Government gave 8000 louis to encourage the arts it would see them perish.

M. Bozzy in the course of the day gave me many interesting particulars of the state of France from his observations *en passage*. He represents the discontent as universal, and the influence of Napoleon as acquiring force rapidly.

By the arrangements that are being made everywhere this reaction will gain strength. In Italy the explosion will with difficulty be prevented; and in Sardinia, by the measures already taken, no sovereign was ever more unpopular than its king.

The whole of Europe is a smothered volcano. If the channels of wisdom, justice, and liberality had been opened, the boiling lixivium would have flowed safely away; but now there is little chance of escaping a furious convulsion more fatal, probably, to thrones than Buonaparte's sword.

Milan at this moment presents a distressing scene. The economical arrangements of Austria suddenly deprive multitudes of employment, and drive into the wide world rash fiery volunteers rendered desperate by the apprehension of future need.

It is a doubt with me, if Government detain my steps much longer, whether I shall be able to pass through France.

Yesterday I went to Monza, the country residence of the late Viceroy, and of the Archduke in former time. Palace and gardens had been new modelled, and a better or more agreeable establishment could not be desired. In the stables were eighty stallions for the improvement of the national breed of horses. Prince Eugène had his own horses in another station, and amongst them I saw two very clever English ones.

In the church of Monza the iron crown was exhibited to me. In the reign of Napoleon only princes and cardinals could see it, and it was not now produced without the presence of the church canons, &c., in their robes, and many other ceremonies. The bell also, according to law, tolled to announce the event to the people. The iron crown proved to be a circle of gold richly studded with precious stones, and in the interior only was a narrow iron band, which however, as reputed to have been one of the nails of the Cross,

was accounted more valuable than all the gems of the world.

I took the crown in my hand, and returned it with the conviction that it would yet encircle the brows of independent sovereigns.

When I was shown the "walking-cane" of Our Lord, I was pained to preserve decorum.

In the town of Monza, although it is the royal residence, a considerable invalid-establishment exists—five hundred men without legs and arms are still there. They have the privilege of going into the park, &c., and I cannot imagine a *séjour* where misfortune would find more consolation.

This morning was devoted to an inspection of the national institution for the encouragement of the ornamental arts and architecture. Five hundred pupils daily assemble, and the whole is conducted on a magnificent and efficient scale. In the picture-gallery are some very fine paintings which escaped the French; and others which were exchanged by them after the period of Vandalism had passed.

The late Government did not create this establishment *ab ovo*, but it inspired energy into it, and extended it to its present amplitude.

A colossal statue in bronze is in one of the apartments, and is a copy of Canova's at Paris. It is to be hoped that the Austrians will be satisfied with a new dedication, and will not require its fusion. I have recommended its presentation to the Empress Marie-Louise.

In the Library I made the acquaintance of M. Heger, a very learned man, who will send, through me, a new work for presentation to the Royal Society.

He has discovered that the inscription on the famous stone at Paris, brought from the Tigris, is an older zodiac than any yet known.

His work on the Babylonian inscriptions we are all familiar with already. Dupuis has in him a proselyte *in essentials*.

During the visits which I have made to search out works of merit and men of talent Boissy has most engaged my attention as a painter, and Jacob as an artist with the crayon-pencil.

Jacob is now employed on two drawings for Prince Eugène. The subject of the one is the attack of a lion on the horse of Hippolyte as she is approaching to sacrifice at the altar of Mars. The Amazon's form, as she glides from her horse, is beautiful to the highest degree. The pendant is—the demand of her girdle by Hercules, after slaying her two brothers. She offers her poniard to satisfy the conqueror, while one of the attendants eagerly unloosens the zone to comply with the mandate of the inflexible hero.

The subject is replete with traits suggestive of expression, all of which the artist has skilfully seized.

The nicest eye will scarcely distinguish the crayon from engraving, excepting in the hair, to which the crayon gives more lustre.

I was nevertheless tempted in the morning so much to admire an engraving of Professor Longhi's (the subject—the Wedding of the Blessed Virgin, by Raphael), that I subscribed ten guineas, and I think two years hence I shall be in possession of a work that will rival any ever yet executed.

In examining the pictures in the National Gallery, I was much struck by the representation to life of a

camelopard, or giraffe, in a picture painted by Bellino four hundred years since. The subject — the Market-place of Alexandria in Egypt. I have always been told that since the time of the Romans until the discovery of one some years ago at the Cape of Good Hope, this animal has not been seen in Europe, or on the coast of Africa known to Europeans; but I think Bellino must have had one under his view. Given proportions could not fashion by the painter's hand in such exact accord with nature, if they could suggest a lively image to the painter's mind.

June 7th, Turin.

Until I quitted Milan I continued my course of inspection.

Camolli, the best sculptor after Canova, had completed a bust of Napoleon, the ex-Emperor having given him three sittings—two of them at Paris, seven months since. The misfortune of *the idol* rendered the bust a dangerous possession—at least the person for whom it was designed, holding the highest official appointment, conceived that it might prejudice his interests to retain a memorial which he had ordered from a feeling of homage and which, as a work of art, would still force his admiration.

I was privately told of these particulars, and, taking with me M. Touchez, an Italian gentleman of great taste, and General Kleinau, I went to the house where it was deposited. I had no sooner looked than I became the owner.*

The likeness is perfect. I would say of it—"What

* It is now the property of Admiral Sir Provo Wallis, K.C.B.

a mental power that eye shoots forth! How big imagination moves in its lip! To the dumbness of the feature I could interpret." The bust is larger than life. A laurel crown encircles the brows, and the marble is one of the most beautiful pieces that ever came from Carrara.

It is now being packed up, and I shall send it to Genoa, to be brought home by some British ship of war.

Camolli has entreated me to let him take a bust of myself. I have some thoughts of acquiescing, but I shall leave the marble for the laurel to be worked only after my death, if my life merits the Pantheon.

Yesterday morning I set off for Turin, and, after passing through a fine but uninteresting country, arrived here, accompanied by rain which is this morning pouring in torrents.

Turin is a dull town in the best of times: it has now a most melancholy aspect.

8th.—I was presented to the King this morning. The reception was most gracious. I found him a little brisk man, with more power of conversation and more thought than I expected from reported character. He stated that he was very anxious to get rid of the twenty-seven thousand Austrians, who cost him a million and a-half, at an annual average. He required, he said, only twelve thousand, and these he would not keep longer than necessary. He stated his resolve never to cede any part of Savoy with his own assent; the integrity of that possession being inseparable from the honour of his house.

He hoped to get Genoa, and thought the Milanese would have been an acquisition generally useful. He

declared that he would reduce the taxes, and, according to his anticipations, prosperity and happiness should gladden all his people.

The public expectation is, however, not so ardent. His regulations have occasioned great discontent; and it is truly absurd to exclude all science and experience, civil and military, because they were in action under the previously-existing government.

This army of invalids or peasants has already given to the Austrians a pretext to declare that they cannot commit the charge of the gates of Italy to such defenders, and the King will see his revenue eaten up by foreign protectors.

Count Bubna, one of my old friends, and a very sensible man, is here. His speculations as to the future did not disagree with mine, but we both know that the past has shown the frailty of reasonable calculations, so we do not speculate further.

When relating the occurrences in the neighbourhood of Geneva, he told me that Augereau might have taken him and his whole force if he had chosen. This proves Buonaparte's opinion of Augereau to be correct; but I think that I shall have more ostensible information in a day or two.

We have just received the 'Moniteur' of the 2nd, with the conditions of peace. To my sight the treaty is not of an olive colour. France cannot and will not remain tranquil under the humiliation of such conditions; and certainly Austria and Russia, but particularly the latter power, are aggrandized out of all proportion for the establishment of an equal balance in Europe. I look upon Russia, united with Poland under the new order of things, as mistress of the

Continent. Austria has gained indeed finance and population, but much is beyond her natural line, and will prove a weakness in the moment of need.

The proposed maritime review at Portsmouth may demonstrate our power, but it will not *diminish* the ardour of Russia for *ports navigable through the year!* What war will first commence I do not know, but I shall be much surprised if the cannon does not rattle through Europe again before there is an anniversary of the peace.

The article respecting regal forms of government is curious.

The price paid for Guadaloupe interests curiosity.

Are we to augment our ignominy, and disgrace our army as well as our navy?

Who can think on the accomplishment of this war, recollecting that Kutusow and the British Government have been great instruments in the proceedings, and afterwards consider talent, wisdom, or integrity essentials for the successful conduct of human affairs?

June 17th, Milan.

On the 13th I quitted Turin, after having had a long parting interview with the King and his minister. To that hour the King had no official notice of the cession of any part of his dominions to France! The loss of the Savoy capital was, however, proclaimed to all his subjects by the publication of the treaty of peace.

I found that some of the Turin Cabinet's views were sage and suitable to Italian interests, but I much fear that the Government has returned with too many pre-

judices to secure even the peace of their own territory. Discontent is general and regularly organised.

I reached Milan in something more than twelve hours, which is very rapid travelling, and I had the good fortune to escape the banditti who infest the road, and who rob and murder with savage ferocity. It was the day of celebration of the peace. *Orders* were issued for universal rejoicing.

A few lights glimmered here and there in the windows, and although the theatre was illuminated—which is a beautiful sight calculated to attract any one who has a shilling to lay out for entrance—there were not two hundred persons in the house.

The Marshal and suite were received with a few feeble plaudits, and some marks of disapprobation. I was pained for him, and quite ashamed of myself and my trappings of a feigned satisfaction.

The 'Gazette,' however, announced the next day *rapturous applause and enthusiastic cheers.* The Austrians present will not betray, and all Germany will believe that the Italians are even grateful for the new order of things which removes the cares of a political existence.

This incident has made a deep impression, and proves that there is a public spirit grounded in this country.

Those who would tell truth cannot, or dare not. Thus mankind walks in darkness.

Yesterday, Lady Davy made her entrance with Sir Humphrey. I am doing the last honours which I shall have to perform at Milan.

In the morning I had a long conversation with Melzy, Duke of Lodi. I found him an enlightened

man, full of interesting information, and I left him with a more perfect knowledge of the affairs of Italy than I previously possessed.

23*rd*.—In the midst of my preparations for departure, Milan has become a place for the entertainment of many British guests, to whom I have done all the honours that circumstances would permit.

Sir Humphrey and Lady Davy left us only the day before yesterday. Sir Humphrey's fame assured him great estimation, and Lady Davy gained the good-will of all but the Italian ladies, who did not see with pleasure those attentions which I procured her. In this country woman is foe to woman, and, although she can boast her conquests over the other sex, she does not possess that consideration which we give to the petticoat without reference to the person.

The Marshal went to Turin two days since. I await his return on Saturday, dine with him on Sunday, and then begin my travels; commencing by the Lake of Como, and then taking the route of the Simplon by the Lake Maggiore.

I shall have lost much English gaiety and time that I could have passed more agreeably in the society of friends at home, but still I have not misemployed it here.

My harvest has not yet come. I have now, however, thrown broadcast a fruitful grain, and converted the soil of my banishment into a field that ought to be rich in future produce.

June 30th, Geneva.

On the 26th I quitted Milan, leaving behind me many personal friends, and I hope a good British repu-

tation. I carried with me more than a common interest for the welfare of this hapless country, and I transmit the official record* of my opinions that it may be preserved with my journal.

I first proceeded to Como, and went on the lake to see the fountain which Pliny the younger describes, and which still preserves its properties of ebb and flow. The cause to this day has baffled all inquiry.

I dined with General Pinot, who received me with military honours as well as with cordial hospitality. With difficulty I escaped from the entreaties and fascinations of my hosts, and I returned to Como where I examined the marble church and a new theatre which connects with the stage a spacious arena—thus affording great facility for representations of magnitude, multitude, and distance.

From Como I proceeded to the Lake Maggiore, where I embarked, and visited the Palace Borromeo on the island of that name. This is the *lion* of the lake; in other respects Como is superior. Indeed, Como may be compared with the Canal of the Bosphorus as to imminent mountain scenery.

We disembarked at Faviolo, and there embraced the water-nymphs.

When we reached the Simplon, a woman showed us the ruins occasioned by an avalanche which had buried, a few weeks since, eleven horses, three postilions, and a large family. Two infants only escaped; the curé had taken charge of one, and a peasant woman of the

* Probably the Despatch-book alluded to above, p. 328. This book is in the editor's hands, and may be printed hereafter, in whole or in part, as encouragement is given by the public reception of Sir Robert Wilson's works.—ED.

other. I went to see the latter. The child was so engaging and the artless tale of her protectress was so affectingly told in favour of the orphan—self-interest was so delicately avoided and yet the burden of such benevolence was so apparent—that a miser would have distributed his largess for Providence with a liberal hand.

The view of the Simplon, connecting itself with many collateral considerations, afforded a grand theme for reflection.

In running through the Valais the carriage broke down. A five mile walk and three hours' detention was the extent of the misfortune. At 12 o'clock last night we reached the gates of Geneva. I was refused entrance, and obliged to sleep on the glacis until 5 o'clock, as the carriage cramped my legs. Heaven defend me from a syndic governor and a burgher garrison! I believe, however, that I am the last sufferer. The magistrates, &c., have felt so hurt that they are about to make new regulations.

I found Lady Davy here, and dine with her this day.

July 8th, Basle.

On the 3rd the magistrates sent a deputation to me at Geneva, to apologise for my exclusion from their city. I told them that a military night more or less was no personal consideration; but I recommended, for the common good, that they should make their garrison arrangements more correspondent with general usage.

I passed by Lausanne, Morat, Berne, and Soleure; the country was fine, and the road good; but I was grievously tormented by the contracts at each stage

for horses, there being no posts in Switzerland. I have written to Canning recommending him to exert his influence to establish them, for there are few travellers who have the patience of Job and the prospective age of Methuselah.

At Basle I was welcomed by my *ci-devant* hosts with great cordiality. I profited by my neighbourhood to Huningen to inspect that fortress, and confirm the opinions I entertained at the siege. The enemy held the Bavarians as cheap as I did, and certainly their attack on this fortress is a monument of their incapacity.

Last night I left Basle. I do not note the military observations I made on my route, as they are on record in my official journal.

I called, at Strasburg, on Marshal Kellermann, who invited me to dine. From thence I went to see the cathedral, and commanded from its spire an interesting and luxuriant view. We then proceeded to the tomb of Marshal Saxe, in another church. It is conceived with genius, and skilfully executed. The sculptor has justly made the intrepid *maintien* of the hero as he steps down to his grave the principal feature of his allegory. Life is secondary to honour and duty in great men. They wish to live to attain their objects, but they despise the impediments that death itself opposes to their progress. The coffin, &c., is shown in a vault underneath the tomb.

"'Tis all thou art, and all the great shall be."

July 9th, Bruchsal.

I dined with Marshal Kellermann. General Merlin was one of the guests. The conversation embraced

every interesting topic. There, as everywhere, I found Napoleon regretted by some, and the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees the cry of all. The language at Strasburg has indeed been so licentious that very strong public orders have been issued on the subject. The Austrians also seem to have offended the French more than any other of the Allies.

The project of dismemberment seems to have originated in their Cabinet, and Kellermann told me that when the Emperor Francis required Alsace in the Council of Sovereigns, Alexander started up, and said to the King of France, "Brother, hold firm, and I will know when to stop my armies."

This protection of France, and the demand of Cracow, &c., by Russia, occasioned the coolness which exists between the Austrians and the Russians; for Francis believed that the Emperor Alexander would not require an inch of territory as an indemnity. General Wickern, the Austrian resident at the Russian head-quarters, told me at Strasburg that he had been very severely rebuked by his master at Paris for having repeated this assurance frequently; but as he only stated what the Emperor had said to him, he threw the responsibility of appreciating the value of these assurances on the ministers of the Cabinet.

Wickern had just left Paris to fix the line of demarcation from the mouths of the Var to Ostend, a circuit of 700 leagues. At Paris he had held many conversations with the king, who appeared to him most pacifically disposed; but he greatly apprehended his inability to resist the warlike temper of the army.

It does appear that Russia and France are closely connecting. This alliance is very formidable to Eng-

land as well as to Austria. Austria too late sees her position, and flutters for safety.

The so much applauded peace will, I think, prove a hasty arrangement which has more involved than composed the affairs of Europe.

It is our interest to support Austria; but it is not by giving her Lombardy, with a hostile population and an eccentric position, that we promote her strength.

Some persons may think France incapable of renewing the war; but passions are deaf to interests, and an effort to the Rhine does not involve much expense. The residue of the warlike stores cannot be inconsiderable, if we may judge by the arsenal of Strasburg in which there are 700 field-pieces.

Between Carlsruhe and Bruchsal my axletree broke, but a passing Russian officer took me in his calèche and Charles found place in a cart.

10*th*.—This morning I saw the Emperor. The reception amply repaid me for the visit. The best personal friend could not be more affectionate in his welcome, or more gracious in his references to the past. He took me afterwards by the hand, led me to the Empress, and told her to regard me as his faithful companion of arms.

I dined with the Emperor, the Empress, the Grand Duke and Duchess of Baden, the Queen of Sweden, the Hereditary Prince and Princess of Darmstadt, the young Prince of Sweden, &c., &c. I proposed to go away after dinner, but they insisted on my passing the evening and staying to supper.

In the course of the day, and at repeated times, I had much very much interesting conversation with the Emperor on general politics and England. Some of

his observations were worthy of record in the golden book of philanthropic and philosophical legislators.

His opinion of England was exactly such as I supposed that he would form, and on some subjects in accordance with what I had told him previously; particularly with regard to *certain friends*, for whom he entertains the *highest esteem*, and to whom he has desired me to express his *best regards*. I dare not write in detail what passed, but it is full of curious matter, and would make much sensation if known.

I owe to the Emperor a discretion which shall now entitle me to his confidence, but I am by no means restricted from communicating where equal discretion will regulate.

The Emperor is much surprised at our store of female beauty. He says, out of four women three are handsome and the fourth good-looking. He gave me a list of the most powerful magnets; but I shall eke out the names with great economy, and according to circumstances. I will not, however, deprive Miss Bowden of her conquest; although at the same time it is a reproach to my countrymen that she should still be single.

Our dinners, both as to length and quantity of wine drunk, our healths, and our toasts were not characteristics of English hospitality which the Emperor and those who accompanied him to England cite with the greatest satisfaction.

July 14th, Paris.

I left Bruchsal on the night of the 11th, and wished to pass the Rhine and see Landau; but after a journey of thirty miles, a banquet given to the mosquitoes on the

banks of the river, and an hour's roar for boats that never came, we were obliged to cross the country, and gain the road to Kehl. However I met Metternich, and that consoled me.

At Strasburg I called on Kellermann, and received two parting kisses: from thence I proceeded to Nancy, where I accomplished all my promises, and, moreover, made Mr. Sheldon's, Miss Rollo's, and Miss Dufixis' acquaintance.

I am sorry to say that Nancy is very much in decay and greatly hostile to the Bourbons, but the family information which I procured I reserve for the pleasure of personal communication.

I walked up *the noted hill*, and filled my mind with interesting recollections. I was, however, much disappointed at finding no letter at the post-office; and that chagrin discomposed me frequently, for I am naturally anxious to a nervous degree.

From Strasburg to Paris I could only hear sighs for Napoleon or songs in his honour. The very beggars—of whom there are multitudes—asked charity in his name, and it appears that a glass of wine is not drunk along the whole route without wishes for his return. Enmity to the Allies, wounded *amour propre*, the view of desolation, and the want of employment, seem to be the chief moving causes of dissatisfaction to Louis, or, as all call him, the *Gros Papa* and the *allied Bonbon*.

I entered Paris without respect: I shall quit it, I am confident, with contempt.

22*nd*.—I have now been in Paris six days, and I only recognise the city when in front of the Louvre and Tuileries, or in the Museums.

Paris—a name that called into instant life in the imagination all the embellishments and graces of society—exists no longer. The gloom, the *mauvais humeur*, which pervades it, may be ascribed to recent impressions, but the features that mark positive deterioration are of older date. I have not yet, however, satisfied myself whether these changes are likely or not to improve the national character—whether the public mind will direct itself to more solid objects, and substitute principle for fashion.

Much will depend on the tone of the Hall of Deputies six months hence. It is there that the nation will receive its permanent stamp. The feelings are as yet so much alloyed with various conflicting passions that no man can form a true judgment of the standard issues of public wrath.

I have been in the Hall of Deputies during one of the sittings, and I think I perceive a growing spirit of independence, but this has to struggle against formidable impediments, and to clear itself of a variety of regulations and usages which dispose to servility and remove respect from the scene of discussion. I am particularly adverse to silk stockings, embroidered coats, and powdered heads in the Commons as a *sine quâ non* costume: and the different modes of movement from the benches to the tribune are calculated to excite, and do excite, ideas that injure the dignity of the interests under debate.

What can be more unbecoming than to see a member run across the Hall in a passion? or more ludicrous than to find him, in his hurry to ascend the tribune, make a false step, and tumble prostrate? The suffer-

ing of the too-tender foot presents him to the assembly with a distorted countenance and a disturbed mind. The example of the ancients is no valid precedent. Their costumes, usages, &c., were different.

The museums are as they were. The Apollo Belvedere remains the glory.

The Venuses may be models of *beauty*, but they do not express my opinion of it, nor touch my sense of its power.

There is a *dancer*, by Canova, that I prefer. It has more living qualities. "There's language in her eye"—her cheek—her lips. Nay! her *foot* speaks!

It is some days since I was at Malmaison to see this statue, and I still retain the impression of the ancle and the hollowed instep in my mind. Those who have lost a limb imagine that they perceive its sensations. Such is my conception of that statue, and I think I can never lose the stamped idea.

The death of the Empress Josephine deprived me of hospitable reception at Malmaison. She was sensible of services which I had rendered; and to Stewart, Captain Black, and others, expressed herself in such terms as proved that I enjoyed a considerable portion of her *bienveillance*.

The gallery is beautiful, and the grounds could not be better laid out.

At St. Denis I saw the mound which covers the ashes of all the Bourbon sovereigns, except Louis XVI. and Marie Antoinette, with their family. It is but a very small plot of ground!

Napoleon had been repairing the cathedral, and had erected expiatory chapels.

The windows, ornamented with the insignia of the different dynasties, are the finest of their kind, and the whole edifice is magnificent.

In the vault where the Bourbons repose Napoleon had resolved to have his remains deposited. A black stone marks the locale. He has been hurled from his throne, but where he may find his tomb is a question that will suspend interest until it is resolved by time.

Vincennes has acquired interest, additional to that of its recorded history, by the murder of the Duc d'Enghien. It is a fine castle, but a mystery prevails in and about it which makes me believe that the *last* crime has not been committed in it.

The *Court* is not worth seeing, but worthy of observation. Louis XVIII. appears there in shackles from head to foot. He is performing a duty in maintaining his crown, but it is one which renders him rather the object of pity than of envy.

The public amusements are not on a splendid scale, with the exception of the ballet, which is very superior to any I ever saw.

Tivoli Gardens are more rural than our Vauxhall, but not so well illuminated. I proposed going to the great fête given the day before yesterday, but, after three hours' patient confinement in a carriage, we turned about and abandoned the design. Rain and bad arrangements rather than numbers prevented our approach.

Society exists nowhere, and it will be very long before any can be formed: the antagonistic particles are too vigorous. Politics engage attention, but the politicians of broad day are not the springs of action.

The Marshals of France are hourly losing import-

ance in public estimation. The greater part have already rendered themselves objects of suspicion to the army.

The generals, from a variety of motives and interests, are at work to profit by the vacancy which this ill-opinion of the Marshals has occasioned. It is in that class that the discontented now find stimulators, and, when the moment for action arrives, it is from them that the signal will be given.

Should, however, *resurrection* be avoided, war is inevitable. Vengeance points the sword against Austria; pride and interest direct another column to the Rhine. Self-preservation renders the feeling of the public consonant with the views of Government.

The doors of the Temple of Janus were not to be closed by violence against the rights of nations: nor will Lord Castlereagh ever be the minister of peace.

One of the most gratifying incidents I have met with here was encountering General Stokowski, to whom, in a former war, I had been not only a good Samaritan but had afterwards saved him from death; as, being a Prussian subject (under the act of partition) he had, by taking arms against Prussia, forfeited his life.

It is the fashion to say that there is no gratitude in the world, but *I have always found it buoyant in the heart of a brave man.*

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

LETTERS, &c.

No. 1.

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DUKE OF interesting,
SIR ROBERT WILSON.

DEAR WILSON, Gloucester House, 11th December, 1812.

I hasten to return to you my sincere thanks for the very interesting, satisfactory, and obliging letter of the 27th Oct. which I have this day had the pleasure of receiving from you, but by which I learn with regret that at the time you wrote you had only received one letter from your friends in this country since you left England. In my last letter I mentioned to you that I had only left one letter of yours for any time unanswered, which was the one you sent to me from Malta; and my reason for not immediately acknowledging its receipt was, as I stated to you, the uncertainty of your motions after you should arrive in Turkey. Since I last had the satisfaction of addressing you I have only received the letter that is now before me, and for which I seize the earliest opportunity of conveying to you my thanks. I am very sensible of your obliging attention in writing to me so frequently at a time when you have so much to do, and in transmitting me such detailed accounts of what is passing in a part of the world upon which the eyes of Europe are turned.

The fate of Europe must be decided in the North, and of course I must feel most anxious for accounts of the state of affairs in that quarter of the globe. Your last letter is a most gratifying one, and the expectations you hold out are very cheering. Undoubtedly Buonaparte has never been in such a precarious situation, and for a very considerable time the prospect upon the Continent has not been so favourable; but we must not be too sanguine, and we must recollect that everything depends upon the advantage we take of the late events, and not permit the favourable moment to elapse. I trust that success will not be considered as certain, but that we shall look upon what has occurred as a foundation upon which a system may be established, which, if it is properly planned, firmly acted up to, and ably executed, may lead to the restoration of Europe. Buonaparte's great error was remaining at Moscow too long: he should have determined on his retreat as soon as he found that, owing to the destruction of that capital, he could not supply his army whilst he retained that position and that his advance to the capital had not had the effect of intimidating the Emperor into a negotiation for peace. First, the destruction of Moscow; secondly, the movement of the Russian army upon the Kaluga road instead of on the Wladimir road; and thirdly, Buonaparte's remaining so long at Moscow, are the causes of the misfortunes he has experienced. It is a most fortunate circumstance that you are with the Russian army, and I have no doubt that your indefatigable exertions, great zeal, and able advice will prove (and have already proved) of most essential service to the good cause.

I have just seen Mrs. Carleton, who assures me

that Lady Wilson (who is at Brighton) is in *perfect health.* She says that Lady Wilson writes regularly to you and that she has herself sent you several letters.

You mention in your last letter that you hope "I have not been ignorant of your opinions through other channels." I do not understand what you mean, as no person has ever communicated to me any opinion or letter of yours since you went abroad.

Respecting the events that have occurred in the Peninsula since we met, I shall merely say I am satisfied that our opinions do not very widely differ, both in regard to the operations that succeeded the battle of Salamanca and concerning the siege of the castle of Burgos; which would not have held out many days and before which little blood would have been spilt, had we attacked it with *twentyfour*-pounders and mortars, instead of with *three eighteen-pounders*: it cost us, I am very apprehensive, upwards of *two thousand* men, and we were thirty-two days before it. The termination of the campaign is too well known.

I have now to offer to you my best acknowledgments for an extremely fine pair of cymbals that Mr. Fisher yesterday delivered to me, and for a very curious little gold medal that I received through Major-General Dilhousé a short time since.* This little medal of Alexander the Great was given to him by a captain of the navy (whose name I forget), and who desired him to forward it to me. It is a very beautiful coin, and truly interesting. The cymbals are, I think, the finest I ever met with, and will be a very valuable acquisition to my band. In expressing to you my

* See Letter to the Duke of Gloucester, vol. i. p. 124.

thanks, I must assure you how very sensible I feel of your obliging attention to me.

I must request of you to remember me most kindly and particularly to the Prince of Oldenburg, who, I am happy to hear, is in good health. I very much regret your not having an English aide-de-camp, or rather your not having several. You certainly must experience great fatigue and very extraordinary toil; but you have the satisfaction of knowing that you are rendering very essential service to your country and to the good cause.

There is no domestic news. Parliament will adjourn on the 22nd or 23rd: the Commons will meet again on the 2nd of February, and our House on the 3rd.

My best wishes for your health, happiness, and success ever accompany you, and I am, with great regard and esteem,

Dear Wilson,

Ever most sincerely yours,

WILLIAM FREDERICK.

No. 2.

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DUKE OF GLOUCESTER TO SIR ROBERT WILSON.

DEAR WILSON, Bagshot Park, 20th April, 1813.

Your letter of the 30th of January demands my very sincere thanks. This is the only one I have had the pleasure of receiving from you since I had last that of writing to you, and this letter has only reached me very lately. *It is a very extraordinary circumstance that the letters you send to some of your correspondents are not delivered to them till a very considerable time*

after that at which they ought to have arrived in this country. Lord G—— and myself have often made this remark. I have, however, had the satisfaction of hearing regular accounts of you in consequence of your brother having been so good as to transmit to me your journal as he received it, and also to send me two or three letters you have written to him. His obliging attention has afforded me much gratification, as, independently of the interest I must always feel in whatever concerns you, your journal and letters contain so much *exact* information of what passes in the part of the world where you are employed, your statements are so truly military and so very clear, and the opinions you have given have been so uniformly confirmed, that, of course, every account from you is very peculiarly interesting.

Since the peace of Utrecht, no British Government has ever had so completely the fate of Europe at its command as this Government might have had this year; and since the year 1793 there has not been so brilliant a moment for the Continent as the present. The game has been, since November, entirely in our own hands. If it is lost, a very heavy responsibility will attach to Ministers.

Were Lord Grenville and Lord Grey now in the situations which are occupied by Lord Liverpool and Lord Castlereagh, Great Britain would certainly dictate peace to France by the 1st of next January.

The I plan suggested in December was that this country should publish a declaration, stating, in very general terms, that she carried on the war merely for the re-establishment of the balance of power and the security and independence of Europe; that she had

no views but those that were for the general good of the world; and that she would willingly make peace whenever she could do so consistently with her honour and with the interests of Europe. I likewise proposed that one of our ablest negotiators should be sent at that time to Vienna in conjunction with a Russian minister, and that an offer should be made to Austria to mediate a peace; that these ministers should state to her what I recommended to have inserted in the declaration, and offer to acknowledge Buonaparte and his dynasty provided he agreed to what Great Britain and Russia consider reasonable terms; but that they should, at the same time, declare that if he refused our terms he would oblige us to have recourse to Louis XVIII. This proposal to Austria should have been accompanied by an assurance on our part that her interests would be warmly espoused by the Allies and that we should, at a general pacification, be anxious to see her considerably aggrandized and restored to that station she occupied in Europe previously to the French Revolution. I also advised that twenty-five thousand British troops should be left under Lord Wellington in the Peninsula, to which should be attached the Portuguese regulars (officered by British officers), the Portuguese militia, and as many corps as could be raised in Sicily and spared from that island: that force, which ought not to have amounted to less than *one hundred and ten thousand* men, would have been quite sufficient in the present state of the Peninsula (particularly as we are in possession of Badajoz and Ciudad Rodrigo) to have defended Portugal and to have given countenance to the Spaniards. As Lord Wellington has *fifty thousand*

British and Hanoverians under his orders, by this arrangement *twenty-five thousand* would have become disposable; to which I recommended that the whole regular force in the United Kingdom should be attached (which might well have been spared); that the volunteering from the militia should take place in December instead of in April (which would have given *ten thousand* additional men), and that this force, which, I can prove, would have amounted to *fifty thousand* men, and to which the corps, which is raising under Walmoden, should have been added, should be landed under the command of Lord Mornington in the beginning of April, between the mouths of the Ems and the Weser. I strongly urged that Lord Moira should be appointed ambassador extraordinary from the King of Great Britain Elector of Hanover, to the Kings of Sweden and Denmark and to all the German Princes, and advised his having *full powers* given to him.

Now, allow me to ask you, both in a political and a military point of view, what would have been the event if these suggestions had been attended to? By landing between the Weser and the Ems, we should have given our right hand to Holland and our left to the Electorate; we should have been enabled to disperse throughout Germany as many arms as might have been required; we should, in a very short time, have doubled, if not trebled, the force originally landed; we should have been able, from our commanding attitude, to hold a very dignified language to the Powers of Europe, and France would immediately have been obliged to abandon the line of the Elbe, if not of the Main. Of the consequences I leave you to form your own opinion. I will not take up your time by stating

to you the different events that have occurred in this country since I had last the pleasure of writing to you, as the public papers give you such accurate details of everything that passes in England.

I must request of you to present my respects to the Emperor, to assure his Imperial Majesty that I feel very sensible of his kind message, and that I hope he is convinced I often reflect with much satisfaction upon the time I so happily passed in Russia, and as frequently remember with grateful sentiments the many marks of kindness I have experienced from his Imperial Majesty: and I trust he will believe that no one feels a warmer interest in his most brilliant successes than I do, or can be more anxious for his glory than myself. To the Duke of Wurtemberg I must desire you to have the goodness to remember me most particularly, and to convey to him an assurance of my very best wishes always accompanying him.

In everything you say respecting yourself I entirely agree with you, and I perfectly enter into your feelings. I am quite shocked at the treatment you have experienced. It is indeed very bad. But you have, what to your honourable mind must be the greatest of all satisfactions, that of knowing that you have done your duty and served your country with great advantage to her and great credit to yourself.

23rd April.

Thus far had I written when I had the pleasure of receiving your very interesting letter of the 13th of March, which demands my earliest and best acknowledgments. The information contained in it is very important, and I shall lose no time in sending it to

Lord G——. In the opinions you give in it I perfectly coincide with you, but in none more completely than in your just lamentation that England's reputation and interests are not maintained on the Continent.

My best wishes for your health, happiness, and success ever accompany you, and I am always, with the sincerest regard and perfect esteem,

Dear Wilson,

Most truly yours,

W. F.

I wish Mr. Grenville was ambassador to Russia and that Robert Adair had been sent to Vienna. The appointment of Charles Stewart to Berlin is a very good one.

No. 3.

SIR ROBERT WILSON TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DUKE OF GLOUCESTER.

SIR, Schweidnitz, 5th June, 1813.

I have the honour to express, in the first instance, my most grateful acknowledgments to your Royal Highness for the letter which I have received, and to acquaint your Royal Highness that I immediately executed your commands.

The Emperor was very much gratified by your Royal Highness's remembrance, and the interest which it was evident to his Majesty you felt in his success.

I expect a communication from his Majesty on the subject, but the last few days have overwhelmed him with public business.

The Duke of Wurtemberg is at Dantzic, but I have

forwarded your Royal Highness's message, which I am sure will very much flatter him, and be agreeable in every point of view. He is an excellent man and well worthy esteem.

The campaign has been severe but short. A suspension of arms, frequently renewed, has terminated in an armistice of six weeks. The enemy withdrew behind the Katspach river. The posts now occupied by the enemy on this side, including Breslau, are to form a neutral territory. Berlin is to remain Prussian; Hamburg and Lubeck are to belong to the Power which shall be in possession at midnight of the 7th of June. The enemy's fortresses on the Oder and the Vistula are to be provisioned by the Allies every five days. The armistice is to include all the belligerents on the Baltic shore.

These terms are more favourable than could have been expected. It is the first time, I believe, that Buonaparte has ever retired to take a line of demarcation; and in withdrawing from Breslau he gives the Allies, in the case of hostilities, a very probable chance of recovering an epaulement of great importance. The arrangement is a strong proof of a conciliatory disposition. At the same time, he will doubtless profit by the armistice to exercise his military means and especially his cavalry. He will also endeavour to gain advantages in Spain, or, at all events, prevent some of the ills which a general pressure would have occasioned.

The Allies will also improve this opportunity. Russia may produce one hundred thousand men, including militia, during that period. Prussia may organize about thirty thousand landwehr in Silesia and augment her Silesian army, which is now near thirty

thousand strong, by late arrangements, exclusive of Bulow's corps.

The arrival of the Austrian Emperor at Girtschen, and his reported visit to the Imperial head-quarters at Reichenbach, may enable the Allies to judge more clearly of the Austrian policy, but not to influence it for the Emperor comes accompanied by Count Metternich; and should the Emperor pass from thence to his son-in-law's camp, he is not likely to retain the impressions which may have been attempted on passage to Buonaparte's prejudice.

My own humble opinion is, however, that Austria's policy has been from the commencement visible and uniform. She wished to see Russia ejected from Germany, to see her influence weakened by the proof of her inability to afford protection: she wished to see France weakened by battles and casualties of service, that her power might be more reduced and her need for peace be more urgent: she aspired to the erection of her own authority by the prostration of all parties, and she hopes that all rivals—*Continental* rivals—will throw down their arms before her buckler and accept the olive garland which she will entwine, perhaps round the hymeneal altar.

A maritime peace is, I believe, not in contemplation. I have already stated to your Royal Highness that England has not sustained even the little influence she had on the Continent. The present moment needs more than ever the presence and eminent qualities of the most able and vigorous statesman; but where is the man forthcoming, and who is England's champion in this important crisis?

The propriety of the armistice will no doubt excite

great discussion. The numerical inferiority of the Allies was considerable. We certainly could not muster in Silesia more than fifty-five thousand Russians and thirty thousand Prussians; but this total would not yield more than seventy thousand *effectives*, and it must always be remembered that the Russian force is composed of skeleton and not full battalions.

The French army opposed to us is certainly one hundred and thirty thousand strong, appuyed upon fortified lines and in connexion with Poland. The "prima et perpetua mali labies!"

Our communications were difficult, our need for supplies of *all kinds* great, our hopes of Austria's co-operation daily diminished, and our reserves were very distant: the conduct of Sweden was extremely suspicious, and rather menaced than encouraged the Allies.

We had no alternative, in my opinion, but an armistice or a great offensive effort to decide in one day the fate of Prussia and of Poland: this, if unfortunate, might have converted Austria's neutrality into active hostility for the *portage* of our spoil. Spain may be prejudiced by the armistice, but on the whole I think the Continent has benefited.

I much doubt whether the Allies will make any effort for Spain in these negotiations. The Allies suffered Bubna's note, containing the expression "les insurgés d'Espagne," to pass without comment, and so indeed did Lord Cathcart; but if Spain does become a principal feature it will be considered with the view of expelling English influence, unless a new tone is given by new men and new measures.

As the courier is going, I am obliged to finish sooner than I intended, but perhaps not sooner than

is agreeable to my readers, for I am only presenting remarks which will obtrude themselves on every man's thoughts.

The honour so graciously conferred on me by the Emperor will, I am sure, give your Royal Highness pleasure; as it is a proof that, whatever may at any time have been representations at home, my conduct here was not deemed injurious to Russia's interests or those of my own country.

Sir C. Stewart's arrival has greatly improved my position. He is truly a most excellent, gallant gentleman, and is very much liked by the Prussian and Russian courts and camps.

I beg my remembrance, through your Royal Highness, to Lords Grey and Hutchinson to whom I have not time to write; and would not indeed write by this opportunity, as I must avoid *large packets* so that small memoranda may safely arrive.

I await letters from England to regulate my own movements, but, in the interim, I shall endeavour to make the most of time and opportunity.

With grateful respect, I remain
Your Royal Highness's attached servant,
ROBT. WILSON.

No. 4.

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DUKE OF GLOUCESTER TO SIR ROBERT WILSON.

DEAR WILSON, Gloucester House, 6th July, 1813.

I was just sitting down to offer to you an assurance of the sincere gratification I feel at the

Emperor of Russia having conferred upon you such a distinguished mark of his esteem, when I had the pleasure of receiving your very interesting letter of the 5th of June, which demands my best and earliest acknowledgments. I trust I need not say that in everything that concerns you I must always take the warmest interest; and therefore I cannot but feel the truest satisfaction at seeing justice done to your merits by those *with* whom you are employed, when certainly equal justice is not done to you by those *by* whom you are employed. The very flattering and honourable manner in which you were decorated with the military Order of S. George, enhances greatly the value of this badge of honour and adds to the gratification this event has afforded your friends.

Owing to your brother's very obliging attention in communicating to Lord Grey and to myself the different letters he has received from you, we have been regularly informed of everything that has occurred of importance in Germany, as the accounts you send contain the *real* and *true* state of affairs; and, I must add, all your predictions have been verified and your opinions confirmed. I perfectly agree with you in expecting that the armistice will lead to a *Continental peace*, and I do not imagine that Lord Wellington's late victory in Spain will materially affect the negotiations in Germany, or that Great Britain will derive any *permanent* advantage from it. Should France succeed in bringing about a Continental peace, Buonaparte will be able to send such a very considerable force to the Peninsula, that this country will soon lose the advantages arising from any successes we may have obtained there.

Lord Grey is gone to Northumberland, but I have forwarded your letter to him, having previously shown it to Lord Hutchinson who is remarkably well and proposes going to Ireland in the course of a few days.

The Session will close about the 15th or 20th. I have no doubt that you coincide in sentiment with me respecting the Swedish treaty. In my mind it is the most dishonourable, disgraceful, and impolitic treaty that ever was made: it sanctions all the revolutionary and Jacobinical principles of Robespierre and Marat —principles against which we took up arms in 1793, and against which we have been contending for twenty years: and I really know not whether the wickedness or the folly of the treaty is the greater. I hope you no longer feel any bad effects from your wound. My best wishes for your health, happiness, and success ever accompany you, and with the truest regard and esteem,

I am ever, dear Wilson,

Most sincerely yours,

WILLIAM FREDERICK.

I congratulate you upon your promotion.

No. 5.

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DUKE OF GLOUCESTER TO SIR ROBERT WILSON.

DEAR WILSON, Gloucester House, 14th February, 1814.

I feel very much shocked at seeing a letter of yours so long unanswered; but I trust that Lady Wilson and your brother have not only conveyed my sincere thanks to you for it, but have also delivered

all my messages to you, and stated why I have not sooner had the pleasure of offering to you myself my best acknowledgments for the extremely important information you have had the goodness to communicate to me. It has been most gratifying, as well as of great importance, to me to receive such regular and such *exact* accounts of all that has been passing on the Continent. Your opinions have been confirmed; your advice, wherever it has been followed, has proved the best; and the statements you have sent home have given us the *real* and *true* state of what had happened, and of what we might expect.

I am indeed much hurt at the cruel and unjust usage you have experienced from Government: it is not only most unfair towards yourself, but it is injurious to the service and to the good cause. I consider your removal from the head-quarters of the three Sovereigns a most prejudicial circumstance to the interests of this country and of the Allies. If you have not received the commendations of your Government, you have certainly merited them, and the campaigns of 1812 and 1813 will ever be proud ones for you. You have obtained, *most deservedly*, from the three Sovereigns the most flattering, the most gratifying, and, I might say, the most affectionate marks of approbation and esteem, as well as from the commander-in-chief of the Allied armies; and you have gained the goodwill and admiration of all those who have served with you. You have not only distinguished yourself most highly upon every occasion, but you have displayed the greatest zeal in promoting the interests of England and of the good cause. These reflections ought to console you for the ill-treatment you have received

from your Government; and they afford, I assure you, the truest gratification to your friends, amongst whom I trust you ever consider me one of the most sincere. I need not, I am certain, say that in everything that concerns you I must always take the warmest interest, and that I ever rejoice at any event that contributes to your honour or welfare.

In a former letter I mentioned my having strongly recommended that the bulk of our army should have been sent to the North of Europe instead of remaining in the South, when the Spanish and Portuguese troops, supported by a corps of twenty thousand British, would have been fully equal to everything that could be required of an army in that part of the world. Had that advice been followed, Holland and the Low Countries might now have had their independence secured, and the arguments of our negotiator at Chatillon would have carried much greater weight with them, both in regard to the enemy and to our allies.

The present moment is, undoubtedly, a most anxious one, as in *a very short period* the great question must be decided. How truly lamentable it is that at such a time our great statesmen and diplomatists are idle. It is reported that the Emperor of Russia has an intention of coming to this country: if he should put such an intention into execution, you ought to make a point of being in England at the time his Imperial Majesty is here, as I really think it may be of *essential advantage* to you that he should have an opportunity of testifying, in your own country, the friendship he entertains for you; and of stating himself to our Government the interest he takes in your prosperity and his opinion of your services.

The public papers so regularly and fully narrate everything that occurs in this part of the world, that I can send you no news.

Parliament, it is supposed, will not proceed to business before April, when Lord Grey will certainly be in town.

I had the gratification of sitting some time with Lady Wilson the day before yesterday, when I am happy to say that she and all your children were perfectly well.

With the highest esteem and the truest regard,

I am ever, dear Wilson,
Most sincerely yours,
WILLIAM FREDERICK.

No. 6.

(*Private.*)

MR. LISTON TO SIR ROBERT WILSON.

MY DEAR SIR ROBERT, 13th July, 1813.

Your letters by Mr. Macdonald reached me in safety, but did not give me the satisfaction that some former ones have done.

In the first place I am disappointed to observe that you have not any fixed appointment for the present campaign. I regret it on your own account, and I regret it on account of the public, because I conceive your military talents to be such that your opinion and your advice (given with moderation) might be of essential benefit to the common cause.

I am hurt, too, to think of the contrast there must be between the first paragraph of your letter from Berlin ("*Still the car of victory and fortune proceeds with*

the confederate banner flying") and any letter you might begin to-day upon the same subject; for we in this part of the world cannot explain the present *retreat* of the Allies by attributing it, as we did last year, to a preconcerted plan. We are, however, inclined to hope the best, and to think that Austria must ultimately act in favour of the Allies and that she must act with effect.

You do not, I know, expect any news from this quarter. The conduct of the Porte has not varied, and does not appear likely to change: she still adheres to her humdrum neutrality, and declines granting the free navigation of the Black Sea *unconditionally* and *with a good grace* as she ought to do. Indeed, the couriers received by the French Ambassador announcing victory after victory, do not tend to induce the Ottoman ministry to alter their sentiments or their system.

We have late *reports* from Spain of decisive success on the part of Lord Wellington and of the retreat of the whole of the French armies behind the Ebro; but they are hitherto but *reports*, and you will probably have the accounts of the reality of that success, when it takes place, sooner by another channel.

The poor Queen of *Sicily* talks of coming to this city on her way to Vienna; and the Sicilian Government sent a cabinet courier the other day to Count Ludolf, directing him to ask that her Majesty may be allowed to come up to the harbour in the frigate that brings her to the Dardanelles. But no answer has yet been given, and I am afraid that at this "*Imperial High Porte, the refuge of the world and the retreat of the kings of the whole universe*," nothing will be granted

that can possibly be refused. They wish she had taken the nearer road by Salonica!

My principal reason for writing to-day is the arrival of the enclosed letter, sent to my care by Mr. Finch from *off Lisbon*, at which place he tired of the sea and landed. I did not like to see it go without giving you *signe de vie*.

We are all pretty well. Frere and Hamilton have taken a double kiosk on the water at Buiukdereh, where they have principally resided for three or four weeks. Mrs. Liston and I made a short stay at Belgrade in June, but have returned here *for good* to oversee the improvements in the garden.

You would do us all a favour if you would let us hear from you as frequently and fully as propriety will allow; the more so as, since the death of P. Kutusow, M. d'Italinsky does not seem to receive such regular information.

This letter is sent by the *Russian post* now established between this and S. Petersburg. I hope it may reach you.

Be assured of the perfect regard and attachment of

Your most faithful, humble servant,

R. L.

No. 7.

MR. LISTON TO SIR ROBERT WILSON.

DEAR SIR ROBERT, Constantinople, 1st Sept. 1813.

The plague at Malta having rendered the communication through the Mediterranean more difficult and uncertain, I avail myself of such English *travellers* as are going northwards to convey now and then a

despatch to England by the intervention of Lord Cathcart.

One of these, Mr. William Brant, a very good young fellow, may possibly meet with you in the course of his peregrinations; and if so I have provided him with this introduction, because I think you will like to see a person who has seen us lately and can tell you all about us.

We all think and speak much of you, and very much feel the want of your correspondence. I think you might send me a *friendly* letter *of news* now and then, without any harm and with good effect. It need not be signed: it may even be copied by another hand. *I shall find you out.*

The *certain* news of the recommencement of the war, with the co-operation of Austria, reached us only the day before yesterday, so that I cannot say what effect the change of circumstances is likely to have upon the Porte.

Be assured of the perfect attachment of

Your most faithful, humble servant,

R. L.

No. 8.

THE DUKE OF OLDENBURG TO SIR ROBERT WILSON.*

S. Petersburg, 23 Janvier, 1813.

Votre aimable lettre, cher Général, ne m'est parvenue qu'hier, et je m'empresse de vous rendre mes actions de grâce pour cette marque de votre amitié. Oui, bon et cher Général, je viens de faire une perte

* Vol. i., page 261.

terrible. Vous connoissez l'attachement que j'ai voué à celui qui n'est plus, et vous pourrez, par conséquence, facilement vous faire une idée de mes sentiments et de ma douleur. Elevé ensemble, j'avois oublié qu'il étoit mon frère puisqu'il devenoit mon ami; et pas un moment dans notre vie il ne cessa de me donner des preuves de sa bonté et de son amitié. Devenu par des circonstances du moment habitant de ce pays, j'y ai retrouvé une partie de ma satisfaction en l'y trouvant heureux et content; mais le sort m'a privé à cette heure de ce bonheur, et je n'y trouve que des resouvenirs malheureux et désagréables. Il y a des moments où on vit par devoir, mais pas par gout. Peut-être le tems et des circonstances commencées par lui changent les idées, mais je vous avoue, cher Général, d'être comme cela. Tout seul dans ce monde, ce n'est ni une idée consolante ni un sentiment agréable.

Je vous remercie pour les nouvelles que vous me donnez de Fenchaw; ce qui me regarde, j'attend les ordres de l'Empereur. Avec une occasion plus sure je renverrai, cher Général, le livre que vous avez bien voulu me prêter, ainsi que l'autre objet: vû qu'on m'a dit que les couriers ordinaires n'aiment pas se charger de pacquets.

Tout à vous de cœur et d'âme. Mes compliments au Duc, en cas qu'il se trouve avec vous.

Auguste de Holstein Oldenburg.

Mon frère et ma sœur sont bien reconnaissants à votre souvenir.

Vous savez, cher Général, que le S. George est arrivé. L'argent arrivera par une occasion plus sure, mon Général, ou je vous l'apporterai moi-même.

Je vous envoie par cette occasion la somme de quatre mille roubles que j'ai reçu pour vous les remettre. Je n'ai pas trouvé plus-tôt une occasion plus favorable, et ne sachant que je retourne bientôt ou plus tard à l'armée je profite de cette occasion.

Mille pardons que je remette cette envoi, mais il paroît que le porteur n'aime pas se charger d'argent, et il faut que je le remets jusqu'à mon arrivée. Tout à vous de cœur et d'âme.

Pour le Général Sir Robert Wilson, Knight,
à l'armée.

No. 9.

COUNT METTERNICH TO SIR ROBERT WILSON.*

MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL, Töeplitz, 24 Septembre, 1813.

L'Empereur ayant appris que vous avez perdu la Croix de l'Ordre de Marie Thérèse, par l'effet d'une conduite tout aussi brillante que celle qui vous a valu jadis cette distinction, m'a chargé, Monsieur le Général, en ma qualité de Chancelier de l'Ordre, de vous transmettre de nouveau une décoration à laquelle vous acquerez tous les jours de nouveaux titres.

Conservateur de cette belle institution, je suis personnellement interessé à vous porter par des honneurs de votre mérite une marque de valeur sur laquelle ils ne réfléchissent pas moins de lustre qu'ils n'en reçoivent eux-mêmes.

Recevez, Monsieur le Général, je vous prie, les as-

* Vol. ii. page 140.

surances de la considération distinguée avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être,

Monsieur le Général,

Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

LE COMTE DE METTERNICH.

A Monsieur le Chev^r. Wilson,
Général au service de S. M. B^tue

No. 10.

PRINCE CZARTORYSKI TO SIR ROBERT WILSON.

MON CHER GÉNÉRAL, Sudawy, ce 1 Octobre, 1813.

J'écris à Sir Charles Stewart comme il m'en a temoigné le désir, et comme vous l'avez aussi souhaité. Je vous demande de lui rappeller la nécessité d'être bien sur ses gardes, et de ne pas nous compromettre. Comme les lettres que vous m'aviez promises n'arrivoient pas, l'envoye projeté a été fait sans elles, pour ne pas perdre plus de temps. Je conçois bien, cher ami, que vous n'avez pas eu le tems et surtout les moyens de m'écrire. Il vaut mieux en effet de ne pas écrire que de le faire par des voyes qui ne sont pas sures.

Plus j'y pense et plus je me persuade que l'Angleterre doit et peut sans inconvénient s'intéresser au sort de la Pologne. Votre Gouvernement a le droit d'avoir un avis sur tout ce qui se passe sur le continent.

Les Puissances ont si grand besoin de ses secours que je ne présume pas qu'il leur vienne la pensée de lui nier ce droit; et l'Europe est intéressée que l'Angleterre ne le néglige jamais et l'exerce toujours, car son intervention et son influence, essentiellement im-

partiale et libérale, fera seule pencher la balance en faveur de la justice et du bien générale.

D'ailleurs le Duché de Varzovie n'appartient encore à personne, et je ne conçois pas pourquoi la Grande Bretagne seroit la seule exclue de donner sa voix sur cette matière. Je m'afflige beaucoup que mes compatriotes combattent et se font tuer pour Napoléon. On l'a voulu ainsi. On a repoussé cette nation. Le gouvernement Anglois, par contre, connoit surement l'importance de gagner les peuples; il a vu que c'est dans leur attachement qu'il faut chercher une garantie et des ressources pour la cause commune.

Votre tems doit être fort occupé dans une campagne aussi animée, ainsi je me fais scrupule de vous en prendre davantage. J'espère qu'il ne vous est arrivé aucun mal, et je le désire du fond de mon cœur. Lorsque le porteur de cette lettre, qui vous est connu, retournera ici, écrivez moi, cher ami, par lui. Peut-être que Sir Charles voudra aussi me répondre. Veuillez me dire un mot sur la situation des choses, et sur la tournure probable qu'elles vont prendre. Croyez-vous qu'il y ait quelque lueur d'espérance pour nous? Avez-vous lu votre conversation avec l'Empereur d'Autriche? Qu'avons-nous à attendre de ce quartier-là? Je connois vos bons sentimens et votre chaleur pour tout ce qui est juste. Je ne doute donc pas que vous n'ayez agi si la possibilité s'en est présenté. Aidez nous aussi à l'avenir quand vous le pourrez. J'attendrai de vos nouvelles avec la plus vive impatience.

Avez-vous reçu ma lettre de Reichenbach avec un paquet adressé à Monsieur l'Amiral Rischkoff? C'est Monsieur Solly qui s'est chargé de cette commission.

Vous ferez bien, cher ami, de bruler les lettres que je vous écris, car à la guerre les papiers se perdent facilement.

Adieu, mon cher ami. Conservez-moi votre amitié et à mon pays votre intérêt constant. Les sentimens qui nous unissent sont inchangeables et pour la vie.

A. CZARTORYSKI.

No. 11.

SIR ROBERT WILSON TO LORD ABERDEEN.

MY DEAR LORD, Marienburg, 5th Oct., 1813.

Notwithstanding the loss of two shoes and an hour's time to replace them, I reached Commotau before 10 o'clock. Notwithstanding Dresden torrents and the impediments of the fifth element, I gained Marienberg on the same animal at 12 o'clock this day.

It was not a day to exhilarate man or beast; but I was greatly pleased to see the Austrian battalions of Merfeldt's corps pass through Marienberg with as much gaiety as if they had been going to enjoy the solace of a good meal, dry clothes, and shelter, instead of the pains of an eel-bed and the miseries of this merciless season *en plein air*.

The reports which I send you are very interesting, and will put you in possession of the past. I recommend you to find some confidential person whom you can employ as an oral translator; but take care that he is not a *communicative interpreter*, as I assure you the reports are considered very sacred, since much is prospective as well as retrospective.

I am now promised a set *ab origine*, so you will be

able to transmit home an historical précis detail of the operations, which must always be a valuable record.

It is not yet certain whether we shall advance or retreat. There will be movements made to ascertain whether Blucher or the Crown Prince have passed the Elbe or not, and what causes may have influenced any change of intention. If the enemy assume the offensive, Wittgenstein, Maurice Lichtenstein, Kleist, and Kleinau will retire by the left on Hof and regain Bohemia in that direction, with the intent of acting on the rear and right flank of the enemy; while Giulai and Merfeldt fall back on Commotau, to reunite with the Russian reserve and Beningsen's force. If the enemy give way at Dresden, a large corps will be thrown on Baruth, while a central movement is made on Leipzic and Beningsen brings up his right along the Dresden road.

You must remember that we have made an offensive demonstration to assist Blucher and the Crown Prince. Without that aiding movement this army is not strong enough to give battle in Saxony against the enemy's whole force; therefore our progress must be regulated by the proceedings of those for whose service we threaten and with whose co-operation we can only act.

Prince Schwarzenberg's view appears to me most correct, and he has embraced every possible movement than can be made by the enemy or ourselves on the *calcul* and *raisonnement* which I had the good fortune to hear from himself this day.

Although I have lost the horse I purposed to sell you and with it my cloak, I intend to reach Kleinau to-morrow; but Schwarzenberg has expressed a wish

that I should not absent myself much, so I propose to keep in motion to and fro.

There is a letter written to the Emperor Alexander by Toller at Schwarzenberg's request, to express a wish that he would not for a day or two transfer his head-quarters here, for it would be prejudicial to the credit of the Allies if his arrival and retreat should occur within the same hour; the enemy would say that he had baffled a serious design to invade Saxony: whereas as long as the Sovereigns remain at Commotau the operation bears the character of a manœuvre and no more.

If, however, the autocrat will not be restrained, I am sure *Red Breeches* and the Emperor Francis will also vault into the saddle: in which case your Excellency will find yourself *aux avant postes*, and I recommend suitable precautions with great *légèreté* of baggage.

I find that Metternich is really a very sincere admirer of yours. He says you are an English diplomatic nondescript; that there is a frankness, purity, and desire to embrace the general interests in your views which he never met with before. I could not help telling him the condition on which you accepted service, and that *sine quâ non* of truth will, I think—as it ought to do—add more estimation.

I may justly say that you have not only won Metternich but that you are *in possession of the army*. If you wore your red coat I should feel some jealousy.

Having thus noted your triumphs I must make a *mem.* of mine.

Schwarzenberg asked me if there was not a Lord Burghersh coming out, and whether he was a general.

I said he was not in rank but in merit, and that he and his handsome wife are probably now on the road to Vienna from England. He then said—"But I hope this appointment will not remove you from us, since I must ask you to remain and *for you* to remain." I then told him that my wish was in unison with his compliment; that you had approved; but that, having been originally attached to the Russian army, my transfer required the sanction of the British Government: in the interim, however, that I had obtained authority to act with the forces under his immediate command, and that I should manœuvre to keep that post; that Lord Burghersh would probably come out late, and that, with regard to him, we should always make together an amicable arrangement so as to please both parties.

This and some *blushing* phrases having passed, I think you had better some day or another intimate to Metternich the state of things; so that he may know that I am resolved to connect myself again with my *first love*, and thus entertain a just opinion of my affectionate attachment to her honour and interests.

You may also improve my power of doing good by stating that I have been an advocate of the counsels which have hitherto emanated from the Austrian bureaux.

I shall beg of you, my dear Lord, to forward my letters under cover to the Prince Marshal, and to let me know with all expedition when you receive your answer to the letter of the 5th of September, be it yea or nay. If I remain, you will find me a zealous lieutenant in your service; if I withdraw, I hope to be registered as your friend, notwithstanding that the

Whigs and Jacobins enrol me on their lists—*comme on dit hautement même dévant Cæsar Sibericus.*

Very sincerely yours,
ROBERT WILSON.

6th October, 1813, 6 o'clock.

I am just returned *from Chemnitz.* The enemy have crossed in some force the river Flohe between Chemnitz and Freyburg, and obliged the Austrian General Murray to fall back a little towards Augustenberg.

No. 12.

SIR ROBERT WILSON TO LORD ABERDEEN.

MY DEAR LORD, Marienburg, 9th Oct., 1813.

I rode out towards Augustenberg expecting to see the enemy in movement as we had deferred our attack. I was assured that Augustenberg was evacuated, and, although I had my suspicions that the fact was otherwise, I passed on towards Schellenberg which I was warily entering, when, casting one look more on Augustenberg that frowned in rear of my left, I saw a great many men with arms running down the hill but sweeping so as to command completely our retreat. An Austrian officer insisted on the party being *Kayserlicher*; fortunately I did not credit his opinion, and a peasant stimulated our speedy return by assuring us that he had just quitted the French, who were now coming upon us.

As we got back to our own posts, leaving the foe breathless and disappointed, we were very nearly mistaken and shot as Buonapartists. Various posts

prepared their arms, and various hussars stroked their whiskers, spurred their horses, and flourished their sabres in greedy expectation of our heads and purses.

It is now proved that the enemy remained in Augustenberg after its occupation last night, and that Murat at the head of fifty Bacchanals, celebrated in the Schloss his triumph, and that of three thousand good and well-behaved cavalry, supported by eight regiments of infantry who passed the Flohe yesterday.

If, however, he does not quit his Capua, return through his defile, and pass his bridge before to-morrow morning, we shall pluck at his laurels. The Marshal has resolved to beat up his quarters to-morrow, and the rather as we have this day received the news of Blucher's passage of the Elbe. To this hour, however, we know nothing of the movements of the French grand army. It has had time, after the review at Dresden of the 4th, to march to Blucher, and it probably has done so, since, with the exception of a cannonade in the direction of Penig heard this morning, all is quiet on our side. Blucher's despatch rather expresses a doubt of the Crown Prince's word; but, if both corps are united, Buonaparte must rouse himself to action and we shall have a battle royal, which, in my opinion, he has decided while Davoust works upon communications. Buonaparte has not remained patient from feebleness or ignorance. Be assured that we shall find him in sufficient strength to render victory glorious and to maintain his title to the fame of a great captain; so I think him since he has been held at bay, and sorry I am to own his merit at the time when his fortunes seem to be abandoning him.

Looking, however, to the grand result of the strug-

gle, I attach minor interest to the "tug of war" in this quarter. Bavaria engrosses my chief attention. The flag of independence waving on her soil is of more value to Europe than the standard of success planted in every Saxon field, except it be crimsoned with the blood of Europe's fiercest enemy.

The Marshal was again on horseback this day, and rode eight German miles. I wonder how he finds horseflesh and leather to keep pace with his moral activity. I hope I went sufficiently this day to the advance to satisfy *C*———. To-morrow I hope to exceed his orders, and to reach a corps of the enemy.

Ever yours, my dear Lord,

R. W.

[Fragment.]

General Giulai has advanced from Zschopau to sustain him, and, if the enemy does not retire in the night, or if nothing occurs to change the Marshal's intention, we shall move on to-morrow in force to dislodge him, as from the point where he now is he has roads that cut in behind Zschopau and Marienberg. Kleinau is at Chemnitz, and is to fall back on Zwickau and Hof in his retreat, as Marienberg would be impossible. He therefore forms a part of Wittgenstein's army.

The Marshal went with us to Chemnitz this day, and certainly he has not ridden less than *nine German miles*. I had only one horse—the "Turk"—and he astonished all the party.

Yours ever,

R. W.

The Marshal has just received the Bavarian intelligence, which all but concludes this important arrangement.

No. 13.

SIR ROBERT WILSON TO LORD ABERDEEN.

MY DEAR LORD, Chemnitz, 9th October, 1813.

The nets were spread yesterday morning, the sportsmen were in the field and at their posts ere day dawned, but the game was as uncivil as the *Neapolitan boars*, and would not wait to be killed.

Murat, with three thousand horse and as many infantry, had been at Augustenberg and returned the preceding night.

Yesterday evening Wittgenstein's and Kleinau's advanced posts were driven from Frohburg and Penig. This morning Kleinau attacked the enemy on this side of Penig, and drove him from the town. The cannonade was heavy, but the mutual loss did not exceed three hundred. Charles took one dragoon and an infantry man. I went to Penig in discharge of duty and pursuit of fortune, but no opportunity occurred to win the *Collar*.

The enemy were all Poles—about three thousand horse and as many infantry. The rest, under Poniatowsky were stationed at Rochlitz, on which his advanced guard retired.

Wittgenstein has entered Altenberg, and is marching on Borna. Granville is at Frankenburg and Khoring at Freyburg, so that Colloredo may now come from Beningsen's army by that route.

Augereau has reached Leipzic with a large body of cavalry and about nine thousand infantry.

Macdonald has passed to the left bank of the Elbe.

It appears that there have been actions between

Blucher and the enemy and the Crown Prince and the enemy. The prisoners say that the Swedes have been worsted in a great battle; but, as the battle could not have been fought earlier than yesterday, it is not likely that they should know the result.

However, there is, in my belief, little doubt of the fact being as anticipated: for if both were united firmly they had not the means to resist the whole force that has borne upon them.

We remain in échellons from Marienberg to Penig, and the Marshal will not fight a decisive battle. Cæsar, who arrived this day and dined with us, approves.

The enemy has been forced to movement—but a movement of concentration. There is a great difference between that collection of strength and a retreat. He seeks battle. *It has been his plan.* It is not our interest to give it unless events occur which are not yet on the *tableau militaire*, and by which alone counsel can regulate action. But, if the favourable opportunity offers, I think it will not be neglected; and, whatever may be the result, Europe will not then have cause to reproach the grenadiers on whose bayonets her destinies rested. It will be a giant battle.

Adieu, my dear Lord, and believe me ever yours,

R. W.

I give a soirée this evening: tea and punch to the Marshal and all his Generals here. The Emperor has even moved the furniture of my quarters. We need such recreations after the toils and soakings of our days.

No. 14.

SIR ROBERT WILSON TO LORD ABERDEEN.

MY DEAR LORD, Penig, 10th October, 1813.

The Marshal moved his head-quarters here this day. Kleinau occupied with his advanced guard Rochlitz and Frohburg. Wittgenstein detached Pahlen to Borna, and Platow was yesterday at Pegau. General Granville communicates with Rochlitz, General Knoring from Freyburg with Granville; and it is hoped that by this time Count Colloredo has passed to the Freyburg route from General Beningsen, who, it appears, left his cavalry behind in the first instance not proposing to make a serious movement, and who only reached the enemy's ground thirty-six hours after they had marched.

The enemy have left about eight thousand men in Dresden. Buonaparte was himself at Dantzic on the 8th: on which day the Crown Prince had his head-quarters at Radegast and Blucher at Düben.

Murat quitted Frohburg this morning. Augereau reached Leipzic yesterday evening. A most violent cannonade was heard at Penig from the afternoon of yesterday till this forenoon in the direction of Strehlen on the Elbe. This morning a heavy cannonade was also heard about Borna, and this evening it recommenced with ferocity and continued till dark. As Wittgenstein writes word that his posts were attacked at Borna, and even hints at retreat, it is presumed that the enemy has pressed and gained ground at that

point. Altenberg is to be the head-quarters to-morrow if possible—*and it must not be impossible*—for the line of retreat, if retreat should be necessary, must be carried through Altenberg or Zwickau for all the troops which have already passed Chemnitz. "*Vestigia nulla retrorsum*" upon Zschopau.

To-morrow will be a warm day, or I am mistaken, on various points.

Remember, I always said Buonaparte wished us to descend into the plain. A letter of Murat's is intercepted. He writes to his wife:—"I have just taken a thousand prisoners after a fine charge of cavalry near Augustenburg. The Allies, it appears, are leaving their fortresses and descending into the plain. It is what the Emperor has wished for a long time." If the Emperor *wished this* on the 8th, what must he have done before Beningsen came up? before Blucher had passed the Elbe? and, I was going to say, before Bavaria secured our left, and gave us safety in our new direction? but, having been disappointed in the signature of the 4th, I dare not introduce that feature in my *tableau militaire*, although I will still write "*esperanza rationale*" upon the quarter it should occupy.

I recommend you not to be too sanguine as to success to the extent that most people imagine. Be assured that Buonaparte has great means as well as great skill; and, extravagant as it may appear, I would rather be in his position than ours, if the prize is to be won by the party which disappoints the other's supposed immediate scheme of action.

We saw at Dresden how much advantage is to be

derived from fortified posts. Buonaparte will not find less at Leipzic and his Elbe fortresses.

I state this in justice to the Marshal, who, on my honour, I think has conducted his movements hitherto with great ability and who has his army at this moment in hand so as to meet every contingency. What more may come to reward his arrangements ought not to be anticipated as inevitable successes.

We shall not, I am sure, tarnish the military honour of the Allies by any timid measures; but when the moment is fitting—and that moment is perhaps very near—fight a battle that shall astound all audience as well as actors, and its fame shall ring through Europe for many a year. But, if we do not fight, do not you join in an outcry that may be raised, but at least pause till you hear every reason that can be assigned *for* as well as against the chief.

Nor must you, my dear Lord, from what I write suppose that we are not eager to join issue sword in hand. Every spirit in the army from the ruler to the lowest ruled is anxious for combat and snuffs the powdered atmosphere with a greedy appetite for all its elemental qualities.

I have this instant had your note brought in. I return you many thanks for the length as well as the matter. I admire all your sentiments, and agree with all your opinions.

I did not run into danger idly; but, being within the snare, I certainly was fortunate in withdrawing.

It is right for me to acquire information sometimes with some hazard. It has beneficial effects, upon the whole; but you may rely on it that I do not trifle with life or liberty in every petty service. I never

wish to lose the last, and I would not part with the first, except on a suitable occasion.

Adieu, my dear Lord, and believe me,

Very faithfully yours,

ROBERT WILSON.

No. 15.

SIR ROBERT WILSON TO LORD ABERDEEN.

MY DEAR LORD, Altenberg, 11th October, 1813.

I send you copies of the two official reports which I have made to Lord Cathcart, as the best mode of putting you in possession of the present state of our affairs: this is, as I always foresaw, from the want of unity of direction and contiguity of action, very critical.

The retreat of Blucher will oblige the Crown Prince to fall back, if he can. His advance on Merseburg under such circumstances must be a measure of necessity, not of choice. We shall open the route, if possible, by Naumburg, so as to receive him if he really has been thrown off his communications with the Elbe; but I should hope that he was gasconading a little when he spoke to the officers, although, when I look at the map, I see that Düben is too near to Radegast to admit of trifling; and I always remember that Davoust is on the superior line with a force greater than that of Walmoden. If we get through to-morrow well, all will be well: but to-morrow our troops make a flank march, and the next day continue their flank march on Zeitz, where we take position:

if the enemy advances, I suspect that we shall not fight *the* battle before we reach Gera.

I must caution you again against calling us by hard names if we do not annihilate the enemy. Look always at your map when you feel disposed to be very indignant. See where Magdeburg, where Wittenburg, and Torgau are: image forts and fortresses at these points. Think of the Crown Prince and Blucher's mushroom *têtes-du-pont*. Place Leipsic as a grand *place d'armes* in the theatre of operations; and finally, bear in mind that Buonaparte has his masses collected, and that our forces are moving from four distinct points and must return, if retreat be necessary, in the same direction.

Close your hand, and then expand it: this is a just type of Buonaparte's past and future movements. We shall, I am confident, do him much injury; but it is difficult to smash above one hundred and eighty thousand men resting on fortified bulwarks.

We may beat the enemy, but it will not be with his tail turned towards the kennel of France. Stewart, I know, if he read this and preceding letters, would think me a candidate for a Buonaparte dukedom, as the Jacobin trade does not thrive in England: but I am Buonaparte's worst foe in developing the physical force at his command; for, in case of success, I diminish his pretensions to the achievement of reputed impossibilities by the omnipotence of his genius, while I enrich our crown of victory if we do prevail against the superiority of means which, I contend, the enemy possesses.

If there is no fight the enemy's strength will never be admitted; if there is a fight—I mean upon the

great scale, for there must be a multiplicity of combats for many successive days—you will then hear what a hydra force sprouted out for the occasion, which *no one could have before believed.*

If Bavaria would but actually sign, I should have little anxiety as to the events which may occur here; but if she does not, and we commit no fault, we may even lose a battle after the thirteenth without increasing the moral or physical means of Buonaparte to continue the war.

He will buy victory in the field dear; and if the consequences do not extend beyond the occurrences of the day to our prejudice, his country and his army will not like such barren yet bloody laurels.

Schwarzenberg will write, and, I have reason to think, in a way that will be satisfactory to all parties.

As soon as I can approach you I will be with you; but in the interim send my letters, &c., through Schwarzenberg, and thence by the Russians on to C———, who, strange to say after what he told you, said to me yesterday that my reports put him in possession of better information than any received in the Emperor's head-quarters.

I long on my own account for another three weeks to pass, with more impatience than ever I yet felt at the slow progress of time.

Adieu, my dear Lord,

And believe me yours truly,

R. W.

No. 16.

SIR ROBERT WILSON TO LORD ABERDEEN.

MY DEAR LORD, Altenberg, 12th October, 1813.

We may now throw our caps in the air and cheer "Victory!" Bavaria was a pedestal on which the colossus alone could rest. Bavaria has lapsed from the over-pressure, and affords to Europe the most valuable bulwark. Now Switzerland can be solidly linked in the connection of independent nations. She will grapple to the chain if you are satisfied in the first instance with defensive concert. Wurtemberg may be awed—I mean the Court: the people are all ready. Hesse will not await arrangements. Holland will from this moment begin to heave and work, but not act until a later period. If I commanded the Allies I would not attempt to dislodge Buonaparte from the Elbe. On the contrary, I would bring Blucher, &c., across, and form échellons to resist his removal.

But no time should be lost in seizing the Main, &c., for Buonaparte must be calculating on new armies advancing from France to check Bavaria and secure his communications. He could not persevere as he has done without such confidence; and remember, a Frenchman is made a soldier in six weeks.

The acquisition of nations by the progress of opinion, depend upon it, is a more safe and durable warfare against France than the experiment of battle under present circumstances.

The more I see of Buonaparte, the more I calculate his means, so much the more am I convinced that we

shall be wrong in fighting a general battle between the Saal and the Elbe.

Schwarzenberg is right in letting his cannon be heard to-morrow, as the Crown Prince may be in need; but, if the enemy have the pluck and force which I expect to find, we shall do well if we do not suffer more than we gain in the attack.

Schwarzenberg continues to superintend all himself, and keeps his army in the best possible order for all occasions; so that you have nothing to apprehend, but all to hope for that is reasonable, if he can follow his own counsel.

Believe me, my dear Lord, faithfully yours,

R. WILSON.

Schwarzenberg tells me he has written to Metternich, requesting him to make an arrangement with you for my stay at his head-quarters; and that he has told the Count he will make the official application to you, if needed, as he feels the greatest interest in the appointment. You know that I never presumed to stipulate about residence. The whole field was left to your appropriation; but certainly, if the *fullest confidence* can be useful, I possess it in the highest degree.

R. W.

No. 17.

SIR ROBERT WILSON TO LORD ABERDEEN.

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Altenberg, 13th Oct. 1813.

Blucher has this moment advised us that, instead of falling back on the Elbe, he has marched to the

Crown Prince; that he has his head-quarters at Halle, and advanced-guard at Merseberg. The Crown Prince has his head-quarters at Rothenburg, and Walmoden is at Cöthen; Tauenzein is at Dessau. This quite alters the state of affairs. Now we may be one army, acting from a common base; and, as we must recollect that we are a coalition thrown into this position probably more by accident than intention, perhaps it would be expedient to trust the destinies of Europe to the bayonets and *thick heads* of the grenadiers. I am almost decided on that subject.

Count Narbonne, in a letter dated "Torgau, the 5th," thus writes: "L'ennemi compte sur toutes les trahisons du monde, et si vous saviez . . . ." The whole letter, which is addressed to Berthier, is expressive of alarm. I have not time to add more than that

I am ever yours faithfully,

R. W.

Metternich is come: he brings the treaty of alliance between *the Allies.*

No. 18.

SIR ROBERT WILSON TO LORD ABERDEEN.

MY DEAR LORD, Altenberg, 14th October, 1813.

Schwarzenberg could not go out of his chamber this day, as *State* affairs occupied him. He sent me to stop the engagement if not too far *entaméd*, as, in consequence of Golz's arrival from Blucher, an attack was determined upon the day after to-morrow, *totis viribus.* I executed my commission like a winged

Mercury flying to save friends from Pluto's drear domains, when they might live a little longer to enjoy this *Nilous* earth; for certainly it is more like Egypt's alluvium during the inundation than hard-set soil.

I had the pleasure of assisting at several charges, of riding to and fro like a cur baiting a bull. I prepared most manfully on several occasions, but the gregarious disposition of my beast always congregated me with the multitude.

I hope what we saw to-day will be a lesson not to disparage the enemy, or to indulge the false pride of continuing bad habits rather than correcting them by his example. We were equally brave, but *we* rabbled while *he* never loosened his solidity.

The Crown Prince, I learn from Count Golz Blucher's first aide-de-camp, is on march to pass the Elbe, *malgré* Stewart, &c. Blucher has disobeyed his order to retire with him, and answers, "Abi in malam crucem."

I do not like the man; but still I think he has some reason not to like the risk of his communications. I should, I confess, be loth to place myself between Scylla and Charybdis—between Rusky and Boney—after all I had said and done to one and the other.

I suppose we shall give battle; and I am inclined to yield to the general wish, as I see too many difficulties in the way of the execution of the most cautious and judicious plan — interception from the Rhine; but, in assenting, I do it with the same feeling that made me approve of the battle of Lutzen. Early knowledge, though paid for dearly, may in the end be cheap. If you do not enter into my views—and very probably you cannot do so, as you do not see what I

observe and cannot combine, compare, and deduce as I do from the experience of seventeen campaigns—still, for your own sake, check too sanguine hopes, that disappointment may be less or satisfaction greater.

At all events, my dear Lord, continue your work. Burst the fetters of nations, and remember the time is short. *You will never keep the coalesced armies together so as to open a spring campaign with them.*

Mistake not moonshine for sunshine. "Take the good;" and *when* "the gods provide it." I should not hold this language if we had *one head* and one-third less the number of *hands.*

Believe me, my dear Lord, faithfully yours,

R. W.

We march to-morrow to Pegau — head-quarters before the battle of Lutzen.

No. 19.

SIR ROBERT WILSON TO LORD ABERDEEN.

MY DEAR LORD, Altenberg, 14th October, 1813.

Yesterday's was a foolish exhibition and a detrimental movement *sous plusieurs rapports.* This day the Marshal goes, and I hope we shall not pass the time so unprofitably. Buonaparte, with about eighty thousand men is turning, in the direction of Wittenburg and Dessau, the left of the Crown Prince. I think he will keep manœuvring on this side the Elbe; and if he proposes anything on the other bank he will leave the operation to Davoust; but many are of opinion that he will *turn* through Wittenburg and *back* by Magdeburg.

It appears to me impossible, strong as his *rest* is on Leipsic, that he should remove for eight or ten days from its neighbourhood. It is a curious epoch. *He who makes the first fault loses.*

Yours faithfully,

R. W.

It is hard work for men and beasts: never less than eight German miles daily; sometimes ten; and in such roads in such weather!

The Emperor Alexander sent to remind Schwarzenberg that "*this was an unlucky day!*"

MY DEAR LORD, 10 o'clock.

Buonaparte passed some troops at Wittenburg. Tauenzein, who had been left to cover the bridges on the right bank of the Elbe, fired them, and thus has prevented the execution of the Prince's intention to repass.

From what I heard drop from Golz yesterday, I suspected this design, but I am not so sure of the good effect. A reluctant co-operation and an angry army are not good allies. However, I hope the god of Russia is booted and in the field.* Buonaparte is at Taucha—his right at Dessau. The Russians now say they might have *écraséd* the enemy yesterday. Wittgenstein has even written in that style, and has had a severe reproof: most deservedly, for such ground as

* An allusion to a caricature popular in Russia in a former war. The Guardian Deity is represented as rousing himself from slumber, and inquiring, "Who commands my Russian armies?" "*Suwarrow*," is the reply. "Oh! then I may sleep on." Awaking again after a time, he asks once more, "Who commands my Russian armies?" "Kutusow," is now the answer. Rising in alarm, with vehemence—"Then bring me my boots!"—ED.

they held had rather the disadvantage than the advantage, and never could have *entaméd* the enemy, whose retreat on Leipsic was assured.

I rather think we should have been very much beaten as we approached the main body.

Yours ever,

R. W.

No. 20.

SIR ROBERT WILSON TO LORD ABERDEEN.

MY DEAR LORD, Pegau, 15th October, 1813.

To-morrow it appears that we are to try the fate of battle; and if we did not attack, the enemy probably would, so that battle is almost inevitable.

I have never been an advocate for the enterprise. The passage of the Elbe by the Crown Prince and Blucher, and the support of Beningsen, relieved my fears of a flank attack in march upon Leipsic; but still Leipsic itself is such a rest for Buonaparte's army, that I consider him as more advantageously posted than ourselves. Perhaps I estimate his numbers too highly, but I calculate that he will muster in the field one hundred and eighty thousand men against us. If I commanded I would have forborne from action, but opposed *barrières d'ailes* to his communications with France, and profited still more by the good disposition which prevails in Germany; so as to have awed all reluctant governments and armed all friendly people in the line between the Saal and the Rhine. Buonaparte must have then submitted to our terms. Submitting to them, France would herself in six months have given him the *coup de grace*. This plan would

not have been agreeable to the grenadier politicians or warriors, but it would have assured Fabian success and Fabian glory. We are now to attack the enemy concentrated on one point, while we extend over a semicircle of not less than fifteen German miles from Cöthen to Naunhof.

If I were Buonaparte, and there can be no other mode of argument, I would keep turning the Crown Prince's left; and, as I threw him upon Blucher, dart out of Leipsic with a force sufficient to prevent Blucher's movement by the right that he might unite with the Austrian left at Lutzen. If I succeeded in this operation, I should establish my communications with Magdeburg and Wezel, and force Blucher and the Crown Prince into my own country without the means of obtaining supplies of ammunition, &c. If I failed in the whole, I could secure at all events my junction with the troops at Bernberg, and consequently my connection with Magdeburg. To resist the Austrian attack on my screen, I would oppose fifty thousand men out of my one hundred and eighty thousand; which would be sufficient, with the nature of the country, to procure me all the time I needed. I will endeavour to explain this theory by a few outlines.


River Saal.
Line of attack against the Prince and Schwarzenberg.
LEIPSIC.
Column rallying to prevent Blucher's junction with the Allies.
Line opposed to the Austrians and Prussians.
River Elbe.

I place little confidence in the Crown Prince's efforts to-morrow, beyond the attempt to re-establish his

communications; but *en tout cas* he will not, I think, expose his Swedes to any sanguinary conflict; he would rather run for it, and if he cannot run, treat. I have read a letter from General Vincent on the subject of the destruction of the bridges, &c. By that statement the Crown Prince is furious against those who advised him to pass the Elbe, and thus neglect the principles of war; but he never sticks like a chief determined to make his efforts equal to the need. He never recollects the *una salus* which often gives victory to the conquered.

However, before you receive this the crisis will be nearly passed. To-morrow morning—not on my own account, but on Europe's account—I shall certainly say, "Would it were night, and all were well!"

The *fainéans* are all worrying the poor Prince out of his life, and would, if it were possible, have long since destroyed his temper. Radetsky and others are quite distracted with the selfish, visionary, and counter projéts of certain persons. If there be success with such impediments, we may well say, "Not unto us, O Lord—not unto us, but unto Thee be ascribed all victory."

Adieu, my dear Lord.

Believe me yours most faithfully,

R. W.

No. 21.

SIR ROBERT WILSON TO LORD ABERDEEN.

MY DEAR LORD, Rotha, 17th October, 1813.

We have had a severe combat on all the points of attack, but the cavalry and artillery had the prin-

cipal share. In all the service I have seen, I never was witness to such gallant charges among masses of infantry and against the enemy's cavalry as I saw yesterday executed by the Austrians supporting the right of Kleist's corps. In other parts of the field the enemy's cavalry obtained a temporary advantage, but it was soon recovered.

The Austrians, Prussians, and Russians emulated each other; but the enemy had a position which, in some parts, could not be approached from the impossibility of throwing bridges, and which was in all parts covered by an enormous artillery.

Against us—*i.e.* from Giulai's corps at Lindenau to Kleinau's corps at Sacfershein—there could not be less than one hundred and thirty thousand men. Blucher's report of the force opposed to him has not yet been received.

We maintained our ground, notwithstanding that the enemy assumed the offensive. I have not yet been able to collect all the details of success and loss. I only know that Blucher has taken one thousand prisoners and fifteen guns; Bianchi, eight guns; that the enemy's cavalry has suffered more than ours, and that his general loss cannot be less than ours, which I estimate at fifteen thousand men; and probably his exceeded ours by a fourth part.

Merfeldt is seriously wounded and was taken when advancing at the head of his troops to support, as he thought, the Allies; but the corps in movement proved to be the enemy. This is a great misfortune, and the more so after his conspicuous merit on this day.

Radetsky is slightly wounded, but does his duty.

You know his importance, and how rejoiced we all are at his escape from a more serious wound.

Colloredo, with nineteen thousand men, is on march to join us this day from Borna; and we hope Beningsen, with thirty thousand, will be on our right from Golditz before the evening.

We wait under arms, ready to receive or give the attack, as circumstances may require. I will write to you more particularly as soon as I can find time.

Yesterday proved that I have had reason hitherto in estimating the enemy's strength at a much higher number than has been generally allowed; in respecting the advantage of his concentrated position appuyed upon such a rest as Leipsic affords; and in considering the horseshoe line of the Allies, intersected by rivers, defiles, &c., as a great disadvantage.

The worst is that, in future, if we cannot dislodge the enemy, *we* must still remain here until Blucher and the Crown Prince can file behind our left.

Adieu, my dear Lord,

And believe me ever yours,

R. W.

I was with the Austrian cavalry yesterday, and therefore can speak *bonâ fide* to their conduct. I *can* and *must* render the same justice to the Russian hussars of the guard, to the Prussians and Russians in the left wing under Kleist's and Prince Augustus's command. Although taken in flank and rear, and raked by a murderous fire, they still kept their ground to the front until I begged Kleist to throw back his right.

Charles had his horse wounded, but is himself well.

Among the Russians one general was killed and several wounded—amongst them Raeffskoi.

Did I not predict that the enemy would greatly employ their cavalry?

No. 22.

SIR ROBERT WILSON TO LORD ABERDEEN.

MY DEAR LORD, Rotha, 19th Oct. 1813,.3 o'clock A.M.

We moved, as I noticed in the memorandum which I sent you; but Beningsen marched on the right of Kleinau, so we advanced in four grand columns, with Platow on the right and Merfeldt's corps and Giulai's, both much weakened, on our left. Their orders were rather to check than to attack the enemy.

Colloredo's column began the action. The enemy had retired their centre and left, so that the engagement on these points commenced necessarily later.

When the enemy was approached he was rapidly forced back with loss upon Sulkhausen and Probstheyda, where he defended himself the whole day. On his right he even assumed the offensive, and took Delitszch three times, but finally lost it in the fourth attempt. About mid-day General Giulai reported that the enemy were debouching on the Merseburg route with about sixteen thousand infantry and ten thousand* horse, and that he was obliged to make a flank movement on his right, as the enemy had pressed him and thus secured the road. The Prince had originally wished General Blucher to rest himself on the routes of Naumburg and Merseburg, but unfortunately that disposition was not adopted.

* This number is very faint and uncertain in the MS.—ED.

"About two o'clock the Crown Prince communicated at Naundorf through Paunsdorf with Beningsen's right, but the Swedish troops were still in the rear. Beningsen reported at the same time the capture of twenty-five guns by a charge of cavalry, and of two Wurtemberg cavalry regiments which had surrendered to Platow. Shortly afterwards three thousand Saxons, including seven hundred horse, with nineteen guns, passed over to Beningsen under the grape-fire of the enemy, which killed and wounded many of them. The army could make no impression on the enemy's position; but the shells fell into Leipsic, and two burst in the market-place while the King of Saxony and the Royal Family were in a cellar belonging to a merchant residing there.

The loss of the enemy must have been considerable, but ours not less than thirty thousand in the whole, including Beningsen and the Crown Prince. It was chiefly cannonade and musketry engagement. The enemy had fewer guns, but the advantage of strong villages, where his people were under cover.

The events of this day I cannot anticipate. The Emperor of Austria gave Prince Schwarzenberg in the field the Grand Cross of Maria Theresa, which he has deserved, not only for his arrangements yesterday or the grand success of yesterday, but for having preserved the Allied army: since it is now evident even to the most ignorant, that if the movement upon Leipsic had been made without Beningsen, &c., we should have been annihilated.

The Allies fought with great intrepidity, and the enemy merit equal eulogium.

Buonaparte was present, and it is said by the Saxons

that one hundred and fifty thousand men were in the field. The fire quite encircled Leipsic.

Yours faithfully,

R. W.

What I noted yesterday of the disposition to profit by the terms offered is, I believe, very correct; and as the enemy has now the Saal as a temporary position with assured communications, acceptance is a wise measure.

Giulai, supported by Merfeldt's corps, and strengthened by a large body of cavalry, is to flank the enemy moving on Merseburg.

Entre nous—by the Emperor's presence we lost at least five thousand more men than we should otherwise have done. He insisted on the masses being kept for some hours under tirailleur fire from the village of Probstheyda. With this exception the whole arrangement and execution were perfect, presenting the grandest tableau ever contemplated.

Colloredo is wounded, but not seriously.

Latour Maubourg, in the French army, has lost a leg, and various officers of distinction are killed and wounded.

No. 23.

SIR ROBERT WILSON TO LORD ABERDEEN.

MY DEAR LORD, Leipsic,* —, 1813.

We have taken Leipsic by storm. A considerable rear-guard, with much artillery, many ammunition-waggons, great quantity of baggage, &c., fell into our

* Date omitted, probably the 21st October.—ED.

hands. The bulletins will give you the details, perhaps with some exaggeration; but the success must be acknowledged as brilliant and important to a high degree in its most unvarnished report.

We lost but few men, and not many of the enemy perished. More humanity was shown, and order better preserved, than is usual on such occasions. The foe fought gallantly to the last, and if defection and famine had not assisted us, we should have experienced a more difficult victory; although victory has, on the whole, been purchased with great expenditure of life.

I believe I made a wrong calculation in summing up the different returns of our loss on the 19th, as, on referring to the lists, I find that I should not by them have estimated it higher on that day than twenty thousand, so that the two days cost us forty thousand according to them; but you may add five thousand more without fear of excess, for Beningsen tells me that on the 19th he had five thousand killed and wounded instead of two thousand, and I have heard of similar diminutions at other points. Blucher, on the 17th, lost eight thousand men in Yorck's corps alone!

It will be said by some, that Buonaparte has no further means of resistance and that he is annihilated. Do not let these gasconades lead you into error. Depend upon it he has the force and intention to fight again. He has been discomfited and distressed, but not ruined. His communications are now also assured, and at Erfürth he will find the needed supplies; as I am told much has been collecting there for some time, since the route was not safe enough for further transport.

I should think he would first make head on the Saal.

I remained here this day, but to-morrow I rejoin Prince Schwarzenberg. I will then send you all the different reports, as they will by to-morrow be ready. I will also add the effective state of the whole Allied army, with a return of general losses. It is extremely interesting that at this time you should be well informed, so that you may be able to arrive at a correct judgment as to the mutual power of the Allies and the enemy. Above all things attend to *Dantzic*. If you do not obtain that place by convention, so as to secure it for Prussia, you will see it fall into the hands of Russia; and then Russia is not only mistress of old Prussia, the Duchy of Warsaw, and Gallicia, but may pursue all her Hungarian and Baltic plans.

Look at the map: study the value of this post in all its topographical bearings; consider then its political and commercial influence. "*Qui cupit ille facit.*"

I wish very much to see you, to talk on a variety of subjects, but none more particularly than this; since I have long reflected on the danger of Dantzic falling into the Russian arms.

The late military events have not at all changed my opinion as to the delicacy of our connection politically, and the difficulty of its military conduct. Providence has given us success in spite of our distractions: but unless you can secure the command of the army to one chief—unless you can make the war popular to the Russians—unless you can supply the Prussian losses—unless you can render the Crown Prince more efficient—unless you can do many more things so as to render the impossible possible, I give my counsel for peace; believing, as I do, that Switzerland may be

separated from France as a vassal state, and that Mantua may be obtained for Austria. If you neglect the golden opportunity, France will probably show that she may be pressed, but only to rise with elastic bound: if she is prostrated, depend upon it you will have discord, war, and more formidable apprehensions than France ought to inspire when her present proposals are accepted.

I am an anti-Buonapartist and a soldier, but I regard general welfare more than personal passions and interests.

Leipsic is no Capua. Famine is in its streets. Ragged poverty—the last human misery, and carcasses of the slain, offend the eye and corrupt the atmosphere.

As I got into the town among the first, I went up to the King of Saxony and assured protection; at the same time I gave him a company to guard his equipages, &c. He was much affected. The Emperor Francis approved much of what I had done, and feels like a gentleman on the occasion of his *brother's* misfortunes.

I do not like to see Russia take the lead in Germany as she does. "*Red Breeches*" must assert the supremacy. Now, Russia appears to me to be all—"*Ego et Cæsar.*" Why Russian garrisons everywhere? Why Russian commandants?

My only booty was a beautiful mule which I destine for the King, but my hussar has got a horse that I think may suit you and which you shall have if it be good enough.

I had the pleasure of seeing your brother here this day, but I am most impatient to hear of the arrival of

another courier who has despatches for you subsequent to the memorable letter of the 5th; more particularly as Burghersh is *en route*, and I wish the question "To be or not to be" decided before his arrival, lest he should dismiss me as a trespasser on his domain. If "Nay," I shall post to England with all speed, but not before I have taken you by the hand with true amity and acknowledgment.

The Emperor Francis has given another proof of his favour and confidence. On my report of the conduct of the Austrian cavalry, he has conferred the Cross of Maria Theresa on General Nostitz, so that I may vaunt my having been the direct promoter of a substantial act of justice which pleases me more than any success of my own. Let me hear my fate as soon as possible, and believe me, my dear Lord, ever faithfully yours,

R. W.

I go to-morrow to Pegau. St. Cyr has driven Tolstoy from Dresden, and Tolstoy having taken the Töplitz route, if you have any baggage at Chemnitz send it off or draw it nearer to you; but I suspect that Buonaparte has ordered this corps to retire on the right bank of the Elbe.

No. 24.

CAPTAIN CHARLES TO SIR R. WILSON.

MY DEAR SIR ROBERT, Zeitz, 20th October, 1813.

The day before yesterday I sought you everywhere in the field as well as in Leipsic, but not finding you I concluded that you had gone to head-quarters of

Prince Schwarzenberg. I propose following him, so that you need not be alarmed about your horses.

I suppose you are aware of my not having seen Lord Aberdeen, but I met Sir Charles Stewart and took him aside; when I communicated, as from you, the subject with which I was charged, conceiving that your only desire was its getting to England, being of importance. I hesitated some time in making the communication, but hearing that *James* was going immediately from the field charged with the despatches, I ventured to take upon myself the giving it to Sir Charles. I kept the original in pencil, and signed the copy with your name. I hope this will meet your approbation, but I have some fears of its not doing so.

I remain, my dear General,

Yours affectionately,

C. N. Charles.

No. 25.

Sir Robert Wilson to Lord Aberdeen.

My dear Lord, Zeitz, 22nd October, 1813.

To my extreme astonishment I received the accompanying letter from Charles on my arrival here. I had despatched him from the field on the 19th with the protocol of Buonaparte's conversation with Merfeldt. I hope Stewart has given you the copy, which will at least convince you that my attention was not wanting, although fate opposed the execution of the intention.

I am much disappointed at Charles's complication of errors—more chagrined indeed than you can be or can

suppose me to be, for you will not know all my reasons for being so until we meet.

I have had much more conversation with Merfeldt subsequently, and I long to see you. Let me know where you are to be found, for you seem lately to have been a wanderer without a fixed destination.

The military intelligence I cannot send you until to-morrow, for I have not yet gained Schwarzenberg; but I must note to you that the Emperor Alexander has had the indelicacy, not to say the rashness, to propose taking from the hands of Schwarzenberg *le baton du commandement.* This Metternich peremptorily told him never could be. When we meet I will give you the detail: it does Metternich much honour.

Your journey to Leipsic will have put you in possession of the martial details, the amount of booty, &c., &c., &c., which has rewarded the efforts of two severe days. I have no intention to check the lists and the general exultation, but, my dear Lord, remember now is the time to grapple and permanently fix fortune. Metternich wants your encouragement. He finds the Emperor Alexander *méfiant*, and he fears to excite jealousy in other quarters. But let not the iron cool: with a little address you may achieve every object short of dethroning Buonaparte, which France may do, but which we should not attempt.

If you doubt our past difficulties and costly efforts, come over and hear the testimony of the Marshal, Radetsky, &c. If you are enthusiastically excited by the *grenadiers*, and think only of marching to Paris, come and discuss the probable future with those who are charged to conduct the operations. I will not say that Buonaparte may not be forced to the Rhine; but

if he only gets there with ten thousand men, he will be stronger than the Allies in the spring; and, as he said himself, Austria will be the only Power against whose existing forces he will have to contend.

The Russian aversion to continuance of the war augments daily, and her means are hourly impaired. Wittgenstein's corps has now not four thousand men under arms. Examine the military and political state of each of the Allies—their views, real interests, force, resources, direction, and *centrifugal* bias; you must then be persuaded that now is the time to profit by the incidental favour of the moment and finish the affair.

The defeat of Tolstoy at Dresden by twelve thousand men is a proof that "all is not gold that glitters," and that *Basquins* * may be men yet not soldiers. "*Non defensoribus istis tempus eget.*" What will the next batch of *rienfaisants* be when the labour of a twelvemonth has produced so infirm a crop?

Believe me, my dear Lord,

Ever faithfully yours,

R. WILSON.

No. 26.

SIR ROBERT WILSON TO LORD ABERDEEN.

MY DEAR LORD, Jena, 23rd October, 1813.

I am just arrived here, and the Marshal has but this moment returned from Naumburg. The enemy attempted yesterday to destroy the bridge of Gotha, but did not succeed. His column did not pass through Naumburg, but at the confluence of the Unstrut and the Saal. It is said that twenty thousand men were

* Tricksters: probably *coined* from *basque*—legerdemain.—ED.

detached this day on the road to Erfürth, and that sixty thousand remain at Eichsberg and Auerstadt in *good order*.

It was intended to march the corps of Giulai, Merfeldt, and Colloredo to-morrow on Weimar, but the guns are fixed in the deep clayey soil of the desperate defile between this and Eisenberg, so that the movement will scarcely be practicable, and at all events would be very hazardous.

Kleist, Wittgenstein, and Barclay were on the route of Buttelstadt; the Prince Royal *ad conservandum* on Halle; Blucher *ad libitum* upon the Lutzen road; and Beningsen *ad sectandum* with his column.

Kleinau has marched on Altenberg, with General Knoring and his cavalry, to secure that communication, menaced by St. Cyr after the defeat of General Tolstoy. St. Cyr, in an intercepted despatch, pretends to have taken eighteen cannon.

Cassel was abandoned two days after General Tchernigow entered and invited the people to insurrection. Several distinguished persons have been victims to this *criminal* flippancy. Kellerman, who was on march to Cassel, took the route towards Erfürth.

The Senate has levied a conscription of two hundred and eighty thousand men. I send you the decree.

I am assured that the accurate return of prisoners made at Leipsic amounts to thirty-four thousand, of which twenty-three thousand were sick and wounded, and part of the rest those troops who quitted the enemy's standard.

The Prince Marshal has stated to me that his loss —*i. e.* the Austrian loss—in the operations before

Lëipsic amounts to thirty thousand men. The chief surgeon of the Russian army, Dr. Wiley, has received his surgeons' reports, by which it appears that fifteen thousand Russians and Prussians belonging to *our army* were dressed by them in three days.

The Emperor Alexander has asked that the person of the King of Saxony may be in charge of Russia. I hope that the Emperor Francis sees the tendency of that request. You must remember what I have often told you was the Russian policy *quoad* Saxony, and from what motives.

It is time to come to an understanding on all these matters. It is necessary that you should support the interests, the influence, and the honour of the "*Red Breeches.*"

Pray read and pass the accompanying note to the grenadier Sir Charles.

Adieu, my dear Lord, &c., &c.,

R. W.

To-morrow will be a day of discovery.

See Merfeldt, and talk to him. He has the confidence of the Emperor, sees much, and speaks honestly.

October 24th.

The report of this morning is, that the enemy yesterday only fired muskets against cannon at Auerstadt; so it is presumed that they were retreating; and we move this evening to Weimar, or to-morrow morning at all events. Pray get in here early.

Jena, 24th October, 6 o'clock.

The enemy have left Auerstadt, taking the route of Buttelstadt. In this march they have blown up three

hundred ammunition-waggons and abandoned fifteen guns. Several hundred prisoners were made in the course of yesterday and this day. The enemy's advanced-guard is supposed to have reached Erfürth about this time. Blucher is at Somerda.

R. W.

The Marshal has requested Metternich to come on to Weimar to-morrow. Pray do the same.

No. 27.

Sir Robert Wilson to Lord Aberdeen.

My dear Lord, Weimar, 24th October, 1813.

We arrived here this day. Since yesterday I have had much conversation with Schwarzenberg and others. All concur in the desire of peace at once if good terms can be procured. Every moment something occurs to render the need more urgent and the desire more vehement. When we meet I can enter into more particulars.

St. Cyr has marched on Torgau; thence he will connect with Davoust, and, I think, endeavour to withdraw the garrisons on the Oder. At all events, the force which the enemy can collect on the lower Elbe will menace Berlin, awe Denmark, and intersect the Crown Prince's communications. There is not a more strategical point in Germany for doing mischief and obliging a great detachment of force. Already Beningsen is ordered back to the Elbe, and the Crown Prince will certainly follow. We shall, however, get up Kleinau.

The Emperor Alexander insists on having Dresden

as his *place d'armes*, and had the hardiness to propose that the garrison of Theresienstadt should form the siege of Torgau, while his troops reposed quietly in Dresden.

This Prince Schwarzenberg peremptorily refused.

The enemy made a movement this day in front of Erfürth with eight thousand horse, but his baggage is filing to Gotha. It is thought that he will be reinforced where he is by about fifteen thousand fresh troops. If he starts we shall take to the left, and move on Frankfort by Meiningen; but his departure at least for several days, is, in my opinion, very doubtful.

The Russians have not pressed his rear-guard at all, and his mass has gained Erfürth in *very good order: rely on my intelligence* on this subject.

Many people may blame Schwarzenberg if St. Cyr gets to Magdeburg and does us mischief *en route*; but the fault is not *his*. He entreated that Beningsen might be sent upon the shortest line towards Torgau instead of passing through Leipsic; but his request was refused.

Come to us. Let me know my own fate.

And believe me ever faithfully yours,

R. W.

Suchet claims another success in Spain against Bentinck, with the capture of four guns and the loss of three thousand five hundred men. Certain it is that we have abandoned ground; but, although repulsed, according to the enemy's own report have gained military credit for a very gallant resistance.

The five hundred Wurtemberg troops taken will

not join us, as they have orders from the King to temporise and declare for neither party.

No. 28.

SIR ROBERT WILSON TO LORD ABERDEEN.

MY DEAR LORD, Weimar, 25th October, 1813.

I am afraid we are destined never to meet. I do not arrive an hour when Cathcart urges me to be gone again. I have, however, told him this day that I thought I had given him sufficient proofs of my activity, zeal and information, to render his continual stimulants unnecessary; and I then added, that if I was not definitively attached to the Austrian army I would go to England, since I could not see Lord Burghersh charged with an ostensible appointment, and myself kept entirely in the background.

I had written so far when I received your letter. I believe it to be for the good of the service that I should be at Schwarzenberg's head-quarters. I am sure no one but myself now could supply you with the intelligence which the present important crisis renders it most desirable that you should have as events arise. No person can fix himself in my saddle and possess the entire confidence which I have acquired with all; but, at the same time, do not let me cause you any inconvenience on my account.

I have made up my mind to the alternative, and shall withdraw retaining towards yourself the most grateful recollections.

I *know* that the Emperor will add his request to the Marshal's, if that is necessary. From what passed between him and me this day, I am sure of it; and,

indeed, he told the Duchess of Weimar that by attachment I had come to him and he would take care to keep me. On that subject there is no difficulty. I will, however, speak to Metternich in the morning. Schwarzenberg has already written to request his application to you, and will write himself. I hope you will get here before Metternich starts again. I am anxious that you should have these documents whatever be the issue. They will justify your application and good-will.

I cannot tell you how much chagrined I am at Charles's mistake.

Metternich is very anxious that you should be inseparably with him. It is now highly necessary.

Every day there is further discordant incident; but the Emperor has insisted on the Saxon contingent being restored to him in a very peremptory and manly manner.

A Captain Hesse, who was with Bubna at Dresden, is to go to-morrow with an answer to Berthier, who proposed an exchange of prisoners. Austria agrees to five thousand and to give Regnier and another general for Merfeldt. This is the ostensible mission; but the real one is to *commence an intercourse upon the conversation with Merfeldt.* Metternich will tell you all this, for he wishes to be candid with you and to let you know all if you keep close to him.

I think the enemy will not easily let us work him out of Erfürth, although the Bavarians have made a forced march on Magdeburg where they were to arrive this day. This will greatly distress him. The Bavarian force is fifty-one thousand, of which twenty-four thousand are Austrian. The march is excessive.

I am assured that they went forty German miles in six days.

I will stay till the last moment. We move on

Yours ever,

R. W.

No. 29.

SIR ROBERT WILSON TO LORD ABERDEEN.

MY DEAR LORD, Gotha, 27th October, 1813.

Pray come over to us to-morrow. The Emperor is to be at our head-quarters, so you will be at your post.

Radetsky is now drawing out the plan of operations, &c., for the winter service, and making his *calcul* for the need of the spring. He requires Austria to give one hundred and eighty thousand men to be placed on the Rhine with one hundred and twenty thousand which he hopes Germany will provide.

He then demands one hundred thousand Prussians and fifty thousand Russians for the operations against the enemy's corps on the lower Elbe, and expects to have fifty thousand Russians in reserve.

Austria and Prussia can supply the required force. I doubt the produce of the German contingents; but, at all events, a good proportion may be obtained if you Ministers do not revolt the petty states by premature vengeance and partitioning.

Schwarzenberg thanked me again and again for having given him yesterday the opportunity of talking with you; and I am sure he would use all his influence to give you the double responsibility, for he

reposes unbounded confidence in your integrity and political views.

Have you got Metternich's letter, and does it contain *Unzer Franz's* request? I assure you, if it were not for your neighbourhood and the attachment I bear to and experience from the individuals forming the head-quarters here, I should prefer Italy as a theatre, for official consideration, important personal conduct of affairs, and reasonable objects of ambition.

If Burghersh has the speculative eye and forereaching thought that I have, he will not wish for the appointment here; where, with his rank, whatever be his merits, he must play a minor character.

He would keep his advantages in Italy and reap the harvest. It would be soon found too valuable for me, and I should only be preparing the field for some favourite who would be named Lord of the manor.

Do not call this Jacobinism; but think whether I have not a right to feel this sentiment after what passed in Portugal with my legion* and what has occurred here.

I have attained wisdom sufficient to seek no service which may subject me to invidious notice and consequent humiliation; but under your eye and with your aid I can do my business very well, speak honestly, act gallantly, and be very willing to continue no longer than you are my chief in a station which derived its original value from your auspices.

Should, however, the fates ordain that I pass the channel before you—*their* channel is not yet the matter in question—I shall be happy to execute your

* This history shall be recorded hereafter.—ED.

orders, and show always with what allegiance I am yours,

ROBERT WILSON.

This is a good city. The reigning Prince looks mad and dresses like the oddities in his galleries, but in talk is a sensible and shrewd person.

The Duchess is a *bonny lass*, and a young Princess a ripening beauty.

No. 30.

SIR ROBERT WILSON TO LORD ABERDEEN.

MY DEAR LORD, Hünfeld, 31st October, 1813.

The enemy have pushed six thousand men ahead of the Bavarian column. Wrede thinks they are not intended to garrison Frankfort, but the têtes-du-pont of Cassel and Mayence.

The enemy's movement upon Wetzlar is still presumed but not ascertained. If he gets behind the Lahn he baffles pursuit for several days; but, whether he turns upon Cassel or Coblentz, he will find very difficult routes.

Hitherto he marches with such expedition that the most advanced of Blucher's advanced-guard is twelve hours behind him.

He has left many dead and dying to track his route hitherto and nauseate the following Court. The Siberian panic renders the hospitals tenantless, which is the cause of this charnel exposition.

On the other hand, the Austrian pursuers gather strength and countenance. Success is a grand physician, disciplinarian, and commissary.

The Emperor of Russia yesterday eagerly expressed his desire for peace, and Wolkonsky, Augerausky, and others, with vehemence urged the necessity to Radetsky.

Radetsky thinks with me that it is most desirable, but also with me that we should be prepared for every event. He therefore urged his plan, which will be adopted.

The passage of the Rhine *this year* is no more thought of by any party; but it is wished that the Crown Prince should go to Holland, and that the operations in Italy should proceed with vigour, while Metternich works up the combustibles in Switzerland for a spring explosion.

The chief topic, however, of discussion yesterday was the lodgment and parade capabilities of Frankfort.

I am told that the King of Saxony is to be re-established if he consents to give some cheese-parings to his neighbours. The re-establishment will have a good effect by preventing a pernicious one.

If you will do a gallant act come on to me upon the 4th prox°.—it is Schwarzenberg's *name day*. General Hack, the Russian attaché here (whom I wish you much to know as he is an excellent fellow), gives the dinner, and will be *aux anges* if you will honour him and so much increase the pleasure of the Prince by your company.

Yours ever faithfully,

R. W.

I am to have the Collar, but I believe not before we reach Frankfort, because it is wished that certain Russian jealousy may not be excited at the instant: so the delay has been explained to me. The dis-

tinction is always so great, so incomparable, that, come when it may, I shall be gratified and grateful; but conscious that I must yet spur my horse in many a field against the adversary before I can truly say—"*Merui.*"

No. 31.

SIR ROBERT WILSON TO LORD ABERDEEN.

MY DEAR LORD, Hünfeld, 1st November, 1813.

I send you minutes of a very important intercepted correspondence. You will see the originals. I think Venice might be carried by a *coup de main.* I know the place well; but there must be a British naval aid.

Wrede, the Prince Marshal thinks, has certainly been obliged to give up the Kinzig altogether; at all events Buonaparte could pass to Frankfort. The loss of Wrede seems to have been very heavy: I hear it estimated at ten thousand. He had not brought up armaments sufficient, which rendered the second day's fight greatly disadvantageous to him.

You will now have another cause to be cautious in believing Buonaparte's army to be a mass without order and strength.

You may also have another reason to respect still more Jacobin opinions.

Kellerman, however, writes that between thirty and forty thousand *fugands* had already repassed the Rhine, and he writes this when he supposes Buonaparte at Erfürth with the main army.

Yours ever faithfully,

R. W.

"You should send a courier to the Adriatic. What became of the rockets for Erfürth, *on me demande journellement.*

I do not enter into the details about Venice and Italy, the state of public spirit, the want of money, &c., to resist operations, because I conceive that the originals will be given to you: but again I must recommend the earliest communication of these details to our officers in those parts. Venice is a certain prize if we assist the attempt.

No. 32.

SIR ROBERT WILSON TO LORD ABERDEEN.

MY DEAR LORD, Fulda, 2nd November, 1813.

You will embrace all the ills of Wrede's mortal wound without having your attention directed to them.

He was the *ame* of the Bavarian alliance and military exertion.

Buonaparte is not yet abandoned by Fortune, and I must confess he does not prove himself unworthy of her martial favours. His efforts have been correspondent with his need.

I cannot estimate his loss: we shall know that best when we reach Frankfort. But the Allies have suffered in officers and men most considerably: "*Sehr empfindlich*" is the expression; it means sensibly as well as largely. The first day certainly cost them ten thousand. We shall take all the enemy's wounded most probably; but I calculate that with thirty or forty thousand "*fugands*," of which Kellerman speaks, who had already reached the Rhine, with his own

corps and General Alix's, he will muster, in his position to cover Cassel and behind the Rhine, about one hundred and ten thousand men.

With that force, a new conscription in great progress of one hundred and twenty thousand, and a reserve of one hundred and sixty thousand—with the corps and garrisons left upon the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula, which still engage large portions of the Allied armies, I do not think we can march to Paris; and therefore I am of the same opinion that I was—that it is best to be content with what we can get by military demonstration and political ability. Let Metternich now take the field; but if the foe will not do what he ought to do—and *must* do for Europe's security—then *we* must with all speed strike our blows in Holland, Italy, and Switzerland. We can do much before the spring in all these quarters. We should, however, know without loss of time what is to be attempted; and therefore I regret not to see Merfeldt *en route*.

You may do Schwarzenberg a great service and a just one by hinting in some confidential conversation with Metternich that now would be the time to repair Schwarzenberg's injured fortunes by the gift of some unappropriated national property recovered from the enemy. Each ally would, I am sure, contribute. They have all given him their highest honours, but a more substantial gift is due. On this principle we reward Wellington; and it is the usual practice of all Governments.

I give you my honour that the Marshal never insinuated a word to me on the subject, nor has he a suspicion of my noticing the matter to you; but I know that his affairs are embarrassed from his Pari-

sian embassy; and I am certain that you, being a man of general justice—a cosmopolite Rhadamanthus—with honourably-acquired influence, may contribute to an object the attainment of which the honour and interests of Austria require. The subject has only to be introduced: it cannot then fail of forcing its own way.

Yours ever faithfully,

R. W.

No. 33.

SIR ROBERT WILSON TO LORD ABERDEEN.

MY DEAR LORD, Schlüchtern, 2nd November, 1813.

I fear the hideous spectacles on the road and the misery of the quarters will disgust you very soon with a campaigning court; but be of good cheer, and anticipate the "*hæc olim meminisse juvabit*" by a comfortable British fireside.

I am in despair. The Prince Marshal tells me that the Emperor proposes to give me the Grand Cross, &c., of Leopold as a higher decoration than the Commander's Cross of Maria Theresa, but "I will none of it." I want no more stars, especially at the expense of sacrificing the envied and enviable Collar. I have told Radetsky so. I prefer the military *liaison* to all others; and, as I give up the *major* for the *minimus*, I trust he will manage it without offence to *Red Breeches* or the Marshal. The Collar assures me military consideration deliberatively and executively *partout*—the Grand Cross of Leopold confers only evidence of Imperial favour, which needs the substantial gradations of the Collar to certify merit. Radetsky, having the Collar, is entitled to the Leopold honours and has re-

ceived them; but I must get the one before the other possesses its real value in my estimation. Radetsky is not in unison with my opinion, but *n'importe*, I adhere to my own. I hope you will attend to what I mentioned in my note this day about the Marshal. A hint from you to Metternich will generate and consolidate the idea. It is a service worthy of him and you. That being done, perhaps some attention will extend to Radetsky, who has, I believe, a soldier's high courage, with a great captain's mind, and an honest man's heart. If I could see these good acts effected, I would sing a pæan.

General Salkowski, a Polish Prince, is here, and will be left for Metternich's inquisition. He tells a curious tale of his departure from the French standard.

He asked Buonaparte's leave. Buonaparte, who had given him the command of the remnant of the Poles not exceeding fifteen hundred men, endeavoured to dissuade him from leaving them, and said Poland was only given to the King of Saxony nominally, but he was always their Duke and would find means to restore their country. On Salkowski's perseverance, Buonaparte collected the Poles and harangued them, first telling Salkowsky he might go. "*Allez donc!* . . . . *Vous êtes indigne de vos compatriotes.*"

Buonaparte, in his harangue to the Poles, told them that he had been betrayed by all the world, from Prince Schwarzenberg to nobody knows who; but that he was still himself, and would show that he was not deteriorated. "*Est-ce que je suis maigri? Croyez-vous —,*" &c. &c. (Quintus Curtius, Tacitus, or Polybius never used such a beautiful apostrophe). "*Suivez-moi. Je vous donnerai la protection.*" "I will assure your for-

tunes." Then turning to Dombrowski, he said, "Vieillard! do you take the command of these brave men. The poltroon Salkowsky is not deserving of it." The Poles who had resolved to leave him were fascinated, and remained to partake his fortunes; and not only that, but remained under the orders of a chief against whose authority they had remonstrated, while the chief they had asked for and obtained was suffered to withdraw without one follower.

Such is the power of a superior mind on the general feebleness of men.

I continue to admire the towering points of character which this foe to humanity displays; but the more I see of him the more I lament that fate does not terminate his aggressive career. Minerva, Mars, and Concord must be vigilant guardians of the Allies.

I think you should get from all the Sovereigns, Princes, &c., of Germany who join the Allies an official order *au plus vite* for all their troops to quit the service of the enemy, and send this order to Lord Wellington. It will have more effect than a mere declaration of the fact without such authority. There may be persons in the French army who will tell the troops too remotely posted for better information that their Sovereigns have *only made peace*, not *joined the Alliance* —that they have only *temporised* to avoid the ills of hostility at this moment—to prevent their countries from being *Steinized* and *Cossacked*.

Where are Congreve's rockets? I am hourly plagued for them, having passed my word. They are also very much wanted at several points.

Faithfully yours,

R. W.

3rd November. Day-dawn—candle-light.

Gelnhausen is, I hear, as bad as this place, and perhaps worse, for it was taken and retaken twice. I therefore recommend your pressing through to Hanau in one day.

Hack's fête is given this day, instead of to-morrow. He has good wit enough to make the most of his banquet and prefer the aid of surrounding famine.

3rd November. After breakfast.

The enemy have gone behind the Nidda river. Frankfort was occupied yesterday by our advance—several thousand prisoners taken, *on dit:* but of all the captures made in pursuit, I have seen no transport returning of able-bodied men; and I fear my friends the Ruskies *Falstaffize* their enemies and *buckramize* their *ghosts.*

Wrede, *on dit*, is not in a hopeless state; but the ball entered his body in a downward direction, as it was fired from a house, and is not yet extracted.

I will send you from Hanau a great project of Radetsky's given in to the Prince last night. It is gigantic; but far from impracticable if we had but one head and all hands united.

No. 34.

Sir Robert Wilson to Lord Aberdeen.

My dear Lord, Gelnhausen, 4th November, 1813.

We press on to Frankfort this day—a judicious march. *Unser Franz* comes in the day after to-morrow, and steals a march on *Sibericus;* a movement, with its collaterals, equally meritorious.

The enemy have taken post behind the Nidda, but I presume only to give time for the *nettoyement* of the route, and a little more order in their passage of the Rhine.

The bulletins up to the 24th of October are very interesting: we read them yesterday. *Much truth*—much mystification—much falsehood: on the whole, however, so unfavourable to himself that the people of England will suppose his condition worse than it really is. Depend upon it, he saves one hundred thousand men of his original army, exclusive of Davoust, &c. Ten days will refix this force in the field, to which you must add Alix's, Kellerman's, &c., and the conscriptions.

We have a giant plan in agitation if the enemy will not yield to our terms; but it is generally supposed that he will do so, and Salkowsky thinks that so it will be *found*.

You are wrong—all wrong—as to the "time enough." *Militarily* we should know as soon as possible: *politically* you should take advantage of first impressions, desponding minds, cold stirrups, naked feet, and Cossack panics. Buonaparte, however, wishes the Cossacks to pass the Rhine and commit some ravages. He said, "that will be worth a million of men to me:" and he draws a just conclusion.

If there be an opportunity to send through France, let me be the courier. I can *probably* make myself very valuable at home, and Schwarzenberg will give me the plan of campaign to carry *in my head*, if hostilities should continue.

Conceive the value of this early information to Lord Wellington, especially as our movements are to be

directed upon a point which will put him almost in direct communication. My passage may be managed by Metternich. I should only need a few hours in London. When the Cabinet had decided I should return—perhaps as importantly charged.

Attend to this suggestion: it is no *fly-away* project. Time—time—time—is the most valuable of all gains.

I shall have my Collar, and not the *pancake* which Nesselrode wore, since the matter can be managed without offending *Unser Franz*, for whom I have Hungarian-Theresan devotion. I am condemned, however, for not preferring the *major*.

I did not send you a saddle-horse, but a "bay mare warranted sound, and to ride or drive, although she has not a *bang tail*." Depend upon my judgment; you have the best bargain you ever had in your life in her and Kovaiski. *Mes gens sont en desespoir* at *his* departure from my stable. He was always *first turn*, and always ready day and night.

I will not quit Frankfort until we meet, unless *glory* summons me like Duncan's knell.

You shall then positively have S.'s letter; he has *pledged* himself to give it to me this day. In addition to other causes of his request, he states "*a twenty years' fellowship.*"

Ever yours, my dear Lord,

R. W

Rockets—Rockets!

No. 35.

Sir Robert Wilson to Lord Aberdeen.

My dear Lord, Basle, 25th December, 1813.

The Prince Marshal is to give me letters, the route of march for horses, &c., the day after to-morrow, when I shall be ready to appear in your presence for the last mournful duties.

I thought it right, however, not to delay acknowledging the receipt of my instructions and communication of my compliance. I therefore send Charles, who will return and acquaint me where you are to be found three days hence; for if you are approaching the Rhine, a very disagreeable *back cast* will be spared me. I expect to find *all arranged* when I arrive.

Three thousand French horse on this side of Colmar have given Scheubler a severe scrubbing. He is himself wounded.

As the enemy seems to be menacing progress from Strasburg, the Marshal does not go to Berne.

Ten thousand Bavarians had been sent to Belfort, but Wrede is now recommended not to detach. I entertain great fears that Wrede will not fight a skilful battle, although he certainly will fight a gallant one. I do not like his dispositions.

The garrison of Huningen is on the *alerte*, and makes partial but successful sallies. In three days the siege is to begin.

I am sorry that you have not been here to judge with your own eyes of the state of *building*, agriculture, men, women, and children, in Alsace.

If all France is like this district, it is not in a state of decay.

I am loth to part, and would wish that the painful sacrifice could be avoided; but as there is no alternative, I am most anxious to be on the wing, and again roosted.

Faithfully yours, my dear Lord,

R. W.

No. 36.

SIR ROBERT WILSON TO LORD ABERDEEN.

MY LORD, Basle, 5th January, 1814.

I cannot refrain from transmitting to your Lordship the copy of a letter which I have received from Prince Schwarzenberg.* The interest which you took in the continuance of my service at the Allied army may not need, but will here find, support on those grounds which induced your Lordship to make a representation in my favour.

I cannot but be flattered by such testimonies; but I must also avow increased pain in withdrawing from an appointment where private friendships contributed to the execution of my duty.

I will not trouble your Lordship again on this subject; but, while I ever feel mortification and regret at the arrangements which removed me from the station I solicited, the recollection of your kindness and approbation will largely augment the gratification which I experience when reflecting on the general good-will which, to the last moment, has been expressed; and

* See Journal, vol. ii. p. 291.—ED.

which augments my ambition to merit its preservation.

I have the honour to be,

&c., &c., &c.,

R. W.

No. 37.

LORD ABERDEEN TO SIR ROBERT WILSON.

SIR, Langres, 2nd February, 1814.

You will see by the enclosed letter, that His Royal Highness the Prince Regent has been graciously pleased to permit you to accept and wear the Commander's Cross of the Order of Maria Theresa, conferred on you by H. I. M. the Emperor of Austria.

I experience great satisfaction in conveying to you the knowledge of this permission; and the honour, rare and valuable as it is, you have nobly merited. It is not easy to possess a title to any higher distinction; yet I feel confident that it will not be long before I have to acknowledge, in common with all who are informed of the real nature of your services, the justice of your claims even to additional honour and reward.

I have, &c.,

ABERDEEN.

No. 38.*

SIR ROBERT WILSON TO LORD CASTLEREAGH.

MY LORD, Villa Franca, 16th March, 1814.

I have the honour to acquaint you that Colonel Cattanelli arrived here this day from *Reggio*, where

* The Despatch, No 41, referred to in Journal, vol. ii. p. 339.—ED.

he left Lord William Bentinck on the morning of yesterday.

His Lordship was still discussing with Marshal Murat the British pretension to the occupation of *Tuscany*, for various reasons which his Lordship will assign in his own official despatches.

Marshal Murat positively refuses acquiescence with the proposition of Lord William Bentinck, asserting that his right to the military possession of that territory is founded on conquest, on capitulation with the enemy, and arrangement with the Allies.

Lord William insists on conformity, and expresses his resolution to make the concession of this point a *sine qua non*.

Marshal Murat has, no doubt, political considerations in view which menace the importance of the Tuscan States, and it is difficult to separate some from military operations in this instance.

The Marshal has only an armistice with England. His military power, as he conceives, is the bulwark of his throne; and it appears that he will not reduce its strength while an English force is lodged on his flank, and, in case of hostility, can intercept the communication with his kingdom.

It is to be hoped, however, that Lord William will not separate without a cordial arrangement.

Misunderstanding must prejudice the immediate interests of the Allies, and may have many mischievous consequences.

His Lordship has made several military propositions.

The first is inadmissible, as it would expose the connection with the Austrian States during the epoch for combined movement of the Austrian and Nea-

politan armies in *Alessandria by the right bank of the Po.*

The second is also exceptionable to the Marshal as hazarding his communications while passing the Po to repass in conjunction with the Neapolitans behind the *Mincio* and the *Oglio.*

The third immediately relates to the employment of his Lordship's own force. His Lordship suggests that Marshal Bellegarde should re-attach to his own army the division Göber, three thousand seven hundred strong, and attach to the British General Nugent in person, with the division Stahremberg, two thousand five hundred strong; that after this disposition of General Nugent's corps the Neapolitans should be left to act by themselves; that, while Marshal Bellegarde pursued his offensive operations, his Lordship would advance on the Riviera de Genoa, and push, if possible, into the heart of Piedmont, where, having the means of distributing arms, he hoped to make a powerful diversion, if not an effectual conquest.

I have constantly assured your Lordship that the Austrian army on the right bank of the Adige was not equal to the prosecution of an offensive operation across the Mincio, unless the Neapolitans afforded vigorous, cordial, and concerted support.

Marshal Murat has accepted the plan submitted by Marshal Bellegarde, and engaged, if possible, to throw his bridges across the Po at *Brescella,* between the *Serchio* and the *Taro,* or, if there should be too great difficulties, to march direct upon Placenza.

The nomination of the day for movement awaited the conference with Lord William.

Had Marshal Murat objected to his proposition,

Marshal Bellegarde could have asked for ten thousand men from the force under Marshal Murat's command to assist in forming the blockade of Mantua on the left bank of the Mincio, while he passed that river with the residue of the army to obtain one of these results—*battle, the retreat of the enemy across the Oglio*, or *the investiture of Mantua, with the enemy's principal army thrown into the place.*

The plan of Lord William restores to the Austrian army but three thousand seven hundred men, and detaches from its immediate sphere of influence two thousand five hundred.

Marshal Bellegarde regards this plan as one which would paralyse his own and the Neapolitan force—supposing the question of Tuscany to be amicably settled—and which would not enable Lord William to pursue successful operations in the Riviera di Genoa with his limited means against the difficulties of country and the force which the enemy possesses in Genoa and Alessandria.

As Lord William declares his inability to co-operate on the Po, I regret to state to your Lordship that, according to present appearances, and, indeed, the actual state of things, the arrival of the British expedition has rather increased the embarrassment of Marshal Bellegarde than promoted his power of action.

In the conference which Colonel Cattanelli has had with the Marshal, his Excellency decisively refuses the proposition of Lord William, and will not detach a man to join his force. In the course of the conversation, his Excellency further expressed his surprise at the colours of one of the battalions (the 3rd) of Lord William's troops bearing the device of "Italian union"

"—"National independence;" and it appears that the proposed proclamation of Lord William, transmitted in manuscript, also displeases, as being at variance with the views of the Allied powers as published under the Marshal's authority and guarantee.

Colonel Cattanelli will return this night to Lord William Bentinck.

The second division of Lord William's force is expected to arrive in about twelve days, which time Lord William states to be necessary for the equipment of his first division.

In consequence of the capture of Lerida and Mequinenza, with the reduction of the enemy's force in Catalonia, Lord William entertains the hope of receiving his Italian troops from thence.

I have communicated to his Lordship the enemy's punishment of the Italians taken in arms, and his Lordship is prepared to adopt such measures as may be expedient for the protection of those who may be captured while acting under his orders.

Marshal Bellegarde expected one or two battalions of free corps from the neighbourhood of Vienna; but the armaments in Bosnia have suspended their march.

I have the honour to be,

&c. &c. &c.,

R. W., Lieut.-Gen.

THE END.

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